Annex 2
Synthesis of the case studies .............................................................................................................1 Case study 1: The Textile District of the Herning Area, Denmark.................................................23 Case study 2: The electronic and mechatronics industry in Ivrea ..................................................37 Case study 3 : Vulnerable area of Czestochowskie (Poland) .........................................................53 Case Study 4: Electronics industry in Western Hungary ................................................................65 Case study 5: The Carpi textile industrial district in Emilia-Romagna..........................................71 Case study 6: The Prato textile industrial district in Tuscany ........................................................95 Case study 7: Textile manufacturing in the North Region of Portugal.........................................116 Case study 8: The metal sector within the Ruhr area ...................................................................138 Case study 9: The region of Western Finland. The micro case Vaasa area : Electric machinery and apparatus ....................................................................................................................................165 Case study 10: The region of Northern Finland. The micro cases Oulu and Oulu South............180 Case study 11 : Les TIC dans l'agglomération toulousaine : un secteur ancré transversalement et s'appuyant sur les avantages compétitifs du milieu local ......................................................193 Case Study 12: Asturias, a vulnerable region ...............................................................................212 Case study 13: North-West Region (Romania): from transition to globalization. .......................236 Case study 14: Le Courtraisis et son tissu industriel textile.........................................................259 Case study 15: L'industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège ...........................................272 Case study 16: Cas d’étude Franche-Comté .................................................................................288
Synthesis of the case studies 1. General presentation of the case studies Case studies have been carried out in very different types of regions in order to give a large picture of reactions. Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the diversity of main structural specialization and reactions to vulnerability for all 16 case studies. We can identify: - 7 in the textile industries, 4 in the metal industries, and 5 in the electric/onic ; industries (some cases are mixed, for example Modena where we also find a metal industry); - 10 are clearly declining regions, while the 6 other show less clear situations; - 3 case studies are located in the new member States, 4 in Mediterranean regions, 3 in Nordic countries and 6 in central regions (Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Italy) (see the map). Figure 1 also illustrates the huge diversity of national and geo-structural contexts (center, Northern periphery, Eastern Europe with different levels of development, Mediterranean regions) in which the case studies are embedded. However, the main point is probably the scale question: case studies concern regions of very different demographic and economic dimensions, from around 100000 inhabitants (in Ivrea or Vaasa) to 5300000 in the Ruhr area. These scales differences also have an impact on the analysis to be carried out: while small areas allow studying in-depth structural evolutions, huge areas give a better view of the general welfare at the scale we are working in the framework of this study.
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© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
Textile Metal Electr.
Figure 1. Location and specialization of the selected case studies
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Synthesis of the case studies 1. General presentation of the case studies Case studies have been carried out in very different types of regions in order to give a large picture of reactions. Table 1 and figure 1 illustrate the diversity of main structural specialization and reactions to vulnerability for all 16 case studies. We can identify: - 7 in the textile industries, 4 in the metal industries, and 5 in the electric/onic ; industries (some cases are mixed, for example Modena where we also find a metal industry); - 10 are clearly declining regions, while the 6 other show less clear situations; - 3 case studies are located in the new member States, 4 in Mediterranean regions, 3 in Nordic countries and 6 in central regions (Belgium, France, Germany, Northern Italy) (see the map). Figure 1 also illustrates the huge diversity of national and geo-structural contexts (center, Northern periphery, Eastern Europe with different levels of development, Mediterranean regions) in which the case studies are embedded. However, the main point is probably the scale question: case studies concern regions of very different demographic and economic dimensions, from around 100000 inhabitants (in Ivrea or Vaasa) to 5300000 in the Ruhr area. These scales differences also have an impact on the analysis to be carried out: while small areas allow studying in-depth structural evolutions, huge areas give a better view of the general welfare at the scale we are working in the framework of this study.
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© EuroGeographics Association for the administrative boundaries
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Figure 1. Location and specialization of the selected case studies
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GDP/inha Share in the b. In PPS Unemploym Vulnerable national in % of ent rate 2005 sector GDP for the EU-27 in (and in % of (evolution of NUTS2/3 the national employment) area (1995NUTS3 or average) 1995-2005 2005) NUTS2 area
Region
Location
Scale and population (2005)
Main vulnerable sectors
Herning Area
West of Jutland, Denmark
295000 inhab. Across different Nuts 3 areas*
Textile
115 (91)
-68%
declining
4 (83)
Electronics
118 (113: Torino provincie)
??
declining
4,8 (62)
530000 inhab. In this NUTS3 area
Metal
45 (88)
-22% between 2000 and 2005 for the whole Silesia
stable
21,5 (121)
1969000 in the two NUTS 2 areas of Central and Western Transdanubia
Electronics
54 (84)
+82%
declining
7,2 (100)
Ivrea area
Czetochowskie
110000 inhab in the local North of Torino, labour system ; 4330000 in Piemonte in the NUTS2 area of Italia Piemonte Northern Silesia in Southern Poland
Western Hungary Carpi
Modena 662000 inhab in the NUTS3 Province near area of Modena Bologna in Italy
Textile
133 (127:Modena province)
declining
2,7 (35)
Prato
Prato Province near Firenze in Italy
243000 inhab. In the NUTS3 area
Textile
116 (111)
declining
6,3 (82)
3732000 in the NUTS2 area
Textile
60 (79)
-21%
declining
8,8 (115)
Vaasa
District of Western Finland
90000 inhab. In the district and 1300000 in Western Finland
Electric and electronic activities
102 (88)
-21% largely in related sectors (metal and machinery)
stable
8,8 (104)
Oulu
Northern Finland
215000 in Oulu and 87000 in Oulu south; 700000 inhab. In the NUTS2 area of Western Finland
Electronics
99 (86)
+58%
declining (not the Oulu area)
11,1 (132)
Ruhr Area
Western Germany
5300000 inhab. In a non NUTS area; inside the Lander (NUTS1) of Nordrhein-Westphalia
Metal
117 (102)
-28%
declining
14,7 (131)
Electronics
101 (90); 121 (108: HauteGaronne)
growing
7,5 (79)
1150000 inhab.
Metal, Electric and electronic industries
97 (86)
declining
7,9 (83)
2700000 inhab.
Textile, Electric and electronic activities
34 (97)
stable
5,9 (82)
Textile
112 (93)
stable
6,2 (73)
Metal
89 (74)
declining
12 (143)
Metal
90 (87)
declining
10,2 (110)
Northern Portugal
Midi-Pyrénées
1100000 inhab. For the South-Western urban area of Toulouse and 2750000 for the NUTS2 France region of Midi-Pyrénées
Franche-Comté Eastern France North-western Romania Kortrijk Area Liège Asturias
Western Flanders
277000 inhab in the NUTS3 area of 1140000 590000 inhab. In the East of Belgium NUTS3 area North-Western Spain
1070000 inhab in the area
-18%
-20% (including mining)
Table 1: Main features of the case studies * Nuts 2 is a very recent creation in Denmark Ruhr is defined on the basis of the following Kreise : dortmund, duisburg, essen, bochum, gelschenkirchen, hagen, herne, Mulhelm, bottrop source: Eurostat; National institute for statistics
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2. Main structural features of the vulnerable regions As already stated, vulnerable regions are characterized by a large diversity according to their structures and reactions to vulnerability. However, we can identify at least one common feature of all vulnerable regions, which is the basis of the definition of vulnerable regions: the high specialization in few industrial sectors, which suppose a dependence upon world markets in highly competitive sectors. In textile, the liberalization of European markets has produced a real shock and an acceleration of a restructuring process which goes through the delocalization of the lowly qualified segments of production. The metal industry has suffered for decades of the crisis of the basic metal industry at the world level, but has gone through a recent recovery with high world demand because of the emerging countries. While in a developing market, the European electronic sector has suffered from the world competition, especially in lowly qualified segments. All electronic regions have gone through an important crisis at the beginning of the years 2000, but successful regions have been able to move up in the value chain to higher technological segments. We propose to classify vulnerable regions by some structural dimensions which could explain their position in the European and world markets. These structural features are of major importance when trying to understand the restructuring process and governance factors: public and private strategies can only build on existing structures, which is something sometimes forgotten in the public policies. We synthesize here these structural dimensions and the table 2 positions each case study according to these aspects: - most of the vulnerable regions rely their specialization on a long term tradition and know how, while not all; - the endogenous aspect of economy is related to the propriety structure of the firms: is it mainly dominated by local capital or are big international firms the main driving force of regional economy ? It supposes very different territorial rooting of the economic actors since local actors often do not act like global actors: while local actors could also off-shore some segments of the production, they still maintain commanding functions and qualified segments of production within the region ; global actors remain as long as the factors of attractivity are present (labour cost, fiscal reasons, know-how…). Textile marshallian districts such as Herning or Prato are typical of endogenous economy while, Western Hungary and Northwestern Romania have their development paths dominated by foreign investments of big firms; - size of firms and/or establishments reflect very different processes of development. The regions dominated by big firms strongly depend upon it while networks of small and medium enterprises are often a sign of dynamism. However, small and medium firms do not always have the same capacity of R&D and innovation than big firms. In general, textile regions have small and medium firms while metal have big firms at the heart of their productive system; - innovation and moving up in the value chain is the main response to vulnerability but all regions have not been able to produce such a response: while Finnish regions appear very innovative, it is certainly not the case for Western Hungary or Northern Portugal. We will however distinguish between innovations and technological skill. For example, to a certain extent, we could consider some textile Marshallian districts (Prato, Kortrijk area) as innovative (marketing, …) but with limited technological progress; - innovation is clearly related to the existence of an entrepreneurial spirit (Schumpeter) which, for example, makes people creating their own business (and others seeing it in a positive way) or entrepreneurs finding solutions to new market configurations. The existence
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or not of this entrepreneurship is strongly related to historical factors (see for example Bagnasco, 1997 for Italian textile districts). These structural features have strong relationships between them but are not necessarily correlated.
Ruhr Area Kortrijk Area Liège MidiPyrénées FrancheComté
Innovation/te Entrepreneur chnological ial spirit level
Sector
Tradition
Endogeneity
Firms size
Metal Textile Metal
+ + +
+ ++ -
+ +
+ + =
++ -
-
-
+
+
=
+
-
+
=
=
+ + + + +
++ + ++ ++ -
+
+ + + + -
++ + ++ ++ -
+ + -
+ + +
-
++ ++
= + +
-
-
+
-
-
+
-
+
-
-
-
-
+
-
-
Electronics Metal
Herning Area
Textile
Ivrea area Carpi Prato Asturias Northern Portugal Vaasa Oulu Northwestern Romania Czetochowsk ie Western Hungary
Electronics Textile Textile Metal Textile Electric Electronics Textile, Electronics Metal Electronics
Table 2. Position of the different case studies according to their main structural features. Note: many classifications are based on the expert view rather than objective measures: this is particularly the case for Endogeneity or Entrepreneurial sprit. Legend + or ++ : high or very high = : average - : low
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3. Qualitative typologies On the basis of the main structural features and of the expert views on their regions, we produce a qualitative typology of vulnerable regions. Table 3 synthesizes this classification.
Case studies
Textile marshallian districts
Old industrial metal regions
Electric/onic innovative regions
Exogenous development regions
Main structural features
Tradition, endogenous, small and medium firms, Kortrijk area, Prato, entrepreneurial spirit, Carpi, Herning innovative with limited technologies Liege, Ruhr, Tradition, big firms, low Asturias, entrepreneurial sprit, Czestochowiskie medium technologies High technologies, big firms Oulu, Vaasa, with subcontractors of low Toulouse area, and medium size, (Ivrea area) entrepreneurial spirit Norte Portugal, Exogenous, low Western Hungary, technologies and North-West innovation, no tradition Romania
Table 3. Classifications of the case studies according to the qualitative typologies and main structural features.
Notes: Franche-Comté has not been classified because of internal diversity between the Jura (non textile) districts and areas dominated by big firms in automotive or metal industries. The classification of Ivrea is far from evident because they certainly suffer from a lack of innovation and from the collapse of the main enterprise (Olivetti).
3.1. Textile Marshallian districts (Herning-Ikast, Courtraisis, Prato, Carpi) Origins and historical characteristics Marshallian districts are very dynamic territorial system characterized by a dense network of interconnected and very specialized small and medium entreprises, generally oriented in light industry (Colli, A., 1998). They emerged in very specific historical contexts. In most of the marshallian districts in Europe, we can identify from the literature several common characteristics which could explain the emergence of such specific local industrial network. Firstly, most of these districts have a long tradition in the textile industry, clearly anterior to the industrial revolution (shaving in Carpi, line industry in Flanders, knitting wool clothes in Herning, softening of wool clothes in Prato). This activity was a complement to agricultural production in very dense overpopulated areas and was dominated by a merchant class residing in the very dense urban regional network (Houssel, J.-P., 1995). However, the Herning area is very different, with low density and merchant class. This specific organization lead to a social and economic crisis in the nineteenth century as they miss the train of the industrial revolution, but often more or less survived until the beginning of the twentieth century. Slowly, a local modern entrepreneurship emerged from the crisis. Nevertheless, the real expansion came after the Second World War with a complete renewal of the industrial
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infrastructure. It is interesting to notice that this expansion occurred in sectors of light industry which never interested the big fordist industry. This dynamism has been prolonged after the crisis of the seventies, since the productive system of the marshallian districts were very adapted to the requirements of a post fordist flexible economy. We could say that they have been flexible before the flexible capitalism even emerged. As a consequence, these districts far behind European averages after World war II are all among the most developed of non metropolitan areas today. Secondly, these regions have built a dense network of small and medium interconnected enterprises using subcontracting and constituting strong informal relations. These entreprises are thus fully engaged in a complex dialectical process of cooperation and competition. This very flexible organization is able to answer quickly to the changeable demand of the market. Finally, we observe in most of these areas specific social features, notably what we could call an interclassist “common agreement”. It means concretely that from the worker to the manager, there is the same social and ideological framework. For example, the “Kortrijk area” (south of Western Flanders) is dominated by what we could call the social-christian pillar, while in Prato, the (ex)-communist hegemony guarantees the social cohesion even in business. The restructuring process in the textile industry From the beginning of their emergence, these districts have been able to strengthen their initial success thanks to a process of rising in the technological value chain of textile industry, with innovations that could disperse through the entire regional industrial network. They could consequently evolve to the most promising segments of the textile, or even diversify to other sectors strongly linked to the textile value chain, such as metal production often developed on the basis of textile machinery (Scherrer F., Vanier M., 1995). The recent liberalization of trade in the clothing and textile industries (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Multifibre arrangement) produces a new crisis in all textile regions. Production and employment have severely dropped and local firms had to adapt to survive. We describe here the strategies that firms and regions have put in place in the most recent periods. Firms strategies are to a certain extent similar in these different marshallian districts. They are synthesized as follows for the Prato case study: “1) Production shift to higher level production (i.e finishing or technological textiles) and integrate import of basic yarns or fabrics from lower cost countries (Asia, North Africa or East Europe). It supposes the off-shoring of the low qualified segments of production 2) Exploitation of niches through strong product innovation strategies (especially in design and collections) 3) Move along the value chain, leaving the production and focus only on trade and services Vertical integration and increase in size” (Zirulia, Mariotti). “Two types of firms emerge as the major actors of this restructuring process: 1. Final firms whose activity is mainly cantered in product design, creation of collections, costumer management, market watch, coordination of various production phases, among which some are often outsourced (spinning, waving, knitting, finishing, etc.); 2. Subcontracting firms, which focus on one highly specialised production phase” (Zirulia, Mariotti). We observe nearly the same processes in Herning to a higher extent since production has nearly disappeared in the area, in favour of the “integration of the production, the wholesale
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and the retail trade to penetrate emerging markets, and be better in phase with the demand”. Those firms have off-shored all the production in two different phases: first, to Eastern Europe, and, in a second step, to Eastern Asia. In the Carpi district, some differences appear in the strategies, mainly the subcontracting to other countries have been here much more marginal, and the qualification and diversification of products have gone through internal rather than international subcontracting. More than in the other districts, the new commercial strategies, with the integration of the wholesale function, have been accompanied by the promotion of new brands rather than the anonymous products sold before the crisis. These strategies, while often successful from the firms point of view, has not allowed avoiding the crisis and its social consequences. Of course, the textile decline is, to some extent, exaggerated by the facts that some firms have now be classified in other sectors than textile (wholesale, services such as design) while they are indeed still strongly connected to the sector. Regional restructuring and the role of public policies In some areas, such as the Kortrijk area, the diversification of the industrial economy is already an old story. In Kortrijk, where this process has been the most accomplished, it took two different directions: first, the development of other light sectors for which big international groups were not interested in (wood and furniture for example); moving up to the value chain, for example by the development of a mechanical industry. In the Modena province, the same processes could be observed. In West Jutland, we also observe the development of furniture, but an electronic industry is present, as well as a renewed production of windmills; these latter activities have however no connection with the initial specialization in textile. Compared to this, the Prato has shown a much weaker diversification of its industrial base. However, services have certainly absorbed most of the job losses in these textile districts, where levels of unemployment remain very low. As a matter of fact, in these areas without any important city, high level services have gone through a rapid development, mostly related to the industrial cluster: for example, the local banks which traditionally financed the enterprises of the district. However, on should not exaggerate the development of high level services and of high technological industries: the textile districts remain highly specialized in low or medium technological industries. So, despite the restructuring of the key-sectors and the economic diversification, these districts have gone through a relative decline regarding the European and national average (Table 4). This is particularly true in the Italian districts, while the Danish and Belgian districts have stagnated rather than declined. These real evolutions contrast with the persisting entrepreneurial and innovation spirit we observed in all these regions. What is the cause of this paradox? We could say in a very simple way that marshallian districts are not metropolitan areas and, as a consequence, lacks of what makes the success of the big cities. Mainly, we can identify three major weaknesses in the textile marshallian districts: - the insufficient size of firms, notably in terms of financial capacities and R&D, even if recent evolutions have favoured the development of bigger firms;
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as a consequence of the small size of firms and specialization in traditional sectors, the districts are characterized by a relatively weak level of R&D; finally, the diversification process has certain limits because of the insufficient size of the district, which can remain competitive only if highly specialized.
In this context, what has been the impact of public policies? According to the authors of the case study, public policies have never been decisive in the success of the marshallian districts. But, on the other hand, we could argue that governance factors, understood in a broad sense, have been decisive. It means that the success can be explained by different governance processes: the cooperation between economic actors, often institutionalized, the social consensus which makes every worker a potential entrepreneur (at least in the mind), the existence of an education system strongly connected to the needs of firms, notably through the development of training inside the firms, and public policies. In this context, public policies have naturally accompanied this success story, but have never been the main driving force of it. For example, “The local governments of Herning and the surrounding communes as well as the government of the County of Ringkoebing have always conducted general policies that were positive with respect to firms and economic activities, and for many years – like most Danish local and regional governments - participated in the financing of development councils where enterprise organisations, unions, educational institutions, banks and other interested parties were represented… Concluding this evaluation, regional policies have on the whole been limited to the supply of the same framework conditions for economic development as everywhere else. Specific EU, national, regional or local policies have not played any noteworthy role for the development of the Herning area” (Illeris). For Carpi, the author suggests that “being the result of the same cultural background, also policy makers have traditionally exhibited a dynamic and innovative attitude. In particular, history suggests that policy has always followed and sustained the changes occurring in the district, often following exogenous events, and it never constituted an obstacle to development.” To a certain extent, we could consider that the textile districts have accomplished a model of governance for business, even in the objectives of “clustering policies” which aim to create specialized competitive areas. However, we have to notice that is has been possible only because of a specific cultural context created on very long term perspective and is certainly not easily replicable in other contexts. In this favourable context, recent trends in the public policies do not distinguish in the objectives from what could be observed in other regions. In the Italian districts however, local policies still act in the traditional sectors by favouring the dissemination of innovations (research centres) and information on markets, and the professional training within organizations financed by public authorities.
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GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average) Textile employment
Kortrijk area*
Prato
1995 2000
132 (102) 131 (104)
152 (126) 135 (115)
Carpi (Modena Province) 142 (128) -
2005
123 (101)
116 (111)
133 (127)
123 (97)
6,2 (73) 17059 14053
6,3 (82)
3,7 (34)
4 (83) 12085 3626
Herning**
2005 Total 1995 Total 2005 share in 2005
Share of manufacturing industries
2005
Share of high-level services
2005
7,2
4,2
27,5 (128)
31,8 (147)
34,9 (161)
25,9 (105)
24,2 (93)
28,6 (112)
25,1 (98)
20,5 (101)
Table 4. Dynamics of the 4 textile industrial districts Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two lines, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Belgium and Denmark, Milano and Roma in Italy). *Arrondissement of Kortrijk, Tielt and Roselaere ** County of Ringkoebing
3.2. Old industrial metal regions (Liege, Ruhr, Asturias, Czestochowskie) Origins, crisis and main characteristics Those old industrial regions have a common history: precociously industrialized (second half of the nineteenth century except for Czestochowskie), they constituted the heart of their respective industrial nation, before entering in a long and structural crisis from the fifties. The origin of industrialization is based on primary resources, mainly coal and, to a lesser extent, iron ore. On this basis, a strong basic metallurgy is born, sometimes on the basis of traditional know how in proto-industrial metallurgy (Ruhr, Liege), as well as diversified activities of fabricated metal products. Czestochowskie has a rather different story: relatively marginal on the context of industrial Silesia, major developments of heavy industries –while not absent before- took place after WWII, under the communist regime. The existing infrastructures and political considerations, - to erase the cultural influence of the traditional pilgrimage place-, explain the location of huge steelworks in the city. In the same time, the development of textile industries can be explained by the will of the communist regimes to develop female employment in the region. On this common background, the crisis has been general and the relative decline continues during the 1995-2005 period, as illustrated in table 5. In the same time, unemployment remains at very high level for nearly three decades. The major causes of this crisis are common to the different regions, even if the timing is different: - the sectoral crisis of coal, as early as the 50’s, and of the basic metal industry, from the 70’s. Due to the strong specialization in those sectors, the sectoral crisis has here become regional crisis, especially from the 70’s, with the deterioration of the global 10
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-
-
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economic context. To a certain extent, due to its size, the Ruhr economy appears to be more diversified than the other regions we are focusing on ; the domination of big firms, often external to the region or even from the country, with the notable exception of the Ruhr area, where the firms are still in possession of local capitalists. In the three other regions, basic metal industry has been sold by the state, which acquired it during the crisis, to big international firms (Mittal in Asturias and Liege, Industrial group of Donbass in Czestochowskie). The lack of local capitalism has weakened the regional economies, because of the absence of regional embeddedness of the major actors; the weaknesses of high level services in these traditionally mono-industrial regions, except, to some extent, in the Ruhr area. In none of these areas, we find a metropolitan area with international functions; the lack of entrepreneurship is also a general feature: the precocious and massive salarization has completely destroyed the reservoir of entrepreneurs (small artisan, merchants, or even farmer); the bad image of the regions, because of deteriorated landscape and sometimes the bad reputation of the workforce.
The restructuring process and public interventions The restructuring process of industrial activities is an old story in these regions, except in Czestochowskie, where it suddenly begins after the collapse of communism. Generally, it has been dictated by the evolution of the market, severely declining from the seventies. Most of the restructuring process has consisted in the progressive closure of the less profitable activities and in progresses in productivity, to the detriment of employment. In this process, the state and public bodies have generally played an important role through two mechanisms: - the nationalization process, except in the Ruhr. In this context, public bodies were decision makers in the whole restructuring process, which has been to some extent amortized by financial injections. In the Ruhr area, there has been no nationalization and big local enterprises (Thyssen-Krupp, Mannesmann…) have been the major actors of the restructuring processes which sometimes suffered from an unfair competition with subsidized nationalized steel industries elsewhere in Germany and across Europe; - anticipated pension has been the general social response to the employment collapse. The power of trade unions in these old and concentrated industries explains this relatively favourable social compromise, mainly financed by social state. Both trade unions and public bodies favour a relatively defensive strategy of restructuring, trying to maintain as long as possible what could be maintained. This policy was probably the only possible because of the specific balance of powers existing in these regions. Also, it has limited the social and probably also the economic crisis, by amortizing the social effects of the crisis, even if it delayed the restructuring process. In the same times, diversification of economies has been the main preoccupation of the regional policies. However, in these old industrial areas, priority has often been given to the attraction of industrial firms by the improvement of infrastructure and the providing of industrial parks which have often multiplied rapidly from the 70’s. Successes have generally been weak in this process of economic diversification: big firms (automotive….) hesitate to invest in these old industrial areas, even if some specific activities find here a competent specialized workforce (aeronautics in Wallonia, Machinery in the Ruhr and Asturias…). As a
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consequence, deindustrialization process has been very fast: Ruhr areas and Liege province are now less industrialized than the national average, while the specialization of Asturias in the manufacturing industries is to be confronted with the under industrialized Spanish economy. In Czestochowskie, the picture is rather different, since the lateness of the restructuring process has not still erased the industrial specificity of the region. In Liege and the Ruhr, we also have to mention the development of logistics activities, sustained by important investments in private-public partnership. As a result, old industrial areas are now dominated by services activities but the nature of these service activities differ from one region to another: - Liege is very specific of non market services, in relation with the general weakness of high level services and the importance of public powers in the restructuring process. To a certain extent, we could argue that the specificity in non market services is explained by the underdevelopment of other market activities, whether industrial or services. But, we have to mention that some high level non market services are present here, especially the biggest University of the French-speaking Belgium; - The Ruhr area is specific of high level services in the German context (once excluded the four major metropolitan areas), which is something quite exceptional for an old industrial area. The existence of a local capitalism has certainly favoured this diversification through high level services. Moreover, Ruhr area has reached a critical mass and could be considered as a multipolar metropolitan area because of the importance of the structural relations between the different cities as well as the quality of the transport system; - In Asturias, the relative specialization in high level services is to be replaced in the Spanish context, where these services are generally relatively weak; - In Czestochowskie, all services are underspecific. In the recent years, there has been acceleration of a specialization/technological process in the basic metal activities. Massive new investments have occurred in all regions, focusing on the latest technologies and very specific segments of production. It has been allowed by the new world context with a growing demand of steel from the emerging economies, and especially for high quality products of the European metal industry. As examples, we can mention the opening in 1999 of a new state-of-technology cast rolling plant in Duisburg-Bruckhausen (flat steel), the specialization on “cold casting” in Liege (even if the foreseen abandonment of “hot casting” has been delayed by Mittal due to the favourable conjuncture), or the specialization of production in the energy sector for the Russian market in Poland. In the Ruhr area, a spatial concentration to the benefit of Duisburg has also occurred. However, the recent recovery of the metal industry has not been reflected in an employment growth: at best, employment has been maintained with a fast growing production. Unemployment is still a major challenge for these regions. New policies and governance structure Traditional responses to the crisis in the old industrial areas focus on the physical infrastructure, especially transport and industrial parks. Rehabilitation of industrial areas have been a priority for all these regions, given the large surfaces which were degraded. The expansion of the education system has also been a main target of these policies, even if professional training has remained very high and concentrated on declining professions. As a
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result, the Ruhr expert notices that “all these long-term programmes have led to an excellent infrastructure, even when compared to other European regions, but they all failed to create new jobs in the secondary sector” (Siebert). The same could be said from Liege and Asturias provinces, but certainly not of Czestochowskie in Poland. Public policies and planning have followed the same paths at least in the three western old industrial areas. Main focus has been put on four major fields: - technology and innovation. For example, 13 centres of enterprises and innovation have been created in the industrial part of Asturias in the recent years, financed by local government and European Union. In the Ruhr also, “The large number of start-up and technology centres indicates that cooperation among universities and economy is good, as far as the transfer of technology and sufficient venture capital is concerned. An efficient cooperation between universities, local administrations, the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, unions and banks has proved to be of great importance as far as the development of the quaternary sector – research and development – is concerned” (Siebert). However, “it has not been enough to simply provide new areas for commercial and industrial use or to build technology centres without caring about the creation of new networks of firms, lines of business and products. After the retreat of the coal and steel industry, most of the new innovation industries in the Ruhr area would still lack links and objectives. The main obstacle would be the lack of cooperation and communication among the structural politics of the state on the one hand, and municipal stimulation of the economy on the other hand.” (Bronny et al., 2004). What we could call cluster strategies have highly been promoted in the Ruhr area and the Liege province, focusing on follow-up industries of metal rather than the metal sector itself. In the Ruhr area, “the selection of those ‘sunrise industries’ is based in criteria like the impact on the employment market and the economic structure, knowledge and technology orientation or orientation on SME” (Siebert) : from 2007, it includes the sectors health, nutrition, logistics, advanced materials, nano-, micro-and bio-technologies, automotive, machinery and plant engineering, synthetics, chemicals, environmental technologies, energy, IT, media and cultural economy. In Wallonia, it focuses on the food industry, aeronautics, mechanical engineering, transportation and logistics, and bio-technologies; - the education system and, in accordance with the precedent objectives, the cooperation between Universities and the regional firms; - the entrepreneurship. The lack of entrepreneurial spirit is a major concern of regional policies which have tried by different ways to promote own business creations; - unemployed people. Major evolutions have been the development of further education for low qualified unemployed ejected from industries. Programs of “entrepreneurship” promotion have also focused on this population. However, these policies have been put in place under very different structures. Only, in Asturias, we find a relevant administrative structure fitting the industrial region. In the three other regions, the major regional actor is larger than the industrial area we focus on: Lander of Nord-Rhein Westphalia for the Ruhr, Walloon Region for the Liege industrial basin and Silesia for Czestochowskie voivodship. For example, these levels (or the national level) are responsible for the employment policies, the cluster promotions and the education system. However, many development structures have been created to promote the area: they generally have in charge the development of physical infrastructure to attract new industries. Major weaknesses are probably to be found in the more informal structures of cooperation, notably because of the industrial structure dominated by big international firms. To a certain extent, we could generalize the statement made for the Ruhr area that “it has not been enough to simply provide new areas for commercial and industrial use or to build technology centres
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without caring about the creation of new networks of firms, lines of business and products” (Siebert).
GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average) Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average)
Liege (province)
Ruhr
Czestochowskie
Asturias
1995 2000
101 (78) 95 (75)
135 (105) 119 (100)
? 42 (88)
81 (88) 82 (84)
2005
89 (74)
117 (102)
45 (88)
90 (87)
2005
12 (143)
14,7 (131)
21,5 (121)
10,2 (110)
Total 1995 Employment in the metal sector (DJ)
42800*
35 285
33300**
?
28 220 7 (including mining)
20, 5 (95) 24,9 (93)
35,1 (135)
22,4 (122)
24,1 (93)
13,2 (80)
19,3 (102)
Total 2005 share (%) in 2005
Share of manufacturing industries
2005
Share of high-level services
2005
28,2 (102)
Table 5. Dynamics of the 4 metal regions Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Belgium and Poland, Madrid and Barcelona in Spain, the four major cities of Germany). *Whole Silesia (2000 instead of 1995) ** Whole Silesia
3.3. Innovative « electric and electronic » regions (Oulu, Vaasa, Toulouse, Ivrea) Despite the specialization in a vulnerable sector, the most specialized regions have had better performances in the “Electric and optical sector” than the others. It means that a concentration process is occurring in this sector. Three of the case studies perfectly illustrate this feature, but not Ivrea (Table 6). Oulu and Vaasa districts as well as the Toulouse areas have remarkably performed in both high technological industrial activities related to electric or electric equipment and globally. Despite the distance, the difference of scale and of structure, some common features are to be found to explain those performances: - their specialization is in a globally growing sector, even if vulnerable to international competition and rather weak in Europe ; - those regions have a specific firms structure, dominated by few (or one) large firms which are at the centre of a network of different layers of subcontracting firms, often of small or medium size. The dependency to the big firm is temperate by the local embededness of the firms and the needs of the know how possessed by the local firms. Indeed, it is not so easy to rebuild such a network of medium and high technological firms somewhere else. In Toulouse, the dependency is however more accurate, because the aeronautics firm Airbus is a giant whose location is also a result of a
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-
-
political decision: this sector is by far the first client of the electronic industry in the region. In Ivrea, the collapse of the Olivetti firms has been a hard blow to the local economy; but it is interesting to notice that a real electronic district made of small and medium enterprises revived from the Olivetti ashes. It proves that the regional know how, originally initiated by the big firm, the specialized education system and workforce are important factors to explain the maintaining of a competitive technological sector despite the collapse of the major enterprise which initiates the cluster; high education level is certainly a decisive factor. The Finnish districts benefit from the general success of the national education system, while Toulouse region is characterized by the importance of its universities as well as the high education level (the Midi-Pyrénées is the second national pole for education and research). In all cases, the local education system provides a specialized workforce for the local enterprises: Faculty of Technology in Oulu, University of Vaasa, Université Paul Sabatier in Toulouse. In Vaasa, local experts estimate that “A core explanation to the resilience of the vulnerable sector is its deep knowledge specialization, generated through co-evolution of institutions providing poly-technical education, and corporate actors supporting on-the-job-training and life-long education” (Virkkala and al.); Policies had been of major importance to explain these regional success stories, and not only through the education system, while in very different ways in Finland and in the Toulouse urban area. In Oulu, “the Triple Helix cooperation between the university, business and public sector in electronics, ICT and electric-related industries has played a fundamental role” (Jauhiainen and al.). The Triple Helix practice was implemented as soon as the 1950’s. “The cooperation intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. The development of technology was supported also by the local authorities. In 1982, the first technology park of the Nordic Countries was established in Oulu. Soon, the local authorities proclaimed Oulu as the technology city and a state research center was opened… The 1990s witnessed a rapid transformation. Nationally designed regional and innovation policies supported the growth and internationalization in electronics and clustered globally relevant technologies. The Faculty of Technology in Oulu grew very fast and provided skilled labor to Nokia mobile phone R&D, especially in GSM mobile phones” (Jauhiainen and al.). In sum, according to Finnish experts, “characteristic for the Oulu area is an active Triple Helix cooperation between technology business, higher education and research and public authorities. For decades, this practice has facilitated internationalization of electronics and electricrelated industries, knowledge-based development and provided on-site Living Lab testing opportunities”. They add “the Triple Helix approach has taken also new forms. Increasingly, the inhabitants test high technology prototypes, making the Oulu area a Living Lab with the Octopus and X-polis projects. Over 60 companies, such as Nokia, Finnet, TietoEnator and TeliaSonera, and communities participate in the Triple Helix cooperation. Oulu supports an open access to the Internet by everyone and develops public services based on the new technologies. These include, for example, wireless mobile services and user-driven citizen technologies supporting e-governance” (Jauhiainen and al.). In Vaasa also, “in various ways, the competitive strategies of the local industrial actors are supported by public sector initiatives, such as municipal planning, creating industrial parks enhancing efficient supplier logistics, as well as regional innovation support programs, supporting the setting up of institutions such as Merinova, promoting further development of the cluster” (Virkkala and al.). In MidiPyrénées, especially Toulouse, decisive public intervention came from the national state rather than local governance structure, especially through decentralization
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process from the 60’s, which made of Toulouse the aeronautics pole of France and later for Europe. However, regional know how and good education system has also favoured the location of new national (cancéropôle) or European programs (Galileo). However, because of their high connection with world markets, these regions could still be considered as vulnerable. The collapse of Olivetti during the 90’s at the centre of the Ivrea district has had economic impact for years. More importantly, the regions are very dependent on the state of the markets: they all deeply suffer from the 2000-2003 crisis in new technologies; the electronic industries of Toulouse urban area are very dependent on the Airbus wealth facing a difficult competition with Boeing. During this period, Finnish big enterprises, especially Nokia, accelerated the process of delocalization, mainly of the lowest segments of production but not only since even R&D has been developed in the Asian markets by Nokia. This delocalization process had social consequences for the low qualified labour.
Oulu*
Vaasa*
Toulouse (HauteGaronne)
1995 2000
96 (89) 100 (85)
96 (89) 103 (87)
127 (109) 124 (108)
2005
99 (86)
102 (89)
121 (108)
Unemployment rate 2005, (and accroding to national average)
2005
11,1 (132)
8,8 (104)
8,1 (85)
Employment in the “electric and optical equipment” sector (DL)
Total 1995 Total 2005 share (%) in 2005
6235 9894
3535 2781
10,4
6,1
Share of manufacturing industries
2005
Share of high-level services
2005
GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average)
29,2 (104) 30,7 (109) 17,1 (96)
10,9 (66)
18,1 (101) 34,0 (1,21)
Table 6. Dynamics of the 3 innovative electric/electronic areas Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns, the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in Finland and France). Figures for Ivrea have been excluded since the inclusion in the Torino province makes the figures not relevant to analyze the Ivrea local labour system. * all figures refer to the NUTS2 area except the employment in the vulnerable sector which fits to the area of the case studies itself
3.4. Exogenous development regions (Western Hungary, North-Western Romania, Northern Portugal)
The name of the type refers to the importance of massive foreign investments during a certain period in a specific sector, which makes the development of those regions dependant from large or medium transnational firms (Table 7).
