Is a science of justice possible? Fourier versus Owen Ragip EGE1, Sylvie RIVOT2 Charles Gide’s Days: “Justice and Economics” 16-17 June 2011 - Toulouse (Work in progress)

Introduction Fourier and Owen are considered as theoreticians belonging to the movement of the so-called utopian socialism. What they have in common is the detestation of the modern industrial society, the will to escape the model offered by capitalism, which they judge unfair for the poorest. They both imagine and try to create a society shaped according to the model of an association at a human scale, where everyone knows each other: “phalanx” (phalanstère) for Fourier and “parallelogram” for Owen. In nineteenth century many social reformists are convinced that this model offers the unique condition to prevent the exploitation of the man by the man. In other words “phalanx” and “parallelogram” are conceived by our authors as the promise of a radically new world, the promise of a society where the justice is finally realised. Now, even if they are said to belong to the same school of thought of the socialist reformers, and even they both advocated at the same epoch the implementation of cooperative societies, a closer examine of the two doctrines shows that the concept of justice involved by Fourier’s approach of the society is noticeably different from Owen’s. In this paper, we shall analyse this difference and attempt to appreciate its theoretical implications. Our basic aim is to exhibit the originality and the profoundness of Fourier’s concept of justice regarding to the one of Owen. However, to be fair with Owen, it should be kept in mind that the context in which they construct their respective ‘associationist’ models is sharply different. In fact, Owen is a businessman; he faces a concrete situation. It is possible then for him to try to implement his 1 2

Ragip Ege, BETA-Theme, University of Strasbourg. [email protected]. Sylvie Rivot, GRAICO, University of Mulhouse, [email protected].

2 plans. Owen’s work cannot be restricted to his writings, as he was fully involved in the implementation of new methods of management in his New Lanark factory, and even created himself the community of New Harmony. By contrast, Fourier’s utopia remained more or less on a purely abstract and theoretical level, as he waited for years each Tuesday for a patron who would help him to realise his plans. As the son of a merchant; he used to hate commercial circles. Ironically, he was himself obliged to earn his life as a merchant. He does not aim to improve the actual world, but seeks to build a brand new world. Fourier’s utopia did not go further than plans. In this way, Owen’s views are more pragmatic than Fourier’s, since the former tried to improve the livelihood of labour at his time, and the conditions of children’s life, in a dramatic economic context. Indeed, Owen’s views have been considered more valuable at his time and after, precisely because of their realism. Closely examined, the concept of justice Owen’s doctrine involves is quite expeditious and “scientistic” (to use a French neologism). Owen’s social conception is profoundly paternalistic. In his world, individual happiness will be realised “for him” but not “by him”. In the world of Fourier happiness is seen as the problem of the individual and not of the social scientist. Such a world is much more confident in mankind “because the true happiness consists in satisfying all one’s passions” (Fourier 2006: 86). Thus one can say that Owen harbours a teleological view of society which, in turn, involves a paternalistic conception of justice. By contrast, Fourier’s conception of the society is not teleological and, in this sense, his conception of justice does not involve paternalism. In a way, what Fourier describes is a ‘society of abundance’ (see Van Parijs 1989, 1991), in which it is no more possible to improve the condition in life of anybody, even in worsening the welfare of someone else.

I. The conception of man The basic difference between Owen and Fourier lies in their vision of the nature of man. In Owen’s eyes man is essentially a “plastic” reality. Human nature doesn’t include any innate determination. Man is made of an infinitely malleable stuff. At any moment, thanks to the modification of the conditions within which the individual involves, one can obtain a radically different being cleaned up of all of the determinations and characteristics having resulted from the previous circumstances under which he is involved. Man is both perfectly malleable and perfectly reversible reality. The reformer is entirely free to impress a radically

3 new character on the individual by simply modifying the circumstances of his existence. On the other hand Fourier’s man is an infinite potentiality of passions. Modern alienated society prohibits the free play of human passions. When the “natural order” will be recovered each individual will enjoy the conditions to give free rein to his passions. His character will be not at all the result of external circumstances, but the work of his particular choices regarding his passions, that is to say the work of his liberty.

I.1. Science of the circumstances versus science of the universal attraction Owen’s science, which he calls “Rational System” or “Science of Man”, is entirely based on a unique principle the author considers as the “Copernican revolution of Modern Times”: “That is a law of nature obvious to our senses, that the internal and external character of all that have life upon the earth, is formed for them, and not by them” (Owen 1842-1844: 202). The fundamental concept of this rational system is the concept of “circumstances”: “So true is that ‘man is the creature of the circumstances in which he is placed’” (Owen 18421844:43). “Each individual is so organized, that his feelings and his convictions are formed for him, by the impressions which circumstances produce upon his individual organization” (Owen 1842-1844: 55). The author doesn’t deny, on the contrary, the fact that man is endowed with a set of faculties at birth. But “faculties” don’t mean qualities or character. “The germ of feelings exist at birth, but the direction which that germ shall be made to take, will greatly depend upon the kinds and qualities of the external objects which shall be around the individual from his birth to maturity, and especially in early part of his life” (Owen 18421844: 55) The potentiality these innate faculties represent is actualised through the circumstances within which the individual comes into existence. “Each individual comes into existence within certain external circumstances, which act upon his original organization, more especially during the early period of his life, and by impressing their general character upon him, form his local and national character” (Owen 1842-1844: 43). Therefore one cannot be considered accountable for his character. The unique responsible of what an individual becomes, is the circumstances which impressed upon him the totality of the characteristics of his personality. Owen thinks that all the educational systems, all the educative politics which admit that individuals had to be accountable of their feelings, convictions, habits, preferences, desires, ambitions even opinions and ideas are

