Supporting the secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Jun 18, 2007 - [email protected]. Lab. CITI, 21, Avenue J. Capelle. 69621 Vileurbanne Cedex ... their code. ○. Execution environments are often resource-restricted devices .... Untrusted Network. – Trusted Platform Issuer.
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Report
Supporting the secure Deployment of OSGi Bundles

Pierre Parrend, Stéphane Frénot [email protected] Lab. CITI, 21, Avenue J. Capelle 69621 Vileurbanne Cedex

Context ●

The OSGi Platform –

Extensible at runtime ● ●

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A versatile Platform ● ● ●

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Based on Java Components are called 'bundles' IBM Websphere 6.1, JBoss Home Set top Boxes (ADSL Modems), Automotive Media Systems Soon in the Sun JVM ? JSR 277, 291

A new Attack Vector ●

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Seemless install code from the environment

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The problem ●

OSGi Security –

How to make actual code secure ●

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Requires a very pragmatic view ●

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Formal approaches is not relevant Java Developpers usually do not accept to put (too much) constraints on their code Execution environments are often resource-restricted devices

Boom on Functionalities ●

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Need a strong secure environment

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This Work ● ●

Identification of the threats over OSGi Platforms A convenient tool for supporting life-cycle long security in OSGi-based Systems – – – –

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Bundle Signature Publication (Download) Signature Verification – OSGi R4 compliant

Objective – –

Provide tools for OSGi users Provide a Spec-compliant basis to support further research

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Summary ● ●

OSGi Platforms and Threats Secure OSGi Tool Suite – –

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SFelix SF-JarSigner

Comparisons

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OSGi Platforms and Threats ●

Overview of the OSGi Platform

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OSGi Platforms and Threats

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OSGi Platforms and Threats ●

Attack Vector - Execution of Malicious Code

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Summary ● ●

Threats over OSGi Platforms Secure OSGi Tool Suite – –

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SFelix SF-JarSigner

Comparisons

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Secure OSGI Tool Suite ●

Overview

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Secure OSGI Tool Suite ●

Sfelix – –

http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/ Sfelix v0.1 ● ●

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OSGi Release 4 Implementation of the Bundle Signature Validation Process Beware of JVM-only solutions !

Sfelix v0.2 ● ●

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Robust against ill-coded Bundles In a near future – still need to be published

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Secure OSGI Tool Suite ●

Sfelix

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Secure Deployment ●

The SF-JarSigner Tools – –

http://sf-jarsigner.gforge.inria.fr/ The Archive Analysis Panel

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Secure Deployment ●

The SF-JarSigner Tools –

The BundleRepository Management Panel

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Secure Deployment ●

The SF-JarSigner Tools –

The Publication Panel

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Summary ● ●

Threats over OSGi Platforms Secure OSGi Tool Suite – –

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SFelix SF-JarSigner

Comparisons

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Digital Signature Validation ●

Validity Criteria

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Perspectives Secure Deployment ●

Key Management with Identity Based Cryptography

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Perspectives Safe execution ●

What if a Bundle Issuer provides ill-tested Code ? – – –

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The whole system is impacted What are OSGi Weaknesses To be released very soon

What guarantees on OSGi Code ? – – –

Code Validation for better code (e.g. Findbugs) Formal Code Analysis (e.g. PCC) Sandboxing (e.g. Java Permissions)

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Conclusions ●

Current Threat Model for OSGi – – – –

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Untrusted Network Trusted Platform Issuer Trusted Bundle Issuer Trusted Host

Future Threat Model – – – –

Untrusted Network Trusted Platform Issuer Untrusted Bundle Issuer ?? Untrusted Host ??

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Questions ? For more informations Secure Component Deployment in the OSGi(tm) Release 4 Platform , http://www.rzo.free.fr/parrend06deployment.php http://sfelix.gforge.inria.fr/ http://sf-jarsigner.gforge.inria.fr/

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OSGi Signed Bundle

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Signing OSGi Bundles

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OSGi Bundles Signature Verification

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