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The attraction of foreign investments relies in general on some comparative advantages: - low wages, or a good quality/price ratio of the workforce; - tradition or even existing plants bought by foreign firms; - good location according to the investors and/or the main markets. The quality/price ratio of he workforce seems to be the major attractive factor for the labour intensive activities developed in these regions. However, these regions follow three different development paths and have attained different levels of development nowadays. Northern Portugal is a traditional textile area. However, from the 80’s, the foreign investments, in relation with the entry in the EU, have accelerated the development of the clothing and footwear industry, while textile was declining. The cheap labour is partially due to the maintaining of complementary agricultural activities. Northern Portugal is still a relatively poor region in Western Europe, even when comparing to the national average. The crisis of textile industry from the late 90’s explains a part of the blocking of the catching up process. However, the relative decline of the Porto metropolitan area, in comparison with Lisboa in terms of commanding functions for example, has also played a role in this relative decline of Northern Portugal. At the difference of traditional marshallian districts, the model of small enterprises have here been associated with a high outside dependence (most of the firms are subcontractors of foreigner firms), and, as a result, the firms networks is not controlled by local firms. In the same time, wages remain relatively low (but not as low as in the Eastern Europe or Eastern Asia), due to the lack of qualification and the existence of complementary incomes coming from agricultural activity. Despite these unfavourable factors, signs of diversification exist. In the manufacturing industries, we can observe the development of electric and automotive industries. In the same time, there has been development of services but, as we already mention, high level services are increasingly located in Lisboa and touristic developments mainly benefit to Southern Portugal. To a certain extent, both Eastern regions we have studied followed the same path: high attractivity for foreigner investments followed by a decrease of comparative advantages, especially regarding the cost of labour. In Western Hungary, massive investments in the electronic industry have been favoured by the location near the Western market. Moreover, the market economy was to some extent already prepared under the Hungarian communist regime. Western regions of Hungary were the first destination for massive investments in the labour intensive segments of production of the largest electronic transnational firms (Siemens, Philips, IBM,…): cheap and relatively qualified labour has been a decisive factor with the proximity of West European markets. Tax exemptions have been the main policy accompanying this process, but it progressively came to an end, notably with the entry in the EU. Local firms are nearly absent from this exogenous development. As a consequence, the region has known a rapid development: NyugatDunántúl has levelled up from 52 to 62% of the GDP/inhab. European average (only Budapest could develop faster due to its metropolitan functions), while the most rural region of Dél-Dunántúl stagnated around 42 to 44% of this average. From 2004, we observed a slowdown of this process and even relocations of industrial establishments outside the region. The initial comparative advantages progressively vanished, especially for the lowest qualified segments: the labour became more expansive, the proximity to Western markets became less
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decisive, and tax exemption came to an end. Relocations are observed to Eastern Hungary, Romania and mainly, Eastern Asia. Remaining production process has been upgraded but these “developments mean a dramatic situation in some smaller towns in Transdanubia, where the only job opportunity was provided by the leaving electronics plants”. The same process can be described from north-western Romania where a textile development occurred from the late nineties, due to foreigner investments, especially from Italian firms. During the recent years (from the end of the 90’s), growth has been high in the region, but from a very low level, from 24 to 34% of the European average, that is to say the same pace than the average growth of Romania, but rather faster than Eastern regions of Romania. However, these evolutions came after the collapse of the Romanian economy, which we can also observe with the dramatic evolutions of employment: in north-western Romania, employment dropped from 933 thousands in 1991 to 576 in 2000 and 595 in 2006. Paradoxically, it did not result in a growing unemployment because of emigration, return to the land and development of a black economy. This situation is not specific to North-West but concerns the whole Romania. How can we explain the recent years of growth in North-western Romania? As for Western Hungary, but some years later, the western location inside Romania explains that the region became a privileged destination for these foreign investments. However, these investments in the textile industry rely on a much more underdeveloped economy with less qualified workforce than in the Hungarian situation. Moreover, after some years of boom, the textile cycle seems already to come to an end around 2004-2005: the cycle has been even shorter than what we observed for electronic industry in Western Hungary. The same causes are to be found than in Western Hungary: end of tax exemptions, more expansive labour in those segments of production compared to Eastern Asia, which attract most of the recent investments. However, it seems that a new cycle has taken over in the region, with the concentration of foreign investments in the low qualified segments of the electric and electronic equipments. As a conclusion, foreign investments have been the major factor of development in those regions, which all have known high growths in their period of major attractivity. To a certain extent, these regions have been for a time in the benefiting group of globalization in the vulnerable sectors, by attracting delocalization rather than suffering from it. However, this very dependent model of development quickly came to an end when the initial factors of success disappear, especially when the workforce became too expansive. Northern Portugal is exactly in this in between situation, unable to sustain an endogenous technological development or to attract high technologies but already too expansive to attract new investors in the low qualified segments. In addition, the metropolitan area of Porto is weakened in the national context in the benefit of Lisboa. Western Hungary shows good signs of being able upgrading the production process while still in a very dependent way. However, the region has already locally suffered from relocations of the low qualified segments. In North-Western Romania, it is probably too early to see if the regions will still benefit from foreigner investments after the apparent end of the “textile cycle”.
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48 (92) 53 (95)
NorthWestern Romania 24 (94)
54 (84)
34 (95) 5,9 (82)
Western Hungary GDP/inhab.according to European average (and national average)
1995 2000 2005
Northern Portugal 63 (84) 64 (81) 60 (79)
Unemployment rate 2005, (and according to national average)
2005
7,2 (100)
Employment in the vulnerable sector
Total 1995 Total 2005 share (%) in 2005
29378 53578
227964 180043
6,2
16,6
Share of other manufacturing industries
2005
Share of high-level services
2005
8,8 (115)
30,3 (99)
27,8 (92)
25,1 (118)
16,6 (107)
15,4 (115)
17,6 (103)
Table 7. Dynamics of the 3 exogenous development areas Figures between brackets refer to the level according to national average and, for the last two columns; the national average is without the main metropolitan areas (The capitals in the three countries).
3.4. Franche-Comté This region has not been classified in the qualitative typology because of its internal diversity. This industrial region has two types of industrial structure: the first is dominated by big firms, especially automotive industries but also metal industry, and their subcontractors; the second are typical Marshallian districts (long tradition, networks of small enterprises…), especially clock-making and spectacle frames industry in the Jura, a mountainous region of Eastern France. The specialisation in clock-making and other precisions instruments explain the classification of the region as a “electric, electronic and optical equipments” vulnerable region. Most of the industrial production is dominated by traditional activities, whether organized around big firms (metal industries) or in districts (clock-making). These industries have severely declined in the last two decades. Franche-Comté is a typical vulnerable region: on the one hand, big firms have developed off-shoring in the low qualified segments of production in the metal and automotive industries and, on the other hand, the districts have not been able to face international competition. In the clock-making industries, the crisis has been particularly important (from 14000 jobs in 1970 to 2855 today): on the one hand, the low segments have been lost because of Asian competition and, on the other hand, the marketing positioning in the up-market has been insufficient, and has not been able to face the Swiss competition. So, the firms are specialized as component producers or as assemblers and sellers but do not have the technological skill. They have limited financial capacities, a weak know how in design and do not invest in R&D. Weaknesses of marshallian districts are quite obvious in this case. However, on the base of the clock-making industry, an original policy has been developed. The know how associated to this declining activity has pushed public powers to develop
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micro-technical industries as soon as the eighties. A voluntarist policy has been put in place through the education system, the development of institutional research and the support to all types of activities related to the micro-technics. However, this policy has not produced the expected results: the technological skill for electronics components remains weak and these components are still imported; mainly, most of the firms are subcontractors in the upstream segments of the sector, which make difficult the upsurge of structural collaborations between firms. In sum, because of these structural weaknesses, there is a gap between the institutional will and the reality of the local industry. As the author states, “Micro-technical regional industry, dominated by SME, is in subcontracting position towards firms coming from different sectors. Microtechnical industry in Franche-Comté remains vulnerable and dependent: it is not territorially organized, neither specialized in specific segments and does not possess technological skill for electronic components, which are necessary for the manufacture of microtechnical systems” (Bergeon et al.).
4. Conclusions From the analysis of vulnerable regions, several factors of success emerge related to the firms. First, the activity sector is decisive: while textile regions are suffering from the growing international competition, despite their positioning in technological segments or in commanding functions, electronic regions benefit from a growing world demand, even if the regions have to abandon the low technological segments. Second, the size of firms is an important element. Big firms certainly suppose regional dependence upon it but small and medium enterprises are suffering sometimes of insufficient financial capacity and R&D. Of course, to a certain extent, the existence of networking and collaboration between firms is an important factor of success -and could compensate the insufficient size of enterprises in some regions- , notably because it allows the diffusion of technologies but also for commercial penetration strategies. If marshallian districts represent the model of collaboration, regions with big firms can also obtain efficient networks of enterprises through chains of subcontracting. Finally, the embededness of firms and the endogeneity of development are also important factors to face structural change. For example, exogenous big firms in Eastern Europe (Western Hungary, North-Eastern Romania) are clearly not embedded in the industrial tissue of the region. This is certainly not the case of Nokia in Northern Finland, which depends upon the technological skill of the local industry as much as the local industry depends on Nokia. Another example is given by the difference between big metal firms of the Ruhr, clearly embedded in the area, and big transnational firms controlling metal activity in the Liege or Asturias areas : when the first decides to abandon some industrial segments, something remains inside the area, especially the highest functions, while it is not the case for the second. Marshallian districts also show this opposition: “weak marshallian districts”, such as Norte Portugal is suffering from the importance of external capital, while in most successful marshallian districts (Herning, Kortrijk area, Prato), strategic functions do not leave the region. Of course, the origin of capital is not the decisive factor, since the firms do not leave the region as soon as the factors of attractiveness of the regions remain. This leads us to a second range of successful factors related to the structural context in which firms are embedded. Case studies have pointed some decisive factors. The quality of the workforce is a central element to keep investors in, at least in the high segments of production. It supposes a good education system and in many cases a connection between the education and institutional research system and the industrial network. Too much specialization of the education system is however a potential problem when the sector is in
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crisis. The price of the labour has also been an important factor of attractiveness but certainly not of embededness, since the firms could leave as soon as they find cheaper somewhere else. Another contextual factor of success is the entrepreneurial spirit, whose historical origins are not easy to apprehend. For example, this strong entrepreneurship, combined with a local know how, has limited the consequences of the collapse of Olivetti in Ivrea. This factor clearly differentiate old metal regions and textile marshallian districts: in the first type of regions, the precocious attraction of workforce in the mining and metal industries has destroyed the reservoir of entrepreneurship of small merchants and artisans. Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of structural factors of success in vulnerable regions, but a selection of the most frequently mentioned by the local experts. Moreover, the separation between firm’s strategies and regional context is a bit artificial. What have been the public policies and which impacts did it produce on the regional welfare? We could first mention regional policies which have been favoured all over Europe. These policies have been implemented to create favourable conditions for economic growth and to improve the regional environment in which firms are acting. The focus on education is a general feature of these policies, at least in the recent years. However, the way it has been implemented, and the impact on the regional welfare are certainly behind the framework of this study. However, Finland, because of high general performances in education, and Toulouse, because of the concentration of education structures, are clearly two cases where this factor has been very important to explain the economic success. To favour institutional research and the collaboration between Universities and local industry is another example of structural policies which have been put in place all over the regions, for example through the promotion of spin-off. However, one could hardly say if the success in Northern Finland or Toulouse could be explained by such a policy or because this collaboration is the consequence of a general positive dyanmics. The accent on the entrepreneurship is also a common feature, especially in the old heavy industrial regions, but with little success, especially when programs focus on the most vulnerable population (unemployed from the vulnerable sectors). More precisely, these vulnerable regions nearly all inscribe their industrial policies in the “cluster paradigm”. The will is to create a critical mass in some sectors or segments of production mainly through the development of small and medium enterprises, the promotion of collaboration and networking between them and the improvement of the connection with the education research institutional system. The critical mass would help to stay competitive by the diffusion of innovation. To a certain extent, local and regional policies try to promote what already exist in the marshallian districts, generally without any decisive public intervention. Old industrial regions and Franche-Comté clearly show the limits of these policies which are often limited by structural obstacles such as the lack of entrepreneurship or the external dependence. Moreover, despite the will to concentrate on some specific sectors, the reality is often different and the human resources and financial means are too often scattered, as we can observe in the Ruhr or in Wallonia. However, in some of the successful regions, public interventions have been decisive by direct investments. Northern Finland and the Toulouse area are good examples, while in a less decisive way in the first case. In Oulu, the promotion of the city as a technology city was proclaimed by local authorities but concretely supported by the National state. In Toulouse, behind the investments in the education system, Toulouse has been chosen as the main aeronautics pole in France and Europe and it has produced a strong technological cluster
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Case study 1: The Textile District of the Herning Area, Denmark Sven Illeris, Roskilde University This is one of the case studies made in connection with the study ”Vulnerability to Globalisation”, made for the Directorate General Regio of the European Commission. As such, its purpose is, first, to explain the performance of a vulnerable region – vulnerable in a high-wage part of the World because of the traditional dominance of the textile and clothing industry in the area, a sector which due to its low entry barriers in terms of qualifications and technology is exposed to competition from low-wage countries. And, second, to evaluate regional policies that have been conducted to solve problems caused by such processes of globalisation. Herning is a town situated in Western Jutland, a traditionally peripheral and poor part of Denmark. As delimited before the Local Government Reform of 1st January 2007, it has 60,000 inhabitants. The Herning area corresponds to the south-eastern half of the County of Ringkoebing and the adjoining parts of the counties of Viborg and Aarhus (see figure 1). (These counties were abolished as part of the Local Government reform), The textile industry of the Herning area has constituted a typical ”industrial district” or ”cluster”, characterized by an entrepreneurial culture and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises located close to one another.
Figure 1. The situation of Herning, the Herning clothing district, and the County of Ringkoebing The case has been studied over two decades by an array of sources – statistics, interviews, scientific literature, memoirs of persons involved, newspapers, reports from various
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authorities and organisations. Given the short time available for the work on the report, collection of additional information has been very limited. Economic activities are in this case study measured by employment, partly because subnational DGP data are only available on county level and only for recent years, and partly because employment data are politically more relevant, in particular in connection with globalisation effects. This report will first describe the structure and functioning of the economic activities in the the area up to 1990. Second, the dramatic changes that took place in the area after 1990, when the process of globalisation accelerated, will be discussed. Third, some evaluations will be offered, both of the statistical data which studies of regional economic development have to apply, and of the regional policies relevant to such situations (including policies to promote cluster-building). Finally, it will be attempted to draw the main conclusions from the case study. The Herning district up to 1990 In the Herning area, the origins of the clothing production can be traced back to the poor farmers of the sandy, heath-covered western Jutland of the 17th century. The farmers started knitting wool clothes, which were sold all over Denmark and Norway by ambulant stocking vendors. In the second half of the 19th century, the heathlands were recultivated, the population increased rapidly, and in the former townless district, Herning grew up at a highway crossings and railway junction. Herning was primarily a service town, but both in the town and in the surrounding district, some manufacturing enterprises were established, including textile and clothing production. Under the protectionist umbrella of the 1930s, entrepreneurs in Herning, the small town of Ikast 10 km.s to the east, and the villages of the area saw their chance to expand the textile and clothing industry. During World War II – with no imports and scarcity of raw materials – all that could be produced could be sold. After the war, international trade was liberalized in western Europe. Much of the West European textile and clothes production succumbed to the increased competition – including that of the previously leading Danish industry in Copenhagen, see figure 2. The Herning firms, however, seized the liberalisation to expand their sales. In the 1950s, they started to export to the Scandinavian countries, and the Danish EC-membership in 1973 was used to start an export to West Germany. Table 1 shows the changing employment in the manufacturing of textiles and clothing. Table 1. Employment in textile, clothing and leather manufacturing, 1925-2005 HerningCounty of Ringkoebing Denmark 1925 806 2,010 70,706 1948 3,442 6,667 113,374 1970 5,563 10,980 65,266 1993 4,230 12,085 27,785 2005 1,330 3,626 10,031 Sources: 1925 and 1948: Censuses of industry. Herning = Borough of Herning.
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1970: Census of population. 1993 and 2005: Register of labour force. Herning= the 1970 municipality. While the County of Ringkoebing before World War II was one of the least industrialized in Denmark, in 1970 it had become the relatively most industrialized. This was largely due to its textile and clothing industry, which in Herning was responsible for 56% of the total manufacturing employment, in the County of Ringkoebing for 35%. In some periods, new factories were set in villages where it was still possible to recruit labour, and other labour was invited from foreign countries.
Figure 2. Sources as in table 1. How could the Herning area – much against the expectations of all “experts” – first so rapidly expand and later stabilize its employment in this sector? Undoubtedly, a combination of several factors have contributed (Illeris 1992). The spirit of entrepreneurship, innovation and openness to do new things or to do them in new ways or on new markets is important. This was connected with the structure of the sector, consisting in the Herning area of 500-1000 small, unbureaucratic firms. In 1958, the textile and clothing enterprises in Herning employed on average 14 persons, in the County of Ringkoebing 9. Only few firms have ever had more than 150 employees. Many of the firms failed, but new entrepreneurs – with few exceptions local people - always started. The competitiveness depended on making clever use of existing ideas found somewhere, rather than on inventing something really new. And the level of formal education was low, the knowledge involved was practical rather than theoretical. Over the second half of the 20th century, products of a higher quality were gradually introduced. Most firms switched from stockings and under-garments to a variety of more sophisticated and fashionable products. Knitware remained a specialisation, ladies´ dresses, sportsware for both sexes and children´s clothes are good examples. Several firms focussed on the growing market formed by teenage girls. Important textile products were carpets and upholstery fabrics, while spinning and weaving of intermediate products tended to be abandoned. 25
There was as much, perhaps even more focus on process innovation as on product innovation. The machine importers and the user firms were well aware of technical progress. The focus on machines may be seen in connection with the cost consciousness present in this traditionally poor area. The buildings in which the firms had started were the cheapest possible premises – often cellars, stables, garages etc, spread all over the towns and villages. Only gradually, better planned factory buildings in planned industrial estates were built. Wages were before World War II very low (but during the agricultural crisis of the 1930s, it was still possible to earn more as a textile worker than as a farmer). After World War II, wage levels approached the national level, and since housing is cheap, the wage level in real terms became higher than in Copenhagen (Kristensen 1992). Work was organized in a Taylorist way, and the repetitive and unergonomic movements were a problem for the seamstresses – at least until the1980s when firms started to change their organisation of work, partly under pressure from a young generation of female workers. Labour relations could be said to constitute an asset. The workers – often former farmers or having grown up on farms – were late to create unions, but after World War II unionisation became widespread (as it generally is in Denmark). However, the unions in the Herning area tended to identify more with the employers than elsewhere, strikes were rare, and the workers were generally loyal and motivated. This must be understood in connection with the fact that many workers would like to start on their own some day, and that they often knew the employers as family members, neighbours or friends. On the other hand, most employers – while leading their firms in a patriarchal way – treated their personnel well. While the level of formal education as mentioned was low, tacit as well as codified knowledge of textile and clothes production became widespread. Many of the local people had a job in the sector, and if not, they had at least family members, friends or neighbours who had. The local “buzz” focussed on the production of clothes, the newspaper wrote about it, etc. Besides, the employers already at the end of World War II created a school for their personnel, where further qualifications could be obtained. Finally, the firms cooperated directly or indirectly in various ways. The most important direct cooperation between the firms was the outsourcing of sewing and knitting operations to specialized actors, who in the early days were often persons with some other job, in their spare time working as sub-contractors for a firm. Later, a small army of sub-contracting sewing firms came into existence, which made the production system very flexible. Operations requiring special knowledge, such as dyeing, were generally sub-contracted to specialists. Most cooperation, however, was indirect: Supporting services were created by the clothes manufacturers, such as the school, already mentioned; or the organisation of textile and clothing firms (which has its head office in Herning, while all other Danish business organisations are Copenhagen-based); or the trade fairs, started in 1947 in cooperation with the Borough of Herning, which now has the largest fair complex in Scandinavia. (But the fashion fairs have moved to Copenhagen which is internationally more accessible). Besides, a number of service firms have been established, for instance a number of trucking and forwarding firms running regular and frequent lines to a large number of European destinations, which is crucial for the quick and reliable delivery of fashion goods. The local
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bank and several computer service firms are well developed for a town of Herning´s size, partly due to their textile and clothing customers. The entreneurial spirit in the County of Ringkoebing was not limited to the Herning area, and not to the textile sector, even if this became the most important one. Three other examples may be mentioned: The furniture industry was in many ways similar to the textile industry, consisting of a large number of small and medium-sized firms, originally spread all over the country. In the 1950s, Denmark became a great exporter of furniture, some of which was high quality “Danish design”. Since then, there has always been some - although changing – degree of product and process innovation, and a considerable of exports. From the 1970s, the furniture sector has concentrated in the former counties of Viborg, Ringkoebing and Aarhus, forming a zone from the north-western corner to the centre of Jutland. In 2005, this zone employed 8000 persons, corresponding to 40% of the total Danish employment in furniture manufacturing. But the sector never concentrated in one cluster as did the textile sector. Another example is the production of windmills. It started much in the same way as the textile and furniture industries. In the late 19th century, a physicist at a folk high school developed a small windmill which could produce electricity for farms, which at that time time could not be supplied from urban power stations. Local blacksmiths took up the production of these windmills – as well as other simple agricultural machines – and it has been estimated that at some time in the first half of the 20th century, 10-15% of all Danish agricultural holdings had such windmills. The County of Ringkoebing had a number of windmill producers. As the supply of electricity from large power plants became ubiquitous after WWII, the production of small windmills ceased. A third example was a radio factory, B&O, founded in the 1920s in the small town of Struer at the northern end of the County of Ringkoebing by two engineers, Mr. Bang and Mr. Olufsen. This showed that not only unskilled clothes-makers and skilled cabinet-makers and blacksmiths, but also engineers were among the entrepreneurs of the region. After WWII, B&O expanded into TV-sets and other audio-visual equipment and became a great exporter, mainly on the basis of high quality and design. In 1990, it had over 2000 employees in Struer and – for lack of labour in this small town – affiliates in some neighbour towns.
The changes since 1990 The political and economic transformation of the former command economies in CentralEastern Europe since 1989 dramatically changed the conditions for the West European textile and clothing industry. Trade became much easier between eastern and western Europe. The EU reduced its customs duties on imports of clothes from the transition countries, and abandoned them totally in 1998. As a result of the Uruguay round of GATT negotiations in 1995, the EU from 2005 –2007 abandoned its quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothes from the poor countries, the so-called multi-fibre agreement. Both in Central-Eastern Europe and in Asia, wage levels are much lower than in western Europe, in Poland in the 1990s for instance only about 10% of the Danish wages. Since wages
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constitute an important part of the costs of producing textiles and especially clothes, and even if transport and some other costs had to be added, these changes exposed the West European production to a devastating competition (Illeris 2000). For market segments where fashions change rapidly, it is crucial that the production programme can be increased, reduced, or modified at a few days´ notice. Hence, the CentralEastern European countries had an advantage, compared to producers in the Far East, whose products had to spend a month on a ship before being sold in Europe. However, since the beginning of the new millennium, wage levels in Central-Eastern Europe have increased, and at the same time, air transport has become relatively cheaper. Thus Danish imports of clothes from Poland have started to decrease, to the benefit of imports from e.g. China, Vietnam and Bangladesh (figure 3).
Figure 3. Source: Statistics Denmark. From the early 1990s, prices of textiles and clothes began to decrease in the western World, and most of the production became unprofitable. More than half of the producers in the Herning area have had to close, including all the specialized sewing firms. As shown in table 1, the sector´s employment has declined dramatically. First and foremost, the sewing work disappeared, and the numerous seamstresses became redundant. Some production was so highly automated that wage levels had little influence on total costs, e.g. the production of carpets. The cluster advantages mentioned above, such as tacit learning, were not important enough to conpensate for the cost disadvantages compared to competitors in low-wage countries. However, in spite of the dramatic reduction of the formerly most important economic activity, the textile and clothes production, Herning has not only survived, but is performing quite well. There was some net emigration in the 1990s, but it ceased at the end of the century. The redundant seamstresses have found other work, e.g. in the wood and furniture industry, and the rate of unemployment in the new communes of Herning, Ikast-Brande and RingkoebingSkjern (corresponding to the Herning area) was in April 2008 1.1 pct., 1.3 pct. and 1.0 pct., respectively. The firms – even the surviving clothing firms – make good profits. Among the 24 Danish towns with between 20,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, Herning is no. 18 as regards educational level, but no. 12 as regards mean incomes.
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Clearly, the Herning area has not suffered a “lock-in” into the routines which previously were successful. Let us look at the ways in which the Herning area has met the challenges of internationalisation – ways which almost overnight have changed the character of the area fundamentally. The most conspicuous reaction for Danish textile and clothes producers has been to off-shore the material production to low-wage countries. This could be done through acquiring firms in the low-wage countries totally or partly, or through having new factories built there (Foreign Direct Investment). Alternatively, they could make contracts with local firms – just as they formerly had sub-contracted the sewing work to firms in the Herning area. Both ways are applied. The tasks carried out are - to find out the directions of the market demand, - to design clothes accordingly and make models/prototypes, - to arrange for the material production according to the design, - to arrange the connected logistics, - to market and distribute the products, - and to manage the whole process in a sufficiently flexible way. The staff of a firm with these tasks must have higher qualifications than the traditional workers, as documented for Denmark as a whole in table 2. They are also better paid. Table 2. The educational composition in the Danish textile & clothing industry, 1980-2000 Education Clothing Textiles 1980 2000 1980 2000 Basic education 72 % 42 % 73 % 50 % High school degree 3% 17 % 5% 13 % Apprenticeship 22 % 31 % 17 % 28 % College degree and above 3% 10 % 5% 9% Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % Source: Olsen, Ibsen & Westergaard-Nielsen 2004 Another organisational innovation has been to integrate the production, the wholesaling, and the retailing functions in one firm. The main advantages are (a) to profit from globalisation by penetrating emerging markets, (b) get a part of the distribution profits which are higher than the manufacturing profits, and (c) that the customers´ preferences – as revealed by their purchases – immediately are known by the management and inspire its planning of the future production. Thus, today´s most successful firm in the area, Bestseller in the small town of Brande, 20 km.s south of Herning, has 4000 shops all over the World – partly owned, partly franchised. A third reaction is product innovation combined with increasing exports: Standardized clothes, based on price competition, are increasingly substituted by quality products based on design and able to penetrate widespread international markets. As it will be discussed later, data on international trade cause problems. According to those which exist, however, exports now represent about 80% of the total turnover (including re-export of goods produced in lowwage countries) of the Danish textiles and clothes sector, and has been extended to all EU countries. As in almost all West European countries, imports are bigger than exports, but with imports surpassing exports by only 15%, Denmark is no. 3 in this respect.
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The media tend to connect the export success with a number of Copenhagen fashion firms which aspire to the haute couture class. This milieu is connected with the Danish Design School in Copenhagen which focuses on artistical refinement. However, the overwhelming part of the exports derives from clothes in the (upper) medium quality class, in particular three large firms of which one (ICCompanys) is Copenhagen-based, while the other two, Bestseller (which has always been a sheer wholesale and retail company) and BTX (before 2006 Brandtex), have their head offices in Brande. But also smaller firms in the Herning area contribute. These firms try to innovate over a broad array of functions, combining consumer demand, quality, prices and services in ever new ways. They are connected with the abovementioned Herning school which has been quick to switch from teaching technical skills to teaching design, and it has a strong tradition of keeping the education closely connected with the needs of the firms. A final reaction has been a diversification of the sectoral structure in Herning which is illustrated by figure 4.
Figure 4. Sources: as in table 1. In 1970, the textile and clothing industry was responsible for a quarter of the employment. The share started – rather unnoticed – to shrink in the following decades, and this was only partly compensated for by the re-classification of firms into wholesaling. In 2005, the textile and clothing industry is down to 4% of the non-agricultural employment. The reactions of the sector included a reduction of the local employment – BTX for instance now have only 100 of their global personnel of 1700 in Brande. If other sectors had not stabilized or expanded, the Herning area would have faced an employment disaster.. The furniture industry has reduced its employment, too, but far less than the textile and clothes manufacturing. It meets some of the same problems. But its luxury products fetch prices which permit production in a high-wage country, and its low-quality markets are to some degree sheltered from e.g. East Asian competition by the high transport costs. In this field, too, there are examples of integration between manufacturing and retailing.
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Manufacturers of electronic products, such as the B&O mentioned above, faces similar problems and has innovated in similar ways – e.g. by creating a system of retail shops. It has had its ups and downs and currently employs about 1900 persons at Struer. The windmill industry, on the other hand, has become totally revolutionized. As mentioned above, this production had ceased after WWII, but some know-how still existed. When in 1973 the first oil crisis hit Denmark – at that time, before oil and gas was found under the North Sea, a country without its own sources of energy – a public interest in renewable energy arose, and the government started subsidizing windmill-generated electricity. In California and some other places, similar policies were adopted. Around 1980 it had become clear that windmills now had to be large, to be electronically controlled, and to be produced for international markets. Among the former numerous small producers, two firms in the Herning area emerged as pioneers in this field, one in the small town of Brande and one in the village of Lem, 30 km.s to the west of Herning. Due to their early start, Danish producers gained large shares of the developing internartional market for windmills. But the rapid technological development, the changing energy prices and government policies, and the huge investment requirements made the conditions turbulent. The Brande firm was in 2004 bought by the German multinational Siemens which has expanded its production and now almost employs 2000 persons there. It has important sub-contractors in Ikast and Herning, the former a local firm producing the electronic equipment that adapts the mill to the ever changing wind, the latter a local firm now taken over by an American corporation making steel towers. In Lem, a number of mechanical producers could survive as a medium-tech cluster. The windmill producer, Vestas, employed in 2004 at Lem and the nearby small town of Ringkoebing an estimated personnel of 3000. It then merged with a similar firm in East Jutland, which got the head office functions, causing a loss of 1000 jobs in Ringkoebing-Lem. However, the employment at Ringkoebing-Lem is now more or less back to its former strength. Between them, the windmill producers in Denmark have about 40% of the global market and still grow rapidly. Metal manufacturing is now by far the branch of manufacturing which employs most people, both in Herning itself and in the area. Apart from the electric and electronic sub-branches already mentioned, it includes highly innovative firms with world-wide markets, such as the Herning employee-owned firm Unimerco which produces cutting instruments, and the aluminium foundry JAI, also in Herning. The food industry is modest for an agricultural region. The main representative is the slaughterhouse in Herning, which in contrast to all other firms mentioned here has, through most of its 118 years of history, not been owned by locals. Today it belongs to the huge Danish cooperative corporation Royal Crown. It has a more hierarchical company culture than most firms in the Herning area. The diversification in the Herning area was not only into other manufacturing sectors, but even more into services. Most of the public and private services are “non-basic”, serving the local market. In figure 4, these are lumped together in one signature. They are similar to services found anywhere and will not be discussed further. But some services have been able to develop national and international markets, and have thus contributed to the stabilisation and expansion of the economic base of the area. In this respect wholesaling must be mentioned. This sector has above average employment for a medium-sized town and its hinterland, for two reasons: First, that some textile firms have
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stopped (or, as Bestseller, never done) manufacturing, and is hence classified as “wholesaling”. However, they differ from most wholesaling firms by not just buying what they can find in the market, but designing the clothes themselves and then contracting manufacturing firms to produce them as specified. Unfortunately, published statistical data do not distinguish this type of wholesaling from other types. – Second, the biggest Danish allround grocery wholesaling firm independent of chains has one of its main storehouses in Herning, as a central location for distribution to the western half of Denmark. The transport sector is relatively strong in the Herning area. Various sub-sectors are overrepresented, above all trucking and forwarding which as mentioned has grown in connection with the textile and clothing industry. Today´s tendency is that most goods are produced in low-wage countries and sold outside Denmark, a good deal of the raw materials and products never pass through the Herning area. Hence, this sub-sector is now weaker than it has been. Other sub-sectors are the result of innovative ideas among local entrepreneurs: In this inland town a successful shipping company has been created, finding a niche for relatively small tankers which can navigate in difficult waters and pick up small cargoes. And two of the biggest Danish holiday travel organisers have been founded in Herning. However, the number of jobs at the head offices of these firms is modest. Business services are over-represented, too. Two sub-sectors should be mentioned in particular. All through the 20th century, the local banks financed the many small textile firms and developed a tradition of taking more risks than most banks would. Threatened in 1965 by a take-over by a large Copenhagen bank, they preferred to merge. They carried on the tradition – occasionally resulting in heavy losses. The bank had ambitions of expanding outside the area. In this respect, the bank in the neighbouring town of Silkeborg was successful, but the Herning bank succeeded only to a limited degree. In 2001, it was bought by a major Swedish bank as a basis for their expansion in Denmark. - The other sub-sector is IT-services, which were started early by the banks and soon found a special niche by developing services customized to the needs of small and medium-sized firms. Dreams of becoming a major IT milieu did not materialize, but the sub-sector is substantial and new firms are often created. Evaluation of statistical data This study is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative information. This is a strength, good quantitative data making the analyses as precise as possible, and qualitative data adding deeper and more detailed understanding of the questions about which no good statistical data exist. It is crucial to discuss what statistical data are good. Data are collected by the statistical authorities in the EU member countries and often transmitted by Eurostat. Inevitably, there are financial limits for the collection of data, and both financial and discretion limits for the disclosure of data. However, the ever increasing complexity of our society makes a it necessary to change priorities, definitions and arrangements of the data that are made available. In connection with the present case study, in particular three problems have been prominent. First,, the question of the sectoral classification of economic activities, the so-called NACE (Nomenclature des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes). The study has shown that the distinction between manufacturing and wholesaling (or trade in general) is blurred. Many firms have started as manufacturing enterprises, but have outsourced the
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material production either to establishments which they own (partly or totally) or to independent sub-contractors. Other functions, such as design, marketing and management, are still performed in the original establishment. The owned establishments and the subcontractors are often located in other countries. The current distinction between manufacturing firms and wholesaling firms depends on the economic significance of the different activities within the firm as a whole: If manufacturing activities are most important, it is classified as manufacturing – if there is little or no manufacturing, as wholesaling. If the importance of the activities changes, the firm is re-classified (although time lags may occur in this respect). However, the case study has showed that for the firms, this distinction plays a minor role. The important decision is whether to outsource to a low-wage country. Once this has been decided, little or no manufacturing activities take place in the core establishment in the original country. In the low-wage country, the firms often change between FDI in owned establishments and contracts with independent firms. They buy and sell establishments at short notice, and enter into and end contracts all the time. As a consequence, the firms should change their NACE-classification quite often. In reality, the impression is that many firms remain classified as manufacturing fims, even if they have no manufacturing in the original country and only some years (possibly never) in owned establishments in other countries. This often makes the interpretation and analysis of the statistical data misleading. The second problem refers to the relationship between international trade across frontiers and ownership of the goods which are traded. As mentioned in the present case study, goods are to an increasing degree owned by a firm (which performs the design, marketing and management functions) in one country, produced (by a sub-contractor or an owned subsidiary) in a second country, and sold in a third country. There is no longer any necessity for the goods to be transported (and registered as imports) to the country of ownership, nor to be (re-)exported from this to the third country – it is often cheaper to transport the goods directly from the production to the consumption country. This means that the statistical data underestimate the international trade of the country of ownership, where after all such highly value-creating functions as design, marketing and management are performed. Third, since innovation has played a central role in both the early economic development of the Herning area and its way of meeting the challenges of globalisation, it would have been interesting to highlight the innovation statistically. Data on innovation consist normally of (a) the number of persons working in or the costs of running Research & Development departments, and (b) the number of patent applications or approvals. These data may be reasonable evidence of innovation in medium or high technology manufacturing in large firms. But in the economy of the Herning area (and many other areas), innovation mainly takes place in low-tech manufacturing, in small and medium-sized firms, and in services, and is hence not registered in the official statistics, even if it is important. The usual statistical data do simply not fulfil the basic scientific requirement of validity: They only measure a small part of what they were intended to measure. The study had to be left without statistical documentation of the innovation. Evaluation of regional policies By what policies conducted by European, national, regional and local authorities have the economic development in the Herning area been influenced, and what effects have they had?
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It is of course not the purpose here to evaluate general economic policies. Since the present study focuses on globalisation, it should be mentioned, however, that while Denmark ever since WWII has pulled in the direction of liberalisation of international trade, this has up to the 1980s been against the wishes of the textile and clothing industry which wanted protection against imports from low-wage countries. In recent decades, however, the latter attitudes have vanished, and the dramatic disappearance of the clothes production in the Herning area has happened with no or only weak protests. Of course, it should be kept in mind that the rate of unemployment in the area has been very low since 1993. The provision of infrastructure – including “soft infrastructure” such as educational services – has of course been a government task, adapted to the needs of the individual parts of the country. The Herning area can hardly be said to have received much special attention in this respect, though the opening in 1965 of the military air base at Karup, 25 km.s to the northeast of Herning, for civil airlines may be mentioned. In 1995 Herning also received an engineering and commercial school on university level, financed by the national government. In 2006 it became a part of the University of Aarhus. Specific regional policies have been rare and weak. When in 1967 special regions were delimited where firms could get support according to the Act of Regional Development, the Herning area was in the beginning among these regions. Due to its positive economic development, the area was soon dropped from the list, however, and few firms ever obtained this kind of support. From 1989 to 1992, the Danish Ministry of Industry had a programme offering support to network-building between firms. This may be seen as an early version of what today is called cluster-policies. The effect was very modest, and the programme was dropped. In 2001 the same ministry – now called Ministry of Economic Activities – started to prepare some kind of cluster policy, inspired by Michael Porter. It was heavily critisized by academic economists, and it seems that the idea was not pursued The local governments of Herning and the surrounding communes as well as the government of the County of Ringkoebing have always conducted general policies that were positive with respect to firms and economic activities, and for many years – like most Danish local and regional governments - participated in the financing of development councils where enterprise organisations, unions, educational institutions, banks and other interested parties were represented. These development councils have have in various ways supported economic development, within the limits of existing legislation (which for instance prohibits ownership of or subsidies to individual firms). Undoubtedly their activities have had positive effects, but hardly of a decisive kind. According to the 2007 local government reform, the new regions have got increased tasks of this kind, but these activities are only at the planning stage. Concluding this evaluation, regional policies have on the whole been limited to the supply of the same framework conditions for economic development as everywhere else. Specific EU, national, regional or local policies have not played any noteworthy role for the development of the Herning area. Conclusion The Herning area has, even if it was dominated by the low-skill and labour-intensive textile and clothing industry and hence vulnerable, survived the challenges of globalisation after 1990. But its character, previously a typical textile cluster, has changed fundamentally.