4 completely wrong. They ignore the fundamental and true principles of the science of man. These systems and policies in question believe that individual actions are the consequence of their voluntary choice; they suppose that the individual is his own master because he is in possession of a free will. But to believe in the existence of a reality such the free will is the fatal error of the humanity. Because, “each individual is so organized, that his will is formed for him by his feelings, or his convictions, or both; and thus his whole character –physical, mental an moral- is formed independently of himself” (Owen 1842-1844: 57). Owen adopts an excessively radical attitude on this matter: “From the earliest ages it has been the practice of the world to act on the supposition that each individual forms his own character, and that therefore he is accountable for all his own character, and that therefore he is accountable for all his sentiments and habits, and consequently merits reward for some and punishment for others (…) This error cannot much longer exist; for every day will make it more and more evident that the character of man is, without a single exception, always formed for him; that it may be, and is, chiefly created by his predecessors; that they give him, or may give him, his ideas and habits, which are the powers that govern and direct his conduct. Man, therefore, never did, nor is it possible he ever can, form his own character” (Owen 1813: 44-45). One of the greatest superstitions of the humanity is what the author calls “internal causality”. The causes of the individual character cannot lie but in external factors, that are the material, social, cultural, economic, moral, political conditions within which the individual is inserted. The new world, the modern education and formation of men must give up expressly such a superstition. They must recognize that man is a “result” and not a “given reality”. One must stop to bring the individual before the courts; the circumstances and only they must be brought before the justice. Only circumstances are really guilty. As a matter of fact, concerning the individual behaviour, the new world must learn to overcome empty oppositions as innocence/criminality, responsibility/irresponsibility, honest/dishonest, etc. When the evaluation of the individual action is at stake, the only elements which must be taken into account are the nature of the circumstances. In other words, as long as the circumstances are conserved unchanged, it is a non sense to want to modify the behaviour of an individual just punishing or rewarding him: «A superior state of human society, therefore, can be formed, only, upon a knowledge that man is not the former of his own nature ; that it is organized in a manner unknown to him, and without his consent; and that, when it is comparatively ill-formed an any particular instance, the individual is an object of compassion, calling for our kindest exertions to remedy the evil, and never once for blame or punishment” (Owen 1842-1844: 42)

5 Concerning the formation of human character, Owen can be considered as being part of Helvetius’ tradition. Indeed, Helvetius opposed the doctrine of “physical determinism” developed by Montesquieu and defended the doctrine of “moral determinism”: “Man is less the product of geographical circumstances than social circumstances, the product of the education in the widest sense” (Halévy 1901: 29). As another Owen’s commentator says: “Owen carries out Helvetius’ determinism to a higher intensity pretending that the discovery of the true human nature gives to the [legislator] the power to impress upon the individual (…) the kind of personality [he] chose to impress” (Abensour 1986: 627). Bentham, who was a shareholder of Owen’s textile mill in New Lanark, could be considered belonging to the same Helvetius’s tradition concerning the question of the determination of the character of man. In this sense Owenian conception of man can also be described as utilitarian. But more than utilitarian aspect of this doctrine, it is its authoritarian aspect which holds here our attention. In fact the fascination the project of the brothers Bentham, the panopticon, exerted on Owen cannot be explained but in reference to his authoritarian and paternalistic vision of human reality. We will return on this aspect of the doctrine in our second part. All these characteristics of Owenian conception of man we developed above show that, according to the author, the resolution of the” social question” depends on the realisation of the appropriate circumstances in order to obtain good, useful, benevolent, wise, rational individuals. Social action must not have as object, directly, the individual behaviour but the context within which the individual evolves. And the institution of such a context demands wise legislators in possession of the truths of the science of man, the truths of the science of the circumstances: “All of the reforms of Owen (…) are specific institutions which meet the will to be the master of the determination of the external conditions and to control the effects of them. Owen dreams of a society where the legislator would be the master to create, as he wishes, the personality of citizens and their form of socialisation” (Abensour 1986: 627). As far as the individual is considered as a reality infinitely malleable and plastic, the “good” legislator can impress upon him, without resistance, all of the qualities he judges as beneficial, desirable and useful. Owen’s dream is to create a “social technology” which will be set up and governed by the engineers in possession of the knowledge of the “science of man”. The “Rational system” can’t be instituted but only thanks to the rational action of wise scientists who know perfectly what is necessary for the happiness of citizens. The social technology will be instituted for individuals but no by them. G. Deleuze is right when he writes that “the technology is first of all social before being technical” (Deleuze 1986: 47). We think that we can qualify Owenian approach of the social question in reference to the term of “scientisme”

6 in French language (as an equivalent in English we propose “scientism” and as adjective “scientistic”). Owen’s distrust toward the human being ability to reach by himself true happiness does not apply to Fourier. Indeed, there is for him a natural order, the “societary order” (ordre sociétaire) that has been wanted by God, and that has been perverted in “Civilization” - our modern industrial world - by the philosophers and the economists. By opposition to the “moralists”, Fourier aims to establish in a scientific manner the universal principals of functioning of our world, and he compares himself with Newton. In his Theory of the Four Movements, he extends the latter to the social, animal, organic and material world. His basic discovery runs as follows: “I conjectured that if God had given so much influence to passionate attraction and so little to its enemy, reason, it must be in order to lead us to the order of the progressive Series in which all aspects of attraction would be satisfied” (Fourier 2006, 15). For Fourier as for Owen, there is a science to be discovered. But for Fourier this science is based on the principle of the “passionate attraction” and relies on the study of passions. Beyond the five sensitive passions (linked to our five senses) and the four affective (i.e. friendship, love, family, and ambition) which makes us cooperate with others, there are three other passions, all of them critical for the organisation of a ‘phalanx’. About the serial [sériaire] mechanism, Fourier argues: “Let us observe that its compass is always UNIQUE: always the rigorous deference to the wish of the three neutral or distributive passions, all the three constantly and combinarily developed in the societary order, which satisfy: 11th: the Papillonne, the most possible diversity in individual functions; 10th: the Cabaliste, through the trinary classification of intrigues, their methodical contrast […]; 12th: the Composite, [permanent composed charm] through the combined intervention of the four springs of enthusiasm and equilibrium. These three passions are thus the oracle that is supposed to be ever consulted, in any problem concerning the Harmony system” (Fourier CW 5: 534-5)

