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AME & WILDLIFE SCIENCE

A quarterly journal Vol. 21 (3)

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September 2004

Special Number ■

15385 bis, avenue de Wagram, 75017 Paris

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WILDLIFE: A NATURAL RESOURCE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE : UNE RESSOURCE NATURELLE

6ème

Proceedings of the 6th International Wildlife Ranching Symposium Actes du Symposium International sur l'Utilisation Durable de la Faune Sauvage 6-9 July/Juillet, 2004 Paris, France Tome 1

Edited by/Coordonnés par Philippe CHARDONNET, François LAMARQUE & Marcel BIRKAN Symposium organized by/Symposium organisé par : La Fondation Internationale pour la Sauvegarde de la Faune

In cooperation with/En partenariat avec : L'Office national de la chasse et de la faune sauvage, le Ministère des affaires étrangères, le Muséum national d'histoire naturelle, l'UNESCO, le MAB, le CIRAD et la Fondation de la Maison de la chasse et de la nature

MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

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Cite Papers as/Citation des articles: AUTHOR(S) (2004). - Title. In: Proceedings of the 6th International Wildlife Ranching Symposium: "Wildlife: a natural resource", 6-9 July 2004, Paris, France, P. CHARDONNET, F. LAMARQUE & M. BIRKAN, eds., Tome 1. Game Wildl. Sci., 21(3), p. or/ou AUTEUR(S) (2004). - Titre. In : Actes du 6ème Symposium International sur l'Utilisation Durable de la Faune Sauvage : "La faune sauvage : une ressource naturelle", 6-9 juillet 2004, Paris, France, P. CHARDONNET, F. LAMARQUE & M. BIRKAN, coord., Tome 1. Game Wildl. Sci., 21(3), p. Cite Symposium as/Citation des actes: P. CHARDONNET, F. LAMARQUE & M. BIRKAN, eds. (2004). - Proceedings of the 6th International Wildlife Ranching Symposium: "Wildlife: a natural resource", 6-9 July 2004, Paris, France, Tome 1. Game Wildl. Sci., 21(3) : 147-496 or/ou P. CHARDONNET, F. LAMARQUE & M. BIRKAN, coord. (2004). - Actes du 6ème Symposium International sur l'Utilisation Durable de la Faune Sauvage : "La faune sauvage : une ressource naturelle", 6-9 juillet 2004, Paris, France, Tome 1. Game Wildl. Sci., 21(3) : 147-496 Photographs by/Photographies de: - Christophe LEPETIT (front cover and first page/Première page de couverture et première page) - Miguel PEDRONO (insert for Part I/insert pour le Thème I) - Patrick HOUBEN (insert for Part II/insert pour le Thème II) - François LAMARQUE (insert for Part III/insert pour le Thème III)

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In memoriam/À la mémoire de S.A.I. le Prince ABDORREZA d'Iran Président fondateur de la Fondation Internationale pour la Sauvegarde de la Faune

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International steering Committee/Comité international des IWRS Lyle A. RENECKER Stratford, Ontario, Canada Raul VALDEZ Las Cruces, N.M., USA John FOWLER Las Cruces, N.M., USA Joseph von KERCKERINCK Chaumont, N.Y., USA Ken DREW Invermay, New Zealand David HOPCRAFT Nairobi, Kenya Andrew CONROY Victoria West, South Africa Keith WOODFORD Lawes, Australia Wouter van HOVEN Pretoria, South Africa National Committe of the 6th Symposium/Comité national du 6ème Symposium Philippe CHARDONNET Fondation Internationale pour la Sauvegarde de la Faune Marianne COUROUBLE Fondation Internationale pour la Sauvegarde de la Faune Delphine NAHON Muséum national d'histoire naturelle Geoffroy MAUVAIS Ministère des Affaires étrangères François LAMARQUE Office national de la chasse et de la faune sauvage Marie-Noël de VISSCHER CIRAD Louis de ROHAN CHABOT Fondation de la Maison de la chasse et de la nature Bertrand des CLERCS Fondation Internationale pour la Sauvegarde de la Faune Didier ROQUES ROGERY Syndicat national des éleveurs de daims Paul AUDENAERDE Fédération européenne des associations d'éleveurs de cervidés Scientific Committee of the 6th Symposium/Comité scientifique du 6ème Symposium Hervé FRITZ Centre national de la recherche scientifique François LAMARQUE Office national de la chasse et de la faune sauvage Claude-Anne GAUTHIER Muséum national d'histoire naturelle Jean-Michel GAILLARD Centre national de la recherche scientifique Michel de GARINE-WICHATITSKY CIRAD Mathieu BOURGAREL CIRAD Symposium Proceedings Secretariat/Secrétariat des Actes du Symposium Mathilde IWEINS Flore MAS

