Visiting researcher at NII, Honiden Lab (JSPS funding) Member of the GRACE center of excellence http://grace-center.jp/en/ Ph.D. from Paris 6 University & Sokendai (2007) Research Interests: Engineering of dependable systems Current focus: Self-adaptive software & Security Application domain: Wireless Sensor and Ad Hoc Networks 2
Email:
[email protected] Homepage: http://honiden-lab.ex.nii.ac.jp/~eric Ofcial NII page inside http://www.nii.ac.jp Organizer of: The APSLA research track at ACM SAC; Tutorials on Agents and WSN; The future AOC conference on agent computing. 3
Wireless Sensor Networks Security Decentralized Security
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© Sentilla™, photo from James Gosling’s blog: http://blogs.sun.com/jag/date/20071016
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© http://www.schneiderism.com/
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Limited Performance
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Limited Resources
Limited Connectivity
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© Culler, UC Berkeley
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© Wireless Sensor Network at Camalie Vineyards - Mt. Veeder, Napa Valley, California.
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© CodeBlue Project, Harvard
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© CitySense Project, Harvard
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Health-care Environment Surveillance Home automation Smart ofces Military support & intelligence
Ambient Intelligence
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Ubiquitous Computing
Internet
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Internet
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Internet
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Internet
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(Fire)wall?
29 (c) Wireless Sensor Network at Camalie Vineyards - Mt. Veeder, Napa Valley, California.
Usual concerns Stringent conditions !
Energy
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Computing power
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Communication
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Scale
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“Wild” environment 30
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Cryptography Network Topology Routing strategy
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Communication: Cryptography Computation: ECC Energy concern: ECC, Cross-layering Scale: Secure routing Wild environment Node compromise: Little work Key management: Little dynamics 34
Communication: Cryptography Computation: ECC Energy concern: ECC, Cross-layering Scale: Secure routing Wild environment Node compromise: Little work Key management: Little dynamics 35
Detection & connement of node compromise Attacking WSN Key management Secure routing
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Work from Yuichi Sei Detection of illegitimate data for connement See Yuichi’s work: http://honiden-lab.ex.nii.ac.jp/~sei
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Properties Faster than related work K-robustness Limitations Fixed infrastructure (no mobility) Overhead data still high 39
Work with Jaewoo Lee, Seoul National University Goal: “Aggressive” attacks of WSN for data collection
Use of common and available security modules Method: Use known weaknesses, from the user doc ! 40
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!"#$%&'($% Sink
Field Sensor
Attacker
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%$42
Field Sensor
Condition of attacks: •! Broadcast communications •! Message payload “too long” •! Weak link due to environment
Eavesdropping
Attacker
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How to dynamically manage keys? Preliminary stage Research issues: Key deployment Re-keying Mitigating key capture Routing 44
Approach: Physical and bio-inspired mechanisms Exploration: Robustness of physical structures Key as digital pheromone “It would be nice if organisms were able to...” 45
Goal (unachieved) Recursive security by decentralized mechanisms
Property “If an attacker captures a node, the attacker must also capture the neighbor to access the network” 46
Current (naive) attempt The “chain-mail” robustness
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*++$%&'$(&!)($%& ,)-$&'$(.&,/012$3& !"#$%&'$(&!)($%&
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Advantage of double chain mails: Very (too) simple Limitations: Expensive Attempt with digital pheromones (current)
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End-to-end security scheme Target features Rely on dynamic key infrastructure Adaptive routing Energy efciency by cross-layering Started this month with Neeraj from NJIT 50
Current work on security in wireless sensor networks Target issues !
Security via decentralized approaches
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Preserving qualities (energy efciency, adaptiveness)
Theoretical and practical results in Summer! 51
Cyrille Artho & Pierre-Loïc Garoche. Accurate centralization for applying model checking on networked applications, ASE 2006, pp. 177–188. Fok, C.L. et al. Rapid development and exible deployment of adaptive wireless sensor network applications. ICDCS 2005, pp. 653–662. Ghosh, S. K.: On Optimality of key predistribution schemes for distributed sensor networks. ESAS 2006, pp. 121-135. Keromytis, A.D. et al.: A Holistic Approach to Service Survivability. Workshop on Survivable and Self-Regenerative Systems (SSRS),(2003) 11– 22. C. Heath and B. Blakley: Security design patterns. The Open Group, 2004. Hui, J.W et al.: The dynamic behavior of a data dissemination protocol for network programming at scale, ACM SenSys 2004, pp. 81–94. Karlof, C. et al. Tinysec: a link layer security architecture for wireless sensor networks, SenSys ’04, 2004, pp. 162–175.
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Luk, M et al. Minisec: a secure sensor network communication architecture, IPSN'07, pp. 479– 488. Girão, J. et al. Tinypeds: Tiny persistent encrypted data storage in asynchronous wireless sensor networks, Ad Hoc Networks 5 (2007), no. 7, 1073–1089. Perrig, A. et al. Spins: security protocols for sensor netowrks., MOBICOM, 2001, pp. 189–199. Luk, M. et al.: MiniSec: a secure sensor network communication architecture. IPSN 2007, pp. 479-488. Tanveer Zia, Albert Y. Zomaya: A Secure TripleKey Management Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks. INFOCOM 2006. Wang, D et al.: Self-Protection for Wireless Sensor Networks. ICDCS, 2006. Zhu, S. et al. Leap: efcient security mechanisms for large-scale distributed sensor networks, CCS ’03, 2003, pp. 62–72.