The Papillonne, the “anti-philosophical passion” (Fourier CW 5: 533) attracts us towards diversity and leads us accordingly to belong to about forty series in a phalanx. Obviously, this passion is far from bloomed up in a modern, ‘civilized’ world, which obliges a man to do always the same work: “so many monotonies for the spirit and the body” (Fourier CW 5: 533). The Cabalist passion expresses our taste for intrigues; it makes us joining groups according to the feelings that other members of the group inspire to us. It will lead us to be generous towards people that we love (artist, lovers, and so on). The Composite passion is the most beautiful one: it expresses our desire for concordance, harmony and the blending of our senses in any activity; it is the combination of pleasure, both physical and spiritual. These

7 three distributive passions are almost unknown in Civilization, “only a few glimmers have appeared on the horizon, just enough to arouse the anger of moralists in their relentless war against pleasure” (Fourier 2006: 85). They are at the outset of the “Association” advocated by Fourier, since the love for competition, for diversity and for cooperation will ensure the full blooming of the former nine passions. Fourier argues that, from these twelve radical passions, eight-hundred-and-ten general human characters can be derived because of the gradations to be found in each human being. More or less the same number will be found in equal proportion in the global population since, trying to be realistic, he acknowledges statistical error. To fully understand his conception of the individual, it must be kept in mind that Fourier seeks to definitely escape our modern world, corrupted by industry and commerce – which he hates - and to come back to the natural world designed by God, in which the prime importance will be given to agriculture. According to Fourier, one of Owen’s basic errors is the ignorance of agriculture. Now, such an appreciation is evidently completely unfounded since the other name of “parallelograms” is “agricultural villages”; and the primary objective of them is to get agricultural self-sufficiency. Fourier is buoyed by a new hope, namely to implement an ideal society mainly based on agriculture and divided in small communities (the phalanxes) in which everyone knows each other and thus in which cooperation between individuals is possible. Hence, there is room in Fourier’s world for a ‘natural’ man, whose essence is the enhancement of pleasure. But, as emphasised by Bell (1968-69: 200), Fourier’s natural man is much more sophisticated than Rousseau’s bon sauvage, “seeking only for food, a female, and rest”. Fourier’s psychosocial theory follows directly from this analysis of the human character. The point to be emphasised is that in the “combined order”, “you will see there is nothing vicious in your passions” (Fourier 2006: 72). Hence, Fourier is highly confident in the autonomy of the individual, in his ability to reach happiness by himself. And this confidence is established in a ‘scientific’ manner, in the sense that the man, if not corrupted by our industrial world, would behave naturally and spontaneously according to these universal laws of attraction, just like the planets and so on obey to the Newtonian principles in the inanimate world. In brief, Fourier’s society is “the calculus of pleasures” (Fourier CW 2: 163).For him, man needs not to be re-educated to behave according to social welfare.

I.2. The “work of the negative”

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We make use of the term of the “work of the negative” in reference to Hegelian conception of negativity. One must distinguish two significations of the “negative” in Hegelian philosophy. The first signification stems from a technical level. Dialectical approach of human reality considers the force of the negativity as the essential driving force of History. In this sense negativity means the negation (criticism, reject, refusal, contestation, abolition, withdrawal, struggle, etc.) of what is simply “given” at one determined moment of the process of the constant transformation of human reality. Thanks to negativity, human reality becomes a dynamic process; it escapes the immobility of the persistence of one single form or figure throughout its existence. Negativity ensures human reality the possibility of its internal transformation, the possibility of moving from one form to another, throughout the destruction of one form by another. In other words, negativity livens up human reality. History as such owes its existence to “the work of the negative”. The latter introduces the mediation in the immediacy of a static world which refuses the change and the novelty. But one can consider a more general signification of the “negative” and in reference to the Owen’s thought we have this signification in mind. Still from a dialectical point of view, oppositions as positive and negative, good and evil, truth and false lack any foundation. Hegel says: “Nor is there such a thing as the false, any more than there is something evil” (Hegel 1807: 22). In human reality nothing can be judged and excluded as purely unessential. The “unessential”, as a constitutive component of reality in evolution, is essential as unessential. In other words, as far as human reality is a process of the “becoming” and construction, an element judged as wrong or unessential at one determined moment of the becoming could and certainly will contribute to the formation of reality at another moment of the evolutionary process but only if it has at its disposal the conditions of its development. Therefore, dialectical point of view refuses to proceed to a selection, purge or purification of human reality, through an immediate and brutal intervention, under the will to separate the wheat from the chaff. Hegelian approach of human reality doesn’t fear the negative since the negative is, just like the positive, a force which works through the formation of reality. One can describe such an apparent paradoxical process as the “positivity of the negative”. Such a theoretical attitude is understandable by the fact that the theoretician pays attention to the becoming, to reality as a process in evolution. The “work of negative” means in this context that if reality is left free, without constraint, to its own dynamism, such element considered as negative could prove to be as useful and necessary as than an element considered as positive. The idea is to leave the forces of a reality to work freely through its process in becoming.

9 If we return to Owenian attitude before reality we notice that the author proves to be extremely wary of the negative. His “scientism” can explain this attitude. When we examine the main concerns of Owen throughout his work, we are struck by the insistence with which the errors, false views, wrong ideas, unfounded beliefs, superstitions, ignorance of humanity are denounced: “These false notions have ever produced evil and misery in the world; and that they still disseminate them in every direction. The sole cause of their existence hitherto has been man’s ignorance of human nature; while their consequences have been all the evil and misery which arise from accidents, disease, and death, are also greatly increased ans extended by man’s ignorance of himself” (Owen 1813: 56). Owen has the firm will to break definitely with this negativity. He thinks to be authorised to do it since he is absolutely convinced to have reached the Truth thanks to his science of the circumstances, thanks to his Rational system. In fact it is quite normal that a social reformer denounces what he observes as negative in the reality he would transform. The same remark is also relevant for Fourrier, regarding his project to create the conditions of human emancipation. But in the case of Owen, the new world cleansed of the alienation of the old world will be entirely instituted through the systematic application of the principles of the Rational system. In other words, the new world will be a creation of the specialists, the engineers of the new science of the circumstances. The idea or intuition of human reality as a process of becoming progressively constructed by the actions of individuals, in Hayekian terms, as a “spontaneous order”, is totally absent in Owenian analyses. In this sense all of his system corresponds to what Hayek called “constructivism rationalist” (Hayek 1973). The latter includes also the concept of “construction”. But this construction is in no way the work and the realisation of the individuals for whom the reforms are undertaken; it is the social technology engineers who construct. This social technology aims to build a new world entirely regenerated, i.e. radically cleansed of all negative element. In the final analysis, such a vision of the social question refuses to harbour any confidence in the spontaneous capacity of the individuals to construct their own realty through their activities, exchanges and interactions. Rational system has no confidence in the creativity of the individual because the latter is considered as a purely passive and entirely dependant reality. In other words Owenian individuals are invited to wait passively to be formed, trained, shaped, moulded by the new and true circumstances the engineers of the Rational system are supposed to create. Scientists, engineers, those who “know” are only entrusted with the mission to separate the true from error, to eliminate what they consider as wrong, i.e. negative, and to inculcate in the head and in the heart of their individuals the truths of the new science. “Each individual is so organized, he must