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Many textile and clothing firms still exist and make good profits, but few of them now have any material production (even if they still are classified as manufacturing due to their ownership of production units in low-wage countries). Their main functions in the Herning area are design, marketing and management, and they are very innovative. Direct cooperation between them, which always was rather modest and based on the material production, has virtually disappeared. They employ far fewer people than the sector used to do. But there is still a labour market with a supply of persons with useful knowledge about clothes, to a high degree due to the textile and clothing school of the area, which has been quick to shift the teaching to the qualifications now demanded. In the long run, it may be a danger that new generations do not have the practical experience about textile materials and production processes which until now has been widely spread in the area. What has kept the area´s rate of unemployment extremely low is primarily the diversification into other sectors, both manufacturing and services which are able to sell their products elsewhere. In reality, this diversification had started in the preceding decades, where the employment in the textile and clothing industry was dominating, but stable, while the employment in other sectors already expanded their shares of the total employment – a process which has accelerated after 1990. Both in the textile and other sectors the work force which is now demanded must be better educated than the former generations who migrated to Herning from the surrounding rural areas and who have been hard working and motivated. Herning and even more the small towns of the area primarily have the characters of working towns, even if some wealthy industrialists as Maecenas have financed excellent architecture and art museums in Birk, at the eastern outskirts of Herning. It is now recognized as a problem that it is necessary to offer more than work if the area is to attract and keep new types of people. Bestseller is already planning to move its head office, with 500 employees, to Aarhus, the second largest city of Denmark and a major university centre with a vibrant cultural and leisure life. This development shows than rather than the character of a textile and clothing cluster, it was the entrepreneurship and innovative culture that has been the basis of the growth and survival of the Herning area. These are characteristics which are found in much of Jutland, as shown by the brief descriptions of other sectors included in this case study – but they are not found everywhere. The policy implications of these conclusions are not to try to build sectorally defined clusters – anyhow ”pick the winners” strategies have often made wrong guesses about what sectors were winners - but rather aiming at promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Though these qualities have deep cultural roots, they are not the same forever, but it is a long term endeavour to influence them. And we know little about how to influence them. References Andersen, P.H., Boellingtoft, A. and Christensen, P.R. (2006), Erhvervsklynger under pres: Globaliseringens indflydelse på dynamikken i udvalgte danske erhvervsklynger. Institut for ledelse, Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus. Engelstoft, S., Jensen-Butler, C., Smith, I. & Winther, L. (2006), Industrial Clusters in Denmark: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Papers in Regional Science, 85: 73-97.
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Illeris, S. (1992), The Herning-Ikast Textile Industry: An Industrial District in West Jutland, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 4: 73-84. Illeris, S. (2000), Outsourcing of Textile and Clothing Industry from Denmark to Baltic Transition Countries, in Owsinski, J.W. and Johansson, M. (eds), Global-Local Interplay in the Baltic Sea Region, The Interfaces Institute, Warsaw, 56-68. Illeris, S. (2007), Hernings erhvervshistorie 1950-2006. Historisk Forening for Herning Kommune. Kristensen, P.Hull (1992), Industrial Districts in West Jutland, Denmark, in Pyke, F. and Sengenberger, W. (eds), Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration, Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 122-173. Lorenzen, M. (1998), A “higher-order” Knowledge-base for Trust: Furniture Production in the Danish Salling Distrct, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 143-166. Maskell, P. (1998), Localised low-tech Learning in the Furniture Industry, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 33-55. Olsen, K.B., Ibsen, R. & Westergaard-Nielsen N. (2004), Does Outsourcing Create Unemployment? The Case of the Danish Textile and Clothing Industry, Aarhus School of Business. Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London & Basingstoke, Macmillan.
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The policy implications of these conclusions are not to try to build sectorally defined clusters – anyhow ”pick the winners” strategies have often made wrong guesses about what sectors were winners - but rather aiming at promoting entrepreneurship and innovation. Though these qualities have deep cultural roots, they are not the same forever, but it is a long term endeavour to influence them. And we know little about how to influence them. References Andersen, P.H., Boellingtoft, A. and Christensen, P.R. (2006), Erhvervsklynger under pres: Globaliseringens indflydelse på dynamikken i udvalgte danske erhvervsklynger. Institut for ledelse, Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus. Engelstoft, S., Jensen-Butler, C., Smith, I. & Winther, L. (2006), Industrial Clusters in Denmark: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Papers in Regional Science, 85: 73-97. Illeris, S. (1992), The Herning-Ikast Textile Industry: An Industrial District in West Jutland, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 4: 73-84. Illeris, S. (2000), Outsourcing of Textile and Clothing Industry from Denmark to Baltic Transition Countries, in Owsinski, J.W. and Johansson, M. (eds), Global-Local Interplay in the Baltic Sea Region, The Interfaces Institute, Warsaw, 56-68. Illeris, S. (2007), Hernings erhvervshistorie 1950-2006. Historisk Forening for Herning Kommune. Kristensen, P.Hull (1992), Industrial Districts in West Jutland, Denmark, in Pyke, F. and Sengenberger, W. (eds), Industrial Districts and Local Economic Regeneration, Institute for Labour Studies, Geneva, 122-173. Lorenzen, M. (1998), A “higher-order” Knowledge-base for Trust: Furniture Production in the Danish Salling Distrct, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 143-166. Maskell, P. (1998), Localised low-tech Learning in the Furniture Industry, in M. Lorenzen (ed), Specialisation and Localised Learning. Copenhagen Business School Press, 33-55. Olsen, K.B., Ibsen, R. & Westergaard-Nielsen N. (2004), Does Outsourcing Create Unemployment? The Case of the Danish Textile and Clothing Industry, Aarhus School of Business. Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, London & Basingstoke, Macmillan.
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Case study 2: The electronic and mechatronics industry in Ivrea Alberto Vanolo1 Introduction The area of Ivrea is located in North-West Italy. Its development used to be strongly tied to a major Italian multinational enterprise, Olivetti, active in the field of electronic, mechatronics and, particularly, office machinery (for example by producing famous typewriters). Particularly from the 90s, under the pressure of phenomena linked to economic globalisation and technological competition, Olivetti has been hit by huge crises, with the massive dismissal of production and employment, together with the decomposition of the company in many branches sold to different groups and multinational enterprises. Anyhow, the long sedimentation on the territory of know how, competencies and industrial relations led, in the last decades, to the growth of a relevant tissue of small and medium sized enterprises operating in the same industrial fields. The aim of this paper is to investigate these transformations, to present a general outlook of the socio-economic characteristics of the area, and to read such a story emphasising the specific development path of Ivrea in the local-global tensions introduced by globalisation forces. To discuss such arguments, the first paragraph presents the area of analysis (the local labor system). Then, paragraph 2 describes the role and the dynamics of Olivetti in the area, while the following section presents a general outlook of the local economic transformations, with particular emphasis on the growth of small and medium enterprises. Finally, paragraph 4 considers recent attempts to develop, through territorial policies, the potentialities of the Ivrea area.
1
I would like to thank many people for their help (in terms of interviews, materials and suggestions) in writing this report; particularly, in strictly alphabetical order, Alberta Pasquero (S&T), Aldo Biglia (Ivrea Technology District), Angela Mazzoccoli (Polytechnic of Turin), Carlo Salone (University of Turin) and Gianfranco Franciscono (Unione industriale del Canavese).
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1. The Ivrea area Ivrea is a small city (about 25.000 inhabitants) in the part of the Province of Turin (in the Piedmont region), in Northwestern Italy. Situated on the road leading from Turin Aosta valley, it straddles the Dora Baltea River and is as the centre of a non-institutional area (it is basically an region) called Canavese. From the physical point of view, lies in a basin that formed a great lake in prehistoric times.
Northern to the regarded historic Ivrea
For the purpose of this study, on the basis of the relevant functional and economic relations between Ivrea and nearby smaller urban centers, we will consider here as spatial unit of analysis (when not differently specified) a wider aggregation of confining municipalities connected through meaningful daily commuting flows. Such spatial units, called sistemi locali del lavoro (local labour systems) are periodically defined by the Italian National Statistical Office2. The latest edition (based on the results of the Census 2001) classified the whole Italian territory into 686 different local labour systems. The Ivrea local labour system aggregates 63 municipalities3, with a total area of 656 km2 and a population of about 110.000 inhabitants (48.400 households, 56.700 habitations). The total active population refers to 45.200 working people (56,9% males) and 2.000 unemployed (55,1% females), of which 476 searching for first occupation. Work in the primary sector is quite scarce (3,4%), while the manufacturing sector is relevant (27,1%) and the heterogeneous sector of services refers to 55,6% of the active population. It has to be noticed here that the sectors object of this analysis, i.e. office machineries and information and communication technologies, refers to both manufacturing and service activities.
2
Istat: http://www.istat.it/salastampa/comunicati/non_calendario/20050721_00 The 66 municipalities are: Agliè, Albiano d’Ivrea, Alice Superiore, Andrate, Azeglio, Banchette, Barone Canavese, Bollendo, Borgofranco d’Ivrea, Borgomasino, Brosso, Burolo, Caluso, Candia Canavese, Caratino, Cascinette d’Ivrea, Chiaverano, Colleretto Giocosa, Cossano Canavese, Cuceglio, Fiorano, Canavese, Foglizzo, Issiglio, Ivrea, Lessolo, Loranzè, Lugnacco, Mazzè, Mercenasco, Meugliano, Montalenghe, Montalto Dora, Nomaglio, Orio Canavese, Palazzo Canavese, Parella, Pavone Canavese, Pecco, Perosa Canavese, Piverone, Quagliuzzo, Quassolo, Romano Canavese, Rueglio, Salerano Canavese, Samone, San Giorgio Canavese, San Giusto Canavese, San Martino Canavese, Scarmagno, Settimo Rottaro, Settimo Vittone, Strambinello, Strambino, Tavagnasco, Trausella, Traversella, Vestignè, Vialfrè, Vico Canavese, Vidracco, Vische, Vistrorio.
3
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2. Olivetti: origins, productions and decline The economic history of the area cannot be told without referring to Olivetti, a key enterprise of the Italian industrial landscape of the XX century. The company was founded in 1908 in Ivrea by Camillo Olivetti, who presented the “first Italian typewriter” at the Universal Exposition of Turin in 1911. The production of typewriters has been one of the main activities of the company for many decades, and in the 30s, many factories and commercial affiliates grew in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, and by the end of the decade, about one third of sales came from abroad. Among the main productions, it is worth mentioning typewriters M40, MP1, MS Studio 42. For the first time in Italian industrial production there is a massive investment in design, with the contribution of technicians, engineers, designers. In 1950 it began the production of Lexicon and Lettera 22, two typewriters designed by Marcello Nizzoni and exposed in the New York Moma Museum. In the same period, pioneering products in the field of calculus devices were designed and sold (Multisumma MC 4M, Elettrosumma 14). Despite a difficult period during the Second Olivetti Lettera 22 (1950) World War (with the death of the founder Camillo, and the exile in Switzerland of his son Adriano), in the following years, the company was able to expand (with the construction of new factories and the novel reconstruction of those destroyed during the war) and to propose successful products. Concerning such expansion, for example in 1950, the Olivetti Corporation of America was founded (with a famous shop in NY Fifth Avenue), and in the 1955, a specific research center (originally set in Pisa, then moved to Borgo Lombardo, and then sold to General Electric after Adriano’s death) began a systematic work in the field of innovation, leading to the production of electronic calculators in 1959 (Elea 9003, Summa Prima, Multisumma). The innovative potential of the company is evident considering, for example, the presentation of the desktop calculator Programma 101 at NY Bema in 1965 (now at the Moma), the precursor of actual personal computers, that has been employed for example in the aerospace industry and for the counting of electoral votes (Perotto, 1995). The strategy of progressive diversification of the original core competencies is evident in this period. Consider, for example, the production of furniture for offices (series Spazio, Synthesis). In 1970, the company included 72 Italian affiliates, 335 concessionaires, and 18 foreign affiliates. The employees, who in 1961 numbered about 22.000 in Italy and 25.000 abroad, in 1972, grew to 74.000, of which about 40.000 were abroad.
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During the 70s, the expansion continued: in 1976 the number of foreign affiliates was 30, and the Italian ones, 90; the research and development sector employed 2.000 persons, and the electronic sector generated half of the sales of the Olivetti group. In 1978 the management of the company passed to Carlo De Benedetti, and with a massive growth of capitals, Olivetti is able to produce and propose to the public a wide set of products designed in the previous years. In 1980, for example, the first portable electric typewriter was presented (Praxis 30/35), and the following year, the electronic writing system Et1010. And, above all, it started a strategy of transformation of the core business, moving towards informatics. In 1982, Olivetti begun to sell personal computers (M20; it has to be noted that the first Ibm PC was introduced in 1981), and in the same period, the company set up important strategic alliances of an international level (for example with AT&T). Despite these successful strategies, during the 80s the De Benedetti management led to some decisions that were strongly criticized in the following years. Particularly, the company was split into many independent units (breaking down even the research and development function) and had been restructured many times, with many changes in directive roles, the dismissal of many functions, and the expulsion of workers. De Benedetti (differently from Adriano Olivetti) was particularly skeptical towards the possibility of developments in the electronic sectors (“which requires too massive investments”), and initially moved the company to the field of informatics, and then to telecommunications, particularly with the creation of the companies Omnitel (mobile communication), Telemedia (multimedia telecommunications) and Infostrada (fixed phone lines). Such a myopia (especially when compared to the long view of Adriano) probably have had a massive role in the progressive exclusion of the whole Italy from the industrial competition in the technological field of electronics and informatics, in a period when even companies like Ibm looked with preoccupation to the Olivetti concurrency. Anyhow, from the late 80s, and particularly during the 90s, various causes, among which the strengthening of international competition, the fall of prices in the global electronic and informatics industry, together with the weakness of the Italian market, led to a massive crisis, with the progressive erosion of the economic position of the company and growing debts (from 4.200 billion liras in 1985 to 8.800 four years later). Of course it is impossible to detect the “main” cause of this crisis; certainly, the progressive erosion of prices in the PC sector, leading to important loss of earnings, is generally considered as one of the major criticalities. Table 1 for example refers to the prices of some Olivetti PCs, assuming 100 as the initial price proposed in the market; moreover, similar dynamics of rapidly falling prices appeared also in the printers market. Olivetti Programma 101 (1965)
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Table 1 – The fall of Olivetti pc prices Pc
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
M 290 M380/Xp9 M 250 E Philos 22-486 M6-440, Echos P 13 s
100
91,4 100
91,4 79,4 100
68,5 81,2 100 100
57,9 80,2
57,9 100
48,4
Source: R&S Mediobanca; adapted from Bricco (2007), p. 338.
The crisis become evident in 1996, when De Benedetti left the presidency in favor of Roberto Colaninno, who continued pursuing the passage towards telecommunications. Many strategic sectors and core competencies had been sold. This is the case of Olivetti Personal Computers (sold in 1997 for a low price to Piedmont International, then to Ics, then to Oliit before the definitive closure in 2004) and Olivetti Solutions (sold to Wang in 1998, and then to Getronics and Eunics). In the same time, the Telecom group had been bought and sold two times in a few years as a consequence of speculative market strategies. Finally, an event of strong symbolic power was the retiring of the Olivetti title from the Italian stock exchange in 2003. The Olivetti brand is still present today in a medium size company with 1.200 employees producing faxes and printers, basically nothing worth comparing with the past glory of the company. Periodically (and particularly right now, in the anniversary of the foundation of the company), melancholic voices about a possible re-launching of Olivetti in the informatics sector still appear in newspapers.
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3. The Olivetti heritage The history of Olivetti strategies and dynamics may be read as a progressive emptying of the industrial vocation of the company, with important backlashes on the local area. Despite Olivetti’s strong attitude towards internationalization, the company represented an exceptional example of embedding and co-evolutionary relations between the territory and the factory (Bricco, 2007). This is evident considering the particular social and political projects carried on by Camillo Olivetti in the 50s, which included, for example, the promotion of local social services and the organisation of training and cultural centres. In his perspective, the ultimate goal of an enterprise is not just to create wealth, but also to distribute it on the territory in order to support local development. In this sense, in 1949, Camillo founded many centri comunitari (community centres), places for sharing and promoting debates and culture at local level, to meet intellectuals and workers, and in a few years the number of such centres strongly grew, reaching in 1958 quota 118 in Ivrea and surrounding municipalities. In the same years, the journal Comunità and Comunità editions started diffusing new ideas in the field of social sciences (and still today the publishing house plays an important role at a national level). It is important to notice that such centres were not intended to produce ideological line-up, but to promote a “collective” life and work. Such a cultural milieu, of course, never disappeared with the crisis of the company. Nevertheless, the whole history of the Olivetti was characterised by several important mutations in technological and cultural orientations. First, with Adriano Olivetti in the 60s, there was the passage from a specialisation in basic mechanics (typewriters) towards more complex mechanics (for example with the production of mechanical machine calculators), followed in the beginning of the 70s by the conversion from mechanics to electronics. Then, with the De Benedetti management, during the 80s there were the definitive orientations towards informatics, which anticipated the last transformation towards telecommunications. As it will be discussed later, all these transformations provoked internal mutations inside the company, together with the spillover from the enterprise of know how, competencies and human capital, which accompanied locally the growing of a number of small and medium size enterprises. It was the latest of these mutations in the core business, i.e. the passage to telecommunications, which accompanied the erasure of the industrial capability of Olivetti. Such a transition (formally started in 1988, concretely at the beginning of the 90s) initially have had a good impact on the overall performances of the company, but a limited one on the territory: for example Omnitel (the Olivetti spin-off) employed 394 people in 1994, of which 96% in Ivrea; the company grew to 8.662 people in 2001, but just 11,5% in Ivrea (Bricco, 2007). In other words, the successful experience of this new company just led to a local growth of employment from 378 people in 1994, to 893 in 2001, and similar numbers refer also to Infostrada, the other relevant telecom company originally linked to the Olivetti group. Moreover, the passage to telecommunications went side by side with the progressive marginalisation of Ivrea in the geographies of these companies. The strategic functions often fell out of the Olivetti group, and generally moved to Milan. And, certainly, such a
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marginalisation has been dramatic with the loss of control over the management of Omnitel and Infostrada in 1999. In terms of local industrial evolution, the passage to telecommunication introduced an element of discontinuity inside the company. The previously discussed transitions towards electronics and informatics were characterised by expansive strategies, for example in the post-war decades, in terms of internationalisation and employment, and during the 70s-80s in terms of investments. Differently, the passage to telecommunications took form in a period of deep crisis. The debts accumulated in the PC sector, the absence of sophisticated industrial strategies, the marginalisation of Ivrea in the economic scenario, the passage from a manufacturing specialisation to a sector (telecommunications) strongly tied to services, together with a long series of disputable complex financial speculations, led to the substantial failure of Olivetti in its last attempt at evolution. This was a particularly evident failure with the cancellation from the Milan stock exchange in 2003. As discussed previously, both the changes in the core business and the progressive Olivetti crisis (and loss of jobs) led, at a local level, to the release of human capital and know how, at the basis of the growth of an important tissue of small and medium size enterprises. Such a phenomenon became visible and relevant particularly in the 80s (during the years of the “second industrial divide”, according to Piore and Sable, 1984). Table 2 and Table 3, for example, provide some figures concerning the evolution of the industrial structure from 1975 to 1990. Table 2 – Number of enterprises by size (%) Enterprise size Small Medium Big Total
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2002
76,92% 9,62% 13,46%
87,38% 3,88% 8,74%
93,33% 1,78% 4,89%
93,95% 1,88% 4,18%
93,42% 2,12% 4,46%
92,84% 2,32% 4,84%
92,28% 2,82% 4,90%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Source: Confindustria canavese; adapted from Bricco (2007), 343 and 357.
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Table 3 – Employment by enterprise size (%) Enterprise size Small Medium Big Total
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2002
29,51% 6,25% 64,24%
38,14% 6,78% 55,08%
45,45% 6,93% 47,62%
45,96% 8,59% 45,45%
51,81% 9,33% 38,86%
61,81% 10,55% 27,64%
63,45% 11,17% 25,38%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Source: Confindustria canavese; adapted from Bricco (2007), 343 and 357.
For example, it is impressive the growth in the number of small sized enterprises from 1975 and 1980 (from 77% to 87%), i.e. during the initial years of De Benedetti management, with the progressive lightening of the electronic core business; in 1985 (years of success for Olivetti informatics) the percentage reached 93%, and basically remained stable (94%) in 1990, an year of severe crisis for the informatics sector. Few data concerning the structure of this universe of small enterprises are available. According to Censis (1993), in 1992 just 22,7% of local enterprises were habitual Olivetti suppliers; 14,4% were occasional, and 62,9% not at all. In the long term, it is evident that the progressive reduction of employment in big enterprises (from 64% in 1975 to 45% in 1990, and 25% in 2002) and the growth in the case of small ones (from 30% in 1975 to 46% in 1990, and 63% in 2002). In 2004, the number of workers in the Olivetti group (split in 8 companies) was barely 1.600, and 3.100 in companies previously part of Olivetti and then sold during the crisis of the 90s. And, considering 82 companies started up by workers previously employed in Olivetti and 10 ex-direct suppliers that have had to reposition themselves in the market, the total amount of workers directly connected to the former Olivetti industrial universe reached 6.855. Considering an active population in the local system of about 45.000 units, Ivrea can no longer be considered a onecompany town (or the ghost of that). This becomes evident looking at employment figures; in the sole municipality of Ivrea, 2.102 were employed in 1991 and, despite the Olivetti crisis, they grew to 2.475 in 2001 (17% growth) (for a comparison between local and regional figures, see table 4). Nevertheless, the propulsive role of the liberation of entrepreneurial energies is testified in the growth of local factory plants: from 9.347 in 1991 to 10.881 in 2001. Similarly, employment in the area passes from 49.664 units in 1991 to 50.680 in 2001. In other words, the growth in the number of plants and in employment may be explained by the formation of a tissue of small and medium enterprises (see tables 5-7, concerning the smaller are of Ivrea and surrounding municipalities). Such enterprises do not work entirely in the electronic sector: on the contrary, the main specialisation refers to the older Olivetti core business, i.e. mechanics, and this sector reveals a certain vitality, with a constant growth in employment. For example, the machinery sector passed from 1.159 workers in 1991 to 1.850 in 2001. On the contrary, companies operating in the fields of electric machinery, electronic and informatics have sometimes shown a loss of jobs.
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Table 4 – Evolution of the municipality of Ivrea and Piedmont Ivrea (municipality) Total Employment (1.000) Population (1.000) Employment in industrial activities (1.000) Unemployment (1.000)
Piedmont (Nuts 2)
1981
1991
2001
1980
1991
2001
13,25 28,17 5,49 0,62
10,71 24,70 4,22 1,16
11,40 23,54 6,43 0,61
1.983 4.484,7 909 107
1.926 4.352,9 730 134
1.877 4.215,0 682 92
Source: Istat, National Census 1981, 1991 and 2001; Istat, Labour Force Statistics 1980, 1991 and 2001.
Table 5 – Newborn enterprises in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Year
Number of enterprises
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1.201 134 153 569 382 192 184
Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007)
Table 6 - Distribution of employment in the telecommunication sector (2002) in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Enterprise dimension (employment)
Employees
(Valid) percentage
251 14 11 3 14 8 141 442
83,4% 4,7% 3,7% 1,0% 4,7% 2,7% ---
Less than 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-50 More than 50 Missing data Total
Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007)
Table 7 - Distribution of employment in the metal-mechanic sector (2002) in Ivrea (in the Centro per l’impiego area) Enterprise dimension (employment) Less than 5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-50
Employees
(Valid) percentage
383 45 16 8 24
77,8% 9,1% 3,3% 1,6% 4,9%
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More than 50 Missing data Total
16 128 620
3,3% ---
Source: Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007)
But sectorial classifications appear quite weak in this case. While in the Southern part of Canavese (in the Province of Turin) there is a clear specialisation in machinery and metal industry, here in most productions the distinction between electronic and mechanic is impossible, and we can, in this sense, speak about a local mechatronics specialisation. Moreover, important service activities are carried on in the field of multimedia production. This is particularly the case with Videodelta in San Giorgio Canavese, an important center for cinematographic productions. And, in addition, the Ict sector is basically a “transversal” sector, dealing with a number of different fields: one enterprise may work in the field of streaming video, and the other providing facilities for the insurance sector. This implies that in the Ict, informatics and mechatronics sectors the input-output relations between local enterprises are basically quite low. Right now (particularly in the Canavese strategic plan, discussed later), the necessity to promote cooperation and “common visibility” of this fabric of technologically advanced, isolated companies has been emphasised. To quote some of the most important local enterprises in the Ict sector, we have to mention the RGI group, with about 350 employees (in various national seats; the main one in Ivrea), working in the field of software for insurance companies; Ribes, in the field of fiscal software for public administration, banks and insurance companies; and Comdata, in the field of call centres. Basically these enterprises sell their products and services outside the local area, particularly at national level. Particularly, many enterprises work for public administration, and not just in the software sector. It is worth mentioning the case of CTS, a relevant (about 250 employees) technologically advanced mechatronics enterprise producing machines for checking money, credit cards and identity documents, working both for public administration and banks. Other interesting local champions include Osai (numeric control for glass, wood and stone working), Selca (numeric control for the mechanic industry) and the interesting case of Matrix, a small technologically advanced enterprise that moved from the specialisation in computer printheads to the pneumatic sector (pressure and flow rate control), converting its technological electronic specialisation and applying to a number of different sectors (automotive, printing, textile, ecc.). While local input-output relations are low, it is worth mentioning that many electronic enterprises, with the Olivetti crisis, decided to diversify their markets, producing also electronic supplies for Fiat and the electronics for the automotive sector. According to interviews with local experts, it is plausible to estimate that about one quarter of small enterprises in the electronic sector have significant relations with the automotive industry. And, outside the electronic sector, it is worth mentioning that the ties between mechanic industry and automotive production are still relevant: in the mechanic sector, for example Deico group employs 400 people in the automobile mechanic supply sector, and Pininfarina factories (automobile design and engineering) are quite close (but outside) the local labour system, employing several people from Ivrea.
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A more detailed picture of the local industry is presented in table 8; it testified a relative loss of centrality of the informatics field, in favor of telecommunications and metal work. Tab. 8 – Employment per sector (Ateco classification), 2001 Sector Telecommunications General electronic Informatics Administrative consultancies Metal working Instrumental goods Design Iron metallurgy Printing Transport Food Optical instruments Woods Research and development Electronic Base electronic
Employment
Variation 1996-2001
7.844 2.824 1.260 1.105 743 694 547 492 398 346 328 231 226 213 212 173
+ 240,0 % + 10,1 % -79,4 % +258,7 % +5,1 % +5,5 % -13,8 % +8,4 % +51,9 % +21,4 % -24,3 % -19,5 % +4,2 % +15,2 % +112,0 % -0,6 %
Source: Asia database; reported in Conti et al. (2004), pp. 35-36.
One critical element in the transition from the big enterprise to a system of small ones refers to a weak attitude towards research and development. Apart from the presence of several of the above-mentioned local technologically leading enterprises, it is not to be thought that an orientation towards telecommunications and (partly) informatics and electronics reveals a particular general attitude towards high technology. For example, local telecommunication sector figures are widely tied to call centre activities, certainly not high-tech spillovers. One of the main problems connected to the passage from the big to the small enterprise is certainly a reduced focus towards research and innovation. Also in the old Censis (1993) survey, the main critical elements evaluated by local enterprises referred (in order) to marketing, distribution and technological enterprise functions. More recent surveys (Società Ricerca e Formazione, 2007) emphasised the strongly local orientation in the recruitment workers. In other words, more than 80% of the workers in key enterprise functions come from the local area, less than 20% from Piedmont region and basically no one from other Italian regions or abroad. This certainly emphasises lack of insertion of external know-how in terms of human capital. Moreover, the interviewed enterprises complained about the difficulty to find high-level technicians, denouncing a “formative deficit” in human capital. Such a problem will become even more evident in the future as the local Polytechnic venue will move next year to another region (in Verres) due to an important accord between Polytechnic and Valle d’Aosta, and so therefore most human formation will be carried on basically outside the local system, in Turin. It will remain at local
47
level just a formation center (Csea Cappelaro and Ghiglieno) oriented towards the provision of Ict skills. But, on the other hand, the success of the stabilising function played by the tissue of small and medium enterprises with reference to loss of jobs, and general local development for the area, has been evident. The last legacy of the Olivetti colossus is a tissue in the middle of the dialectic between mechanical specialisation, the old Ivrea industrial heritage, and the electronic one.
4. Territorial policies The Olivetti crisis during the 90s has been rapid and dramatic, pushing local political actors for the formulation of interventions. The first to take a position towards the ongoing Olivetti collapse has been the Province of Turin, who asked Censis in 1992 to develop a “strategy for the development of Canavese”, a wider area also hit, in the same period, by the closure of an important factory in car production (Lancia). The analysis proposed by Censis (1993) emphasised the lack of innovative attitude of the novel tissue of small enterprises, the weak transport infrastructures (a well known problem of the area: 45,6 entrepreneurs evaluated roads as insufficient, 72,3% in case of railways, 73,3% in that of public transport), stressing at the same time the difficulty to formulate policy interventions and to stimulate proper development strategies. A further attempt to promote industrial visioning for Ivrea took form in 1993, with the building of the Consortium for the “Ivrea technology district”. Capital was prevalently public, and the main partners were the Province of Turin, the Ivrea city hall, the Association of Ivrea industrials and Olivetti. The main goal is to support innovation, both in small enterprises and in public administration, particularly with the creation of technological competence centres (furnishing technical consultancies). There are two centres in the local system; one in Vico Canavese (in the field of laser and nanotechnologies), and one in Ivrea (mechatronics), in a decentralised seat of the Polytechnic of Turin. Between 1999 and 2001, 133 enterprises have been involved in the technological projects of these centres, with a total expenditure of 8 billion euros (70% from European Union). It has to be noted that the major part of such interventions never referred to mechatronics (1,7 billion euros out of 8 billion), but to traditional mechanics (1,9 billion; the third field referred to laser technologies, with a budget of 1,6 billion euros). To put it briefly, in a phase of peculiar transition from Olivetti to a fabric of small enterprises, the choice to support specialisation in informatics has been basically absent. Anyway, it is worth mentioning the ongoing attempt to build up a territorial node for informatics for public administration, on the basis of the presence of some important enterprises working in this specific field. Right now, the Provincial project has been approved at National level, and specific Ict infrastructures (a wide wireless network) have been provided.
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A second relevant regional policy refers to the formation of a territorial pact4 for Ivrea in 1998. The pact included, among others, 117 municipalities, the Province of Turin, the Ministry of labor, the Polytechnic of Turin, trade unions and a number of associations. The pact, set up in a framework of strong tensions and fears for the future of Olivetti and for local employment, was centered around two objectives (in coordination with the Ivrea technology district). On the one side, providing physical and immaterial (i.e. technological) infrastructures for the area, and on the other side to support economic and industrial differentiation (also by the Canavese Business Park integrated project5). Apart from important results in terms of governance and public participation, the pact financed (up to 80%) local enterprise investments regarding technological innovation, productive conversion and relocalisation inside the area of factory plants (table 9). No particular economic sectors have been privileged. Table 9 – Ivrea territorial pact: investments Year
Number of financed projects
Total investments (million euros)
Employment growth (units)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
108 94 84 80 77 74
78,2 74,8 98,5 98,8 98.4 95,4
840 451 677 762 762 888
Source: Territorial pact secretary; quoted in Bricco (2007).
Concerning infrastructures, the pact allowed the flow of public investments in order to realise seven operas (17,4 million euros), mainly in the field of transport infrastructures, but also destined to improve the general development potentialities of the area, as in the case of the building of a congress centre in Castellamonte and one for fairs and expositions in Quincinetto. Both the technology district and the territorial pact initiatives have had an important role in the development of the area. Certainly, it is difficult to say to what degree the maintenance of relatively high employment levels after the Olivetti crisis has been due to these policies, but certainly they allowed the financing of relevant infrastructures, the enhancement of technology transfer towards small local enterprises (through six specific thematic programs), and, particularly in the case of the territorial pact, the definition of new governance
Patto territoriale is an agreement between local public and private actors in order to reach specific goals – namely local development. It is an Italian formal policy instrument: Cipe resolution on 21 March 1997. For details concerning the Ivrea case see Lions Club Canavese (1999). 5 http://www.comune.ivrea.to.it/Comune/frontend/002/Sezione66/Elem11/Sezioni/Pagina1 4
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mechanisms6. Basically, those policies softly accompanied the spontaneous passage from one industrial paradigm organized around the big enterprises towards one focused on small and medium sized enterprises. Finally, in terms of territorial policies, the attempt, not properly industrial, to develop other economic vocations for the area has to be mentioned. Such an attempt started to take form in the 90s, years of evident Olivetti crisis, and assumed above all two directions. The first refers to biotechnologies; in 1993, it born the Canavese Bioindustry Park7, a structure intended to host research laboratories (both private and academic) in order to promote innovation and enterprise start-up. It is an attempt to capitalise the experience of RBM, a local research lab in this field, together with the electronic research knowledge developed in the Olivetti environment. The park opened in 1998, and in 2003 it involved 24 enterprises and 215 researchers, with a production of 3,2 million euros. In 2008, the park reached 35 enterprises and 240 researchers. These are certainly limited figures, and considering the long-term perspectives of investments in this technological field, certainly biotechnology may be part of a strategic option for the future, but right now assumes a marginal impact on the dynamics of the area. A second diversification attempt refers to tourism, particularly with the activities of the Ivrea tourism agency: one of the main elements has been the promotion of a network of 11 local castles. Despite some positive figures in the growth of tourist flows (+8,2% between 1996 and 2001) and in the number of hotels and restaurants, also this vocation is marginal for the economy of the area. Anyway, the attempt to differentiate the economic basis is testified by the recent Canavese Strategic Plan proposed by the Ivrea technology district in 20078. Here, tourism (particularly by networking with Turin museums) is explicitly considered as a possible development field, without of course overlooking the necessity of investments in industrial and service activities. Important projects are planned for the future, as in the case of Mediapolis, a theme park of 50.000 m2 in the sector of multimedia to be located in Albiano. At the moment, beside the importance of the governance mechanisms implemented in order to develop the strategic plan, it is too early to set a general evaluation. In general, it is interesting how one of the wider and open topics discussed in the plan refers to theme of identity. After a century of glorious centrality in the Italian and international scenario, with the fall of Olivetti and its brand, together with a non clear economic specialisation, the Ivrea system has to interrogate himself on his nature and his possible development paths.
Conclusions
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According to a local survey (Barbera, 2002), the three (perceived) most important achievements refer to a) sharing of visions for local development; b) attraction of external investors; c) trust building between local institutions. 7 www.bioindustrypark.it 8 www.provincia.torino.it/speciali/piano_start_canavese/
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The territory of Ivrea have certainly experienced different deep mutations over the last century; namely the alternation of different industrial specializations (in order: mechanics, electronics, informatics, telecommunications), together with the passage from a system centred on the big enterprise to one where small enterprises play a major role. The result of these transformations is still not entirely clear. It is curious that, in official documents, this heterogeneous tissue of small and medium enterprises has been described as a “productive multi-vocation district”9. The heritage of the Olivetti “sweat-capitalism” (with reference to the peculiar Olivetti orientation towards human and social development, differently from the “hard Fordism” practiced by Fiat in the same Province: Bonomi, 2005) spread to many managers who have been able to start up small enterprises in many different economic fields. The result of this metamorphosis certainly involves critical elements, for example, the telecommunication sector operates much in call centres and customer services, which are quite important activities in terms of employment, but with a limited technological content. But a strong tissue of innovative factories in the field of electronics, mechatronics and Icts is nevertheless locally present, and for this reason the area has been sometimes reported as a sort of “Italian silicon valley”. What is certainly interesting in this case study is the peculiarity of the reactions of the Ivrea territory in front of a tension in the local-global dialectic, a story that partly confirms the well known geographical and economic literature stressing the importance of processes of sedimentation of know-how, social capital and entrepreneurship. Despite many critical elements, the economic system is basically still “alive” and kept employment to relatively high level despite deep transformations in the industrial structure.