10 necessarily become irrational when he is made from infancy to receive, as truths, false fundamental notions; and can only become truly rational, when ne shall be made to receive the fundamental principles, without any admixture or error” (Owen 1842-1844: 48). In this context the fear of the negative means a total absence of confidence in the auto-organisational capacity of human reality. The criticism Smith addresses to F. Quesnay in the IVth book of his Wealth of Nations, could also be returned against Owen: “The healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen. Mr Quesnay, who was himself physician, and a very speculative physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concerning the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty and perfect justice” (Smith 1776: 259-60). Owen’s will to control and determine rigorously the totality of human reality makes us think of this figure of man Smith calls “the man of system”. The latter is so convinced of being “very wise in his own conceit, and (…) so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. (…) He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon the chess-board” (Smith 1759: 342-43). The total absence of the confidence in the possible positive effect of some elements which are not controlled and determined (or which are considered as negative) by the legislator leads Owen to consider human society as a great “chess-board” upon which purely passive individuals are supposed to be arranged according to the will of the possessor of the science. We will reconsider this observation in our second part. Fourier acknowledges the –apparent – insuperable gap between our unlimited desires and our bounded resources. Here, he strongly opposes the “moralists”, such as Owen, on the human nature. The latter “argue that they are rectifying God’s work, tempering or repressing the passions they cannot satisfy and sometimes do not even recognize” (Fourier 2006, 74). By contrast with Owen, there is no bad instinct to be inhibited in Fourier’s understanding of the human nature. All the contrary is true: “All the arrangements of the combined order will produce complete contrasts to our own customs, and will make it necessary to protect everything we call vice, such as greed and sexual intrigue; the cantons where these so-called vices will be most in evidence will be those which develop industry to the most complete state and whose shares are most sought after for capital investment.” (Fourier 2006: 72)

11 For him, in a state of nature the world is governed by the principle of the “passionate attraction”: there are no bad instincts to be repressed but only passions, bad and good, both useful for the collective welfare. These passions were designed by God; we should thus conform to them. At first sight, some of our passions, like for example greediness, seem to be dangerous, and thereby to be rejected and inhibited. But for Fourier these outward ‘bad’ passions necessarily contribute to the right order. The ‘negative’ should not be excluded but integrated, since it might contribute to the ‘positive’. In Fourier’s words: “our passions become all good, if we develop them in the serial order [ordre sériaire] to which God destine them” (Fourier CW 6: 314). To this extent, Fourier can be considered as being part of Hegel’s tradition, for which, as we saw above, nothing is simply to be rejected as unessential, false or erroneous. Since our passions have been willed by God, their operation, their interactions between them will necessarily contribute to the happiness of the individual. In short, Fourier is not afraid of the negative. That is the way the “natural education” given in a phalanx is supposed to develop and bring to perfection all the germs given by the nature. That is precisely how the combined order will provide much more wealth than our civilised order, “surpluses” (surabondance) becoming a recurrent scourge, just as now “shortages” (disettes) (Fourier 2006: 161) in our industrial world. We should prevent ourselves from inhibiting our passions but on the contrary release all of them, both bad and good, “because the true happiness consists in satisfying all one’s passions” (Fourier 2006, 86).

II. The conception of justice The two conceptions of man we have presented involve two opposite conceptions of justice. More precisely, in the case of Owen, because of paternalistic and “scientistic” options of the author, the question of justice is removed in its complexity and its indeterminacy, whereas in the case of Fourier, because of the attention the author pays to the individual emancipation, the realisation of the conditions of possibility of the justice in a world of particular diversity emerges as the fundamental question of justice, even if Fourier doesn’t address directly this difficult problem. On the other hand, one must observe that Owenian approach of economic and social reality (essentially regarding the question of labour) is much more utilitarian than the Fourier’s one.

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II.1. Labour and the question of private property In the economic doctrine of Owen the concept of labour plays a fundamental role. This role is closely related to the question of the effective demand. If it exists today a problem of markets for products, if the markets are saturated, the reason lies in the fact that workers are not paid at their fair value, at the actual productivity of their labour. The present system makes the production dependant on the solvent demand, i.e. on the demand accompanied by the purchasing power and not on the real needs. Here lies the profound vice of this system. Owen believes that the return to the natural standard of value, i.e. the labour, is able to reverse this situation, since such a reform will allow a just remuneration of the worker, and consequently it will allow transforming the needs into solvent demand increasing the purchasing power of the working classes. “The markets are created solely by the remuneration allowed for the industry of the working classes, and those markets are more or less extended and profitable in proportion as these classes are well or ill remunerated for their labour. But the existing arrangements of society will not permit the labourer to be remunerated for his industry, and in consequence all markets fail” (1820, p.253). The production will finally make peace with the consumption. Working classes “in consequence of their numbers are the greatest consumers of all articles; and it will always be found that when wages are high the country prospers; when they are low, all classes suffer (…) It is therefore essentially the interest of the master manufacturer that the wages of the labourer should be high” (Owen 1818b, pp. 143-44). These considerations lead Owen to propose a reform program of the exchange system and of the mode of distribution. The basic principle of this program is the substitution of labour for money as the standard of value. Owen believes that the choice of gold and silver as means of payment and then as standard of value “altered the intrinsic values of all things into artificial values” (Owen 1820: 249). The author does not hesitate to write: "Money is the root of all evil" (ibid.). If we want to bring the peace between production and consumption, if we want to free the production from its dependence on the solvent demand, we must replace gold and silver with labour. But how can we succeed in making labour, which differs so much from one individual to another, the measure of value? How to reduce this diversity to an average magnitude? Owen's answer is simple: the power of the horse too differs significantly from one individual to another. But this fact does not preclude the use of the horse power as the standard of the mechanical

13 power. Similarly we can determine an average labour force and express the value of all goods as a multiple of this reference unit. Such a reform would permit that all goods be exchanged equally between them, an evolution which will eliminate all fraud, all robbery, all injustice. Every producer, every worker will receive the exact value of his work, neither more nor less. Owen does not fail to recognize that this view is also that political economy, at least in its Ricardian version. In Ricardian theory too labour is considered as the origin of wealth, as the "natural standard of value”. But, political economy has never resolved to give to labour the social consideration it deserves regarding its conceptual importance on the theoretical level. It is nowadays time to draw all the consequences of this principle and, first, to institute the "right to work" as an absolutely inalienable right. In this regard, Owen can be considered as one of the leading social reformers who have initiated an action in order to assure the protection of the labour and the worker, and the protection and the security of the employment in modern society. Within his own business in New Lanark or in New Harmony, he refused the slightest concession on this ethical imperative of the right of men to work, despite the insurmountable financial difficulties such an imperative caused, difficulties which have come to ruin totally our author. These considerations on labour are of great importance in theory and practice. Many elements of Owen’s economic analysis will be borrowed by other socialist thinkers and especially by Marx and Engels. But when we examine the question closely, we see that Owen’s approach considers the question of labour, essentially, in its economic, utilitarian, instrumental dimension. In his eyes labour represents exclusively the space of the creation of economic values. Man works in order to produce, in order to meet his needs, to provide for his family, to increase his power and his control over his environment, over nature. The concept of labour is never associated with pleasure, enjoyment, having an interest on aesthetic, spiritual, non material level. In the final analysis labour is understood as a pain, a chore, as an activity carried out under constraint, which requires physical fatigue. We will observe that the status of labour is highly different in Fourier’s doctrine. On the other hand, Fourier is very critical concerning Owen’s condemnation of private propriety. In fact, the economic system Owen imagines and proposes on the national level supposes the existence of individual producers who exchange freely their products between them. We refer here to the unfortunate experience of National Equitable Labour Exchange (1832): a co-operative society consisted of volunteers shareholders who had to invite producers and farmers to deposit their products in the counter of the society, in exchange for labour notes made out in terms of labour hours corresponding to the quantity of hours that

14 were necessary for the production of goods deposited; evidently these labour notes were supposed to represent a purchasing power on all other products brought in the counter by other producers. Through such a system of exchange Owen hoped to replace money by labour as the standard of value, and consequently to resolve the problem of effective demand. As we know this experience ended in a crushing failure (see Ege 2000: 20 and sq.). But Owen had also proposed an immediate solution for the poverty, unemployment and under-consumption; that is the creation of self-sufficient agricultures villages (Parallelograms) consisted of 800 to 1200 persons. In these villages private property (at least of the means of production and of the fruits of collective work) had to be prohibited: “It is found that when men work together for a common interest, each performs his part more advantageously for himself and for society, than when employed for others at daily wages, or than working by the peace (…) The labour and expenditure of individuals are now applied so ignorantly, wastefully, and under so many disadvantages, that (…) they (…) acquire, under the influence of a strong necessity, a tenacious love of that property which costs them so much to procure” (Owen 1817: 177). The elimination of private property is the condition of the success of the experience of agricultural villages (Owen 1820: 264 and sq.) On the necessary social reformation to implement a fair society, Fourier’s views are in sharp contrast with Owen’s. Here, two issues are closely interlinked, namely his conception of the wage-earner – to be abolished – and the individual property right – to be maintained. As demonstrated below, this advocacy ensues from Fourier’s conception of the individual, as moved by his passions and thus ‘attracted’ to labour. For him, labour is not the essence of man as many socialists theoreticians suppose it, in the sense that one does not realise oneself through labour and effort. The human being designed by God is not supposed to stand pain to be able to consume, enjoy life and reach happiness. As recalled above, this does not mean that mankind should content them with the satisfaction of the basic needs necessary for life. Fourier’s ideal type is definitely not the ‘bon sauvage’ of an isolated island. For him, we should take advantage of the sumptuousness offered by the nature. Fourier’s writings are full of descriptions of luxurious caravanserais in which music, gastronomy and so on are enjoyed. His utopian world is plenty of resources – however rarely manufactured. Fourier’s society is “the calculus of pleasures” (Fourier CW 2: 163). Hence, it should be possible, in Association, to attract spontaneously the individuals to work, provided that the principle of the passionate attraction is enforced. In a phalanx, access to labour is a right, and the division of labour ensures efficiency.