References AASTER et al. (2004), Per un capitalismo coalizionale del canavese; www.confindustriacanavese.it Associazione industriali del canavese (2005), Progetto canavese; www.assindcanavese.it Barbera F. (2002), Il patto territoriale del canavese, Rapporto finale. Boccia E. (2002), L’Olivetti dalla macchina da scrivere alla telefonia, in S. Zaninelli, M. Taccolini (eds) Il lavoro come fattore produttivo e come risorsa nella storia economica italiana, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, pp. 415-434. Bonomi, A. (2005), “Quelle formiche del capitalismo che non si vedono”, Il sole 24 ore, 23 January. Bricco P. (2007), Dalla crisi della grande impresa all’imprenditorialità diffusa: la Olivetti e l’Eporediese, in G. Berta (ed.), La questione settentrionale. Economia e società in trasformazione, Feltrinelli, Milano, pp. 323-378. Camoletto M. (1990), La struttura industriale ed il mercato del lavoro nelle aree programma di Ivrea e Pinerolo, Working Paper Ires Piemonte (96), Torino. Censis (1998), Reinventare il Canavese. Strategie per il riposizionamento del sistema economico e sociale, Franco Angeli, Milano.
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Chiarini R. (1990), Nella città dell’uomo. Il governo locale e la sfida del movimento di Comunità, in G. Sapelli, R. Chiarini (eds), Costruire la città dell’uomo. Adriano Olivetti e l’urbanistica, Comunità, Torino, pp. 137-183. Ciborra C. (1986), Le affinità asimmetriche. Il caso Olivetti – AT&T, Franco Angeli, Milano. Conti S. et al. (2004), Accompagnare lo sviluppo locale nel Canavese, Dipartimento Interaneo Territorio, Politecnico e Università di Torino. Kicherer S. (1990), Olivetti. A Study of the Corporate Management of Design, Trefoil, London. Lions Club Canavese (1999), Il patto territoriale del Canavese, Lions Club Canavese, Castellamonte. Maglione M. (1990), Olivetti e il sistema economico locale, in R. Maglione, A. Michelsons, S. Rossi (eds), Economie locali tra grande e piccolo impresa. Il caso di Ivrea e del Canavese, Comunità, Torino, pp. 6985. Novara F., Rozzi R., Garruccio R. (eds) (2005), Uomini e lavoro alla Olivetti, Paravia, Milano. Parodi M. (2006), Il paesaggio industriale olivettiano, in E. Dansero, A. Vanolo (eds), Geografie dei paesaggi industriali in Italia. Riflessioni e casi studi a confronto, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 223-243. Perotto G.P. (1995), Programma 101. L’invenzione del personal computer, Sperling & Kupfer, Milano. Piore M.J., Sabel C.F. (1984), The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity, Basic Books, New York. Provincia di Torino (2006), Piano strategico del canavese, www.provincia.torino.it Ricciardelli C. (2001), Olivetti. Una storia, un sogno ancora da scrivere. La sociologia del lavoro italiana nell’esperienza di Ivrea, Franco Angeli, Milano. Società Ricerca e Formazione (2007), Poli di sviluppo e fabbisogni professionali nell’eporediese. Prospettive di crescita
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Case study 3 : Vulnerable area of Czestochowskie (Poland) Roman Szul, Centre for European regional and local studies, University of Warsaw. 1.General economic and social evolution of the area Changes in definitions of statistical categories, changes in territorial divisions and other deficiencies of statistics (simply lack of relevant information) make it very difficult to provide exact data on evolution of the social and economic situation of the area under study. However, some tendencies can be discerned. As regards unemployment, it didn’t exist (at least as an officially registered phenomenon) until the change of the system (transition to market economy) in 1989. It appeared (and was officially recognized) in 1990 and since then it grew rapidly, both in Poland as a whole and in all regions (although with different speed). In 1995 unemployment rate reached 14.9% for Poland and 13.5 for Czestochowskie voivodship (which was a little bit larger than the present Czestochowskie subregion). It should be added that the outbreak of the registered unemployment was due to several factors, not only to real joblessness. For instance, a number of people who never meant to work (so called “social parasites”, housewives, etc.) or had worked in the shadow economy registered themselves as unemployed to benefit from this status. Since that time ithe unemployment decreased, again both in Poland as a whole and in most areas, including Czestochowskie. (This decrease was mostly due to some macroeconomic measures taken by the central government, a tightened labour market regulations, etc.). The unemployment started to grew again by the end of the 1990s. In 2005 it amounted to 17% both for Poland and for Czestochoskie subregion. Since then a dramatic decrease of this indicator has been taking place in Poland, and in Czestochowskie as well. The latest number (June 2008) for Poland is 9,9%. In April 2008 unemployment rate both for Poland and Czestochowskie subregion was exactly the same – 10.5%. It is worth noting that the unemployment rate in the town of Czestochowa all the time has been lower than in the surrounding rural areas. As for the latest data for April 2008, the unemployment rate in the town of Czestochowa was 8.3% and in the three surrounding districts it ranged from 10.8 to 16.5% (Reasons of this difference will be dealt with later on). Unemployment was partially caused by losses in employment. In 1980 – 1995 the number of the “employed” (without self-employed in private farming which otherwise was quite significant) in Czestochowskie voivodship dropped from 234.9 thousand to 173.8 thousand. Further numbers are incomparable to the previous because of the change in territorial delimitation of statistical units. In 2000 employment in Czestochowskie subregion amounted to 111.4 thousand, in 2005 to 110.2 thousand, then it grew to 113.1 thousand in 2006. This dynamic was in line with all-national tendencies. Unemployment was alleviated by emigration to other regions and abroad. Since 1990 Czestochowskie registered negative balance of migrations. For instance, in 2000 registered migration balance amounted to - 0.1 and in 2005 to - 0.6 per 1000 inhabitants. These numbers are, however, highly unreliable because of the widespread phenomenon of unregistered and temporary migrations. What seems to be sure is the net outflow of population from Czestochowskie. As to GDP or GVA level and dynamics, it should be noted that these indicators per capita in Czestochowskie area are below the national average. Since they started to be calculated at regional level in the mid-1990s, they amount to about 85% of the national average, without significant changes. Consequently, dynamics of these indicators evolve around the national average. In 1990-91 national GDP fell by cumulative 15%, since 1992 it has been growing. In 1992 –1998 it grew by 39% in Poland and by 35% in the Czestochowskie voivodship. In
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1998-2003 it increased by 15% in Poland and by 13% in Czestochowskie subregion. The growth of GDP in recent years (for which data are available) – 2004 and 2005 - was 9.7% and 6.4% for Poland and 13.8% and 3.8% for Czestochowskie subregion. 2. a) Historical and cultural background Czestochowskie subregion (in Polish: subregion częstochowski) forms the northern part of the present (since 1999) Silesian voivodship or region (województwo śląskie), making up about 10% of its population (about 0.5 million, half of which in the town of Czestochowa) and 20% of its area. The main centre of the area – Czestochowa (cca 250 thousand inhabitants) – is located some 50 km to the north of Katowice, the capital of the Silesian voivodship, 100 km to the north-west of Krakow, and 150 km to the south-west of Warsaw. Despite its present location as a part of Silesian voivodship, the history of Czestochowskie considerably differs from what is traditionally meant as “Silesia”. Historical Silesia, which was much larger than the present Silesian voidodship (region) was a part of medieval Poland (one of its provinces). Silesia, formed by a number of small duchies, dropped out from Poland in the 14th century to become a part of the Czech kingdom (ruled by the Luxemburg dynasty), then of the Habsburg (Austrian) monarchy and finally, in the 18th century, was divided between Prussia (a larger part) and Austria (a small, south-eastern part). Czestochowskie area belonged to Poland until the end of the 18th century when Poland lost independence and its territory was partitioned between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. Before and after the partitioning of Poland the town of Czestochowa played an important role in the spiritual life of Poland as being its major religious centre (due to Jasna Góra monastery). After the partitioning of Poland Czestochowskie area for a short time belonged to the Prussian sector, and since 1813 to the Russian sector of occupied Poland, and more exactly to the autonomous “Kingdom of Poland” (established at the Vienna congress in 1815; its “king” being Russian emperor). Autonomy of the “Kingdom of Poland” was gradually reduced and in the second half of the 19th century it was abolished (together with the name “Kingdom of Poland” replaced by a Russian name “Privislanskiy krai” or “Vistula peripheral area”) and a permanent state of emergency was introduced. After the first world war when Poland regained independence, Czestochowskie became its integral part, while a small part of Silesia (its easternmost part) became autonomous region of Poland and the rest of Silesia remained in Germany. After the second world war all Silesia (apart form its Czechoslovak part) belonged to Poland. In years 1950-1975 Czestochowskie area formed a part of Katowice voivodship (one of 17 voivodships) whose core was the Upper Silesian agglomeration, in 1975 – 1998 it was one of 49 new voivodships, and since the reform of 1999 part of “Silesian” voivodship (one of 16 voivodships, whose territory is largely identical with the territory of the former Katowice voivodship. (Incorporation of Czestochowskie to the Silesian voivodship was opposed by a part of Czestochowskie’s population, but this opposition was ignored by the government). Centuries of separate histories of Czestochowskie and Silesia have resulted in some sociological differences, concerning first of all ethnic-national identity of their inhabitants (strong Polish identity in Czestochowskie, unclear and unstable Polish-German-Silesian identity of indigenous inhabitants of the part of Silesia bordering with Czestochowskie), mentality and language (standard Polish spoken in all contexts by the urban population, very limited use of dialects by the rural population in Czestochowskie; widespread use of dialects, including by urban population, apart from standard Polish, in Silesia). Due to its sociocultural characteristics Czestochowskie easily absorbs immigrants from other parts of Poland, while immigration from other parts of Poland to (Upper) Silesia causes some frictions or tensions. Another difference is the legal status (citizenship, passport) of inhabitants of the two
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areas. According to German law, descendants of German citizens are considered as German nationals and consequently receive German passports and other related rights. Consequently, some inhabitants of Silesia (that belonged to Germany in the interwar period) have double citizenship and two passports. German passports used to open to them employment and other opportunities in Germany and the European Union, which resulted in intense permanent or temporary migration from Silesia. This phenomenon is much weaker in Czestochowskie. In the 19th century the eastern part of Silesia around Katowice (Kattowitz) (called Upper Silesia) underwent a violent process of industrialization and urbanization, mostly due to discovery of hard coal and iron ore deposits and the resulting development of coal mining and metallurgy. The industry also spread to the other side of the Prussian – Russian state border – to the area of Sosnowiec (coal mining and metallurgy) and to the area of Czestochowa (metallurgy due to discovery of iron ore, now depleted). Consequently Czestochowskie became one of the most industrialized areas of the “Kingdom of Poland” (or “Privislanskiy Krai”). The industry of Czestochowskie benefited from technological and capital links with industry in Upper Silesia and from markets in the Russian empire. In the interwar period a vitally important railway line was built connecting (Polish part of) Upper Silesian industrial basin with Polish Baltic sea port of Gdynia leading through Czestochowa. An acceleration of development of heavy industry in Czestochowskie (especially in Czechochowa itself) took place after the second world war, under the socialist/communist or centrally planned economy. To understand the mechanism and logic of this development and further problems resulting from the collapse of the socialist/communist system, one has to briefly describe this system. The industry was almost entirely nationalised or overtaken by the state (many owners died during the war and occupation or fled) in a few years after the war. (In Poland agriculture and small services remained in private hands). The state in its decisions concerning production (kind, size, technology, employment, supply-delivery chain etc.) and investments (sectors of production, size, location, etc.) took into account two considerations: technological and political ones. If something was politically desirable and technologically possible, it was done regardless of economic, environmental or other considerations. Economic factors (prices, profits, demand etc.) could not be taken into account for these categories were only “bookkeeping categories” without real meaning, as prices, profits, etc. were being set up in an administrative way in absence of the market, and profitability was not a condition for surviving of enterprises. Political considerations resulted from ideology, international political situation, international division of labour within the “socialist bloc” and internal (national, local) political and social situation. As a result of these considerations development of heavy industry received high priority. It was due to the ideological conviction that heavy industry was “engine of the socialist economy” and that heavy industry working class was the fundament of socialism supporting the communist party and communist revolution. (The word “communism” itself was never used in Poland as it was highly unpopular, it was always replaced by “socialism”). The international political situation since the outbreak of the Korean war and the cold war in the late 1940s created favourable conditions for development of heavy industry, especially metallurgy (for steel for tanks and other arms). In the international division of labour within the communist bloc Poland was specialized, among other things, in metallurgy, some kinds of arms and shipbuilding – all these sectors being highly “steel-consuming”. As regards internal political and social situation, communist authorities shortly after the imposition of the communist regime wanted to solve one of the hardest problems of the inter-war (capitalist) Poland – urban unemployment and rural poverty. To do so, they preferred building big industrial factories employing large numbers of workers (regardless of their productivity).
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All the above mentioned factors prompted development of heavy industry in Upper Silesia and its adjacent areas, including Czestochowskie. There was already a necessary “starting capital” there – industrial plants and infrastructure, skilled workers and engineers, proximity to Upper Silesian coal basin and proximity of underdeveloped rural areas in central Poland. Czestochowa, being a centre of Polish Catholicism and conservatism, was a preferred location of heavy industry and concentration of working class as the ruling communists believed in “progressiveness” of the industrial working class and thus in counterbalancing the Jasna Góra monastery by a huge steelworks. (For the same ideological reason big steelworks were also located in other “centres of conservatism” – in Krakow and Warsaw). As a result, a huge steelworks named “Huta Bieruta” (“Bierut Steelworks” – Boleslaw Bierut was the first communist president of Poland) was located in Czestochowa. “Huta Bieruta” had to be big and famous to overshadow Jasna Góra and to herald the victory of socialism and progress over “religious obscurantism and backwardness”. The steelworks was accompanied by a set of other investments, including Polytechnic University of Czestochowa, to prepare engineers for the heavy industry in the area. Parallel to building of heavy industry there was building of textile industry (to create jobs for metallurgists’ wives). In the 1970s, to facilitate transportation of steel products from Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie to the USSR and of iron ore from the USSR, large-gauge railway track was built which further facilitated industrial production in Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie. In the 1960s, and especially in the 70s and 80s when ideological considerations were of minor importance and hardly any believed in “progressiveness of industrial working class” or in the necessity of armaments to deter “imperialist invasion”, non-ideological mechanisms still operated creating high demand for steel products (as well as practically for all products) and for employment. These were mechanisms of “centrally planned” economy and administrative distribution of tasks and resources among enterprises and ways of rewarding of managers of enterprises. Enterprises and their managers were interested in receiving as much resources and workers as possible (their demand was practically unlimited) to fulfil the plans. The managers, almost always engineers by education, and politicians were usually fascinated by big projects (big industrial factories) so they always needed more and more steel, energy and other raw materials to realize such projects. This tendency was especially evident in the 1970s when the state leadership launched the ambitious programme of technological modernization of Poland to catch up with the developed Western countries. (One of results of this policy was a high indebtedness of Poland). Consequently, the national economy was hungry for steel and workers, and at the same time was highly steel- and labour-consuming and labour productivity and effectiveness of use of steel (energy and other materials) were low. (A part of industrial capacities and workforce was idle, there were often interruptions in production for shortage of energy, materials, skilled workers, etc.). Economic reforms (started in 1956 and intensified in the early 1980s) designed to increase economic efficiency by introducing some market mechanisms failed to reduce the demand for materials and labour in heavy industry and in large state-owned firms. In such a situation Huta Bieruta and other industrial plants in Czestochowskie continued growing. In its “best” time in the mid-1970s it employed 16 thousand workers. A radical change in the economic and political environment came about in the 1990s with the change of the economic system and international situation. As a result of the collapse of the socialist bloc, of its international division of labour and of the end of the cold war, the demand for tanks and other armaments, for ships (for the USSR) etc. decreased dramatically. This led to a decrease in demand for steel from Czestochowskie. The general decline in industrial output in the national economy and the improvement of raw material efficiency and labour productivity added to the reduction in demand for steel and resulted in getting off
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superfluous capacities and employment (in 2004 Huta Czestochowa employed only 4 thousand workers). Introduction of market mechanisms revealed low economic efficiency and low competitiveness of ideologically motivated and politically and bureaucratically driven enterprises, such as “Huta Bieruta” (renamed into “Huta Czestochowa”). The change of the economic and political system and situation in Poland in the 1990s coincided with tendencies in European and global markets characterised by overcapacities in steel industry which limited export prospects. Liberalization of the national economy opened up the national market for foreign competition in steel products which further deteriorated the whole sector. The impact of the new system on the economy of big industrial firms was, however, cushioned by some political and economic measures, deliberate or spontaneous. In the first stage of the transition to the market economy heavy industries were exempted from privatisation and their economic losses (not paying taxes, debts, social insurances and other payments) were tolerated for political considerations. (It turned out that Marxists were right to believe that heavy industry working class was a defender of socialism). In order to protect restructuring of the steel industry, Polish government introduced some restrictions on imports of steel. Consequently, decrease in output of such firms as Huta Czestochowa was lower than otherwise would be, the decrease in employment and incomes paid to the employees was lower than the decrease in output. As a result, unemployment rate and other phenomena related to industrial decline in areas dominated by heavy industry and characterized by militant working class, including Upper Silesia and Czestochowskie, was lower than national average. Nevertheless, pressures of the market economy, of the WTO and the EU forced organizational and technological restructuring and reducing of capacities of steel industry and preparing it for privatisation. The restructuring was carried out mostly by the central state as the owner of the enterprise, and more directly – by a governmental agency called Agency for Restructuring of Industry. The restructuring of big industrial enterprises, in general lines, consisted in dividing enterprises into smaller units, especially by separating the main activity from auxiliary ones, making the latter ones independent companies, then in technological modernization and reduction of capacities of the main unit while preparing it for privatisation. This process led to a reduction in employment. In the case of restructuring of heavy industries (coal mining and metallurgy) in politically strong areas (as Upper Silesia and other industrial centres) efforts were done to limit the number of people to be unemployed, e.g. by offering “early retirement schemes”, preferring “natural” reductions (not employing new workers while the employed abandon job for natural reasons), etc. The workers to be reduced who were not eligible for “early retirement schemes” used to receive substantial compensation (it was not the case with restructuring of other branches of industry in other parts of the country). Some of them started small private businesses, many found jobs in the growing but often unstable service sector or in the shadow economy, some returned to their home regions, some migrated looking for jobs abroad, some became jobless. In this context a growing tourist sector should be mentioned, linked with the role of Czestochowa as an important tourist and pilgrimage centre in Poland. (Czestochowa belongs to a so called “golden triangle” of most frequently visited tourist centres in Poland, together with Warsaw and Krakow). As regards privatisation of Huta Czestochowa, after 2000 two investors competed for it: the world-wide known international company Mittal Steel and a Ukrainian company called “Industrial Group of Donbass”. After a fierce competition the factory was sold in 2004 to the Ukrainian group. The decisive factor was the support for the Ukrainians by the workers and trade unions. They preferred Ukrainians for supposed cultural and linguistic affinity of Poles and Ukrainians (for workers, usually speaking only Polish, it was important that they could communicate directly with their bosses as Polish, Ukrainian and Russian are mutually highly
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comprehensible and many Ukrainians speak good Polish), and for the fact that Ukrainians had promised considerable benefits – increase in wages and salaries and not reducing the employment. Since then the factory is registering a revival: output and employment are growing (the latter from 4.200 in 2004 to 4.800 in 2007), as well as salaries and wages. In 2004, for the first time in its free-market history the factory registered profit and paid taxes to the central and local budgets. The factory produces mostly heavy plates used in such industries as ship building and production of pipelines. More than half of its production is exported, one of important destinations being the former USSR (Russia and Ukraine). One can not exclude that it is further re-exported to China and elsewhere. As can be seen from the above presentation, the changing conditions of the industry in the Czestochowskie area were predominantly, if not exclusively, due to the factors out of reach of the local or regional community or its governments. Location of heavy industry in Czestochowa and its characteristics (size of firms, specialization, technology) during the communist regime/centrally planned economy were decided upon by the central government. Although there were some objective preconditions to locate metallurgical industry there, namely the already existing plants and skilled workers and engineers, the rapid development of heavy industry there was not a natural result of those preconditions, and the industrial tradition of the area was discontinued as a result of human losses caused by the second world war and occupation and the change of the socio-economic and political system after the war. The crisis of metallurgy in Czestochowskie in the 1990s was also caused by external factors, namely the change of the system and collapse of the communist bloc and its international division of labour. In this context globalisation was of relatively lesser importance. The recovery after 2000 was also mostly due to external forces: central government-sponsored restructuring and privatisation. In this case, however, local factors did matter, as it was the employees of the Huta Czestochowa who finally took decision to whom the factory was to be sold. This time globalisation did matter more than earlier, as it created favourable conditions for the recovery. As to socio-cultural characteristics of the area that could influence local response to externally generated impacts, such as entrepreneurial tradition, trade union membership, employers organisation membership, cultural homogeneity or diversity, etc., it can be said the following: Entrepreneurial tradition in Czestochowskie area doesn’t seem to diverge substantially from the “national average”. In Poland entrepreneurial activity seems to be positively associated first of all with urbanization, higher incomes and education, and negatively with rural factor and heavy industry, so it is more visible in big urban centres like Warsaw, Krakow and Poznan, and less in rural areas, small towns and heavy industry centres. However, it is difficult to say whether entrepreneurial activity is a cause or a result of relative prosperity of those urban centres. As for political attitudes of the population of the area, it seems to be inclined towards the left wing. The “left wing” in Poland means a distance from the political role of the Catholic Church (it may be surprising or not given the role of Czestochowa in the Catholic Church in Poland), non so negative assessment of the “communist past” and a slightly greater than on average the reliance on the active role of the state in economy and public life. It should be added, however, that the division between the “left” and the “right” wing is vague, unclear and has little impact on kind of policies carried out both at national and at local level. The political scene in the area is dominated by all-national parties. Regionalist Silesian parties or movements, visible although still marginal, in Upper Silesia are absent in Czestochowskie. This is due to the aforementioned ethno-cultural homogeneity of the area and the lack of any desire to oppose Poland or the central government.
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Trade unions in the area are also “on national average” – they are more active than, let’s say, in small towns and rural areas, but much less than e.g. in Upper Silesian agglomeration, in Three-City (Gdansk, Gdynia, Sopot), etc. After the first shock of post-socialist transformation local trade unions became less and less militant and accepted the necessity of restructuring and privatisation of industry. 2. b) Governance structures As regards relationships between big industrial plants and their local environment, it can be said that in the period of socialism/communism here, as elsewhere in Poland, big firms were independent from their local social and administrative environment. Local social and technical infrastructure, transportation system, housing, education (vocational schools) etc. were adjusted to the needs of big industrial plants. In other words, big firms, such as Czestochowa steelworks supplied considerable parts of the town of its location with electrical energy, hot water, etc. Managers of such firms were the most influential persons in the local political scene. Territorial organization of the state changed several times. Since the end of the war to 1950 the area of Czestochowa belonged to Kieleckie voivodship, from 1950 to 1975 to Katowickie voivodship and from 1975 to 1998 it was a separate voivodship. The latter period should be divided into two distinct subperiods: 1975-1990 and 1990-1998. In the first subperiod voivodships had formally institutions of regional self-government such as regional council with its executive, regional budget, etc., apart from a representative of central government (called “wojewoda” – an institution similar to French prefect). Not democratic way of elections to the regional council (regional party organization had a decisive say concerning the personal composition of the council), the “double subordination” of the regional executive – to the regional council and to functional ministries (in practice it was a “triple subordination” as the third centre of power was party organization) made that regional councils could hardly be considered as institutions of regional self-government. The same is true for local level (rural, urban-rural and urban communes) self-government. In 1990 a reform was made in the system of territorial self-government: regional councils with their executives were abolished, and fully-fledged democracy was introduced at the local level. The institution of wojewoda was retained, just as voivodships – this time as territorial statistical units and territorial delimitations of competences of governmental representatives (wojewoda). Wojewoda was charged with control of legality of activity of local selfgovernment, with dealing with extraordinary situations as well as with fulfilling of central government’s tasks. As noticed earlier, in the 1990s a decline and restructuring of industry took place. It resulted, among other things, in unemployment. To deal with this problem an institution called “labour offices” was created. It was organized at voivodship and “rejon” (“district – a level between commune and voivodship) level and was responsible to the ministry of labour. This institution was rather passive as its main activity was registration of the unemployed and distribution of unemployment benefits. Local authorities had to cope with some problems resulting from industrial decline and restructuring, such as providing social assistance to people in need, reorganization of school network (e.g. trimming of vocational schools as they were believed to produce unnecessary skills) etc. In a relatively better situation were communes where big factories were located than the nearby communes, from where numerous workers used to commute to the factory. Due to differences in political strength of local self-governments in bigger cities and in rural communes, as well as between the urban working class and countryside commuters, factory managers more readily fired out commuters than local urban dwellers. It is why towns almost always register lower unemployment rates than their surrounding rural areas. It should be noted that during the old (socialist) system commuting was a considerable phenomenon (just
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for different reasons than in the western/capitalist countries). Commuters almost in 100% used public transport, to a large extent operated by factories. One of element of the restructuring was the almost entire elimination of factory transport accompanied by a considerable reduction in non-factory public transportation. The latter was due, among other things, to commercialisation of this activity and getting rid of unprofitable lines. Richer (urban rather than rural) local self-governments could afford to subsidize local public transport. Local authorities in the 1990s, including the town of Czestochowa, in doing their business usually prepared medium or long-term strategies – elaborated by experts, consulted by representatives of local inhabitants and approved by local authorities. These strategies, if not always guided local executives in their daily activities, help the local actors to evaluate the situation (SWOT analysis was a norm) of the given area. The strategy for Czetochowa and its surrounding doesn’t differ from “standard” local strategies: it envisages improved living standard of the population (better physical and social infrastructure), increased competitiveness of the economy, restructuring of industry, exploiting advantages of the location and of the role of Czestochowa as religious and tourist centre in Poland, protection of natural environment, etc. It can be said that local authorities in Czestochowa are quite stable and enjoy considerable support of the inhabitants, and quite successful in leading the town through the turmoil of restructuring and transition of the local community towards globalisation and market economy. In doing so local authorities could take support from a network of formal and informal institutions, such a business associations, universities (mostly of technological specialisation), local media, etc. Being a religious and historic centre of the Polish nation Czestochowa is known practically to all Poles, in Poland and abroad. It helped the local authorities to some extent to establish international contacts which eventually profited in attracting international investors. In 1999, after several years of discussions and preparations, a new territorial division and organization of territorial government came into force. A new, regional, level of territorial organization was introduced. Previous 49 (small) voivodships were abolished, replaced by 16 (big) voivodships. More importantly, these new voivodships (regions) were self-government units as they had assemblies (councils) elected by inhabitants in direct elections, executive bodies (elected by the councils) and competencies and financing. The institution of wojewoda (government representative) at the regional level was retained. The main responsibility of voivodship was to be economic development. To this end, voivodships had to prepare and adopt (by voivodship councils) in 2000 long term strategies of regional development. In practice, however, these strategies were intellectual exercises of regional politicians, experts and public opinion rather than real instruments of regional policy of the regions themselves, because these strategies lacked precise connections of objectives and financing. It can be said that this was a learning by doing process. Regions in that time had no established leaders: persons fulfilling political positions in the newly created regions usually were second- or third-rank activists of all-national parties, without prestige and without experience and without a clear idea what to do for their regions. Their main task was to fulfil formal obligation of preparing some documents, among others regional strategies. To do so they employed external experts and consulted public opinion. He main way of consulting the public opinion were meeting with representatives of various socio-professional groups and with inhabitants of individual areas. The quality of such meeting were different – from constructive information and inspiration to just wishes taking into account narrow interests of the given group. Only a few years later, when EU financing for the years 2004-2006 and 2007-2013 clearly determined amount of funds available to Polish regions, strategies were amended and objectives and funds were interconnected. An instrument of regional policy introduced with the 1999 reform was so called “regional contract” – a two-year agreement
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between the central government and respective regional self-government. In such a contract the two parties agreed on undertakings of common interest. In practice, however, the stronger partner – the central government, decided what was to be done. This way of financing the bulk of expenditure for regional development made, in fact, regional policy carried out by regional self-government dependent on external, mainly EU and national, financing and programming. It doesn’t seem that voivodships have a substantial impact on economic development on their territories. They are predominantly concerned with applying for EU and national funds for regional development (mostly projects in physical infrastructure). As regards Czestochowskie area, as mentioned above, it was included, despite some protests of its inhabitants, to Silesian voivodship. For internal technical purposes the voivodship is divided into five parts, one of them being Czestochowskie area. This division serves for planning and administrative purposes. In Czestochowa, as in other subregional centres, offices of the wojewoda and of regional government are located. In preparing of the strategy for the voivodship, attention is paid not only to sectoral or “horizontal” issues, but also to territorial ones, including specificity of Czestochowskie. Together with big voivodships another level was introduced – that between voivodship and communes, called powiat (district), supplied with council elected in direct elections, and executive bodies elected by the council. There are two kinds of districts – “usual” and “townsdistricts”, the latter being the biggest cities and all centres of previous 49 small voivodships, including the town of Czestochowa. Districts were charged with such issues as some kind of roads and other infrastructure, some types of schools. Physical planning, crucial for local economic development, remains competence of local (communes) authorities. The central government may introduce ‘projects of state-wide importance’ into territorial physical plans, but such practices are considered as exceptions. Regional and district authorities have not legal power to do the same. Unlike regions (voivodships), districts have no legal obligation to elaborate regional/local development strategy. Nevertheless, many of them, including all forming the Czestochowskie subregion, have got such strategies. For the restructuring of industry in Czestochowskie of special importance are several specialized institutions acting at local level. (They were, however, invented and implemented top-down). Three of them should be mentioned: Regional Development Agency (RDA) in Czestochowa, Czestochowa Industrial Park and Czestochowa branch of Katowice Special Economic Zone. The RDA in Czestochowa is one of several similar institutions established in Poland in the 1990s, whose aim is to carry out industrial restructuring and promoting local development. They form an umbrella organization “Polish Regional Development Agency”. The Czestochowa RDA is a company whose main owner (98%) is the commune (town) of Czestochowa. Its main task was to rehabilitate industrial estate (buildings, land) abandoned by the Huta Czestochowa and other industrial area (for instance, land of former ore iron mines) and to attract investors. As to the Czestochowa Industrial Park, it was established in 2003 9in the final stage of restructuring of the Huta Czestochowa). It was result of an agreement between the town of Czestochowa, the Agency for Development of Industry (a central institution in Warsaw) and Huta Czestochowa. It has built or adapted some building rented to small and medium enterprises on preferential conditions. The Park delivers also some business services to the enterprises. The Czestochowa branch of Katowice Special Economic Zone is an are in Czestochowa where investors benefit from tax reductions. (This kind of institutions was introduced in Poland in the early 1990s to cope with restructuring of declining industries and to promote development of underdeveloped areas. It was a problem in accession negotiations of Poland with the EU, but finally the EU agreed to accept it under some conditions). 3) The impact of recession in the vulnerable sector of the regional welfare
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Generally speaking, the impact of recession on the regional welfare in Czestochowskie area doesn’t differ from the impact of recession on the national welfare. The most visible element of the recession – unemployment rate – in Czestochowskie since 1990 has been always on the national average or below. (This had two peaks: about 15% in 1994, and ca. 20% in 2001/02; in the second half of the 1990s and now, in June 2008, it dropped slightly below 10%). As regards other effects of recession, such as poverty and the related social phenomena, the situation in Czestochowskie, unlike other regions, was never reported in Polish media and scientific research as serious. The above statement may seem surprising. There are several ways of explaining this situation. First, the industry in Czestochowskie (metallurgy) was not the only sector in Poland affected by the recession and transformation restructuring after the change of the socioeconomic system after 1989. Consequently, other regions were also affected, many of them even worse. Second, the impact of decreased output of the metallurgical industry in Czestochowskie on the regional economy was rather limited as main inputs used to come from outside (iron ore from abroad, coal and energy mostly from Upper Silesian industrial basin). Third, the drop in demand and output of region’s production at the beginning of transformation and recession didn’t translate immediately into increased unemployment and decreased incomes of the population. As noted earlier, overemployment and losses of enterprises in heavy industry were tolerated for several years and the rationalisation of employment in this sector was relatively smooth and slow. Fourth, the reduced workers in heavy industry received substantial compensation or enjoyed early retirement schemes, so their living standards were not so much affected. Besides, many of them were commuters from the countryside possessing small farms, so they were “absorbed” by agriculture and were not registered as unemployed. Fifth, there was an outmigration – abroad and to other regions (including returns) which alleviated the problem of unemployment and poverty. Sixth, the unemployed in Czestochowskie didn’t form large territorial concentrations of unemployment. “Pushing out” of the unemployment to the rural areas made that the unemployed persons were dispersed and could rely on family and neighbours’ support and thus find a job, often irregular or temporary. (Such concentrations of unemployment and poverty did exist, e.g. in some areas of Upper Silesia and in rural areas dominated by stateowned farms in northern and western Poland). As regards the impact of the recession on individual sectors of the population, it seems that two age groups were particularly affected: young people looking for their first job, and the unemployed in the age of 50s. The unemployment rate among the youngest (under 25, and under 30) was two – three times higher the average. The older (over 50) if unemployed, had practically no chance of getting a job as employers preferred younger people. The unemployment among the young graduates was somehow reduced by the rapidly expanding higher education, including private one. (Young people treated higher education as an advantage on labour market, or simply didn’t know what to do after graduating from secondary schools). At the very beginning people with vocational education were more affected by unemployment than those with general and higher education. Now the situation is different as there is high demand for blue-collar workers. Theoretically, the crisis in the heavy industry in the region should have affected more male working force than the female. In fact, however, many textile plants (employing mostly women) in Czestochowskie went bankrupt as well. Young women were affected by the new situation on the labour market in the sense that they often refrained from having babies as they were afraid of loosing job during pregnancy or maternal leave. Another category of victims of the new situation in recent years are so-called “euro-orphans” – children of parents
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temporarily working abroad (mostly in western Europe). (This is a serious problem in areas of high work emigration, Czestochowskie is not one of them). 4) Evaluation of policies Several levels of policy were involved in developing or determining, and implementing policies regarding the metallurgic sector in Czestochowskie and the socio-economic life in the area. These are: local (town of Czestochowa) government since the very beginning of the transformation after 1989, powiat (district) governments of the area of Czestochowskie subregion (since its creation in 1999), regional (voivodship) government of Silesian voivodship (since its creation in 1999), central government (especially Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Privatisation and its successor – Ministry of State Propriety, Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires, Ministry of Regional Development [when it was a separate ministry and not a part of the Ministry of Economy]) and some central agencies (Agency for Restructuring of Industry, Polish Regional Development Agency, Polish Agency for Foreign Investments), the EU (European Commission and units responsible for regional policy and competition policy), and WTO. WTO and the EU since the beginning of transformation determined ways of protection for and restructuring of steel industry in Poland. They accepted a programme of restructuring and temporary protection, which envisaged reduction of capacities. After a few years of implementation of this programme both institutions expressed some disappointment for the slow pace of progress. Given that Poland was interested in maintaining good relations with them, especially since it applied for EU membership, Poland carried out the restructuring of steel industry to an end. “The end” was privatising and selling steelworks to investors (almost exclusively to private foreign investors). This job was done by the state Agency for Restructuring of Industry (restructuring of firms), Polish Agency for Foreign Investments (providing information on possibility of investments in Poland for potential foreign investors, looking for such investors, monitoring of fulfilment of investors’ obligations) and the Ministry of Privatisation (taking decision of the way of privatisation – e.g. selling to strategic investors, selling shares on stock exchange, selling to firm’s employees, transferring propriety to local authorities [communalisation] , etc. – in the case of steel industry selling to strategic foreign investors was chosen). Consequently, crucial decisions on restructuring of steel industry in Czestochowskie were taken by national and international actors. They created a framework in which local, regional and national actors could act. When talking about external actors one should add Ukrainian government and media which strongly lobbied for selling Huta Czestochowa to the Ukrainian investor. One element of this framework was unemployment. From the very beginning this problem was dealt with by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affaires and its local units, including in Czestochowskie. There were two kinds of activity: passive (registration of unemployment and distribution of unemployment benefits) and active (incentives for the unemployed to undertake business, schooling etc.). The Ministry carried out a territorially differentiated policy (e.g. different length of time of receiving unemployment benefits). It should be said that passive forms of dealing with the unemployment prevailed in the activity of the Ministry and its units. At the beginning of the transformation (to the mid-1990s) the government, dominated by neo-liberal ideology, refrained from active industrial and regional policies considering them as harmful for the smooth functioning of the market and equal treatment of all participant on the market. In such a situation the Ministry of Labour was the only institution which tried to react to the situation. Social problems resulting from restructuring and unemployment (assistance for the poor) was duty of local authorities.
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Since the mid-1990s the central government took a more pro-active stance in relation to regional policy. Evidently, this was influenced by the EU. Strengthening of relations with the EU, a possibility to make use of EU funds (PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA, INTERREG, etc) and a perspective of accession to the EU changed the attitude of the government towards regional policy. Regional policy became institutionalised, carried out by the Ministry of Economy or a separate Ministry for Regional Development. More importantly, it received a substantial financing, mostly from the EU. On the local level it meant opportunities to obtain funds for programmes of local development and restructuring. This influenced local authorities, such as those of Czestochowskie. The territorial-administrative reform of 1999 added two new actors: district and region, and at the same time meant further strengthening of the idea of active regional policy. Local and regional actors received new instruments of carrying out economic policy and of articulating their needs to the central government. Cooperation between the various levels of actors in Czestochowskie seems to be smooth and effective. After the privatisation, communalisation or liquidation of bankrupt firms by the central government, now the main actor in promoting economic development at local level in Czestochowskie are local authorities. Poland’s access to the EU in 2004 opened up new possibilities and funds for promoting local and regional development, especially what concerns infrastructure building. Opening up of labour markets in several countries for Polish workers also alleviated the problem of unemployment. Recently, however, there are signs that the outflow of workers is too high and the recovering industries have problems with finding skilled workers.