15 Fourier’s primary observation is that, in Civilisation, the wage earner is neither free nor motivated to work, mainly because of the awful working conditions entailed by manufacturing: “they only seek to escape the work” Fourier CW 4: 170). That leads him to make a clear-cut statement against to the wage-earners, which is detrimental for both efficiency and freedom: “As a prime problem of political economy, we then had to study how to transform all the wage-earners in owners co-interested or associated. This would have led to double the value of the day-wages, and thus the advantages of acceleration” (Fourier CW 4: 171). In a “phalanx”, the individual is no more remunerated in wage but perceives dividends. Instead of providing the artificial equality as advocated by Owen, efficiency requires for Fourier to gather people as unequal as possible according to their endowments in labour, capital and talent. There is no wage-earner as such in a phalanx, but only owners who are cointerested and associated. How does it work? Fourier himself acknowledges several conditions of feasibility of such an organisation. There is first the guaranty of a minimal basic income. However, as shown by Cunliffe and Erreygers (2001), Fourier’s minimum income is slightly different from our modern conception. For what concerns us here, it should be underlined that Fourier’s minimum is paid in kind; it is given without any work as a counterpart and does not only correspond to the minimum preventing the poor from starving to death: it includes pleasure. The second condition, which is critical for Fourier’s system, is to have full respect for the individual freedom. That is precisely what undermines our ability to pursue happiness in an industrial capitalistic world. We must have care for the natural right of the human being to open out, to bloom his passions. Work must be undertaken freely. The industry then becomes “an amusement” (Fourier CW 1: 292). What happens for hard tasks associated with a very low attractiveness, such as mining? Fourier’s answer is simple: in his “combined order” gold, silver and luxuries would be worthy, since mining is very little attractive, and thus highly expensive (Fourier CW 1: 307). Just as in a liberal system, goods would be produced and exchanged according to the value given to them by the individual desires of the society. In Fourier’s utopia there is thus no pain necessarily sustained in order to fulfil oneself; there is no negative to be reduced. In the strict sense of the term, work becomes a pleasure rather than alienation or a source of ‘disutility’, to borrow a utilitarian wording. Labour intrinsically provides happiness since it is always undertaken freely and allows us to blooming out our passions. Since the wage-earner has been abolished and there are only owners who are cointerested and associated, we need incentives instead of the authority to ensure efficiency.

16 There are two powerful motives for these individuals, namely the Ownership and the Truth. Indeed, everyone belongs to several series. This ensures that the repartition of the product according to labour, capital and talent will be fair. Indeed, if I bring more capital and less labour than the other in a particular series, I will bring in turn less capital and more talent in another one. Those are my greed instincts that ensure a fair repartition. Secondly, the principle of the division of labour would be respected, just as in a capitalist system: everyone is most capable in small and repetitive tasks. However, concentrating on this sole principle and forgetting the whole passions of the individual is detrimental for efficiency. The latter is ensured by the enforcement of the three distributive passions almost forgotten in Civilisation. Indeed, everyone enrols oneself in a series according to his own ability and character: this is in accordance to the cabalist passion of the competition and the intrigue. The session of each “series” in a phalanx is very short (at most two hours), in accordance to the “papillonne” passion for the diversity. Here is to be found the main criticism against the manufacture system, namely the repetition of tasks and the pure specialisation of workers. For Fourier, this is not natural since it prevents the full blooming of the human being’s passions. Last, the enforcement of the “composite passion” for the cooperation ensures that the individuals will be volunteers, and thus motivated in their series. Hence, a “societary industry” operates through “reunions” as large as possible, sessions as short as possible, subdivisions as detailed as possible, and above all “attraction” and “charm” (Fourier CW 2: 37). People cooperate inside a series, and the series compete between themselves. His peculiar conception of labour leads Fourier to advocate the preservation of the individual property right, in contrast with the views hold by Owen regarding the organisation of “agricultural villages”. For him, “a sect run by Owen pretends that it sets up the societary order [ordre sociétaire]; it does all the contrary” (Fourier CW 6: 4). Owen’s plan only foreshadows the new society to come, and “the Owenites are very dangerous people” (Fourier CW 6: 472), because of the good that they prevent to happening. Beyond the excess number and the neglect of agriculture, Owen’s basic mistake is his concern toward equality, “a poison in Association” (Fourier CW 3: 4). For Fourier, “the property spirit is the most powerful lever ever known to electrify the Civilised; one can estimate without exaggeration to the double the product of owner’s, as compared to the salaried or slavish labour” (Fourier CW 4: 171). The defence of the private property goes hand in hand with the abolishment of the wage-earner. That leads Fourier to argue: “Thanks to these gradations of societary interests, the inferior is interested towards the wellbeing of the superior; and their union being cemented by the usual meeting in the attractive works and the affairs in the industrial series, one has nothing to dread of the full freedom of the common people

17 who, in its current state of misery and jealousy, would use its independence only in the purpose of spoil and slaughter its superiors.” (Fourier CW 3: 175)

Here can be seen one of the effects of the work of the negative in Fourier’s thought. Indeed, there are no bad instincts to be inhibited, but only passions to bloom out. The mechanism of repartition between diverse owners offered by Fourier allows to “absorbing the individual greediness in the collective interests of the Series” (Fourier CW 5: 533; emphasis added). In a world in which everyone is an owner, the individual becomes an autonomous body. In sharp contrast with Owen, the individual is here considered as responsible. Fourier is highly confident in the individual ability to behave spontaneously in accordance to the collective interest, provided that one let him express both his bad and good instincts. The negative has to be integrated, absorbed, rather than inhibited. To this end, the private property is the true motive of efficiency.

II.2. Justice of “scientific” paternalism versus justice for the individual emancipation As we underlined above, Owen’s ideal is to institute a social order where the Rational system engineers apply the principles of the science of circumstances to impress the good, rational and desirable character upon individuals. This conception of the social organisation, we called it “social technology”. It is undeniable that Owenian vision of society is highly generous. The aim pursued is nothing less than the regeneration of mankind. All the efforts are made to provide happiness for individuals. But this happiness, individuals will receive it from the hands of scientists and engineers and not by their own initiative. The happy world will be created for them but not by them. Such a vision of society, we qualify “paternalistic”. We mean by this concept the fact that Owen considers individuals like children waiting to be educated. Engineers and scientists of the Rational system are the fathers of the citizens reduced to the status of children. Educators are invited to transform citizens through the application of the truths of the science of man. This application begins necessarily by removing wrong, bad, superstitious, negative habits, ideas, values, representations individuals adopted under the constraint of perverted political doctrines and erroneous systems of education. Educative process must proceed, first of all, to the purification of human reality. We don’t deal here with a conception of education as a set of efforts in order to realise the moral and material conditions that can allow the individual to develop freely, on its own,

18 his personality. The concern is to create the circumstances which will remove the negative qualities and replace them by the positive ones. More exactly regarding the question of the formation of human character liberty is a secondary problem. We mean by that that liberty may be an ultimate aim in human existence but its realisation doesn’t stem from the will of the individual. The individual doesn’t reach, doesn’t win his liberty progressively, through his own will, determination, patience, physical and intellectual efforts. Liberty is not a creation, a product of the individual. It is given to him under the effect of rational circumstances, by care of wise engineers in possession of the principles of Rational system. Indeed it is significant that Owen mentions very little the concept of liberty or freedom. In fact such a concept is irrelevant regarding the Owenian vision of the education. But we must moderate these judgements. Owen felt very strongly concerned by the question of children education. One must remind here that at the time of Owen children were subjected to the rhythms of work absolutely inhumane and intolerable. Excluded from any system of education, working classes children, at five or six years old, were forced to work much than ten hours a day in factories. Face this unbearable reality Owen has undertaken a set of political and practical (in his own factory, in New Lanark) actions which can described, without exaggeration, as heroic. He proposed several “Factory Acts” to the parliament, whose objective was to prohibit the excessive labour of young children, to institute a minimum system of primary education intended for the children of deprived backgrounds, to submit the application of these measures to the control of a “State system of factory inspection” (Owen 1818a: 130 and sq.). His science of the circumstances has been designed essentially related to the issue of children education. In other words, his Rational system is built essentially on the observations related to the formation of children character. The problem is that Owen extends without precaution the lessons drawn from his observations of children behaviour on adult’s behaviour. Let’s consider the question of the “will”. Owen says: “It must be evident to those who have been in the practice of observing children with attention, that much of good or evil is taught to or acquired by a child at a very early period of its life (…) that many durable impressions are made at the termination of the first twelve or even six months of his existence” (Owen 1813: 40). In a more concise style we read also: “The fundamental principle on which all these Essays proceed is, that children may be collectively taught any sentiments and habits; or, in other words, trained to acquire any character” (Owen 1813: 70). These considerations lead Owen to assert, with some reason, that the will is a faculty whose formation is later than the formation of habits and feelings, and

19 therefore later than the formation of the character. But the author doesn’t stop here; he goes a step further and on the basis of the observation of the epiphenomenal status of the will he thinks having right to extend the content of the concept and declares (highlighting with major characters his statement): “the will of man has no power whatever over his opinions; he must, and ever did, and ever will believe what has been, is, or may be impressed on his mind by his predecessors and the circumstances which surround him” (Owen 1813: 53). The fact that a faculty comes after the formation of other faculties can not authorise the theoretician to conclude that the former must necessarily be entirely dependent on the latter. The will is a faculty which, by definition, confers a relative autonomy to human being. The concept of autonomy doesn’t mean here that human being be master of his feelings, habits, character, etc. It merely means that the individual, when he is in possession of his will (no matter how it is acquired) he has the ability to take a distance vis-à-vis his social, cultural, familial, historical (etc.) determinations. This should not be understood to mean that the individual can easily change his character thanks to his will. But the possibility exists. As soon as the individual acquires his will, he ceases being a child; he becomes an adult. Consequently, saying that “the will has no power whatever over [the] opinions [of the individual]” amounts to saying that the individual doesn’t have any autonomy and any freedom until the circumstances under which he lives are modified. As the power of changing the circumstances is in the possession of wise engineers and scientists, until their intervention individuals are condemned to remain children. Owen says: “Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world of large, by the application of the proper means; which means are to a great extend at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men” (Owen 1813: 16) We find here, in its rigorous sense, the problem of justice. Owenian justice is the one that father applies to his children. The utopian world dreamed by the author is a world where individuals are rigorously moulded by the principles of the true science. As science is necessarily represented (possessed and applied) by a given social category, such a dream amounts to supposing that all characters which will come into being in this world, will rigorously determined by the will of the mentioned category. Such a world can not make room for real diversity. We underline the word real because Owen pretends also to be defender of diversity: « The diversity of the human race is necessary to the happiness of man. (…) This diversity is, then, not only a necessary result of the organization of man, but should be found, and in a rational state of society will be found, a potential cause of his greatest happiness. Without this diversity, society itself would be a mass of confusion, and universal disorder

20 would pervade all the transactions of mankind; the business of life could not be continued without this variety among human species” (Owen 1842-1844: 40). But a diversity which is throughout planed and controlled by a particular will, i.e. according to the particular representations, values, opinions, preferences, in brief according to one particular “conception of the good” (Rawls 1993: 30) -whatever could be the pretention of this particular conception to the science-, is not a real diversity. Real diversity can not exist but in a world where individuals are supposed adults. In other words, only in a world where individuals enjoy the recognizing (in Hegelian terminology Anerkennung) of the community which considers them as free wills, i.e. as adult individuals able to organize their lives according to their particular choices or will, only in such a world one is authorised to speak about an effective diversity. A world where a real diversity reigns is a world which makes room for the otherness (altérité). Aristotle says that “justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a co-partner” (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, Book V-1). In a social structure where the attitude of the community regarding its citizens (note that community is necessarily represented by a determined part of the citizens) is paternalistic and scientistic the otherness is, from the outset, denied. Because the other is, by definition, what is beyond of our control. A society governed according to the principles of science is supposed to determine and control the totality of human reality. In such a world everything that escapes the control and the determination of science appears as a negative element that must be eliminated. The “fear of the negative” we discussed above appears here as the fear of the other. A justice founded on science, a “scientific” justice is the repression, the negation of the question of justice. Being just amounts to making room to the other, i.e. to the negative. Things are fundamentally different in the side of Fourier. This ‘scientific’ study of the mechanisms that govern the individuals leads Fourier to elaborate his social order accordingly. In his system of thought there is a natural order as wished by God that is has been perverted in Civilization and that should be re-established in a “societary order”. Just as the material world is by itself self-adjusting, we should come back to this natural order, in which there is no bad instincts to be inhibited and good feelings to be encouraged, but only passions to bloom out. According to Fourier, we should escape the modern industrial world, as it has been perverted by merchants and speculators and come back to the natural society as designed by God, in which agriculture would be predominant. However, this scientific view of the society does not mean that Fourier’s approach is ‘scientistic’. The individuals should conform to the natural principle of “attractive passion”, just like the particles, the planets and