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Case Study 4: Electronics industry in Western Hungary Ivan Illes
The region The Western part of Hungary is bordered by the river Danube, therefore its name is Transdanubia (Dunántúl). Having been part of the Roman province Pannonia, it was always regarded as the more “civilised” part of Hungary, in contrast to the Eastern half of the country which was never part of the Roman Empire. The more “civilised” character did not mean always more richness: agricultural endowments were more favourable in the Eastern plain which meant higher incomes in this part of the country. Furthermore, in the time of the “Cold War”, a large part of Western Hungary was in the zone of the “Iron Curtain”, which meant that no substantial industrial and infrastructural developments were implemented in this zone. Closeness to the West was a disadvantage in this period. After the change of the political and economic change in 1989-1990, the place of Transdanubia changed radically. Being closer to Western Europe and to the EU became a geographical advantage. Some of the old economic and trade relations with the neighbouring Austrian regions could be revitalised. Hungary was the first target country of FDI in Eastern and Central Europe. In 2004, more than half of FDI in whole Eastern and Central Europe was invested in Hungary. Within Hungary, the overwhelming part was invested in the capital and in the Western regions. At that time, the motorway network was not sufficiently developed in the country. Therefore, investors favoured locations near to the Western borders or along the few motorways. Due to these investments, Central and Western Transdanubia regions were among the 10 most dynamically developing regions of Europe. Regions with the highest average annual rates of growth in Europe 1995-2004 Country
Region
Ireland Ireland Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Poland Netherlands Hungary Hungary
IE02 Southern and Eastern IE01 Border, Midland and Eastern EE Estonia LV Latvia LT Lithuania PL12 Mazowieckie PL41 Wielkopolskie NL23 Flevoland HU22 Central Transdanubia HU23 Western Transdanubia
Average annual rate of growth 8,2 7,7 6,8 6,4 6,4 6,2 5,9 5,6 5,5 5,2
Source: EC Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion
FDI was targeted overwhelmingly to two industries: motor car production and electronics.
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There are 7 NUTS2 regions in Hungary, of which three are in Transdanubia. Our analysis comprises two of them (Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia) which are the main locations of the new motor car and electronics production plants.
The place and rank of the two regions within Hungary is the following: Region
GDP per head EU27=100
GDP per employed EU27”100
GDP growth rate
Central Hungary Central Transdanubia West Transdanubia South Transdanubia North Hungary North Plain South Plain Hungary EU27
101,6 61,1
56,8 41,6
5,0 5,5
Agriculture 1,3 4,6
Industry 24,3 43,1
Services 74,4 52,3
0,6 0,2
66,8
40,7
5,2
5,3
39,2
55,4
0,2
45,6
33,7
3,2
7,9
32,7
59,3
0,1
42,5 41,9 44,2 64,0 100,0
35,2 32,7 31,8 42,8 100,0
3,6 4,0 2,9 4,5 2,3
3,9 7,0 9,9 4,9 6,2
37,3 32,3 33,2 32,5 27,7
58,8 60,5 56,9 62,7 66,1
0,1 0,3 0,1 0,4 1,2
Regions
Central Hungary Central Transdanubia West Transdanubia South Transdanubia North Hungary North Plain South Plain Hungary
Industrial enterprises per 1000 inhabitants 74,1 40,6 37,7 33,7 28,8 28,9 34,8 44,9
Of which more than 250 employees 0,8 2,3 2,8 1,3 2,0 1,7 1,2 1,4
Employment share
Enterprises with foreign interest 1454 418 597 328 277 213 360 3647
R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP
Production per employee million HUF 18,1 23,5 20,4 11,1 12,2 11,2 9,8 16,0
Rate of unemployment 4,5 5,6 4,6 7,3 9,7 7,2 6,3 6,1
In almost every respect, the Central Hungarian region – including the capital Budapest and its agglomeration – is the most developed country in Hungary. But the next ones are the two regions under study: Central Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia. They have the second 66
and third highest GDP per capita, the highest growth rate, the highest shares of industrial employment, the highest proportion of big enterprises, the highest industrial productivity and relatively low unemployment. The figures demonstrate that regional disparities are rather large in Hungary. The difference between the region with the highest (Central Hungary) and the lowest (North Plain) figure of GDP per capita is 1: 2,5.
Electronics industry in Central and Western Transdanubia Electronics industry before 1990 was on a very low level in Hungary (and in all other “socialist” countries) both in respect to technology and competitiveness. The reasons for this bad situation were, beyond the internal systemic problems, the external obstacles. According to policy of embargo towards the communist countries, advanced technologies and know-how could not be sold to these countries. Central Europe was isolated from the main scientific and technological currents of the World for four decades. The result was lagging behind the World in electronics technology. To cite one example: in the 1980s, Hungary was the larger producer and exporter of electronic tubes in the World. But this first place was rather a sign of backwardness, because at that time integrated circuits were used already almost everywhere in the World. From 1989-90, the situation changed radically. Embargo and the COCOM list were abolished. For Western investors a huge new area was opened for investment in Europe with huge educated and skilled labour reserves. The first target country was Hungary, because it was the country where the institutions and instruments of market economy were first introduced. In this respect, Hungary was two-three years ahead of the other countries of the East-Central European region. The forms of investment were different: either the purchase of former state-owned enterprises, or establishing joint venture with them, or new green field investment with 100 percent foreign ownership. This two-three years advantage in the opening and the closeness to Western Europe made Central and Western Transdanubia the main area of FDI in electronics production in whole Central and Eastern Europe. Major investors in the electronic and electric industrial sectors in Central Europe 1989-1998 Year Czech Republic Hungary Poland 1989 Siemens $60m, GE $720m 1990 Philips $25m, Samsung $23m Alcatel $90m 1991 Electrolux $25m, United Curtis $21m, Thomson Technologies $25m, Siemens $90m, Philips $50m $20m 1992 Hantarex $20m, Flextronix Lucent $50m $45m Siemens $50m, Fiat $20m 1993 Siemens $62m, Kyocera $39m, Ford $100m 1994 ITT $40m 1995 IBM $100m, Nokia $30m Philips-Matsushita $65m 1996 Philips $30m, Sony $21m 1997 Matsushita $66m, Philips $30m, Nidec $27m Motorola $45m, AMP $20m 1998 FIC $100m Elcoteq $30m Total $432m $1336m $435m
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The advantages offered – beyond educated and skilled labour force and good accessibility – were the following: - Substantial tax allowances by the government (frequently through disregarding EU state aid regulations); - Substantial local tax allowances offered by local governments and other favours (by supplying public facilities free or at reduced prices); - More than 200 industrial estates and more than 20 technological parks - Cooperation between industry and academia (specialised training, adjusted to the needs of industry) - University R&D centres in the service of multinational investors. These developments made Hungary – by the early 2000s the largest base of electronic industry in Central and Eastern Europe: - 40 % of total electronic production and 48 % of exports by CEE are produced in Hungary (2006); - Yearly production is 25 billion USD, yearly exports are 22 billion USD; - 9026 (mostly very small) firms and 135 thousand employees are engaged in electronic industry; - Electronic goods constitute 30 percent of Hungarian exports and 38 percent of industrial exports; - 20 percent of industrial employees are working in the electronics industry. Nevertheless, some warnings appeared already in the first years of the new millennium: 1.
The capital structure of electronics industry according to type of ownership in percentages Owner 1999 2000 2001 State 1,1% 0,6% 0,5% Foreign 85,4% 90,8% 94% Domestic private 13,5% 8,6% 5,6% Source: Hungarian Central Statistic Office
Nowadays the share of foreign ownership is about 96-98 percent. Domestic private ownership could not keep pace with the development of the industry. 2. The product structure of the electronic industry Type of product 1995 1998 Parts for electronic 15,7% 13,5% industry Electronic products 57,1% 22,2% for industry Electronic products 27,2% 64,3% for consumption Total 100% 100%
2001 14,6% 10,3% 75,1% 100%
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
Electronic products for industry require the most skilled work, the most domestic R&D staff, and Hungarian firms were mostly engaged in this type of production. Consumption articles (mobile phones, TV sets) are produced in mass production requiring less skilled work. This latter was the most dynamically developing type of production in the 1990s. 68
3.
The market structure of electronic production in billion current Hungarian Forints (HUF) Year Production Sales Domestic Export sales Share of sales export sales in % 1995 71,3 70,6 43,1 27,5 39 1999 664,4 656,1 105,8 550,3 84 2000 1191,8 1179,4 211,6 967,9 82 2001 1122,5 1126,9 123,8 1003,1 90 2002 1358,0 1363,0 104,0 1259,0 92 2003 2000,9 1989,9 110,3 1879,6 94 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
The Hungarian market is a relatively small market for this mass production. Around 2000, it became more or less saturated by mass electronic products. The value of domestic sales halved between 2000 and 2003. Parallel, the share of export sales increased, achieving now more than 96 percent. Summarising these processes: electronic industry is working with more than 94 percent foreign capital, selling more than 92 percent of its products abroad and requiring for the overwhelming part of its production no domestic R&D services. It means that the “endogenisation” of electronics industry did not succeed in the 1990s. The trends pointed rather in the opposite direction. 45 percent of Hungarian electronic production is located in Central and Western Transdanubia regions, 16 percent in Budapest and 39 percent in all other regions of Hungary. It means that the two “Transdanubian” regions are most vulnerable to any changes concerning the location factors of electronics industry.
Slowdown and standstill after 2004 After 2004 this development slowed down and departing investors almost matched the number of new arrivals. The main reasons: 1.
The slowdown of worldwide development and investments after 2000;
2.
The exhaustion of labour force reserves in the two regions and the low spatial mobility of the Hungarian labour force. One of the reasons for the low mobility is the nonexistence of rented housing in Hungary. 97 percent of the people live in dwellings owned by them. Today, nearly half of the labour force in the West Hungarian electronics plants are Slovak and Romanian citizens (though ethnic Hungarians). Their transport and accommodation must be paid by the enterprises
3.
Multinational firms are moving further to the neighbouring (Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine) and to faraway countries (China, Malaysia, etc.) where labour costs are lower than in Hungary.
4.
EU state aid regulations are enforced. The government cannot offer the same generous allowances as before. After the 5 or 10 years tax exemption period expires, investors move further to other countries.
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5.
6.
The relative tax burden on wages is one of the highest in Europe. It makes labour very expensive for investors even if net salaries and wages are low. The reason for high taxis is the very high level of welfare expenditure and the very low proportion of taxpayers within the population. The continuous appreciation of the Hungarian currency against the € and $. This makes investment and operation for foreign investors more and more expensive.
In the last years 6-10 thousand jobs were terminated yearly in the electronics industry in Western Hungary. But these were the jobs, requiring the least skills and paying the lowest wages in the industry. Even present Hungarian wages are already too high to carry out these activities profitably. These jobs had been relocated either to the Eastern regions of Hungary, where the cheap labour reserves were not yet depleted, or to other countries, mostly to China. Simultaneously, the remaining production processes and jobs in Western and Central Transdanubia have been upgraded. PC production has been converted to servers (IBM), simple TV tubes production to liquid crystal screens (Siemens), production of CDs to DVDs (Sony). Relocations are of quite different types: besides the most frequent movements of Western Europe to Hungary and from Hungary to China types, there are movements between new member states (from Hungary to Romania and Slovakia, but also from Poland and Czech Republic to Hungary), and even from developing countries to Hungary (from Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia to Hungary). The other frequent direction is within Hungary, where wage level is still lower. Furthermore, due to the extensive motorway construction in the last few years, Eastern Hungary became more accessible for investors. According to calculations, at national level, the number of terminated jobs in the West, and the number of new jobs in electronics in the other parts of the country approximately match. This process contributes to the catching up of Eastern Hungarian regions and it is a positive development. On the other hand, these developments mean a dramatic situation in some smaller towns in Transdanubia, where the only job opportunity was provided by the leaving electronics plants. At the beginning of the 1990s, two industries were the largest capital investors in Western and Central Transdanubia: electronics and motor car industry. The concentration of motor car industry is even substantially higher in these regions than that of electronics: nearly 100 percent of Hungarian motor car industry is located in these two regions. The further development of the two industries, however, is rather different. Motor car industry seems to be more “endogenised” than electronics. So far, there was no case of leaving the region. Restructuring has occurred: the OPEL plant in Szentgotthárd does not assemble any more carts; they are producing gear systems for other OPEL factories. It seems that motor car producers stick more to their once selected location and appreciate more the once trained labour force. Electronics is the “rapid reaction force” of globalisation. To sum up, the globalisation and the free global movement of capital and know-how resulted so far in very favourable developments in Hungary, and especially in its central and Western regions. But the signs are already there that the process can turn, and – if a new adaptation will not follow and if the necessary measures will not be taken, then serious situation can arise, especially in the so far most favoured regions.
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Case study 5: The Carpi textile industrial district in Emilia-Romagna Alessia Mariotti and Lorenzo Zirulia, Department of Economics, University of Bologna 1. Introduction The aim of this report is to investigate how the Carpi textile industrial district in Italy has been facing the recent threats (but opportunities as well), linked to the globalization of markets. The report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short description of the economic and social evolution of Emilia-Romagna, the Italian region where Carpi is located. Section 3 focuses on the Carpi district. After a short review of its historical and cultural background, the section describes the recent changes and the present situation of the district (then following the increased international competition), both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Section 4 describes regional and local policies in recent years, and their connections with changes occurring in the industrial sectors. Finally, Section 5 concludes, summarizing the lessons that, we believe, can be learnt from the Carpi case. 2. General economic and social evolution of Emilia-Romagna 2.1 Short history of economic development in Emilia-Romagna At the end of the Second World War, Emilia-Romagna was mainly an agricultural region, while the industrial activity, concentrated in particular in the mechanical and food sectors, emerged as significantly damaged by the war. The region, however, was soon able to play an active role in the process of structural change and economic growth that characterized the Italian economy in the 50’s and 60’s. From one side, the old agricultural structure was rejuvenated, also following institutional changes (like the national law 756, passed in 1964, which abolished sharecropping). From the other side, industrial development was sustained both by direct public intervention (like the huge investments that created two important chemical hubs in Ravenna and Ferrara) and private initiatives. In that respect, the sustained growth in domestic and international demand created opportunities in several industries, which were promptly taken by a generation of new entrepreneurs (many of them previously being croppers or blue-collar workers). As a consequence, in the period 1958-62, the average yearly Emilia-Romagna growth rate in GDP was 11,1% (compared to 8,3 % for Italy). In this development process, a key role has been played by the emergence of industrial districts, as the textile district in Carpi, on which this report is focused. This form of organization of production, with its network of specialized small firms accompanied by a high degree of social cohesion, is not limited to Emilia-Romagna, but characterized and still characterizes many other Italian regions as well, like Veneto, Piedmont, Lombardy in the North, Tuscany and Marche in the Centre, and Apulia and Campania in the South. Growth continued in '70s, when an important institutional innovation has been the creation of administrative regions (i.e. the so-called "Regioni" in the Italian Constitution). In the case of Emilia-Romagna, this administrative level played a positive role, both for the policies under its direct control and for the coordination of decisions taken at lower levels. In that respect, Emilia Romagna regional policies in 70’s were characterized by some recurrent features, which substantially belong also to the provincial and communal levels. First, public decisions were the outcome of a well conceived planning activity, with the involvement of business association, in a pragmatic spirit of collaboration. In particular, an important role
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was played by ERVET, i.e. the regional agency in charge of supporting industrial development. Founded in 1974, this agency created sectoral and intersectoral centres for the provision of support services to firms (e.g., CITER for knitwear and Centro Ceramico for ceramics), and it was involved in the determination of "strategic" sectors, including those in which industial districs were active. Together with economic goals, regional policies pursued social goals as well. First, woman participation to work was favoured, allowing the region to gain leading positions in Italy in terms or female employment rates. Second, several policies has been characterized by a redistributive intent in favour of the poorest. Third, the no-profit sector has been promoted, in particular in the form of workers' cooperatives. All this interventions were the outcome of, but also contributed to, the social cohesion which is a fundamental ingredient in the functioning of industrial districts. In the 80’s, Emilia-Romagna was one of few regions positively contributing to the Italian trade balance (the others being Lombardy, Piedmont and Veneto). Its firms gained leadership in numerous market niches at the international level, in sectors like packaging, ceramic tiles and wood carving machineries. Emilia-Romagna emerged as a truly European region, being open both in terms of exports and outward direct foreign investment. At the same time, the socio-economic system was still characterized by a high level of social capital, with high income and low inequality. The high level of social trust is confirmed by the low level of tax evasion and by the spirit of cooperation between citizens and public institutions. In more recent times, Emilia-Romagna confirmed its leadership positions in technologically advanced niches. The technical background of entrepreneurs, the good level of education of the workforce and a qualified network of suppliers make these types of production particularly competitive. The situation for consumer goods sectors was instead more problematic. On one side, some highly innovative firms emerge, like Barilla e Parmalat in the food industry, Max Mara and La Perla in the clothing industry, Magli and Pollini in the shoe industry; on the other side, the small firms system, overall, seemed unprepared for globalisation. This occurs also in the Carpi district, where the number of firms exhibited a strong reduction. However, as we will see, the surviving firms were able to implement those changes that preserved the international competiveness of the district.
2.2 Evolution of sectoral structure both employment in the region In this paragraph we look at the recent evolution of Emilia-Romagna under three dimensions: i) industrial structure (in particular, firms' size and their typologies); ii) employment; iii) export activities. (Industrial structure) The current regional industrial structure of Emilia Romagna is still dominated by small firms, although since the 90’s medium-size firms became the leading actors in the system, in particular in terms of employment. However, the dimensional growth of Emilia Romagna firms did not modify the approach to specialization which is typical of small firms. For a better understanding of Emilia-Romagna industrial structure, we look at the level of local employment areas (“Sistemi Locali del Lavoro”). Local employment areas are defined as those aggregations of communes where most people live and work. As shown by the charts in appendix (see Figure 2.1 and the following) the region is almost entirely characterised by local employment areas that are specialized in manufacturing. This is consistent with the “Third Italy” Italian industrial development model described by Bagnasco (1977). In particular, the four main industrial sectors in Emilia-Romagna are textile, mechanics, agriculture and food industry, furniture and ceramics. The main agricultural and food local
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areas are located in the north western part of the region, while mechanics is concentrated around Bologna, and the ceramic and furniture industrial districts are located in Romagna (south east and coastal area). There is only one textile district, i.e. Carpi. Figure 2.6 shows clearly that the mechanic and food industry sectors are mainly characterised by medium-sized and large firms, while small and “micro” firms are associated to ceramics and furniture, and textile. The presence of numerous firms (that goes together high employment rates) is the outcome of widespread entrepreneurial culture and organizational capabilities. In EmiliaRomagna there are more than 138.000 artisan firms, about one third of the whole, including the agricultural sector. In the manufacturing sector, they account for the 70% of firms, while the share for construction and transportation is around 80%. The artisan attitude towards production, which often characterizes the other firms in the region, favours a strong attitude towards learning, continuous improvements in products, technologies and organization, and trust-based cooperation, and it surely constitutes an element of strength of the regional system. Emilia-Romagna represents also the largest cooperative district in Italy, and one of the largest in Europe. According to the Chambers of Commerce data, in 2002 there were 4114 cooperative firms in the region. While their number is about 1% of regional firms, their economic weight and their external impact is much higher. First of all, the size of cooperative firms is in some cases very high: In this region, this type of large firms often plays the role of socioeconomic “integrator” across productive chains. Related to their size, the share of total employment of cooperative firms is about 10%. (Employment) 3,4% of Emilia-Romagna workforce, including both employees and selfemployed, is active in the primary sector (agriculture and fishing). The percentage is 33,8% for the secondary sector (industry strictu sensu) and 62,8% for the tertiary sector (services) (source: Unioncamere, 2005). The region, then, has the typical employment structure of service-based economies. This is also confirmed by the trend in the employment distribution, in which the tertiary sector is constantly growing (from 60,9% of workers in 2000 to 62,8% del 2006), while industry (from 34,6% in 2000 to 33,8 in 2006) and agriculture (from 4,4% in 2000 to 3,4% in 2006) are declining. As long as the secondary sector is concerned, textile and clothing declined from 2,8% in 2000 to 2,4% 2006 (accounting for 8% of the workforce in this sector in Italy), while the fashion industry in five years went from 3,4% to 3,0%; the engineering industry accounts for the 12,9% of the workforce (it was 13,3% in 2000), while wood, non-metal materials, plastic and paper altogether account for 6,8%. In the tertiary sector, the highest share is for retail trade, which accounts for 24,4% of the workforce in services. Within this segment, 5,3% is active in the hospitality industry, with a share which is growing from 2000 to 2006. If we look at the geographical distribution of employment, establishments in the province of Bologna account for the 25% of the total numbers of regional employees. The share is 17% for Modena (the province where Carpi is located), while establishments in Reggio Emilia and Parma provinces account for the 12% and the 10% of employees, respectively. For the other provinces, shares are between 6% and 9%. Finally, if we look at employment quality, a study on medium-size firms in the North East of Italy, produced by Mediobanca e Unioncamere and referring to 1999, shows that the share of white-collar workers and managers (over total employment) was 33% for Emilia Romagna, 29,8% for Veneto e and 27,1% for Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The high skill and competences of the workforce is still a source of competitive advantage of Emilia-Romagna firms, with a positive impact on wages. Related to that, Emilia Romagna must not be seen a static system, that passively adapt to changes in demand, but rather as a dynamic system in which technological and organization innovation are more and more widespread across firms.
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(Exports) Emilia Romagna exports constitute about 11,9% of national exports, and in 2000 the region has become the third Italian exporting region after Lombardy and Veneto in absolute value. Although Emilia Romagna is not specialized in high tech industries (in line with Italy, and in a certain sense with Europe), activities with a significant technological content play a significant role; the mechanical industry, for instance, accounts for 55% of total regional exports: a share which is similar to the one of Lombardy, but definitively higher than the one in the rest of Italy; ceramics, non-metal materials, chemicals, plastic, paper together account for about 23%; while the share of more traditional, “made in Italy” sectors (textile, clothing, shoes, furniture, food) is about 21%.
3 Analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector 3.1 Historical and cultural background Carpi is located between Modena and Mantua, on one of lateral streets of Via Emilia. Although it has never been a centre of industrial tradition, like Prato since the Middle Ages, Carpi was a small city. This implied a certain degree of differentiation in the economic activities, which were organized with the typical corporative structure of the medieval societies: the guilds. Guilds were institutions regulating the activities from which they took their name, also limiting individual initiatives. The wood shaving manufacture was organized in a guild at the beginning of 17th century. The production process consisted in obtaining shavings from willow and poplar trunks, and these were used to weave hats. In the first half of 18th century, the Duke attributed the right to exploit the raw material to the Carpi entrepreneur Carlo Francesco Scacchetti, and the guild was obliged to supply him the merchandise in the desired quantity and quality. Carpi export was initially directed towards the British markets, in which hats has become a fashionable item for nobles and princes. With the Italian political unification process (1861) a free trade regime was established and other European and extra-European market started to be served. Facing now a strong competition, an internal re-organization of the shaving guild was needed. In particular, it was necessary to improve the quality of the product, and increase the specialization of the workforce in order to do that. While straw weaving was traditionally done by women at home and in an irregular way, soon it become a full time job, with some of these women (called "trecciaiole") taking the role of masters. In 1895, the Carpi shaving industry employed 3000 boys, 1970 women and 1000 men, whose principal activity was straw extraction. Six years later, also following the introduction of specialized machineries, the industry employed 13500 women and 2450 men in a regular way, while irregular workers were 11760 women and 1055 men.10. The First World War caused a crisis since most credits of straw hats manufactures had been given to German clients. The first solution was to send the goods to Switzerland, and from there to everywhere it was in demand, without distinction among enemies and allies. The second solution was to use the same productive structure, the same firms and the same workers, to produce mimetic nets for the Italian and allied army. The Second World War had a big impact on the Carpi economy, too. However, Carpi did not experience plant destructions, and significant resources (in particular financial resources), were still present in the agricultural sector at the end of the war. Then, there was the possibility to revert to the shaving manufacture, taking into account that the Japanese 10
Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi, Torino, Rosenberg &Sellier, 1994.
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competition had been eliminated with the collapse of the Japanese empire, and that the international markets had been re-opened. However, there were doubts on the real upturn of straw hats demand. At the end, it was commonly agreed that a return to the past was impossible. Straw manufacture was considered by then a secondary activity. In fact, during the war, sewing machines, once used for hats, were adapted to the production of shirts and other pieces of clothing for soldiers, and this type of activity was continued also after the end of the war. It must also be considered that skills for straw manufacture had significantly decreased: because of the low wage, the number of "trecciaiole" (women who were skilful in weaving straw) was declining. In mid 60's, in Carpi there were 13 straw hats manufacturer, while the shirt factories were 89 and the knitwear factories 138. In the 70's, the straw hats industry disappeared. In the district restructuring process, a key role was played by women's initiatives. Women were willing to contribute to domestic income, without neglecting their family duties (as happened with straw manufacture). For that reason, they were in search of a new, promising market in which they could invest. In 1950 the home, artisan production of sweaters started, requiring a modest capital for the purchase of machine and yarns. Female homeworking become the true support of the Carpi productive activity, taking back and developing the network of the pre-existing production organization. What followed was an extraordinary industrial growth, so that at the beginning of the 50's local workforce starts to be scarce, and this forced people working in this sector to widen their own productive area11. The first (male) entrepreneurs typically come from other activities. Often, they were former street merchants, with relevant skills in bargaining and, thanks to their wives, with knowledge on products. Demand was receptive, and able to sustain the start of numerous new enterprises that could take advantage of mechanisms of financing and organization that were already tested. The transformations in the local economy had an impact on the society: many families abandoned the countryside to move to town, many small merchants became real entrepreneurs, and a number of collateral jobs emerge, like hemmers, model makers and ironers, for which competitive prices were guarantee thanks to piecework. The development of the industrial district in Carpi occurred according to a division of labour logic that had strong geographical consequences: Carpi became the centre where end products are realized, and where firms producing merchandise for goods' finish (dye works, typographies, serigraphies, etc) were located; while it is in the neighbouring towns, as Concordia and Mirandola, where knitters were decentralized. Given their origins, Carpi firms were (and substantially are) almost exclusively individual or family businesses, with a marked propensity towards a "do it alone" strategy and commercial and creative flexibility. During the 60's and 70's the good state of the economy leads to an increase of production. New plants were built, and at the same time there was the hiring of the best home knitters for the manufacture of samples for foreign markets. However, the share of homeworking was still predominant, since, despite the incessant rhythms of work and the clear contempt of their social security rights, Carpi knitters were relatively well remunerated. However, most benefits of this production system, both of economic and political nature, were enjoyed by employers, who can take advantage of low labour cost, elimination of investment risk, absence of union conflicts and great flexibility of the workforce12.
11
Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., "Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. 12 D'Attore P. P. and Zamagni V., Distretti, imprese, classe operaia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992.
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In the 70’s, however, some exogenous shocks induced a strong transformation in sector organization of the sector. Higher qualitative standard started to be demanded, which were incompatible with homeworking because of the scarce controls; firms started moving from handicraft to industry; the Value Add Tax (IVA), introduced with the 1972 fiscal reform, favoured the diffusion of regular working relationships; and, finally, in 1973 a law regulating homeworking was approved. Altogether, these elements reduced homeworking in favour of buyer-supplier relationships. The new structure of the inter-firm relationships was characterized by final firms, concerned with distributive channels, financial management and design, and subcontracting firms, assuming the risks of the purchase and maintenance of the machineries and adapting production to the request of buyers. However, the fragmentation of the production implied a scarce integration of information: while final firms were informed of market characteristics, subcontracting firms possessed technological knowledge. The transformations in the production system and organizational model lead to notable changes in firms' location. From the Carpi area, knitwear production extended progressively into the neighbouring provinces, Mantua, Ferrara and Rovigo, and subsequently into more distant Italian regions as Apulia. During the 80's, for the first time after three decades of growth in employment, the district underwent a period of crisis, with a significant reduction in the number of firms. The market became more and more segmented, consumer's tastes more diversified, and, above all, there was an increase of the international competition from new industrialized countries (NICs), leading to loss in market shares of national producers inside the EEC. During the 80's, moreover, clothing consumption was characterized by low growth rates, with an average of 1,3% from 1980 al 1990, compared to 5,1% in the 70's13. These new conditions lead the district to adopt a series of changes, which permitted temporarily stable levels of employment and an increase in production volumes. Among these changes, in the 80's and then in the 90's, we find the birth and the development of the phenomenon of "Pronto Moda". "Pronto Moda" is a new model of organization of production. It consists in the creation of an up-to-date product, in terms of fashion tendencies, which is realized in small lots, introduced in the market close to the sales season, and addressed typically young, female, consumers. Samples are created three or four months in advance of the sales season, rather than one year; moreover, they are created on the basis of most important existing collections. For this reason, it is considered an "open" system, since new models are designed during all the production process. The shortening of the productive cycle is obtained through the reduction in time for design, samples production and advertising, since machine time is not squeezable beyond a certain limit. Once the customer has chosen its product line, the delivery usually occurs within a month. This limits the risks of unsold merchandise and allows retailers to arrange products always in line with demand requirements. The success of this model made Carpi the capital of "Pronto Moda", changing again the organization of production system. Indeeed, "Pronto Moda" firms are usually more specialized and smaller than "programmed" firms. During the 90's, "Pronto Moda" firms underwent a strong selection, due to sector maturity and unfavourable economic conditions. Selection occurred because of competitive threat coming both from national producers and low-cost foreign producers. "Pronto Moda" firms belong to the categories of small firms (till 9 employees) and medium-size firms (10-49 employees), representing, in both the cases, less than one third of
13 Bigarelli D. and Crestanello P., "Strategie di diversificazione e di riorganizzazione produttiva a Carpi negli anni Ottanta", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (a cura di), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994.
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finished-product firms in the district. Only some of them exhibited a positive growth rate in turnover, usually associated to investments for the promotion of their brand. 3.2 The Agreement on Textile and Clothing as a sectoral shock In this paragraph we briefly summarize the salient features of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the trade agreements for the textile sector that, signed in 1995, constituted a crucial step towards free trade in the industry. Despite the gradualism of its application, from the point of view of Carpi it produced a true shock, since it increased sharply international competition. The agreement scheduled four phases: the first one lasted from January 1 1995 to December 31 1997, when all the countries were expected to integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990 (integration means here that trade in these products became governed by the general rules of GATT). The second phase (1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) expected every country to integrate products accounting for at least 17% of the imports in 1990. The third phase (1 January 2002 – 31 December 2004) expected the integration of products accounting for at least 18% of imports in 1990. Finally, all remaining products were integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products were to be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. All the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over into the new agreement and maintained until the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, ATC laid down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. During the first phase, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth were not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For the second phase (1998 to 2001), annual growth rates were 25 per cent higher than the rates in the first phase. For the third place (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates were 27 per cent higher than those in the second phase. 3.3 The evolution of textile and clothing in the ATC era (The sector at the national level). In the period 2001-2005, the Italian textile and clothing industry showed a constant reduction in turnover, due to a negative tendency both in the in domestic and foreign markets. SMI-ATI (which is the Federation of the Italian Textile, Clothing and Fashion industries) estimated in the period a 15% decrease in turnover and a 8,2% decrease in exports (at current prices). Also the number of firms and employees decreased (respectively -16% and –14%), while the importations maintained a positive trend of growth (+10%) (Figure 3.1 in the Appendix). The state of textile industry, however, changed in 2006. In this year, the turnover started again to grow, thanks to internal consumption and exports, and this trend has been confirmed in 2007, even if at a lower pace. The recovery of the Italian textile industry during 2006 lead also to growth of imports related to delocalization. This has a negative effect on trade balance, whose positive value remains nevertheless very high (Figure 3.2 in the Appendix). Forecasts on the future evolution of the Italian textile industry appear to be positive, even if the effects on employment are not easily predictable: given firms delocalization strategies, as growth in turnover does not correspond anymore to a proportional increase of the production realized in Italy.
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(The sector at the province level) The dynamics of the sector in the province is similar to one at the national level, in terms of growth, number of firms, employment and export14. The most relevant fact emerging from the last survey by the Observatory on the textile and clothing sector in the Carpi district concerns the recovery of knitwear and clothing in terms of turnover. After a long period of slowdown, in 2005 the value of the production starts growing again, with a significant acceleration in 2006 (Figure 3.3 in the Appendix). Factors leading to this positive dynamics are in part exogenous, with respect to the local context, and due to an upsurge in clothing consumption in the Italian market, which still constitute the main market of Carpi firms; some other, nevertheless, are to be found inside the district, linked to firms' strategies and re-organization processes. In slowdown years, Carpi firms have been very active in new initiatives: they qualified and diversified the product, they reorganized the distributive networks, they invested in advertising and communication. These changes lead to a recovery in terms of competitiveness, and, partially, in terms of market shares. However, similarly to what happened at the national level, the recovery of turnover in knitwear and clothing went together with a further decreasing of the number of firms and employees (see Table 1 in the Appendix). Data from the Italian National Confederation of the crafts and small and medium-sized enterprises (CAN) show in the last decade a persistent reduction in registered firms, with a mortality rate around 3%. This phenomenon is not only due to cyclical phases of crisis in this sector, but also to succession in family firms and strong international competition from low labour cost countries. The decrease in the number of firms, however, is not uniform across firms' typologies. The decrease has been more significant for subcontracting firms, which are much more exposed to foreign competition, under the form of delocalization, and to the "unfair" competition from the black economy, under the form of Chinese factories that are active in the territory. Final firms are usually in a better position, which can count on export and market niches. Meanwhile, new typologies of firms emerged, like "advanced" sub-contracting firms, which offer design, services and integrated production, and firms that are specialized in design and samples, following the decision by small and middle firms to outsource this phase of the production process. The divergence between the positive dynamics of the turnover, and the negative one of employment, is primarily due to subcontracting outside the district. However, in the case of Carpi, delocalization towards foreign countries has played a relative minor role, compared to other districts: the movement has been typically to areas which are close to the district. The district of Carpi appears then as an open system (as it has always been), whose production is mainly concentrated in Italy. As we mentioned before, turnover growth in 2002-2006 period was mainly driven by the domestic market, while exports recovered only recently. This reduced the export orientation of the district, and now two thirds of production is sold in the domestic market. If we look at export data more in detail, from 2002 (when Modena province exports reached a peak) to 2004 export declined, while in 2005 start again to grow, and 2006 exhibits a slowing in this tendency (Figure 4). In resemblance to the national level, the dynamics of the local exports exhibits significant differences between knitwear and clothing. Knitwear export has undergone a significant decrease, while clothing has been characterized, on average, by a positive growth. Modena clothing exports outperformed Italian exports in terms of growth rates, while knitwear exports (in value) reduced by half in the period. As a consequence, export changed significantly: from the predominance of knitwear to the predominance of clothing. At the same time, exports of tops and yarns have increased, in light of the trend towards delocalization, which consequently implied also a growth in clothing imports. The main low 14
Notice, however, that the textile sector in Modena province is active mainly in knitwear and clothing, while upstream manufacture is substantially absent.
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labour cost foreign countries Modena imports are Turkey, China and Romania, for textile products, and China, Turkey and Tunisia for clothing. Also in terms of foreign destination markets, the changes were significant. The share of export toward western European countries has decreased in favour of Eastern Europe countries, both as delocalization targets and finished products markets. Knitwear exports are more strongly connected to Western Europe, compared to clothing, and show a lower degree of differentiation in terms of export destination countries. More than 60% of the decrease in knitwear exports is due to the strong reduction of exports towards Germany, which remains nevertheless the first export destination, followed by France, United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium. In clothing, instead, although Western Europe is still the main export destination, Asian and North America gained prominence. Among the main export destinations, we find France, Spain, Japan, Germany and the United States. Together with variations in turnover trends, one can also observe changes in firms' distribution channels. Sales with the highest growth rate are those towards independent retailers , which now accounts for more that the half of sectoral turnover of the area, while a decline was observed in the wholesale channel and large retailers, where price competition is tougher. The distribution strategy followed by final firms of the district was in fact oriented towards the overcoming of wholesaler intermediation, coherently with the product upgrading policies. This transformation represents a significant change for the Carpi district, which was traditionally operating through wholesalers. Marketing and communication investments were significant, and obtained significant results. This strategy was supported by opening of owned and franchise shops, which in any case account at the moment for a limited, although growing, share of sales, since most firms are too small to male this investment convenient. These tendencies are observed both in knitwear and clothing, although in knitwear sales to wholesalers and large retailers have still a high incidence. Products sold with the brand of the producer exhibited a significant growth rates and represent at the moment more than two thirds of turnover of the district. This strategy of promotion of proprietary brands lead to excellent results both in domestic and international markets, and it was followed also by a few small firms. In these years, also new brands appeared, proposed by young firms managed by a new generation of entrepreneurs. 15 This fact represents an important novelty for firms in the Carpi district, which use to sell an anonymous product. The "visibility" of these brands represents a crucial element to explain the district return to growth of the turnover. Beyond the support of their own brands, some firms acquired new productions on licence, related to local prestigious brands license and firms outside the district. This licensed production is growing, and its profitability will be measured in the next years. (The other sectors at the province level) The dynamics of other industries in the area is particularly important since these sectors are expected to absorb at least partially the job losses occurred in textile and clothing. The area of Carpi is active in a number of other sectors: food farming industry, mechanic industry (especially agricultural and wood carving machines), electronics, automation and plastics. A relevant share of public investments concerned particularly food and agriculture (Modena is becoming the Italian capital for biological food) and the mechanic industry, the most important one after textile, with 130 firms, 1300 employees and a 55% export share. Overall, these sectors exhibit positive growth. Internationalization processes, together with technological innovation spurred by the regional industrial strategy (see Section 4), brands strengthening, accumulation of tangible and intangible capital, are at the basis of firms' 15
Among renowned and emerging brands we find Blumarine (Anna Molinari, Blugirl), Liu-Jo (Liu-jo girl, L.jo, Liu-jeans, Ajay), Clips, Ki6? (Parrot, Les Parrotines, Lu-mà!, Mpd), Champion, Gaudì, Denny Rose, A-style, Love Sex Money, Twin Set, ecc.