21 so on conform to the Newtonian laws of the attraction. In sharp contrast with Owen’s view on society, there is no room in Fourier’s system for a class of ‘social engineers’ who would possess this scientific knowledge and would implement in accordance the required technology. Hence, in Fourier’s utopia there is no need to attribute power to some individuals in the political sphere: there is not, on the one hand, the class of the ones who know and, on the other hand, the class of those who do not know and who ought to obey to the formers. To this extent, “the whole tenor of Fourier’s thought is anarchistic. […] The essential characteristics of anarchism, the accentuation of individual differences, the absence of authoritarian control, an organisation of society based entirely upon individual agreement, are all to be found in Fourier” (Mason 1928: 257). Let us now turn to Fourier’s conception of justice that ensues from his ‘social science’ of a natural order. Fourier deals explicitly with the “distributive justice” (Fourier CW 6: 354), the law of repartition in a societary order: “finally we arrive to the main object, to the terrifying problem of implementing a vivid justice, a full harmony in the sharing of benefits and a satisfying reward for everybody according to his three industrial faculties, labour, capital, and talent.” (Fourier CW 6: 308). Fourier’s conception of justice derives directly from his appraisal of the laws that govern the natural social order. Here again, the Newtonian principles should be applied: “In all the system of the nature, the equilibriums operate through the gathering of opposite forces that are named in physics centripetal and centrifuge; by the same the equilibrium of repartition has its centripetal impulse, the one of greediness, and its centrifuge impulse, the one of generosity” (Fourier CW 6: 319). How does it work? The initial condition, which is far from fulfilled in our civilised world, is to guarantee a minimal standard of living to anybody: “the first sign of justice should be to guarantee to the crowd an increasing minimum according to the social progress” (Fourier CW 6: 354). Next, there is the issue of the sharing of the global product obtained by the phalanx. As seen above, there are no more wage-earners but only owners, the distribution operates according to the labour, capital and talent brought by each co-operator. Here, it should be kept in mind that Fourier’s basic purpose is to “cause the antagonisms of classes to disappear” (Fourier CW 6: 276) in an unequal society. Indeed: “The societary regime is as incompatible with the equality of fortunes as with the equality of character; it wants in every sense the progressive scale, the widest variety of functions and above all the gathering of extreme contrasts, such as the opulent man with the one without fortune, the fiery-natured character with the apathetic one, the young man with the elderly;” (Fourier CW 4)

As far as the remuneration of the capital is concerned, Fourier argues that “nothing is easier than the repartition in proportion of capital: this is a strictly arithmetic operation, well-

22 known of everybody” (Fourier CW 6: 303). Things become more complicated as far as labour and talent are concerned. Here, the first step is to classify series according to the benefit that they provide to the collective. For each series, “its retribution is according to the rank it occupies in the panel of the function divided in three classes, necessity, utility and pleasure” (Fourier CW 6: 304). This does not meet that needs that are considered are basic and of prime necessity in our perverted world are of first order in a societary society. Indeed, “it is not on the value of the product that we order the ranks, but on the influence of a work in the mechanic of attraction and harmony” (Fourier CW 6: 304). That is the reason why, in such a world, “the more a work excites attraction, the less pecuniary value it possess” (Fourier CW 6: 307). The next step is to go downward and to apply to the groups that compose the series the same mechanism of repartition. Here, “it is the same scale in the importance of functions” (CW 5, 526) as for the series. The key-mechanism that will make such a law of repartition effective is the Papillonne passion: this principle will guarantee the preservation of diversity in the different activities offered in a phalanx: “each individual is obliged for his own interests to speculate in inverse order of the civilised, and to vote in each sense in favour of equity” (Fourier CW 5: 529). By contrast, in the world in which we live currently, each individual belongs to a single series; he is thus not able to favour harmony between all the series that constitute the society. Hence, for Fourier justice does not imply for him to re-shape mankind. There is no room for individuals that would know better than others and that would take power accordingly. We do not need highly qualified people to govern the society and to shape the real. Individuals only have to conform to their natural passions. In this sense, Fourier does not hold a utilitarian conception of justice as Owen does: his basic purpose of justice is to ensure the blooming of each individual, in his diversity. Indeed, in a world in which diversity is promoted to the extreme, “the need for justice will exist in the details as in the whole of the repartition. The regime of the passionate series is a mechanism that sweats justice (“sue la justice”), and that transforms in thirst for justice the so-called vice named thirst for gold” (Fourier CW 6: 313). Since his utopia escapes from the material conditions of the modern industrial society his time, Fourier is quite likely to be much more optimistic than Owen on the ability of mankind to be spontaneously led to collective happiness. Basically, Fourier is not distrustful towards the world. In contrast to Owen, he is highly concerned by the otherness. For him, “it is through the extreme inequality of fortunes that we arrive at this beautiful agreement of generosity: it would suffice of a grain of equality, of a proximity of fortunes, to prevent this sort of agreement” (Fourier CW 6: 321). Now, to understand such a

23 statement, it is necessary to keep in mind that, for him, the diversity that is at stake is not only our wealth in terms of capital, but also our natural bend for music, theatre and so on. Everyone has a specific potential to express, and the task attributed to the “natural education” is precisely to develop the talent of each individual. In the world of Fourier justice is called to realise the conditions of the coexistence of the diversity and the multiplicity of passions and desires and not of the strict equality and uniformity between individuals.

Concluding remarks One must not forget that at Owen’s time the economic reality of the England is literally unbearable for working classes. The measures and reforms proposed by Owen, the considerable (one can say superhuman) efforts made by him in order to improve the living conditions of the workers, and especially of their children, deserve our admiration and respect. His work, both practical and theoretical, is at the origin of the creation of the fundamental social institutions in England which will ensure a minimum security of life and work to thousands of individuals and will allow, for the first time in the history of England, that the children of poor families can receive a basic education. The undeniable social utility of his work should justify forgiving the dogmatic character of his doctrine and the excessive optimism of his convictions relative to the formation of individual character. But in the present contribution our concern was to identify and interpret the great difference relative to the conception of man that exists between two works supposed to belong to the same historical doctrinal current. As we saw, this difference has deep consequences as far as the social organisation is concerned. Despite the delirious aspects of his doctrine the world imagined by Fourier seems, in a final analysis, much more “bearable” compared with the paternalistic and “scientistic” world of Owen which can easily sink in totalitarianism.

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