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competitive strategies. From one side, large firms engage in transnational agreements, mergers and acquisitions, which increase concentration at the horizontal level; from the other side, there is a tendency towards greater and greater specialization for small firms. Concerning food and agriculture, firms in this sector were the first to face global competition of the global markets following "network" strategies, as showed by different examples of vertical and horizontal integration whether vertical or horizontal of traditional products. Parmesan cheese, Lambrusco and Modena Ham, are the most known products, recognized also at European level, with the labels of protected designations of origin (PDO) and protected geographical indications (PGI). The continuous demand segmentation lead firms in food and agriculture to develop the flexibility of their production processes, but above all to improve the quality of their products and to broaden the range of offer for the consumers. At the moment, there are about 1000 firms with 1800 employees (which confirms the extremely small size of local firms), with a share of export of 20%.
4. Industrial policies at the regional level In this section we discuss recent industrial policies (broadly intended) at the regional and at the local (i.e. district) level. These policies have an impact on social welfare in two ways: through their direct effect on the vulnerable sector and through their effect on other sectors competitiveness, and then ability of absorbing the job losses in textile and clothing. 4.1 The regional industrial strategy In recent years, an important institutional change in Italy was given by the so-called "federalist reforms", with the (partial) transfer of industrial politicise to administrative regions. The first changes are associated to the so-called "Bassanini decrees" in 1997 and 1998; a change in Part Five of the Italian Constitution followed, assigning exclusive or shared areas of intervention, and the corresponding resources, to the regional administrations. The national level still manages the main laws for supporting internationalization, scientific research and technological innovation (with few exceptions), depressed areas and women entrepreneurships, while the regional level managed, among the others, all the laws concerning small and medium-sized firms. At the same time, the 112/98 national law assigned to local governments and Chambers of Commerce a number of other administrative functions, among which are of considerable importance those attributed to communes and related to the creation, enlargement and closing of production plants. In accordance with the national law, Emilia-Romagna region launched a reform through a regional law passed in 1999 and called "Reform of the regional and local system". Finally, the last step in the process of decentralization of industrial politics is constituted by the regional law 7/2002, called "Promotion of the regional system for industrial search, innovation and technological transfer", followed, in 2007, by the classification of the regional industries and the identification of the most relevant sectors for the regional economy based on their weight in employment and the degree of specialization with respect to the Italian economy. Until now, two three-year plans for regional industrial and development policies have been launched (2000-2002 and 2003-2005), which add to other programs in areas such as communication infrastructures, environmental and energy policies, professional training and territorial planning. The three-year programs represented an attempt of organic industrial policy at the regional level. In that respect, the Emilia Romagna regional administrators did not see their role as
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simple execution and management of interventions which are decided at the Ministry of Industry. Rather, they took the opportunity to build a regional strategy for development and industrial competiveness, tailored on the specific regional needs. The general principle of action behind the program is that regional competiveness cannot be attained through a continuous search of reduction in costs (especially labour costs), but rather promoting firms' innovativeness and internationalization, entrepreneurship, public administration efficiency, and guarantying at the same time social and environmental sustainability. It is clear that those principles are particularly relevant for most dynamic industries, including those from which, in the Carpi area, growth in employment is expected. At the same time, a particular attention is devoted to small and medium-sized firms, which constitute the large majority of regional firms. As long as the 2003-2005 program is concerned, seven main areas of interventions have been determined: 1. Financial support to firms, in particular for innovative activities; 2. Support for the acquisition of last generation quality certificates; 3. Support to industrial research and technological transfer; 4. Support to entrepreneurship; 5. Support to internationalization; 6. Interventions in favour of local development, also in terms of environmental quality and energetic efficiency 7. Interventions favouring the digital access of laws, information and data, also with the goal of improving public administration efficiency. 4.1 "Industrial" policy at the district level Since the 80's, provincial and local administrations implemented policies to support new technology adoption and the related professional up-dating. Such policies lead to the creation of CITER (Emilia Romagna Textile Information Centre), to which the Commune of Carpi, Ervet and industrial and artisan association adhered. The primary goal the centre was to supply relevant informative services about fashion tendencies, demand conditions and technologies. Nowadays, CITER activities were significantly reorganized and orientated particularly towards the development and the promotion of the innovation and knowledge transfer; support to creation of networks among research centres, universities and firms; and dissemination of information on new foreign markets (Asian markets in particular). It is evident that changes in CITER activities followed but then sustained the recent changes in the district organization that we describe before. A key area of public intervention in the district is professional training. In that respect, Carpiformazione is the public agency in charge of it, and it plays a key role in the district dynamics. Carpiformazione is specialized in offering courses in the fields of fashion, textile and clothing, and concerning all the phases in the value chain, from design, samples manufacture, industrial production, marketing, and accounting. The main customers of Carpiformazione are the European Union, the Ministry for Employment and Social Security, the Emilia Romagna region, the Province of Modena and the firms in the district. Projects have usually business associations and unions as partners. In some cases, these organizations are the project promoters; about 300 firms supply each year a qualified support to planning and accomplishment of the training activity. The range of courses that are offered is wide: training is offered to workers who are already active in the textile industry, but also to professional school students and to unemployed people. The centre regularly contributes to
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the activity of research by Observatory on the textile and clothing sector in the Carpi district, and it act as coordinator or partners in international projects, usually funded by European research programs. Finally, together with other Italian agencies and organizations, it is active in research activities on the fashion industry and in the production of teaching materials. 5. Conclusions The district of Carpi surely deserves the name of "vulnerable region", since its specialization in a traditional sector like textile makes particular the threat from foreign competition particularly strong. The district, however, seems to have taken the way to transform this threat in an opportunity, preserving its international competiveness. In this process, there has been a significant change in the actors which play the leading role: medium-size firms have gained prominence, innovating in their organization of work and investing in aggressive marketing campaigns and in their own brands, while small, traditional firms massively exited the market. In that respect, two factors appear fundamental. The first one is entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship refers here to the creation of new firms, to a new generation of individuals that tries to catch new market opportunities and enter new market niches. Entrepreneurship refers also to a general entrepreneurial attitude, widely spread in the district, which lead to new ways of organizing production, new products, new distributive channels. As we saw, this entrepreneurial attitude has always characterized the district, which changed it several times during its history, often in a radical way. In a sense, this factor seems to be not easily replicable in different context. The second factor is policy. Being the result of the same cultural background, also policy makers have traditionally exhibited a dynamic and innovative attitude. In particular, history suggests that policy has always followed and sustained the changes occurring in the district, often following exogenous events, and it never constituted an obstacle to development. The restructuring process that preserved competitiveness lead however to a significant reduction of employment in the sector, with its unavoidable social costs. Nevertheless, the same two factors, entrepreneurship and policy, seems to have mitigated the negative effects. From one side, the other industries which are present in the district area showed a positive, counterbalancing dynamics in that respect. On other side, although it seems fair to say that policy, at least at the regional level, has not played a significant direct role in the district restructuring process, public intervention supported the growth in high-tech sectors, which absorbed job losses in textile.
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Becattini G., "Alfred Marshall e la vecchia scuola economica di Cambridge", in Becattini G.(ed) pensiero economico: temi, problemi e scuole, Torino, UTET, 1990.
Becattini G., "Alle origini della campagna urbanizzata", mimeograph. Facoltà di Urbanistica dell'Università di Firenze,2000. Becattini G., "Dal distretto industriale alla distrettualizzazione: alcune considerazioni", in Fontana G. L. (ed), Le vie dell'industrializzazione europea. Sistemi a confronto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 65 - 76. Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (eds), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Becattini G., Dal distretto industriale allo sviluppo locale. Svolgimento e difesa di una idea, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2000. Bellandi M. and Russo M. (ed), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Bellandi M. and Sforzi F., "La molteplicità dei sentieri di sviluppo locale", in Becattini G., Bellandi M., Dei Ottati G. and Sforzi F. (ed), Il caleidoscopio dello sviluppo locale. Trasformazioni economiche nell'Italia contemporanea, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2001. Bigarelli D. and Crestanello P., "Strategie di diversificazione e di riorganizzazione produttiva a Carpi negli anni Ottanta", in M. Bellandi and M. Russo (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Cigognetti L. and Pezzini M., "Dalla lavorazione delle paglie all'industria delle maglie: la nascita del distretto industriale di Carpi", in Bellandi M. and Russo M. (eds), Distretti industriali e cambiamento economico locale, Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1994. Comune di Carpi, Il settore metalmeccanico nell’area di Carpi, Campogalliano, Novi e Soliera June 2001 Comune di Carpi, Osservatorio sulle tessiture di maglieria nel distretto di Carpi, October 2001 Conti S. and Sforzi F., "Il sistema produttivo italiano", in Coppola P. (ed), Geografia politica delle regioni italiane, Torino, Einaudi, 1997. D'Attore P. P. and Zamagni V., Distretti, imprese, classe operaia, Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992. Delibera Giunta Regionale dell’Emilia-Romagna n°1411 del 2007. IPI and Ministero delle attività produttive, L'esperienza italiana dei distretti industriali, Roma, 2002. Lazerson, M., "A new Phoenix? Modern Putting out in the Modena Knitwear Industry", in Administrative Science Quarterly, March 1995. Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "The firms that feed industrial districts: a return to the Italian source", in Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 8, n° 2, June 1999. Lazerson M. and Lorenzoni G., "Resisting organizational inertia: the evolution of industrial districts", in Journal of Management and Governance, n°3, 1999. Mariotti A., Sistemi locali in aree di vecchia e nuova industrializzazione in Europa: Carpi e Roubaix, PhD Thesis in “Environmental quality and regional economic development”, Università di Bologna, 2003. Nora L. and Pecoraro M., Impara l'arte ed entrane a far parte – Aspetti dell'artigianato carpigiano, Modena, Il Fiorino, 1998.
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Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Ottavo Rapporto, 2007. Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Settimo Rapporto, 2004. Provincia di Modena and Camera di Commercio di Modena, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi, Sesto Rapporto, 2002. Pyke F., Becattini G. and Sengenberger W., Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia, Firenze, Banca Toscana, 1991. Regione Emilia-Romagna, La struttura produttiva dell'Emilia-Romagna -censimento industria e servizi Bologna, September 2004. Regione Emilia-Romagna, Politica industriale e sviluppo del sistema produttivo regionale, 2006. Sforzi F., "Il cambiamento economico nel sistema urbano italiano", in Dematteis G. and Bonavero P. (ed), Il sistema urbano italiano nello spazio unificato europeo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997, p. 206 – 207. Sistema Moda Italia, La filiera tessile-abbigliamento-moda italiana. Nota congiunturale, January 2003.
Websites terredargine.it www.ermesimprese.it www.apsti.it www.carpidiem.it www.citer.it www.clubdistretti.it www.ires.it www.progettotessile.it www.rer.camcom.it www.sistemamodaitalia.it
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Appendix
Figure 2.1: Local employment areas specialized in manufactory
Source: ISTAT
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Figure 2.2: Local employment areas specialized in manufactory in Emilia-Romagna
Modena and Carpi area
Source: ISTAT
86
Figure 2.3: Local employment areas specialisation sectors
Source: ISTAT
87
Figure 2.4: Local employment areas specialisation sectors in Emilia-Romagna
Yellow: Textiles Lila: Mechanics Grey: Food and agriculture Okra: Ceramics and furniture
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Figure 2.5: Enterprises dimension in local employment areas
89
Figure 2.6: Enterprises dimension in local employment areas in Emilia-Romagna
Red: Small enterprises Okra: Medium enterprises Lila: Large enterprises
90
Figure 2.7: Microenterprises local employment areas in Italy
Carpi
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Figure 3.1: Textile and clothing industry dynamics, 2001-2007. 2001=100
finance turnover
enterprises
employees
Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data
Figure 3.2: Export and Import dynamics of the textile and clothing Italian industry, 2001-2006. 2001=100
Export
Import
Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data
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Figure3.3: Import, export and commercial asset of textile products and clothing industry in Modena province (in euro) import
export
commercial asset
Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data Figure 3.4: Textile and clothing industry dynamics in the Carpi industrial district, 19902003 1990=100
finance turnover
Enterprises
employees
Source; R&I srl, Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi
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Tab 1: The knitwear and clothing sector in the Carpi district:1990-2006 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 200 200 0 2
2005
2006 (Preliminary )
Turnover (millions of Euro) Current prices Constant prices (2000=100) Constant prices (1996=100) Export share (%) Enterprises Employees
1042
1110
1047
1094
981
102 7 102 7
102 3 982
1170
1273
1070
1151
1173
1196
1099
1094
943
962
920
1003
1079
22,4
25,6
36
38,4
36,7
37,5
36,8
30,6
30,3
2258
2188
2068
2000
1871
1158
1269 2 1215 2
1149 1 1097 1
1113 7 1066 5
1043 0 1002 7
158 3 896 0 864 2
1255
1400 5 1350 9
173 5 962 7 934 0
7841 * 7497
7278*
472
403
287
271
- By establishment s in the district 496 540 520 - By establishment s outside the district Employees in controlled foreign firms**
344
2750
*It includes employment by establishments owned by firms outside the districts. ** Foreign firms that controlled by firms located in the district.
Source: R&I srl Osservatorio del settore tessile abbigliamento nel distretto di Carpi
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Case study 6: The Prato textile industrial district in Tuscany Silvia Grandi, Enza Zabbini, Faculty of Economics – Rimini Campus, University of Bologna
1. Introduction The purpose of this report is to investigate how the Prato industrial district in Italy has been facing the recent threats (but opportunities as well), linked to the globalization of markets. The report is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a short description of the economic and social evolution of Tuscany, the Italian region where Prato is located. Section 3 focuses on the Prato industrial district. After a short review of its historical and cultural background, the section describes the recent changes and the present situation of the district (then following the increased international competition), both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Section 4 describes regional and local policies in recent years, and their connections with changes occurring in the industrial sectors. Finally, Section 5 concludes, summarizing the lessons that, we believe, can be learnt from the Prato case. 2. General economic and social evolution of Tuscany Tuscany has a long tradition in superior craft and architectural skills, dating back to the preroman civilisation. For example, Etruscan archaeological findings, potteries, jewels, paintings and architecture show the high level of the fine works that has been carried out in this territory since at least 3000 years. Such historical socio-economic ground has been very fertile also in the High Middle Age in the period of the Communes, first, and the Signory, later, when the flourishing municipalities of Tuscany, often competing and fighting each other, could count on powerful Guilds (Corporazioni delle arti e mestieri), associations of craftsmen in a particular trade (textile, masons, carpenters, carvers, etc.) trading outside their boundaries. Moreover, not to be forgotten, Tuscany has been the cradle of Renaissance, a period where art, crafts, banks and trade incredibly flourished under the influential and enlighten government of the Medici’s dynasty. After the 15th century Tuscany was a relatively stable independent state, called the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, until the late 19th Century when Italy was unified. This was composed of several cities, a part Florence: Pisa, Arezzo, Lucca, Siena, Prato, etc. that where able to find their characterised roles, specialised crafts and agriculture production famous internationally. Today Tuscany corresponds to a administrative region in the central part of Italy, accounting for 6.8.% of Italian GDP. Similar percentages, with respect to the Italian economy, are observed for private and public consumption, import and export and investments (see table 1). In 2005, the GDP per capita was 28,049 Euro, which corresponds to the 8th position among the Italian regions (ISTAT, 2007). The relatively lower GDP per capita, compared to Northern regions, can be explained by the specialisation of relatively low value added industry (“Made in Italy”) per employee of the Tuscan product activities. Table 1: Percentage of the main macroeconomic elements of Tuscany within the Italian economy
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(Source: IRPET, 2007).
GDP Import private consumption public consumption Investments Export
2. The economic system (Industries) The economic system in Tuscany is characterised by two main elements. First, there is a strong specialisation of certain industrial manufacture sectors and secondly the determinant role of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Specialisation is above all in textile and clothing (T/C) and in leather and footwear (L/F) industries, but all “Made in Italy” productions16 are generally relevant and represented above the Italian average (table 3). However, it has to be said that the specialisation is not homogenously distributed in the territory, actually several agglomeration can be observed. This lead Tuscany to be one of the most worldwide studied case of agglomeration economies, thanks to seminal works of Bagnasco (1977), who explained the reasons behind the industrial and socio-economic growth of the “Third Italy” – relatively medium sized dispersed industrialised economies composed of aggregation of SMEs, external to the traditional polarised industrial areas in the northern west part of the country – and Beccattini (1987, 1990, 1991), with his model of the industrial district17.
16
Generally these includes: textile, clothing, leather and footwear (fashion in broad sense), ceramic & marble, furniture and home appliances and machinery. 17 BAGNASCO A. (1977), Tre Italie: la problematica territoriale dello sviluppo economico italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna BECCATTINI G. (1987), Mercato e forze locali: il distretto industriale, Il Mulino, Bologna BECCATTINI G. (1991), Il distretto industriale Marshalliano come concetto socio-economico. In PYKE F., BECCATTINI G., SENGENBERGER W. (eds), Distretti industriali e cooperazione fra imprese in Italia. Quad. Banca Toscana, Nardini, Firenze, pp. 51-65 BECCATTINI G. (1998), Distretti industriali e Made in Italy. Bollati Boringhieri. Torino
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Table 2: Specialisation indexes of Tuscany industries (Italy = 100, year 2001) Paper Marble and Ceramics Other means of transportation Other manifacturing industries Textile and Clothing Leather
(Exports) Tuscany shows an high degree of internationalisation in terms of exports, accounting for more than 7,5% of the whole Italian export. Fashion (namely all the enterprises in the value chain of textile, clothing, leather, shoes and accessories), mechanics and machineries and jewellery are the most important sectors that contribute to the high level of export of the region (Table 2) as well as services in the field of tourism is strongly represented in this region (23% of the whole Italian values). Tuscany is one of the most important Italian regions in fashion goods production, counting more than 35% of the country’s export (in value), in a sector where Italy has a worldwide leading position. This is due to the presence of highly productive specialised areas, among which we find Prato, the province of this case study. Table 3: Percentage of exports of Tuscany in the main industry within the Italian export value (Source: IRPET, 2007). Food & Beverage
Textile and Tanneries Paper Industry Chemical Industry Mining Industry Mechanical Industry Automotive Industry Other Manufacturing Industries
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Exports of Tuscany are generally towards European countries (mainly Germany, France, UK and Eastern Europe), though less than the Italian averages (only 47.1% vs 53.6%). Exports go beyond the European boundaries: more than the 17% of the exports are towards North America as well as NICS (newly industrialised countries) are also a significant target area for Tuscany goods. (Enterprise System Structure) As mentioned before, the industrialisation process has been characterised by the existence of an incredibly rich systems of micro enterprises and SMEs, which created a localised productive system through mechanisms of collaboration and competition. Every main centre is specialised in a particular sector: for example, textile in Prato, tanneries in Valdarno, furniture in Poggibonsi, Cascina and Quarrata, clothing and leather in Empoli and Florence, footwear in Val di Nievole and Lucca, jewellery in Arezzo, marble in Carrara. Together with local productive system composed of SMEs, some traditional craft local systems are still alive, for example alabaster manufacture in Volterra, Glassware in Colle Valdelsa, as well as some industrial hubs lead by large firms in the automotive (Pontedera) and mechanics sector (Florence and Pistoia). Table 4: Distribution of local units of enterprises according to the number of employees (Source: IRPET, 2007)
Tuscany Italy
(Employment) Employment data shows a composition aligned to the Italian average. In 2003, Tuscany counted about 1.483.000 workers allocated in agriculture (4%), industry (32%), trade (17%) and services (47%). In the last 10 year the number of employees raised by more than 110000 units, all in the service sector, while manufacturing industries lost more than 40000 employees (about 9.5%). The rate of job losses in industry is the second highest in Italy, where the average rate is around 1%. Unemployment is lower than 5%, even if there is still a gender gap (the rate is 7,3% for women and 2,8% is the male one). Less stable jobs are mainly localised in the weakest areas of the region. explaining that forms of flexible type of job are rather following activities more precarious and unstable.
(Territory) Tuscany is one of the Italian region with the highest balanced relationship between urban and and natural environments. The variety of the territory granted several advantages, such as differentiate tourist supply and productive activities. Moreover, this 98
variety granted the reduction of the effects of economic shocks and on these plus, Tuscany focuses most of its tourist activities. Environmental resources, therefore, guarantee significant economic returns, but they are also a source of infra-regional income redistribution of in Tuscany, in favour of areas that are industrialised areas, but with are characterized by beautiful landscapes. For this reason, regional and local authorities recently extended the total surfaces of land that are considered natural or national parks (now accounting for more than 8% of the region). In addition, in these areas, local traditions, fine food and wine, arts and crafts are preserved and became a fundamental driver for tourists. (Latest trend and forecasts) After four years of modest growth rates (on average 0.2% in 2001-2005), regional GDP growth rates raised in 2006 (+1,7%). However, the mechanisms that determined growth are more interesting than its magnitude. The main drivers have been goods and services export, services, and tourism. The machineries sector is still the most dynamic industry, whilst the difficulties of textile and clothing are visible.
Table 5 - Added value in the industrial district of the Region. Average rate of variation per year.
Carrara Capannori Valdinievole Prato Empoli Castelfiorentino S.Croce sull’Arno Poggibonsi Valdarno Superiore Casentino-Val Tiberina Arezzo Sinalunga Total industrial districts The rest of Tuscany Total (Tuscany)
Manufacturing 1995-2001 2001-2005 1,3 -3,5 2,4 -3,8 0,6 -4,0 2,3 -3,4 0,4 -1,9 0,7 -1,4 -1,8 -1,5 -0,1 -0,4 1,6 -2,9 2,0 -2,9 1,2 -2,8 1,8 -0,3 1,1 -2,7 1,0 -1,4 1,0 -2,0
Whole economy 1995-2001 2001-2005 1,3 -0,6 3,0 -0,7 1,7 -1,4 2,1 -0,5 1,8 0,6 1,9 0,8 0,0 0,4 1,0 1,9 2,3 -1,0 2,3 -1,0 2,2 -0,7 2,1 0,7 1,8 -0,3 2,2 0,7 2,1 0,3
Table 6: Main indexes for the Italian region and the Provinces of Tuscany (year 2003)
Piemonte Valle d’Aosta Lombardia Trentino Alto -Adige Veneto Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Added value over unit of labour 49855 51178 52851 51345 47460 50629
Added value over population 45,6% 50,3% 48,9% 52,9% 48,6% 46,6%
Added value over population 2003* 2000 22758 25738 25825 27139 23044 23615
20928 22070 23378 23990 21025 20490 99
Liguria Emilia-Romagna
51872 49421
Toscana 46957 Massa Carrara 46111 Lucca 47692 Pistoia 42996 Firenze 50927 Prato 45095 Livorno 48177 Pisa 48808 Arezzo 42164 Siena 42795 Grosseto 41001 Umbria 44938 Marche 44619 Lazio 51662 Abruzzo 43396 Molise 44161 Italy 48133 Source ISTAT; *estimation by IRPET
42,0% 51,6%
21772 25491
19235 22840
47,0% 35,0% 42,5% 47,7% 52,0% 52,8% 41,5% 46,6% 47,8% 50,3% 41,0% 43,0% 45,9% 44,2% 39,4% 35,4% 42,0%
22071 16156 20251 20527 26461 23807 20015 22752 20174 21516 16800 19327 20478 22838 17098 15624 20198
19895 14940 19061 18411 23088 21836 19192 19234 18437 19905 16016 17525 18141 19729 15155 13945 17982
This new wave of growth is also the results of a restructuring process. The number of firms decreased sharply, due to a selection process that was particularly strong for micro and Unlimited enterprises. However, the number of productive unit did not decrease. This means that a process of consolidation occurred, lead by medium and large companies, in search of the required scale and resources to be active in international markets. In addition, a shift from lower value added “Made in Italy” production activities to technologically intensive ones can be observed.
Table 7 : Specialisation Indexes in Tuscany Entrepreneurship Specialisation Index 2000 2006
Export Specialisation Index 2000 2006
Based on product technology contect High-tech Medium-high tech Medium-low tech Low-tech Total
0,62 0,63 0,71 1,25 1,00
0,65 0,65 0,75 1,24 1,00
0,34 0,58 0,73 1,95 1,00
0,63 0,68 0,74 1,87 1,00
According to typologies of goods Durable consumer goods
1,15
1,20
1,48
1,39
100
Non-durable consumer goods 1,13 Assets 0,67 Intermediates 0,97 Energy 0,45 Total 1,00 Notes: Indexes calculated over Italy Source: Infocamere (StockView) and ISTAT (Coeweb)
1,13 0,70 0,94 0,49 1,00
1,50 0,53 1,03 0,20 1,00
1,50 0,72 0,93 0,30 1,00
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2 Qualitative analysis of the restructuring process in the vulnerable sector 2.1 Historical and cultural background The textile industrial district of Prato represents the major agglomeration of this kind of production in Italy. The area of the district is abut 700 km2 with 325000 inhabitants and, in addition to the of Prato itself, it includes the Councils of Cantagallo, Carmignano, Montemurlo, Poggio a Caiano, Vaiano and Vernio in the Province of Prato; Calenzano and Campi Bisenzio in the Province of Florence; Agliana, Montale and Quarrata in the Province of Pistoia. The specialisation of Prato in the textile manufacturing can be dated back to the 1200 A.D. when the wool processing was facilitated by several favourable environmental conditions (a flourishing sheep farming, good climate and the presence of a good amount of water that, in addition, was naturally characterised by a chemical composition helping the softening process) and by the specialisation in the so called “Art of Calimala”, i.e the ability to process wool cloths to soften them. This type of specialisation will be maintained until the end of the Twentieth Century. Since its origins the textile industry in Prato was characterised by a strong tendency towards fragmentation of the productive cycle among small and medium sized firms. Furthermore, the coordination of activities was done by one entrepreneur with specific skills to be an effective market interface. Something similar is still present today to organise the international trade. In the second half of the 19th century, the productive organisation changed, from a craft-type manufacturing to a more industrial production specialised into the regeneration of fabric rugs (waste from dressmaking atelier, old knitwear works, etc). For this reason, Prato was known as “the capital of rugs”, as it was able to produce regenerated wool that was placed in the market at very competitive prices. These peculiarities have characterised the district up to the first years of the 20th Century, whilst during the period between WW I and WW II vertically integrated firms (i.e. firms that internalized all the steps in the productive process) including all the unit processes) appeared and gained prominence. However, this phenomenon last only to the end of the beginning of the 50's, when a deep market crisis shocked the textile production in Prato. After this crisis, a new fragmentation of production in specialized SMEs was observed, and large enterprises disappeared. The highest growth rates in the Prato district were observed in 50's and 60's, lasting until the 80's: in these years the number of enterprises grew from 20,000 to 60,000. This was due to several factors that created virtuous growth cycles: a wide entrepreneurial attitude, the substantial lack of entry barriers and the need of large plant to recover flexibility. In fact, a productive system based on SMEs has the advantage of flexibility and fast production and response-to-market times. In the 90's, Prato has been widely cited by industrial and regional economists to explain how the traditional and labour intensive production could still be competitive in advanced economies (see as seminal work Beccattini, 1987). From the 80's, however, a new crises overwhelmed Prato: employment dropped by 25%, going from 60000 to 45000 units and enterprises decreased from a number of 16000 to 10000. The reason of this change was recognised in a radical change in patterns of consumption of textile and clothing products, due to a vast diffusion of comfort (mass motorisation and
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heating) in consumers’ lifestyle and choices. The result was an average lightening of fabrics and the larger use of fiber other than wool. The carded wool, the successful production insofar- dropped dramatically excluding from the market several companies that were specialised in this product.with a world leadership. The answer to this shock by the district was relatively fast to appear, with a progressive repositioning of the production both towards new type of products (in term of material composition: cotton, linen, silk, artificial fibres, non-woven textile, and mixtures) and in higher value market segments or higher value added production phases. During this shock smaller enterprises suffered more. Aggressive price competition lead to a strong selection process, and pushed some of them towards lower value added activities. This resulted in a change of the division of labor among district and external enterprises: firms in the district started buying unfinished goods from firms located in low labour cost areas. . The shift was then towards higher specialisation activities (i.e. finishing): in these fields the number of SMEs exceeded the number of "traditional" firms. In parallel, this diversification induced also a requalification of the productive system. So that some enterprises acquired a role also in the design function. The increase of the span of its textile products opened them to new frontiers, in addition to traditional fashion marketplace. In the last decade a new process of mergers, acquisitions and formal creation of business groups was observed, together with informal relationship based on trust and on sharing experiences, as the result of the new quality-oriented and costumer care strategies. 2.2 The Agreement on Textile and Clothing as a sectoral shock In this paragraph we briefly summarize the salient features of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the trade agreements for the textile sector that, signed in 1995, constituted a crucial step towards free trade in the industry. Despite the gradualism of its application, from the point of view of Prato it produced a true shock, since it increased sharply international competition. The agreement scheduled four phases: the first one lasted from January 1 1995 to December 31 1997, when all the countries were expected to integrate into the GATT products from the specific list in the Agreement which accounted for not less than 16 per cent of its total volume of imports in 1990 (integration means here that trade in these products became governed by the general rules of GATT). The second phase (1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) expected every country to integrate products accounting for at least 17% of the imports in 1990. The third phase (1 January 2002 – 31 December 2004) expected the integration of products accounting for at least 18% of imports in 1990. Finally, all remaining products were integrated at the end of the transition period on 1 January 2005. At each of the first three stages, products were to be chosen from each of the following categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products, and clothing. All the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) in place on 31 December 1994 were carried over into the new agreement and maintained until the restrictions are removed or the products integrated into GATT. For products remaining under restraint, ATC laid down a formula for increasing the existing growth rates. During the first phase, and for each restriction previously under MFA bilateral agreements in force for 1994, annual growth were not less than 16 per cent higher than the growth rate established for the previous MFA restriction. For the second phase (1998 to 2001), annual growth rates were 25 per cent higher than the rates in the first phase. For the third place (2002 to 2004 inclusive), annual growth rates were 27 per cent higher than those in the second phase.
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2.3 The evolution of textile and clothing in the ATC era (The sector at the national level). In the period 2001-2005, the Italian textile and clothing industry showed a constant reduction in turnover, due to a negative tendency both in the in domestic and foreign markets. SMI-ATI (which is the Federation of the Italian Textile, Clothing and Fashion industries) estimated in the period a 15% decrease in turnover and a 8,2% decrease in exports (at current prices). Also the number of firms and employees decreased (respectively -16% and –14%), while the importations maintained a positive trend of growth (+10%) (Table 8). The state of textile industry, however, changed in 2006. In this year, the turnover started again to grow, thanks to internal consumption and exports, and this trend has been confirmed in 2007, even if at a lower pace. The recovery of the Italian textile industry during 2006 lead also to growth of imports related to delocalization. This has a negative effect on trade balance, whose positive value remains nevertheless very high (Table 9). Forecasts on the future evolution of the Italian textile industry appear to be positive, even if the effects on employment are not easily predictable: given firms delocalization strategies, as growth in turnover does not correspond anymore to a proportional increase of the production realized in Italy.
Table 8 - Textile and clothing industry dynamics, 2001-2007. 2001=100
finance turnover
enterprises
employees
Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data
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Table 9 -Export and Import dynamics of the textile and clothing Italian industry, 20012006. Export
2001=100
Import
Source: R &I s.r.l elaborations based on SMI-ATI and ISTAT data
(The sector at the district level). One of the main characteristic of the Prato industrial district is the form of organisation, based on a dense pattern of mostly micro and small enterprises, specialised in a specific phase of the productive process phase (spinning, waving, finishing, etc.). Fundamentals features are: 1) the channels of diffusion of information, either formal or informal; 2) the sense of trust among entrepreneurs that feed the independents bonds and reciprocal influence; 3) the equilibrium between collaboration and competition among local actors. Within the Prato district ones can distinguish the following typologies of firms: 1. Final firms whose activity is mainly cantered in product design, creation of collections, costumer managemen, market watch, coordination of various production phases, among which some are often outsourced (spinning, waving, knitting, finishing, etc.); 2. Subcontracting firms, which focus on one highly specialised production phase. Few final firms are the core engine of a network of outsourcing firms (about 90%), which are not in direct contact with the final market. Until the come into practice of ATC, the full value chain was kept inside the Prato district, and local SMEs acted in a collaboration and competition atmosphere that induced a good degree of innovation. Table 10 - Enterprises according to class of number of workers (end of 90's) N. of workers
Up to 3 4-9
End enterprises Added value
%
283 194
32,7 22,4
Total Subcontractor Added value 3063 889
%
v.a
%
65,1 18,9
3346 1083
60,0 19,4
105
209 10-19 137 20-49 36 40-99 7 100< 866 Total Source: IRIS/ R&I
24,2 15,8 4,1 0,8 100
562 163 23 9 4708
11,9 3,5 0,4 0,2 100
771 300 58 16 5574
13,8 5,4 1,1 0,3 100
An interesting feature is the substantial absence of large firms, which constituted a point of weakness in the global competition. In addition, most of the companies are concentrated in spinning and weaving, while about 270 out of 4700 are in the finishing phases, though producing half of the value added. The latter, due to the higher technological intensity, are generally of medium size. Furthermore, an analysis of the enterprise birth rate shows the decreasing number of individual and unlimited companies versus a general invariance of the limited ones (compensating over the years across sectors and through the transformation of unlimited forms to limited forms). In the Prato district there is also a subset of firms working in the clothing industry that are either specialised in knitware or in prêt-a-porter, in both cases characterised by high creativity and research in design and yarn selection. In this perspective, Prato clothing productive system becomes a cognitive-production laboratory to continuously improve, select and experiment know-how, thanks to the integration among economics, society and tacit/codified knowledge. Yet, the existence of a critical mass of production creates the condition of the existence of a specialised job market and dedicated network and service structures also supported by regional and local public policies. Exemples are Tecnotessile, a technical support centre, or the trade exhibition Prato Expo, that, however, was integrated with all other main Italian textile trade fairs and moved in 2005 to Milan, in order to keep the pace of the international competition. In 2007 the Prato province registered about 28,000 active enterprises, among which 30% are in manufacturing. Their average number of employees is very low (4.8), as already explained. The vast majority of firms are in the textile and clothing sector (7395 against a total of 8338). Their distribution is now equally distributed among textile (3711) and clothing (3684).
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Table 11 – Enterprise structure according to main sectors in 2007 N. of active enterprises 8338
% of industrial enterprises 43%
Export (M Euro)
2193 Manufacturing (including fashion sector) Construction 4650 0,0 24% 13710 0,5 Commerce, services to private and companies Agriculture & 626 2,9 Fisheries Other 969 2,4 Total 28293 67% 2198 Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Table12 – Overview of the textile and clothing industry in Prato in 2007 Textile
Clothing (incl. Knitware) 3684 49,5% 13930 43%
Prato Industrial District 7395 44,5% 40580 66%
Enterprise 3711 39,5% Of which industrial (%) Employees° 26650 73% Of which in industrial enterprises (% in 2006) Turn over (M Euro) 3661 1192,4 4853 Export (M Euro) 1894 523 2417 52% 44% 50% % export over Turn over ° estimate Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008
Table 13- Estimate of the turnover in the Prato district
1.Yarn 2. Orthogonal Fabric 3. Knitted fabric 4. Other textile 5_Textile Industries (1+2+3+4) 6.Knitware 7.Clothing 8.Pret-a-Porter 9_Textile & Clothing
2005 662.0 2180.0 350.0 415.0 3607.0
(M Euro) 2006 680.0 2205.0 395.0 425.0 3705.0
2007 * 663.0 2127.8 379.2 442.0 3612.0
350.0 700.0 50.0 4707.0
320.0 790.0 50.0 4865.0
339.2 853.0 48.5 4852.9
Differentials % 2006/2005 2007/2006 +2.7% -2.5% +1.1% -3.5% +12.9% -4.0% +2.4 +4.0% +2.7% -2.5% -8.6% +12.9% +0.0% +3.4%
+6% +8.0% -3.0% -0.2%
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(5+6+7+8) * forecast Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Table 14 - Estimate of the export in the Prato district Differentials % M Euro 2005 291.8 1342.9
2006 289.5 1267.2
2007 * 277.8 1205.2
2006/2005 -0.8% -5.6%
1.Yarn -4.1% 2. Orthogonal -4.9% Fabric 3. Knitted fabric 176.2 196.3 186.3 +11.4% -5.1% 4. Other textile 199.4 190.0 208.7 -4.7% +9.8% 2010.3 1943.1 1878.1 -3.3% -3.3% 5_Textile Industries (1+2+3+4) 6.Knitware 210.8 195.6 210.9 -7.2% +7.8% 7.Clothing 264.1 291.8 311.9 +10.5% +6.9% 8.Pret-a-Porter 15.4 16.7 16.0 +8.3% -3.9% 2500.6 2447.2 2416.9 -2.1% -1.2% 9_Textile & Clothing (5+6+7+8) * forecast Source: Elaboration of data by Bureau Van Dijk ISTAT, SMI, Unionocamere Tagliacarte e UPI, 2008 Turnover over the last three years shows a certain degree of stability, while export significantly rised in clothing and knitwear as well as in the class “other textile”. This shows that Prato is moving along the value chain towards higher technological production and consumer market, commerce andhigher value added activities. Exports of the Prato district are significant and generally directed towards European or developed countries. However, according to the data of the Ministry of International Commerce (2007), the overall value of the exports of goods in the Province of Prato is decreasing since 2002, with two main shocks in 2003 and 2005. Table 15 – Variation of export value in the Province of Prato
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0 -0.2
-0.4
-2
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
-4
-1.1
-6
Variation over the year before
-6.6
-8 -8.1
-10
Source: Ministry of International Commerce (2007)
2.3 Employment and labour market in Prato (Demography) Prato is the highest populated Italian industrial district; since years, however, its growth is due to a high rate of immigration. This created, in such a small area, one of the most multicultural areas in Italy, with the largest Chinese community in Italy (the Chinese account for 40% of the foreigners). This has to be mentioned, in order to point out one of the latest evolution of the district, i.e. the creation of a sub-district (a district nested in the district), quite well integrated with the Italian companies and composed by Chinese workers and owners. The following table summarises the main demographic information. Table 16– Population in the Province of Prato (2002) Residents - foreign - chinese Foreign over residents (%)
234919 14139 5769 6,0
Class of age 0-14 12,8 15-24 10,5 25-34 16,1 35-44 15,8 45-54 14,0 55-64 12,3 65< 18,5 Total 100,0 Source: ASEL elaboration on data of the Ufficio Statistica of the Municipality of Prato
(Employment) As indicated in Table 12, in 2007, district employees in the textile and clothing sector were 40.580 i.e 66% of the total workers in the industrial enterprises. Despite a significant reduction, the textile and clothing plays still an extremely relevant role in the area. In particular, analysing the data provided by the Industrial Association branch of Prato, it emerges that 33% of the employees in the textile sector operates in micro enterprises ( 11 Limites du Courtraisis
0
30 Km
Source des données : VDAB
Carte 2 – Taux de chômage en Région flamande en 2006 (source : VDAB).
Stratégie politique Comme les autres sous-régions flamandes, le Courtraisis fait l’objet de pactes régionaux (streekpacts) établis par les RESOC, organes régionaux de concertation entre les employeurs, les travailleurs, les organes communaux et provinciaux. Ces documents fixent une stratégie à long terme pour le développement économique et l’emploi au niveau des sous-régions concernées. Le Courtraisis est couvert par deux RESOC (Regionaal Sociaal-economisch Overlegcomité), le RESOC Zuid-West-Vlaanderen (arrondissement de Courtrai) et le RESOC Midden-West-Vlaanderen (arrondissements de Tielt et Roulers), ayant chacun produit un streekpact 2007-2012. Si le secteur textile en tant que tel n’y fait pas l’objet d’objectifs précis et chiffrés, il est quand-même question de mettre d’avantage en valeur son image en tant que secteur industriel spécifique de la région (streekpact Midden-West-Vlaanderen). A Courtrai (streekpact Zuid-West-Vlaanderen), une volonté inscrite est d’introduire dans ce secteur (cité au même titre que la métallurgie, la construction, les soins de santé…) des 270
plastiques à haute valeur ajoutée et intelligents, en lien avec le Centre Flamand de Plasturgie (VKC) et les centres de connaissance (université, hautes écoles…) présents dans la région courtraisienne. Un point d’ailleurs souligné dans ce dernier document est la volonté de R&D de nouvelles activités à haute valeur ajoutée, tant à partir du tissu entrepreneurial présent que de nouvelles entreprises arrivant dans la région, sans toutefois citer directement le secteur textile.
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Case study 16 : L’industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège Septembre 2008, ULB-IGEAT Moteurs de l’économie locale il y a quelques décennies, la plupart des industries métallurgiques d’Europe occidentale sont aujourd’hui mises à mal dans un contexte de mondialisation accrue. Les régions concernées connaissent (ou ont connu) des difficultés pour se maintenir dans le système économique actuel, et ce, malgré la mise en place de diverses mesures. Le rapport qui suit est consacré au cas de la province de Liège. Nous analyserons dans un premier temps l’évolution du secteur industriel au travers d’indicateurs socio-économique. Nous donnerons ensuite quelques explications historiques et culturelles quant à la localisation de l’industrie métallurgique à Liège. L’évolution récente du secteur fera également l’objet de notre attention. Viendra enfin, avant de conclure, l’analyse des mesures politiques prises en réaction aux problèmes rencontrés par le secteur métallurgique.
1. Les indicateurs socio-économiques 1.1. Le bassin d’emploi liégeois La carte 1 nous localise les différentes communes belges qui envoient plus de 10 % de leur population active dans le centre d’emploi de Liège. Elles constituent ainsi le bassin d’emploi de Liège. Il est intéressant de constater que la limite nord suit parfaitement la limite régionale et linguistique. Notons également qu’à l’exception d’une commune, le bassin d’emploi (tel que nous l’avons défini) est constitué uniquement de communes de la province liégeoise. Au total, ce sont près de 50 communes qui sont concernées par l’emploi (quel qu’il soit) à Liège. 1.2. Définition de l’industrie analysée
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La métallurgie regroupe différents sous-secteurs d’activités, comme nous l’enseigne le tableau 1 ci-contre, issu de la nomenclature d’activités NACE-BEL. Nous y joignons généralement le secteur du travail des métaux. Comme nous allons le voir par la suite, il s’agit encore aujourd’hui des secteurs industriels les plus importants de Liège en termes d’emplois. D’autres secteurs industriels sont couramment associés à ces derniers lors d’analyses comme la nôtre, tel que la fabrication de machines et équipements (code 29), la fabrication d’équipements électriques, électroniques et optiques (codes 30 à 33) et la fabrication de matériel de transport (codes 34 et 35). Ces secteurs présentent en effet des liens rapprochés avec le secteur du métal proprement dit51.
Code NACE Description 27 METALLURGIE 27.1 Sidérurgie 27.2 Fabrication de tubes Autres opérations de première 27.3 transformation du fer et de l’acier 27.4 Production de métaux non ferreux 27.5 Fonderie 28 TRAVAIL DES METAUX Fabrication d’éléments en métal pour la 28.1 construction Fabrication de réservoirs métalliques et 28.2 de chaudière pour le chauffage central 28.3 Fabrication de générateur de vapeur Forge ; emboutissage, estampage et 28.4 profilage des métaux Traitement et revêtement des métaux ; 28.5 mécanique générale Fabrication de coutellerie, d’outillage et 28.6 de quincaillerie Fabrication d’autres ouvrages en 28.7 métaux
Tableau 3: La métallurgie dans le code NACE-BEL
Source : SPF Economie, PME, classes moyennes & Energie (2004)
51
Sauf précisions, nous utiliserons dans la suite de ce rapport le terme « industrie » pour parler de l’ensemble de ces différents secteurs.
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Carte 2: Liège et son bassin d'emploi. 1.3. L’emploi L’évolution récente de l’emploi telle qu’elle est présentée à la figure 1 montre bien le déclin de l’emploi industriel, au contraire de l’emploi total qui connaît une croissance positive sur la même période, et ce, quelque soit la zone géographique étudiée. Comparé au déclin du royaume, la province de Liège est particulièrement touchée : l’emploi industriel en 2006 diminue de 27 % de sa valeur initiale en 1995, alors qu’à l’échelle du royaume, l’emploi industriel décline « seulement » de 12 % (21 % à l’échelle de la région wallonne)52. L’évolution relative53 (figure 1) de l’emploi (tant industriel que total) dans la province de Liège reste à un niveau pratiquement constant sur toute la période 1995-2006, malgré les différences de croissances que nous venons de constater entre la province de Liège et le royaume. Il est cependant nécessaire de noter que la part de l’emploi industriel dans l’emploi total au sein de la province de Liège a diminué de 2,8 %54. Il faut y voir la conséquence d’une diminution de l’emploi dans ce secteur d’activité et une croissance dans d’autres domaines tels que l’immobilier et les services aux entreprises ou encore la santé et l’action sociale.
Figure 2: Evolution de l'emploi industriel et total entre 1995 et 2006. 52
L’industrie métallurgique liégeoise représente – en termes d’emplois – 30 % de l’industrie totale liégeoise. Ceci explique les résultats obtenus dans l’annexe 1 pour l’ensemble de l’industrie liégeoise, malgré l’évolution positive d’autres secteurs industriels tel que l’industrie chimique par exemple. 53 Les valeurs obtenues sont le résultat du rapport entre les effectifs de la province de Liège (ou de la région wallonne) et les effectifs du royaume pour une même année et un même secteur (industrie rapportée à l’industrie, total rapporté au total). 54 En 1995, l’emploi industriel représentait 8,90 % de l’emploi total de la province de Liège. En 2006, cette part est passée à 6,10 %.
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La figure 2 nous montre l’évolution des emplois salariés au sein de l’industrie liégeoise, entre 1996 et 2006 (au niveau NACE-BEL 2). Plusieurs informations ressortent de cette figure. Nous pouvons tout d’abord observer la dominance – encore actuelle – du nombre d’emplois dans les secteurs de la métallurgie et du travail des métaux55. Ceci n’empêche cependant pas d’observer une forte décroissance dans le secteur de la métallurgie entre 1996 et 2006, malgré la remontée enregistrée en 2001. En 2006, le secteur de la métallurgie est même passé en seconde place en nombre d’emplois dans l’industrie liégeoise. A l’exception du secteur de l’automobile et de la fabrication de machines et équipements, la tendance va vers une stagnation voire une diminution de l’emploi entre 1996 et 2006. Au niveau des grandes structures (activités primaires, secondaires et tertiaires), quelques tendances sont à souligner au regard du tableau 256.
Figure 3: Emplois salariés dans l'industrie liégeoise. Comme ailleurs en Belgique, le secteur primaire ne représente qu’une très petite part de l’emploi liégeois : sa part relative décline à nouveau depuis le milieu des années 1990, pour atteindre à ce jour moins de 2 %.
55
C’est également dans ces secteurs que l’on retrouve le plus d’établissements (En 2006, 549 établissements dans les secteurs 27 et 28, contre 335 pour l’ensemble des autres secteurs industriels (29 à 35)). 56 Seuls les employés sont pris en compte de 1980 à 1990. A partir de 1995, les indépendants sont également pris en considération.
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Les résultats du secteur secondaire sont, en revanche, plus intéressants : en un quart de siècle, la part de l’emploi dans le secondaire (essentiellement représenté par l’industrie) a diminué de moitié à Liège. Le tertiaire reste plus que jamais dominant, avec une augmentation de plus de 19 % de part relative entre 1980 et 2006. En termes d’emplois, nous soulignerons une croissance nonnégligeable du secteur de l’immobilier, de la location et des services aux entreprises, ainsi que du secteur de la santé et de l’action sociale sur la période 1995-2006. Dans le même temps, le secteur des activités financières décroît sensiblement. Nous pouvons nous demander, au vu des résultats précédents, qu’elle est l’évolution du taux de chômage dans la province de Liège entre le milieu des années 1990 et le milieu des années 2000. L’IWEPS57 nous apprend à ce sujet que le taux de chômage enregistré en province de Liège a légèrement augmenté, passant de 17,7 % en 1997 à 18,5 % en 2005, avec une diminution au début des années 2000 (15,6 % en 2002). Cette évolution à la hausse est également observable à l’échelle de la région wallonne ainsi qu’au niveau du royaume. Notons cependant que ce taux élevé se rapproche plus de celui de la région wallonne (17,7 % en 2005) que de celui du royaume (à savoir de 8,5 %). En % Primaire Secondaire Tertiaire
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 1.70 1.90 1.90 2.65 2.50 2.42 2.30 2.22 2.11 1.96 1.91 1.82 40.10 33.90 28.70 24.75 24.28 24.06 23.83 23.09 22.74 22.49 22.26 21.88 58.20 64.20 69.40 72.61 73.21 73.52 73.87 74.68 75.15 75.55 75.84 76.30
Tableau 4: Evolution des structures en province de Liège (1980-2006)
2004 1.79 21.12 77.09
2005 1.73 21.00 77.27
Sources : ONSS + INASTI
1.4. Le Produit Intérieur Brut par habitant Le PIB par habitant fait partie des indicateurs intéressants à prendre en considération. La figure 3 montre son évolution entre 1995 et 2006. Deux approches sont reprises dans cette figure: d’une part l’évolution à partir de la valeur enregistrée en 1995, et, d’autre part, l’évolution du PIB / habitant en province de Liège (ou en région wallonne) rapportée à la valeur du royaume. L’information qui ressort de cette figure est le « changement de cap » qui s’observe en 1998 : avant cette date, la croissance du PIB par habitant dans la province de Liège augmente au même rythme que celle enregistrée à l’échelle du royaume. Après 1998, en revanche, la croissance est moins soutenue à Liège, et l’écart se creuse d’année en année, que ce soit par rapport au royaume ou même par rapport à la région wallonne. Cette différence entre la croissance du PIB / habitant au niveau du royaume et à l’échelle de la province de Liège est telle que le PIB / habitant de Liège, en 2006, n’est plus que de 72,5 % de celui du royaume, alors qu’il avoisinait encore les 79 % 11 ans plus tôt.
57
2006 1.70 20.61 77.69
Institut Wallon de l’Evaluation, de la prospective et de la statistique.
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Figure 3: Evolution du PIB par habitant entre 1995 et 2006
1.5. La valeur ajoutée Il ressort de la figure 4 que les courbes de croissance de la valeur ajoutée « industrielle » diffèrent très nettement de celles prenant en compte l’ensemble des secteurs d’activités : les premières présentent une évolution relativement chaotique, au contraire des secondes qui enregistrent une évolution positive sans forte rupture de pente. Parmi les courbes de croissance de la valeur ajoutée « industrielle », il est intéressant de remarquer les différences de comportement entre la province de Liège, la région wallonne et le royaume58. Si les tendances (croissances positives ou négatives) vont dans le même sens d’années en années dans les trois cas (excepté en 2006), il est par contre important de noter les différences de pente: la croissance enregistrée au niveau du royaume est moins « mouvementée » mais permet au final l’obtention d’une augmentation de près de 24 %, au contraire de la province de Liège qui, en 2006, affiche une diminution de 7,5 % par rapport à 1995 (la région wallonne, quant à elle, enregistre une légère augmentation de 5 % au terme de cette période). La province de Liège fait donc moins bien que le royaume et que la région wallonne (à partir de 2004 en ce qui concerne la région wallonne). L’évolution des parts relatives également présente sur la figure 4 vient nuancer quelques peu nos propos. En effet, même si les croissances de la valeur ajoutée au niveau du royaume sont plus élevées que celles de la province de Liège, il apparaît que l’évolution des parts relatives de la province de Liège ne décroît que très légèrement, passant de 11 % à 8 %.
58
L’annexe 2 présente les résultats – sensiblement différents – obtenus pour l’ensemble du secteur industriel.
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1.6. Conclusions Les différents indicateurs montrent une situation défavorable à l’industrie métallurgique dans la province de Liège : diminution de l’emploi, diminution de la valeur ajoutée, diminution des secteurs secondaires au profit du secteur tertiaire. La crise qui a débutée il y a quelques décennies persiste encore à l’heure actuelle. Analysons à présent l’évolution de ce secteur d’activité à Liège.
2. Facteurs historiques de localisation et évolution récente 2.1. Les facteurs de la localisation de l’industrie métallurgique liégeoise59 Diverses conditions préalables doivent être réunies pour pouvoir mettre en place une industrie dans un lieu déterminé. Il ne suffit donc pas d’avoir des ressources minières à proximité pour pouvoir lancer une industrie métallurgique. Une des conditions nécessaire est l’existence d’une main-d’œuvre. Très tôt, déjà au milieu du 15ème siècle, Liège pourra compter sur un nombre important d’habitants, nombre plus élevé qu’ailleurs en Wallonie ou dans ce qui deviendra plus tard l’axe industriel wallon. Les densités de population et le surplus de main d’œuvre du monde rural vont permettre la mise en place d’une proto-industrie (textile) dans la province de Liège, sous le règne des Hollandais. Par ailleurs, les débouchés (tant légaux que la contrebande) existent, ce qui remplit une autre condition nécessaire. Dès la fin du 18ème siècle, la province de Liège obtient un atout supplémentaire qui n’est autre que la mécanisation du travail de la laine (rendu possible par W. Cockerill).
59
Cette partie provient principalement de l’ouvrage de MM. Vandermotten et Marissal (2004)
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Les temps modernes verront apparaître une métallurgie du fer dans la province de Liège, utilisant du charbon de bois et du minerai local. Liège et d’autres provinces wallonnes seront les principaux lieux d’une telle activité sous le règne des Hollandais. L’arrivée de hauts-fourneaux à coke dès la fin des années 1820 (et qui supplanteront les hautsfourneaux au charbon de bois à la fin de la première moitié du 19ème siècle) sera sans conteste un apport majeur à la mise en place d’une industrie sidérurgique et métallurgique dans la province de Liège. C’est durant la deuxième moitié du 19ème siècle, lors de la phase A du deuxième Kondratieff, que l’industrie métallurgique liégeoise va réellement prendre son envol. Deux éléments nonnégligeables sont à prendre en compte, à savoir les fonds financiers (viennent s’ajouter aux fonds locaux60 les fonds nationaux) d’une part, permettant l’acquisition d’outils de production ; ainsi que l’avènement du chemin de fer d’autre part, grand demandeur de fabrications métalliques lourdes. Ce type d’industries étant énergivore, on observe à cette époque une concentration importante de cette activité dans le sillon wallon en parallèle avec une diminution au nord du pays. L’industrie métallurgique ne se développe cependant pas systématiquement là où des ressources existent. Il faut en effet posséder le savoir-faire. C’est ainsi qu’à Liège, cette activité a pu bénéficier de l’expérience acquise lors de la phase protoindustrielle, élément loin d’être négligeable à cette période-là. En résumé, sont donc réunis en province de Liège tous les facteurs nécessaires au développement d’une industrie métallurgique, et ce pratiquement dès le départ : certes il y a la présence des matières premières, mais il y a également de la main-d’œuvre mobilisable, du savoir-faire acquis avec le temps, un capital financier tant local que national, sans oublier les débouchés pour la production. 2.2. L’évolution récente de la sidérurgie à Liège Au regard de l’emploi dans les différents secteurs industriels, il apparaît que la sidérurgie est de loin le sous-secteur utilisant le plus de mains d’œuvre à Liège, et ce, malgré la croissance négative de l’emploi industriel enregistrée ces dernières années: en 2006, un employé sur cinq dans l’industrie liégeoise (telle que nous l’avons précédemment définie) y travaille. C’est également le principal sous-secteur d’activité de la métallurgie, concentrant 70 % des emplois de ce secteur d’activité. Il convient donc d’étudier l’évolution de la sidérurgie liégeoise, ce qui revient à analyser le passage de l’entreprise Cockerill Sambre à l’actuelle ArcelorMittal61, localisée à Seraing. La crise de la sidérurgie qui sévit en Europe au milieu des années 1970, suite notamment à la crise pétrolière, n’est pas sans conséquence sur le groupe sidérurgique Cockerill, basé à Liège. Pour faire face aux difficultés de productivité et de finances, une restructuration importante (9.500 postes en moins, soit 45 % des effectifs) y est mise en place dès ce moment-là. En 1981, Cockerill fusionne avec Hainaut-Sambre (Charleroi) pour créer Cockerill-Sambre. Cette fusion ne sera pas une réussite sur le plan financier. Commence alors une série de plans de restructurations, dont le plan Gandois (1983-1987) qui va permettre d’importants gains de 60
Liège bénéficiera ainsi d’un soutient financier local lié à son passé de capitale principautaire, avant que les fonds nationaux ne prennent le dessus. 61 Un schéma montrant les principales étapes de fusion des entreprises se trouve en annexe 3.
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productivité et ainsi sortir de la crise. En parallèle à cette restructuration, l’entreprise mise sur la production de produits à haute valeur ajoutée. Au final, le groupe Cockerill s’est séparé de 70 % de ses effectifs en 15 ans, et a investi considérablement dans la modernisation de ses installations. Dès la fin des années 1980, le groupe Cockerill se spécialise – et est reconnu comme tel – dans la production d’acier plat et mince. Le groupe peut alors compter sur les marchés de l’automobile, de l’électroménager, de l’emballage et du bâtiment pour écouler sa production. Il devient par ailleurs « une entreprise sidérurgique intégrée et performante »62. De 1993 à 1996, Cockerill-Sambre se recentre sur ses métiers de base, avec le redémarrage d’un haut fourneau, la modernisation d’un laminoir à froid et la mise en route de deux nouvelles lignes de galvanisation. Ceci donne naissance en 1997 à deux sous-traitants (Eurogal et Tailored Blanks). La capacité de production d’autres sites du groupe (Chertal et Jemeppe) est quant à elle revue à la hausse. On assiste donc à un redéploiement ciblé de la part du groupe Cockerill Sambre, avec une volonté de renforcer l’aval de la production. Fin des années 1990, dans le but de rester compétitif, un rapprochement avec un grand sidérurgiste français (Usinor) est lancé. Cette fusion est bien plus qu’un accord sur papier conclu en 1998 : Usinor confirme son intérêt en investissant dans plusieurs sites belges dès le début des années 2000. En 2003, le groupe s’agrandit encore pour devenir le leader mondial de l’acier et se dénomme désormais Arcelor. Ayant une vision de capitalisme mondial, Arcelor décide d’effectuer quelques changements dans ses implantations belges. Le nouveau groupe en vient donc à délaisser la sidérurgie continentale au profit de la sidérurgie maritime. En pratique, la sidérurgie à chaud doit disparaître de Liège, où il ne resterait plus que la phase à froid alimentée par Sidmar63. Durant cette période (la fermeture de la phase à chaud étant prévue pour la mi-2005), le groupe investit massivement dans certains hauts-fourneaux maritimes64, dans le but d’y accroître la production. En termes social, cette fermeture concernait près de 9500 emplois65, dont 75 % d’emplois indirects, parmi lesquels les sous-traitants66 et les fournisseurs67,68. Mais rien ne garantissait la stabilité sociale pour les 2400 emplois directs de la phase à froid69. Les organisations syndicales ont ainsi mis en avant certains problèmes techniques qui pourraient survenir et entrainer la fermeture de la phase à froid également : des questions telles que le transport entre la sidérurgie à chaud maritime et celle à froid continentale, les délais d’approvisionnement ou encore la qualité des produits fournis. Ceci a amené les organisations syndicales à plaider pour une sidérurgie intégrée à Liège. Des négociations en 2003 entre la 62
Capron M. (2001), p.6 Arcelor comptait par ailleurs investir à Charleroi (Carlam) pour en faire le pôle mondial de l’inox. 64 Sidmar, Dunkerque, Brésil, … 65 Estimation des organisations syndicales pour l’année 2002. 66 Ceux-ci interviennent notamment dans les entretiens électriques, hydrauliques, pneumatiques, le montage, le nettoyage, … 67 Sont entre-autres concernés des emplois dans les domaines du transport, de la production de chaux, le travail interimaire, … 68 D’autres emplois que ceux des sous-traitants et des fournisseurs étaient également menacés, du fait de la perte de pouvoir d’achat ou encore de la moindre rentrée financière au niveau communale. Cela représenterait environs 2500 emplois. 69 Galvanisation, revêtement organique, étamage, électro-zinguage, … . 63
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direction d’Arcelor, la Région wallonne et les représentants syndicaux ont abouti à une fermeture progressive, étalée de 2005 à 2009. Ce long délai devait servir à mettre en place70 des mesures permettant de limiter les pertes d’emplois. Par cette stratégie de fermeture des hauts-fourneaux liégeois, Arcelor cherchait en réalité à diminuer l’offre dans le but d’augmenter les prix de l’acier. Il s’agit d’une politique facile à implémenter puisque, rappelons-le, Arcelor était leader mondial de l’acier71. En 2006, le groupe Mittal Steel lance avec succès une OPA sur le groupe Arcelor. La sidérurgie liégeoise est depuis lors entre les mains du groupe ArcelorMittal. Cette nouvelle page dans l’histoire ne passera pas inaperçue. De fait, M. Mittal décide de relancer la phase à chaud à Liège, ce qui représente en 2008 près de 8110 emplois72 qui ne sont dès lors plus menacés de suppression. L’annonce de la fermeture de la phase à chaud d’Arcelor a amené les fournisseurs et soustraitants d’Arcelor à envisager une orientation vers d’autres secteurs en croissance positive, ou encore à diversifier leurs activités. Contre toute attente, cette reconversion s’est réalisée avec succès73. En 2007, selon l’étude sectorielle de STRATELLIA, seuls 21 entreprises – soit environ 8 % – dépendaient encore de la sidérurgie à chaud pour plus de 10 % de leur chiffre d’affaires. La majorité d’entre-elles sont des sous-traitants qui n’exportent que très peu. L’annonce de la réouverture des hauts-fourneaux liégeois n’en reste pas moins un soulagement et une garantie de continuité de fonctionnement de l’ensemble des entreprises. De surcroît, graviter autour d’ArcelorMittal a permis à certaines d’entre elles d’accéder aux marchés étrangers. La phase à froid semble plus que jamais bien implantée à Liège. Celle-ci bénéficie en outre de la présence de deux centres de Recherche et Développement dans des domaines proches de la sidérurgie74. Actuellement, les produits sortant de la phase à froid ne sont pas encore assez proches de la consommation finale75. Les recherches en cours portent tant sur des produits finaux (tels que les maisons en acier) que de nouveaux matériaux76 ou encore de nouveaux processus de production. L’avenir à moyen terme de la sidérurgie liégeoise ne semble donc plus compromis. L’annonce en 2003 de l’arrêt du chaud a constitué un véritable « électrochoc » auprès des acteurs économiques de la région liégeoise qui ont alors entamé des actions dans le but de diversifier l’économie dans le bassin liégeois. Depuis lors, la demande croissante d’acier a conduit le groupe actuel à remettre en fonctionnement un haut-fourneau liégeois77, écartant en même temps toute menace de perte d’emplois à court terme. 70
Grâce notamment aux services de la société SODIE. Avec une production frisant les 115 MT d’acier chaque année. 72 Cela représente moins d’emplois qu’en 2002, conséquence de gains de productivité évalués à une diminution de l’emploi de 2,5 % par an. 73 Ceci explique une partie des résultats obtenus à la figure 2. 74 Le RDCS (Recherche et Développement de Cockerill Sambre) et le CRM (Centre de Recherche Métallurgique). 75 Aujourd’hui encore, la plupart des produits qui sortent des usines ne sont que des bobines recouvertes. Il serait préférable d’aboutir à des produits plus en aval de la filière, telles que des portes de voitures ou de frigos par exemple. 76 Notamment les produits dit à Très Haute résistance (destinés par exemple au secteur de l’automobile : ceux-ci permettent d’alléger le véhicule tout en gardant une bonne résistance), les matériaux de surface (pour la captation solaire ou encore les tôles autonettoyantes), … . 77 Voir à ce sujet le communiqué de presse de la société ArcelorMittal du 09 octobre 2007. 71
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3. Evaluation des mesures politiques 3.1. L’implication financière directe récente des pouvoirs publics dans la sidérurgie wallonne L’implication financière directe des pouvoirs publics dans la sidérurgie wallonne fut décroissante avec le temps. Les accords d’Hanzinelle78, signés en 1978, verront l’arrivée d’une intervention de l’état belge dans la gestion de la sidérurgie wallonne. Celui-ci possèdera 80 % du capital du nouveau groupe sidérurgique Cockerill-Sambre en 1981. Par la suite, la participation des pouvoirs publics sera représentée par la Région wallonne. La fusion avec Usinor (1998) sera l’occasion pour la Région wallonne de céder une part importante du capital au groupe français, tout en gardant une part significative permettant une intervention dans la stratégie du groupe. En 2002, lors de la fusion entre Usinor, Arbed et Aceralia donnant naissance à Arcelor, la région wallonne n’a plus qu’une influence à la marge, ne possédant plus que 4,25 % du capital de ce nouveau groupe. Enfin, toujours sur la même lancée, la région wallonne s’est récemment désengagée de la sidérurgie wallonne, en ne disposant plus qu’1 % du capital du groupe ArcelorMittal. On le voit donc, les pouvoirs publics sont aujourd’hui sortis du capital de la sidérurgie wallonne. Il ne faut cependant pas y voir un désengagement dans l’aide aux entreprises et aux employés dans le secteur industriel. Ceci fait l’objet de la section suivante. 3.2. La réaction politique face aux problèmes rencontrés par le secteur industriel liégeois 3.2.1. Les grands axes de développement Actuellement, différents niveaux politiques (européen, régional et provincial) participent à la réalisation de projets garants du redéploiement économique de la région liégeoise. Ces projets tournent autour de plusieurs grands axes de développement. Un premier axe principal est celui de la logistique, aujourd’hui représenté par l’aéroport de Bierset et par le Port Autonome de Liège (troisième port intérieur d’Europe)79. Dans un avenir proche, cette infrastructure sera rebaptisée Liège Trilogiport, dont l’objectif est la multimodalité, utilisant pour ce faire la voie d’eau (afin d’accéder à la mer), ainsi que les réseaux ferré et autoroutier. La localisation géographique de Liège permet en outre d’accéder rapidement à d’autres marchés nationaux tels ceux des Pays-Bas et de l’Allemagne. Le développement de cette plate-forme multimodale est gérée par le Groupement d’Intérêt Economique, où l’on retrouve notamment les ports d’Anvers et de Liège, ainsi que la SPI+80. Notons qu’en termes d’emplois, la logistique permet à des catégories diversifiées de travailleurs d’y trouver un emploi, notamment des personnes au faible niveau de qualification, nombreux dans la province de Liège. Un second axe principal de développement de la province liégeoise est celui des Sciences du Vivant, dont notamment la biotechnologie. Ce pôle économique peut notamment s’appuyer sur les équipes universitaires de l’ULg. Les emplois directs recherchés requièrent un haut 78
dont le but était la restructuration de la sidérurgie wallonne. www.portdeliege.be pour en connaître d’avantage sur le port de Liège, ainsi que « Liège Trilogiport : un parc logistique unique en Europe », présentation de M. E.-L. Bertrand à la Semaine Internationale du Transport et de la Logistique, Paris, mars 2006. 80 Agence de développement de la province de Liège. 79
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niveau de formation, critère que ne possède pas la majorité des personnes sans emplois. Il y a cependant une création d’emplois indirects, comme par exemple le transport, plus adapté à la qualification de la main d’œuvre existante. L’aérospatial ainsi que l’agroalimentaire et la (micro)mécanique constituent d’autres secteurs dynamiques présent à Liège, mais employant également majoritairement des personnes à hautes qualifications. Un troisième axe principal de développement est constitué par la sidérurgie, secteur compétitif. Comme dit auparavant, ce secteur bénéficie de centres de Recherche & Développement pour sa phase à froid, ainsi qu’une volonté de refaire de Liège un site continentale de phase à chaud, tout bénéfice pour l’emploi de la province. 3.2.2. Les acteurs du redéploiement économique de Liège L’intervention de l’Union Européenne et de la Région wallonne dans le redéploiement économique de la province de Liège se concrétise par l’intermédiaire de subsides alloués aux diverses formations régionales et locales dont c’est la charge. C’est ainsi que le Groupement pour le Redéploiement Economique de Liège (GRE-Liège) bénéficie à la fois des soutiens financiers de l’Union Européenne (via le FEDER81) et de la Région wallonne. L’apport financier actuel du FEDER couvre la période 2008-2013, dont bénéficieront en partie82 des projets tels que la réhabilitation de la friche industrielle de la papeterie Godin, le Trilogiport, la restructuration du quartier des Guillemins (Gare), l’aménagement du centre de la ville de Seraing, ou encore la redynamisation du centre de Herstal. Le GRE-Liège est né en 2004, suite à l’annonce de la fermeture de la sidérurgie à chaud à Liège et à l’étude menée par l’Association « Avenir du Pays de Liège » cherchant une possibilité de reconversion. L’objectif du GRE-Liège est donc de coordonner les actions de l’ensemble des acteurs économiques impliqués dans le redéploiement. Les priorités liégeoises mises en évidence dans l’étude Foret-Mathot citée ci-dessus sont en parfaite adéquation avec les objectifs du Plan Marshall, lancé par la Région wallonne en 2005. La Région wallonne a depuis lors doté chaque bassin industriel wallon d’une Structure Locale de Coordination, avec pour mission la création d’emplois au travers de nouvelles activités et PME. Dans le cas de la province de Liège, cette structure a été intégrée au GRE-Liège. 3.2.3. Les quatre pôles du redéploiement économique de Liège Le redéploiement économique de Liège présenté ci-dessus est basé sur quatre pôles, formés de diverses institutions, organisations, sociétés et associations, comme le montre la figure 583.
81
Fonds Européen de Développement Economique et Régional. Le reste provenant pour l’essentiel de la Région wallonne et de la Ville de Liège. 83 Schéma réalisé notamment sur base d’un entretien avec M. J. Verdin. 82
283
t es inv us
SI BL
SOWALFIN
Me
EP A
F SL
SRIW
Banques
ULg
Pôle Finances
ULg
SO G
Te ch nif ut ur
CS RD
Pôle Formation M
CRM Si
rri s
Cewal
IFAPME
RE FO
Pôle Recherches
GRE
Pôle Développement SPI + GV Eur o T
PA
B SA
ET M
L
MVD
Le pôle Finances Pôle indispensable à plus d’un titre. Les différents acteurs qui le composent84 ont en effet plusieurs rôles à effectuer, tel que favoriser le développement économique de la région wallonne ; accompagner les restructurations ; assurer sur le long terme le financement des projets d’entreprises ou encore venir en aide aux TPE et PME existantes ou en création. Diversifier le tissu économique de la province liégeoise reste également une priorité dans le choix des actions menées. Le pôle Recherches Le pôle recherches est basé sur différents centres tel que l’indique la figure 5. La vocation de ce pôle est le maintient de la compétitivité des entreprises liégeoise, au travers de la recherche dans le domaine de la métallurgie ou via l’assistance ou l’apport de conseils lors de la mise en œuvre d’innovations technologiques. Le pôle développement Le pôle développement regroupe des acteurs aux missions différentes. Nous y retrouvons par exemple la SPI+ (dont le rôle est la création d’emplois au travers d’un soutient aux entreprises lors de leurs démarrages), mais également des acteurs du secteur du transport tel que le PAL, le Trilogiport, l’Euro TGV, la SAB85 et le MET ou encore Meuse-Vesdre Développement (dont le rôle est la coordination des opérateurs du développement économique de la province liégeoise qui bénéficient des fonds FEDER).
84
La Société régionale d’Investissement de Wallonie (SRIW), la Société wallonne de Gestion et de Participation (SOGEPA), la société Meusinvest, la Société Wallonne de Financement et de garantie des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (SOWALFIN), la Société d’Investissement du Bassin Liégeois (SIBL), la Société de Leasing de financement et d’Economies d’Energie (SLF), et enfin les banques et assurances. 85 Société de Développement et de Promotion de Liege Airport.
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Le pôle formation Le pôle formation est loin d’être négligeable dans la volonté de redéploiement économique en province de Liège. En effet, ce pôle réunion des acteurs (l’ULg, le FOREM, Technifutur et l’IFAPME86) dont la mission commune est la formation des travailleurs ou demandeurs d’emplois, aspect non-négligeable pour toute personne n’ayant pas une qualification élevée. Comme nous le voyons, chacun des quatre pôles est nécessaire au redéploiement économique de la province de Liège. Il est cependant indispensable qu’une structure – telle que le GRELiège – soit mise en place afin de mener une politique intégrante et ainsi coordonner les différentes actions tant au niveau économique qu’administratif.
4. Conclusions La crise qu’a subie le secteur métallurgique liégeois à la fin du 20ème siècle a mené les différentes entreprises à se regrouper, notamment par fusion. Ceci a eu entre autre pour conséquence la perte d’un grand nombre d’emplois. L’annonce de l’arrêt de la sidérurgie à chaud à Liège au début du 21ème siècle a été l’un des moteurs du réveil des autorités tant locales que régionales. La nécessité de diversifier les activités économiques et rendre compétitif le secteur de l’industrie métallurgique n’a été que très récemment mise en avant et en pratique. Celle-ci est maintenant opérationnelle et bénéficie notamment du soutient de l’Union Européenne. Ces différentes mesures n’auraient sans doute pas permises d’éviter les importantes suppressions d’emplois prévues depuis 2003. Mais aujourd’hui, grâce à la demande croissante d’acier, grâce aux différentes forces vives liégeoises, grâce aussi au travail des différentes organisations syndicales, la sidérurgie liégeoise est non-seulement maintenue mais également renforcée avec entre-autre la remise en route d’un haut-fourneau nécessaire à la phase à chaud, et divers investissements dans les différents sites industriels. Il n’en reste pas moins que des efforts de redéploiement économique doivent continuer à être soutenu. La sidérurgie et le secteur métallurgique dans son ensemble ont en effet marqué profondément l’histoire socio-économique de Liège, ce qui a notamment pour conséquence certaines faiblesses structurelles encore visibles actuellement. La faiblesse des services de haut niveau et la faiblesse d’une classe d’entrepreneurs en sont deux signes clairs. Mais Liège possède également des atouts non-négligeables, comme par exemple la présence d’une université bien intégrée dans le tissu régional et la présence d’une main-d’œuvre qualifiée. Orientation bibliographique Capron M. (2001), « Cockerill Sambre (1989-1997) : Le développement d’une sidérurgie intégrée », Courrier hebdomadaire, n°1719-1720, CRISP, 60 p. FGTB (2003), « Cockerill : non au bain de sang social », Edito syndicats. Foret M., Mathot G. (2003), « Redéploiement du Pays de Liège : Méthodes et Perspectives » Marissal P., Medina Lockhart P., Vandermotten C., Van Hamme G. (2006), « Les structures socio-économiques de l’espace belge », SPF Economie, Direction générale Statistique et Information économique. 86
Institut wallon de formation en alternance et des indépendants et petites et moyennes entreprises.
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ONSS, (1974-2006), rapports annuels. STRATELLIA (2007), « Etude sectorielle : Fabrications métalliques et mécaniques en province de Liège ». Vandermotten C., Marissal P. (2004), « La production des espaces économiques », Tome 1, deuxième édition revue et augmentée, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 468p. Sites Internet .planmarshall.wallonie.be ; site du Plan Marshall de la Région wallonne .statistiques.wallonie.be ; site de l’Institut Wallon de l’Evaluation, de la prospective et de la statistique. .www.cockerill-sambre.com ; site des usines sidérurgiques liégeoises du groupe ArcelorMittal .www.crisp.be ; site du centre de recherche et d’information socio-politique .www.gre-liege.be ; site du Groupement pour le Redéploiement Economique de Liège .www.nbb.be ; site de la Banque nationale de Belgique .www.sodie.be ; site de la société SODIE .www.spi.be ; site de l’agence de développement pour la province de Liège Les différentes entreprises citées tout au long du rapport possèdent également un site internet. Entretiens M. B. Collet : Attaché au service « Développement » de la SPI+ M. R. Hattiez : conseiller, SOWALFIN – « la coupole des PME » M. J.-P. Massin : Account Manager Steel, CARMEUSE M. J. Pélerin : Président de l’Union Wallonne des Entreprises liégeoises (UWEL) M. J. Verdin : Directeur de la Form’action André Renard (FAR)
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Annexe
Annexe 1: Evolution de la valeur ajoutée industrielle* et totale entre 1995 et 2006.
Source : www.cockerill-sambre.com
Les différentes fusions d'entreprises dans le secteur de la sidérurgie.
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Case study 16 «
Vulnérabilité à la globalisation »
Cas d’étude Franche-Comté Rapport pour la DG Regio, juillet 2008 Sophie Carel, Edwige Dubos-Paillard Université de Franche-Comté, ThéMA-Céreq UMR 6049
[email protected] [email protected]
1 1.1
LA FRANCHE-COMTE : CADRE GENERAL Situation
Située dans le quart Nord-Est de la France, entre la Champagne et l’Alsace au Nord, la Bourgogne à l’Ouest, la région Rhône-Alpes au Sud, la Franche-Comté est une petite région (fig.1). Région centrale en Europe, elle est également frontalière avec la Suisse et proche de deux grands pays européens (l’Allemagne et l’Italie). Fig. 1. Une région au cœur de l’Europe mais en marge de l’espace français
1.2
Atouts/faiblesses de la région
La Franche-Comté est une région dotée d’un cadre de vie remarquable, sensible aux questions de développement durable et de préservation de l’environnement. Elle bénéficie d’un sentiment identitaire fort mais souffre néanmoins d’un déficit d’image et d’une faible attractivité (fig. 2) de plus en plus problématiques dans un contexte de
288
mondialisation. Les principales caractéristiques de la Franche-Comté peuvent être résumées au travers des points suivants1 : -
Une position géographique proche du cœur de l’Europe, dont elle ne bénéficie pas encore suffisamment. Cette position est contrebalancée par une situation en marge au sein du territoire national, accentuée par la présence de la moyenne montagne (Jura) sur la moitié de son territoire. La Franche-Comté est ainsi éloignée des espaces attractifs en France à savoir la capitale et les littoraux méditerranéen ou atlantique, particulièrement recherchés par les entreprises high-tech, les cadres et les ingénieurs depuis une trentaine d’années.
-
Un territoire fortement rural avec des densités de population faibles qui compte peu de grandes villes. Sa capitale régionale, Besançon (116 100 habitants), peine à rayonner sur l’ensemble de la région et encore plus à l’extérieur du fait de la forte concurrence avec les capitales voisines plus attractives (Lyon, Dijon, Strasbourg, Paris).
-
Une image d’industrie traditionnelle, justifiée par un poids de l’emploi industriel très supérieur à la moyenne nationale sans spécialisation véritable dans des activités de haute technologie (l’électronique, l’informatique, les télécommunications ou les biotechnologies) qui pourrait conférer à la région une image innovante (et ce, nous le verrons, malgré les efforts des acteurs locaux à développer une image de région spécialisée dans les microtechniques, cf. 2. Processus de restructuration).
-
Un effort de recherche et développement qui en 2003 s’établissait à 2.1% du PIB classant la région en 5ème position à l’échelle nationale (moyenne des régions de province : 1.7%).
-
La présence de grands groupes (notamment Peugeot, Alstom) peut à la fois être vue comme une richesse mais peut aussi être source de fragilité avec l’arrivée de mutations industrielles.
-
Une région qui offre peu d’emplois métropolitains supérieurs et qui de ce fait peine à attirer les cadres et les emplois tertiaires supérieurs.
-
Une région qui retient modérément ses habitants, ses emplois, ses entreprises, de plus en plus confrontées au phénomène de délocalisation, mais surtout une région qui attire très peu sur l’extérieur.
-
Une région qui perd des étudiants et des jeunes actifs qui migrent vers les régions voisines ou plus attractives (Ile-de-France, Rhône-Alpes, Alsace).
-
Une proximité de la Suisse, tour à tour considérée comme un avantage et/ou un inconvénient qui génère un nombre important de travailleurs frontaliers et des activités de sous-traitance dans l’industrie.
-
Un réseau de transport concentré principalement au sein de l’axe Rhin-Rhône qui devrait être complété par la ligne à grande vitesse vers 2011. Ce dernier
1
INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/insee_regions/f-comte/rfc/docs/ESS0798.pdf INSEE/ SGAR, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté Edition 2006. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/regions/f-comte/default.asp?page=publications/thematiques/attractivite.htm
2
tranche avec le réseau situé de part et d’autre de l’axe quelque peu souséquipé. -
Un fort potentiel touristique encore peu mis en valeur.
-
Une région peu fragile socialement au regard de la proportion de population vivant en zone franche urbaine, de la population à bas revenus et du taux de chômage.
Fig. 2 :
-
Source : INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007. Disponible en ligne : http://www.insee.fr/fr/insee_regions/f-comte/rfc/docs/ESS0798.pdf
Cet état des lieux rapide montre que dans les prochaines années la Franche-Comté sera confrontée à des défis importants tant d’un point de vue démographique qu’économique. Reposant presqu’entièrement sur l’industrie, l’économie régionale risque de se fragiliser encore en cas de nouvelles mutations industrielles.
1.3
L’industrie en Franche-Comté
La région Franche-Comté est une région très industrielle : elle est la première région française pour son poids des effectifs industriels (Fig. 3). L’industrie assure près du quart de la valeur ajoutée régionale et place la FrancheComté en tête des régions françaises pour ce ratio, qui n’atteint pas un cinquième pour l’ensemble de la France.
3
Source : Insee, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté, 2006
4
Fig. 3 :
Source : Statistiques annuelles des effectifs salariés affiliés au 31 décembre 2006 http://info.assedic.fr/unistatis/travail/documents/statan06.pdf
La Franche-Comté est surtout spécialisée dans des secteurs considérés comme traditionnels et peu orientée vers les secteurs de haute technologie. La construction automobile emploie plus de 21 % de l’effectif industriel de la région et 13,5 % de l’effectif français de ce secteur. La métallurgie et la transformation des métaux représentent le deuxième secteur dans la région (10 % de l’effectif industriel régional et 7 % de l’effectif sectoriel français). Fig.4. Les sept principaux secteurs d’activité franc-comtois
Source : INSEE, Connaître la Franche-Comté, édition 2008
Au niveau régional, l’industrie repose sur deux piliers essentiels : la présence de plusieurs grands groupes, accompagnés d'un grand nombre de sous-traitants, et 5
l'existence d'un tissu dense de petites et moyennes entreprises implantées surtout dans les montagnes du Jura. Les grands groupes appartiennent à trois secteurs industriels : l'automobile avec Peugeot, la construction mécanique avec Alstom et l'industrie chimique avec Solvay (tableau 1). Quant aux entreprises petites et moyennes, elles concernent surtout trois secteurs traditionnels qui font encore la réputation de la Franche-Comté : l'horlogerie (devenue aujourd'hui les microtechniques, cf. sur ce point le 2. Processus de restructuration), la lunetterie et le jouet. Ces trois secteurs connaissent depuis plusieurs années des difficultés d’adaptation à une concurrence mondialisée relativement importante. Tableau 1 :
On observe ainsi en Franche-Comté une répartition spatiale de l’activité industrielle assez particulière avec des concentrations de certaines filières dans quelques bassins : - l’automobile et la mécanique autour de Montbéliard, Vesoul, Besançon. - les industries du transport et de l’énergie à Belfort ainsi qu’à Besançon. - les industries de la plasturgie et de la lunetterie autour de St Claude et de Morez. - l’horlogerie dans le bassin de Morteau - l’industrie du bois et de l’ameublement du côté de Lure-Luxeuil et de Champagnole.
6
1.4
Positionnement des secteurs vulnérables 2
1.4.1 La fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques : un secteur en recul En 2005, la fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques compte 11443 emplois et 404 établissements employant au moins 1 salarié3 (respectivement 11.2% des emplois et 11% des établissements franc-comtois). Le secteur se caractérise par l’importance des très petits établissements industriels (TPEI) puisque près des ¾ de établissements régionaux comptent moins de 20 salariés tandis qu’un seul établissement emploie plus de 500 personnes (contre quatre en 2003). Par ailleurs, le secteur est marqué par la forte présence des entreprises mono établissement (16,5% d’établissements non siège) et la faible dépendance par rapport à des sièges sociaux extra régionaux. Néanmoins, si le nombre d’établissements ayant un siège social hors région est peu élevé, 40% d’entre eux sont des unités de plus de 200 salariés. Le secteur se caractérise également par l’importance de l’activité de sous-traitance. Tableau 2
Le chiffre d’affaires des entreprises comtoises dans le secteur de l’équipement électrique et électronique a connu un repli en 2007 qui tranche avec le dynamisme affiché en 2005/2006.
Il se distingue également par l’importance de la fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie (tableau 3) qui comptabilise 6.5% de l’emploi industriel régional (4% au niveau national). Tableau 3 : Les établissements et les emplois dans la fabrication d’équipements électriques et électroniques en 2005 Fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques dont Fabrication de Machines de bureau et de matériel informatique Fabrication de machines et appareils électriques Fabrication d'équipements de radio, télévision et communication Fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie
Etablissements
Effectifs salariés
404
100.0%
11443
100.0%
5 62
1.2% 15.3%
380 3022
3.3% 26.4%
31
7.7%
1329
11.6%
306
75.7%
6712
58.7%
Source : Unedic 2 3
Voir la nomenclature en annexe des secteurs repérés comme vulnérables au niveau franc-comtois Les établissements n’employant pas de salariés ne sont pas pris en compte dans l’analyse.
7
Tableau 4 : Evolution des établissements et des emplois dans la fabrication d’équipements électriques et électroniques entre 1993 et 2005. Evolution 1993-2005 Fabrication de Machines de bureau et de matériel informatique Fabrication de machines et appareils électriques Fabrication d'équipements de radio, télévision et communication Fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique d'horlogerie Total Fabrication d'équipements électriques et électroniques
Etablissements -29% -13% -24%
Effectifs salariés -37% -1% -22%
-13% -14%
-35% -27%
et
Source : Unedic Le secteur présente plusieurs spécificités : − Une diminution notable des emplois salariés : - 27,4% entre 1993 et 2005 (tableau 4). − Une forte féminisation qui n’est cependant pas spécifique à la FrancheComté : 47% des salariés sont des femmes. − Une forte concentration sectorielle des emplois dans l’horlogerie et la lunetterie associée à une forte concentration spatiale (figure 5). Ces deux secteurs réunissent près des ¾ des emplois relevant de la « fabrication d'instruments médicaux, de précision, d'optique et d'horlogerie ». Ces derniers se situent essentiellement dans le Doubs et dans le Jura (96% des emplois) et plus précisément à Besançon et le long de la frontière avec la Suisse pour l’horlogerie, et dans le sud du Jura autour de Morez pour la lunetterie. Fig.5 : La répartition des principaux établissements de l’horlogerie et la lunetterie Lunetterie Horlogerie
Source : INSEE/ DRIRE (2005) Visage industriel de Franche-Comté,
8
1.4.2 La lunetterie et l’horlogerie : deux secteurs aux passés florissants qui doivent s'adapter aux nouveaux marchés d'aujourd'hui. La présence de ces deux secteurs d’activités au sein de l’arc jurassien est ancienne. Elle s’explique entre autres, par un attachement fort des paysans à leurs terres pourtant peu fertiles et leur refus d’aller travailler à la ville. Pour rester, les paysans deviennent pluri actifs. En hiver, lorsque la terre est recouverte de neige et donc incultivable, ces derniers travaillent le fer à domicile pour un marché local dans un premier temps, puis international. La lunetterie : un secteur né de la fabrication de montures en métal L'invention de Pierre-Hyacinthe Caseaux, installé dans le Jura près de Morez4 est déterminante pour le secteur de la lunetterie. Il fabrique la première monture métallique française en forgeant des clous. Il reçoit des commandes de bijoutiers de Genève, développe son atelier et fait des émules autour de lui. Peu à peu se crée une véritable industrie. La production des ateliers passe de 3 000 pièces en 1826, à 11 millions de pièces en 1882 et fait vivre toute une région à travers des dizaines d'entreprises dont certaines continuent à travailler en parallèle dans d'autres métiers traditionnels de précision comme l'horlogerie, l'orfèvrerie. Dès le XIXème siècle, Morez s’impose comme capitale de la lunetterie française. La spécialité de Morez est la production de montures "optiques" en métal (88%), tandis que sa voisine Oyonnax, distante d’environ 75km est centrée sur les montures en matières plastiques. Aujourd’hui, le canton de Morez réunit environ 60 entreprises. Plus généralement, en 2004, la Franche-Comté réunit 60% des entreprises françaises du secteur et assure 50% du chiffre d'affaires de la lunetterie française (chiffre d’affaires régional en 2003/2004 est de 331.74 millions d'euros, dont 135.66 pour l'export). Ces entreprises régionales emploient 2400 salariés. Entre 1999 et 2003, la réduction des effectifs a été notable (22%). Le secteur est constitué exclusivement de PMI et de Très Petites Entreprises Industrielles (TPEI) (tableau 5). Tableau 5 : le secteur de la lunetterie en 2004
INSEE/ DRIRE (2005) Visage industriel de Franche-Comté,
Depuis plusieurs années, le secteur de la lunetterie connaît des difficultés importantes liées à une concurrence étrangère de plus en plus grande. Les industries franc-comtoises peinent à avoir une visibilité sur la scène mondiale. Le marché de la lunette reste dominé par les grands groupes italiens (Luxottica, Safilo). Ces derniers ont su préserver leur compétitivité en acquérant de gros circuits de 4
http://www.lunetiers-du-jura.com/html_fra/lunet_01.htm
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distribution, principalement aux USA, au sein desquels ils écoulent leur production. Ils ont également su se positionner rapidement sur le haut de gamme et le design. Par ailleurs, l’arrivée de la Chine et des pays d’Asie du sud-est sur le marché mondial pour les produits de gamme moyenne et basse a précipité la fermeture de plusieurs unités. En Franche-Comté, les entreprises les plus importantes ont établi des contacts, délocalisé tout ou partie de leur production vers les pays à bas salaire pour acheter ou y fabriquer les articles de bas et milieu de gamme. Pour rester compétitives, certaines entreprises jurassiennes portent actuellement leurs efforts sur le développement de produits haut de gamme intégrant design et innovation technologique. Elles recherchent des partenariats avec les grands noms de la mode et les opticiens, pour répondre au succès actuel des lunettes griffées et/ou stylées. L’horlogerie : un secteur dans l’ombre de la Suisse Le secteur de l’horlogerie connaît un développement important durant le XIXème et la première moitié du XXème siècle. Néanmoins, dès la fin du XIXème des signes de perte de compétitivité apparaissent par rapport au voisin suisse (automatisation de la production plus tardive, intérêt tardif pour la montre à quartz). La fermeture des usines LIP dans les années 70, la plus grosse entreprise horlogère de Besançon, marque un tournant important. L’horlogerie franc-comtoise connaît dès lors une diminution importante du nombre d’entreprises et le développement de la sous traitance pour le compte des horlogers suisses. Les effectifs tombent de 14000 en 1970, à 8000 dans les années 1980 pour s’établir à 2855 salariés actuellement (tableau 6). Tableau 6 : Répartition des effectifs et des établissements du secteur de l’horlogerie en France
Source : SESSI/CFHM/FFBJOC, Ecostat, n°66, avril 2008 Cette réduction s’est accélérée entre 1996 à 2006 avec la division par deux du nombre d’entreprises et de salariés tant au niveau régional que national. Malgré cela, l’industrie horlogère franc-comtoise recense près de 60% des entreprises horlogères françaises (tableau 6) et les 2/3 de la masse salariale française. Comme dans le cas de la lunetterie, le secteur horloger franc-comtois est constitué exclusivement de PMI et de Très petites Entreprises Industrielles (tableau 7). 95%, d’entre elles emploient moins de 100 salariés et 80% moins de 50 salariés. Une grande part d’entre elles est sous traitante et dépend de donneurs d’ordre souvent suisses.
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Tableau 7 : Taille des unités franc-comtoises de l’horlogerie en 2004
Les entreprises régionales ont dû se recentrer soit sur des produits de moyenne gamme originaux ou bien «marketés», soit sur des produits haut de gamme ou de luxe. Le délaissement du bas de gamme en raison de la concurrence asiatique au profit du haut de gamme a eu des effets sur les volumes produits. « Au cours des 10 dernières années, le nombre d’unités fabriquées a ainsi été divisé par 4,5 pour les bracelets cuir et les cadrans, par 6,5 pour les montres, par 8 pour les mouvements et par 17 pour les boîtiers, alors que le prix unitaire de ces produits a été multiplié par 2,5 pour les montres, par 3 pour les boîtes et par 5 pour les bracelets cuir. »5 Les difficultés du secteur horloger en Franche-Comté tranchent avec la bonne santé des entreprises suisses positionnées sur le haut de gamme. En 2006, le chiffre d’affaires à l’export était de 13.5Mds CHF alors que le chiffre d’affaires global (hors taxe et hors production délocalisée) du secteur en France était de 321 M€. Aujourd’hui, en France, il n'existe plus de fabricants de montres assurant en interne l’ensemble du processus de production. En Franche-Comté, les entreprises horlogères sont, soit des fabricants de composants, soit des créateurs qui assemblent leurs produits propres et les commercialisent6. Ces dernières soustraitent dans le Doubs mais également en Asie, achètent le mouvement en Suisse ou en Asie et pour, partie font réaliser tout ou partie de l’assemblage en Suisse pour bénéficier du label « Swiss made » synonyme de luxe et de haut de gamme. Les entreprises régionales possèdent des capacités financières limitées, ont peu recours au design, à la R&D et au transfert de technologies. La proximité de la Suisse est donc à double tranchant. Elle a permis le développement d‘une activité de sous-traitance et le maintien des fabricants de composants mais le dynamisme de l’activité et les salaires proposés attirent les salariés formés en Franche-Comté. Cette proximité entraîne donc une fuite des savoir-faire régionaux et rend plus difficile l’amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises horlogères franc-comtoises. Dès les années 1970, les institutionnels et les acteurs économiques affichent le souhait de ne pas voir se perdre les savoirs faire issus de l’horlogerie (notamment en mécanique de précision, micromécanique) et de les mettre à disposition d’autres secteurs d’activités de plus en plus concernés par « l’infiniment petit ». Dès lors, ces derniers n’auront de cesse de favoriser le développement des microtechniques.
5 6
DRIRE de Franche-Comté, La lettre du développement industriel, avril 2008. INSEE/DRIRE, 2006, Visage industriel 2005 de Franche-Comté,
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2. PROCESSUS DE RESTRUCTURATION AU NIVEAU REGIONAL Reconnue capitale de l’horlogerie pendant deux siècles, Besançon et sa région vantent aujourd’hui et depuis presque 40 ans leur spécialisation microtechnique. La politique régionale est claire : il y a une réelle volonté d’affichage, de signalement microtechnique, et ce depuis la fin des années 1970. L’ancrage local et la réalité économique des microtechniques semblent ne faire aucun doute pour les acteurs locaux, d’autant que la zone d’emploi de Besançon a été labellisée par la DATAR système productif local (SPL) microtechnique7 puis labellisée pôle de compétitivité8 microtechnique à vocation nationale ou régionale en juillet 2005, suggérant ainsi un territoire microtechnique organisé, avec des collaborations fortes entre industrie, formation et recherche. Le secteur des microtechniques en Franche-Comté se caractériserait aujourd’hui par un chiffre d’affaires de 1,36 milliards d’euros pour 350 entreprises et environ 11 000 emplois (« Pôle de compétitivité des microtechniques. Un enjeu pour la région Franche-Comté, un enjeu pour la France et l'Europe ». Dossier de candidature remis au Gouvernement, 28 février 2005). Un retour sur le passé est utile pour comprendre les difficultés de reconversion de l’horlogerie vers les microtechniques. 2.1
Le temps de l’horlogerie
L’horlogerie franc-comtoise est née dans le dernier quart du XVIIIème siècle, à partir des centres horlogers suisses. L’organisation du système productif était digne d’un district industriel marshallien. En effet, les deux bassins de Besançon et du HautDoubs (Plateau de Maîche et Val de Morteau) concentraient de nombreuses PME, concourant toutes à la fabrication d’un produit unique et bien identifié : la montre. Chacune était spécialisée dans une étape du processus de production : fabrication des pièces du mouvement, fabrication des pièces d’habillage ou assemblage. Ainsi, le territoire était associé à son activité horlogère, identifiée elle-même à son produit, unique et symbolique – la montre –. Autonome sur son territoire, le secteur horloger bénéficiait d’une organisation collective soutenue, grâce à l’appui d’institutions spécifiques au secteur et issues de la profession. Le système horloger comtois s’est montré incapable de résister à deux révolutions successives. - La première relève d’une innovation technique avec l’introduction de la microélectronique (quartz, 1967) dans le produit horloger. Une première stratégie a été de maîtriser totalement, à l’instar de la Suisse, la technologie intégrale du produit et donc d’opérer un regroupement entre horlogerie et électronique. Des plans se sont succédés, faisant entrer dans cette industrie des groupes électroniciens français, comme Thomson ou Matra, mais ceux-ci 7 La décision du CIADT de décembre 1997 de « soutenir les initiatives tendant à consolider ou faire émerger des systèmes productifs locaux » a conduit au lancement de deux appels à projets en novembre 1998 et novembre 1999. Sur 202 réponses à l’appel, la DATAR en a sélectionné 96. 94 ont été effectivement engagés au cours des années 1999 et 2000, dont le SPL bisontin microtechnique. 8 Le gouvernement a octroyé, en juillet 2005, le label de « Pôle de compétitivité » au secteur des microtechniques après celui de Système Productif Local en 1999. L’automobile et la plasturgie en ont également bénéficié, portant à trois le nombre de pôles de compétitivité franc-comtois, sur les 66 labels décernés à la première vague de sélection. Aujourd’hui il existe un 4è pôle régional : Vitagora.
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se sont vite désengagés. Une seconde stratégie a été, à défaut d’intégration électronique totale, d’opérer des regroupements à partir d’un noyau exclusivement horloger et de produire des montres à quartz avec achat externe de composants électroniques. Au delà d’une modification des procédés de fabrication, l’introduction du quartz remet en cause les savoir-faire et les qualifications, traditionnellement mécaniques. Le système a donc dû se réorganiser. En Suisse, les fabricants horlogers ont choisi de produire tous les composants électroniques de la montre à quartz. En France, les industries ne se sont pas appropriées la technologie de fabrication des composants électroniques. Elles sont donc restées tributaires de l’industrie électronique, avec laquelle elles ont dû coopérer. - La seconde provient du marché, avec l’entrée de nouveaux producteurs sur le marché mondial. En proie déjà à de lourdes difficultés de restructuration de son système de production, le secteur horloger a vu de surcroît son marché attaqué tout au long des années 1970 par une concurrence étrangère totalement nouvelle. Le Japon, avec Seiko, Citizen, Casio, Ricoh, puis les pays du Sud-Est, ont livré une rude concurrence par les prix sur le marché de la montre mécanique, tout en se positionnant aussi sur le créneau de la montre à quartz. La conjoncture, pour les entreprises horlogères régionales, est restée encore favorable jusqu’à la fin des années 1970. Mais un retournement conjoncturel brutal au début des années 1980 a porté un coup fatal à l’horlogerie régionale. Dans ce nouveau contexte économique, les concurrents étrangers ont pu obtenir un avantage concurrentiel absolu : compétitifs pour les produits bas de gamme du créneau mécanique occupé par les franc-comtois, ils avaient en plus une avance certaine sur celui de la montre électronique. Face à la crise horlogère, les industries franc-comtoises étaient placées devant une alternative : rester dans le créneau mécanique ou se reconvertir. Beaucoup d’entreprises, attachées à la tradition de la région, ont persisté dans le créneau mécanique. Elles ont soit disparu, soit délocalisé dans les années 1980. L’industrie de la montre aujourd’hui se limite à quelques entreprises spécialisées dans l’habillage (boîtes et bracelets) ou quelques producteurs finaux ayant réussi une politique de marque ou de produit (Herbelin, Silberstein…). 2.2
Une reconversion microtechniques
volontariste
difficile
dans
le
secteur
des
La double perte d’unité et d’autonomie du territoire horloger franc-comtois a conduit acteurs horlogers et pouvoirs publics à s’interroger sur l’avenir industriel de la région et sur les moyens de refédérer les acteurs de l’ancien territoire horloger. Les technologies et les compétences horlogères traditionnelles (production d’objets de petite dimension) paraissaient complémentaires à celles de l’industrie électronique et ses exigences de miniaturisation. Il ne restait qu’à impulser des rapprochements technologiques, donc moderniser, et diversifier les activités horlogères. L’espoir était de reconstituer, sur une base locale, un système productif issu de l’horlogerie et mobilisant l’ensemble de ses compétences technologiques et de redonner une cohésion au secteur. Une politique volontariste, impulsée par le système éducatif, la recherche puis relayée par les institutions, a alors promu le développement d’une industrie centrée sur ce que l’on a appelé, pour la circonstance, « les
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microtechniques 9». Tout au long des années 1980, acteurs locaux publics et privés, se sont ralliés sous la bannière des microtechniques, qui laissaient présager des débouchés nombreux, dans l’automobile, l’aéronautique, le médical… Néanmoins, les effets d’entraînement sur la base industrielle sont restés limités. On ne peut que constater l’échec relatif de la diversification totale vers les microtechniques. Déjà, l’industrie comtoise est restée sur les composants mécaniques et doit donc recourir à l’approvisionnement externe de composants électroniques puisqu’elle n’a pas la maîtrise de ce segment de production. De plus, l’essaimage des microtechniques est limité à quelques cas exceptionnels. Ensuite, l’écart n’a cessé de se creuser entre le tissu industriel régional, basé essentiellement sur la micromécanique, et les institutions (centres de recherche, collectivités locales et appareil de formation) qui ont souhaité une orientation vers les microtechniques. Enfin, les entreprises, très en amont des filières, sont souvent en position de soustraitance face à de grands donneurs d’ordre. Il est donc difficile de faire jouer des solidarités et de créer des institutions propres au secteur comme pour l’horlogerie… malgré l’effort des politiques.
3. LES POLITIQUES EN DIRECTION DE L’INDUSTRIE MICROTECHNIQUE Au niveau national, la politique française industrielle et d’innovation a subi en 2004 un renouveau certain. Une nouvelle politique labellisant des pôles de compétitivité a été lancée, succédant à celle des systèmes productifs locaux (SPL) et de nouveaux instruments ont vu le jour : le statut de Jeune Entreprise Innovante, l’Agence de l’Innovation Industrielle, l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche… Notons avant de poursuivre que la région Franche-Comté s’établit en quelque sorte comme précurseur des préconisations européennes ou des actions politiques nationales en matière d’industrie et d’innovation avec la création, en 1986, d’un dispositif original : les Contrats Professionnels de progrès. Ces contrats, signés pour trois ans entre Etat, Région et syndicat professionnel sont établis pour aider les entreprises d’un secteur à formaliser des axes de progrès. Par leur intermédiaire, des actions collectives, des actions de mutualisation, des coopérations inter-entreprises, des actions de transfert de technologie sont promues, anticipant en cela des actions comme celle des SPL ou des pôles de compétitivité. 3.1 Les SPL (1997-…) La politique d’appui aux SPL a été engagée par la DATAR en 1998, par décision du CIADT du 15 décembre 1997. La notion de SPL recouvre "une organisation productive particulière localisée sur un territoire correspondant généralement à un bassin d'emploi. Cette organisation fonctionne comme un réseau d’interdépendances constituées d'unités productives ayant des activités similaires ou complémentaires qui se divisent le travail (entreprises de production ou de services, centres de recherche, organismes de formation, centres de transfert et de veille technologique etc.)" (DATAR, 2002). Cette politique est la première politique nationale incitant à la coopération territoriale. Les technopôles, rappelons-le, n’étaient pas guidés par une politique nationale et n’avaient pas de dimension incitative à la coopération. 9
Il n’existe aucune définition consensuelle des microtechniques et le secteur échappe à toute nomenclature puisqu’aucune ne prend en compte la précision et la dimension des objets.
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On dénombre aujourd’hui plus d’une centaine de SPL en France, qui coexistent de manière ambigüe avec les pôles de compétitivité. Pour le secteur des microtechniques, la labellisation SPL a permis une reconnaissance nationale. Néanmoins le SPL microtechnique est resté une construction institutionnelle et n’a jamais obtenu l’adhésion des entreprises. Les actions engagées sont modestes. Le projet de développement d’un outil d’intelligence économique n’a pas vu le jour ; l’opération « salles blanches » fut rebaptisée plus modestement « salles propres » et ne concerna pas plus de 10 entreprises ; le projet de création d’un diplôme d’opérateur de maintenance de salle blanche fut mal accueilli par l’Education nationale ; le site internet dédié aux microtechniques n’a jamais vu le jour ; il reste la création d’une publication « SPL microtechnique ». 3.2 Les pôles de compétitivité (2004-…) La naissance en France des pôles de compétitivité s’inscrit dans un double cadre contextuel : les impératifs des règles de la construction européenne d’une part et une réflexion française sur la prise en compte des mutations industrielles du manque de compétitivité de certains territoires d’autre part. Un pôle de compétitivité est « la combinaison, sur un espace géographique donné, d’entreprises, de centres de formation et d’unités de recherche publiques ou privées, engagés dans une démarche partenariale destinée à dégager des synergies autour de projets communs au caractère innovant. Ce partenariat s’organisera autour d’un marché et d’un domaine technologique et scientifique qui lui est attaché et devra rechercher la masse critique pour atteindre une compétitivité mais aussi une visibilité internationale.». Selon l’appel à projets, les projets de pôles devaient répondre à 4 exigences : créer des richesses nouvelles à forte valeur ajoutée et des emplois qualifiés ; avoir une visibilité internationale ; s’appuyer sur des partenariats forts entre acteurs ; définir les objectifs et les moyens d’une stratégie efficace de développement économique et de recherche de l’innovation. L’appel à projets, clos le 28 février 2005, a suscité 105 projets de pôles de compétitivité, a donc réussi à mobiliser. Sur les 105 projets soumis, 66 ont été labellisés et hiérarchérisés selon leur impact territorial. Au niveau régional, le projet de pôle de compétitivité autour des microtechniques a été labellisé par le gouvernement, marquant à nouveau la volonté des acteurs locaux et, fait nouveau, de quelques entreprises à obtenir une visibilité nationale voire internationale. Le pôle rassemble 350 entreprises, soit un peu plus de 10000 emplois déclarés. Les entreprises concernées couvrent des secteurs d’activité divers, dont l’horlogerie, la lunetterie, la plasturgie, le médical, l’aéronautique, la mécanique… ; jusqu’à aujourd’hui, elles cohabitent au sein du pôle plus qu’elles ne coopèrent entre elles ou avec le milieu de la recherche... En fait une seule structure, le Comité microtechnique (crée en juillet 2004), représente un embryon de réseaux inter-entreprises dans notre région. Par contre, il est constitué d’entreprises très spécifiques au regard du reste du tissu industriel régional : ce sont des PME high-tech, des sociétés d’études, des entreprises
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ingénieristes, éventuellement incubées, très axées recherche. Le comité microtechnique peine donc à trouver de nouveaux adhérents, à s’ouvrir et donc à devenir représentatif des microtechniques franc-comtoises. Faute de recul, l’évaluation des pôles de compétitivité est difficile. Le montage des dossiers de projets, dans un délai très court de 4 mois, a semble-t-il eu des répercussions positives sur le mise en relation des acteurs locaux. Mais la complexité des structures de financement et des dossiers à instruire viendraient contrecarrer ces effets positifs.
4. CONCLUSION La crise horlogère en Franche-Comté a induit une diversification volontariste vers les microtechniques. Mais la faiblesse de l’électronique et la forte composante micromécanique empêchent notre région de fabriquer des systèmes et l’obligent à rester sur la fabrication de composants. L’industrie microtechnique régionale, faite d’une multitude de PME, est donc en position de sous-traitance, face à des donneurs d’ordre issus de secteurs d’activité variés et n’a donc qu’une visibilité réduite de la destination finale de ses produits… L’industrie microtechnique en Franche-Comté reste donc vulnérable. Elle n’est pas structurée territorialement, n’est pas spécialisée et ne maîtrise pas la partie électronique, pourtant nécessaire à la fabrication de systèmes microtechniques… Les entreprises vraisemblablement, ne se sentent pas encore microtechniciennes… et ont des trajectoires pour le moment trop individualisées pour pouvoir coopérer. BIBLIOGRAPHIE Carel, S. (2007). Approche territoriale de l’innovation industrielle. L’exemple des microtechniques en FrancheComté, Université de Bourgogne, décembre Carel, S., & Larceneux, A. (2004). De l'horlogerie aux microtechniques. La trajectoire d'un SPL franc-comtois. Dans J.-C. Daumas, Les systèmes productifs dans l'Arc jurassien. Acteurs, pratiques et territoires (XIXè-XXè siècles). Besançon: Presses Universitaires de Franche-Comté. Carel, S., & Larceneux, A. (2004). La difficile reconversion de l'horlogerie franc-comtoise vers les microtechniques. Dans Formation-Emploi (Vol. n°87). Paris: La Documentation française. Caro, P. (2004). Les économies jurassiennes. Dans J.-C. Daumas, & L. Tissot, L'Arc jurassien. Histoire d'un espace transfrontalier. Maé-Erti/Cabédita. Cheref, S. (1996). Les microtechniques : une spécialisation de Besançon. Dans S. Cheref, J.-C. Chevailler, & A. Larceneux, Le développement d'une capitale régionale : Besançon, citadelle assiégée ou métropole en devenir ? Besançon: Irades. Cheref, S., Cuisinier, P., Kabantchenko, E., Larceneux, A., & Ternant, E. La rénovation de la filière microtechnique (Vol. CPC documents 98/3). 1998: Irades, Ministère de l'Education nationale. Conseil économique et social de Franche-Comté. (2002). Quel avenir pour les microtechniques en FrancheComté ? Actes de la réunion de travail du 2 mai 2002. Besançon. Conseil économique et social de Franche-Comté. (2001). Quel avenir pour les microtechniques en FrancheComté ? Autosaisine, mai 2001. Besançon. INSEE, Connaître la Franche-Comté, édition 2008 INSEE/ ARD , Forces et Faiblesses de la Franche-Comté, coll l’Essentiel, n°98, sept 2007 INSEE/DRIRE, 2006, Visage industriel 2005 de Franche-Comté INSEE/ SGAR, L’attractivité de la Franche-Comté, Edition 2006
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Larceneux, A., & Normand, G. Microtechniques en Franche-Comté. Dans Images de France-Comté (éd. ThéMA, Conseil régional de France-Comté, Vol. n°20). Normand, G. De l'horlogerie et des microtechniques. Dans Images de Franche-Comté (éd. ThéMA, Conseil régional de Franche-Comté, Vol. n°18). Ternant, E. (2003). La dynamique longue d'un système productif localisé : l'industrie de la montre en FrancheComté. Thèse de doctorat. Université Pierre Mendès France, Grenoble. UIMM et Comité des microtechniques de Franche-Comté. (2005). Pôle de compétitivité des microtechniques. Un enjeu pour la région Franche-Comté, un enjeu pour la France et l'Europe. Dossier de candidature remis au Gouvernement, 28 février 2005. Besançon.
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