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AME & WILDLIFE SCIENCE

Volume 21 (3) – September 2004 CONTENTS OF TOME 1/ SOMMAIRE DU TOME 1 PART I/THÈME I COMMUNITY-BASED WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT/ GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE ET DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE Session chairmen/Présidents de session: Serge Bahuchet (Muséum National d'Histoire Naturelle, France) & Samy Mankoto Ma M'Baelele (UNESCO) Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Namibia: the Conservancy Programme and Nyae-Nyae Conservancy case study / Gestion participative des ressources naturelles en Namibie : le Programme des Conservatoires et le cas du Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae by/par P. SKYER ......................................................................................157 The Torghar Conservation Project: management of the livestock, Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri) and Afghan urial (Ovis orientalis) in the Torghar Hills, Pakistan / Projet de Conservation du Torghar : gestion du bétail, des markhors de Suleiman (Capra falconeri) et des urials d'Afghanistan (Ovis orientalis) dans les montagnes du Torghar, Pakistan by/par M.H. WOODFORD, M.R. FRISINA & G.A. AWAN.........................177 Wildlife management by forest people in the Brazilian extractivist reserve of Cazumbá / Gestion de la faune sauvage par les habitants des forêts dans la réserve brésilienne extractiviste de Cazumbá by/par P.B. SILVA NETO, J.O. GUIMARÃES, A.C. DE PAULA & G. BARQUERO ........................................................................................189 New approaches for involving communities in wildlife management including Community-Based Natural Resource Management and Conservancies in southern Africa / Nouvelles approches pour impliquer les communautés en Afrique australe dans la gestion de la faune sauvage incluant la gestion participative des ressources naturelles et les Conservatoires by/par C. CHINHOYI ...............................................................................197 Les zones cynégétiques villageoises : une expérience de gestion participative des ressources naturelles en République Centrafricaine / Village hunting zones: an experiment of Community-Based Natural Resource Management in the Central African Republic par/by R. MBITIKON ................................................................................217 Gestion de la faune intégrée au développement rural dans le Complexe Écologique du Parc National du W du Bénin / Wildlife management integrated with rural development in the Ecological Complex of the W National Park, Benin par/by A. EL HADJ ISSA & O. NOVELLI .................................................227 Co-management of the natural resources in the Waza-National-Park area in northern Cameroon / Cogestion des ressources naturelles dans la région du Parc National de Waza au nord du Cameroun by/par F.N. TARLA & M. BACHIROU .......................................................237

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Une gouvernance originale pour mettre en œuvre le développement durable : l'expérience des parcs naturels régionaux de France / An original governance to implement sustainable development: the French Regional Natural Parks experience by/par G. MOULINAS. .............................................................................249 Game management and hunting in an enlarged European Union / Gestion de la faune sauvage et chasse dans une Union européenne élargie by/par Y. LECOCQ ...................................................................................267 Communal game ranching in Zimbabwe: local empowerment and sustainable game meat production for rural communities / Ranching communal de gibier au Zimbabwé : octroi de pouvoirs aux communautés rurales locales et production durable de viande de gibier by/par S. LE BEL, N. GAIDET, S. MUTAKÉ, S. LE DOZE & T. NYAMUGURÉ .......................................................................................275 Beekeeping in Tanzania: when the bees get out of the woods... An innovative crosssectoral approach to Community-Based Natural Resource Management / L'apiculture en Tanzanie : quand les abeilles sortent des bois... Une approche multisectorielle innovante de gestion participative des ressources naturelles by/par Y. HAUSSER & P. MPUYA .............................................................291 La gestion participative de la faune sauvage au Burkina Faso : les expériences du ranch de Nazinga et du Parc du W / Community-based wildlife management in Burkina Faso: the experiments of the Nazinga Ranch and W Park par/by C. VERMEULEN............................................................................313

PART II/THÈME II WILDLIFE BREEDING/ÉLEVAGE DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE Session chairmen/Présidents de session: Sébastien Le Bel (CIRAD, Zimbabwé) & Paul Havet (Office national de la chasse et de la faune sauvage, France) Farming rusa deer (Cervus timorensis rusa) in southern tropical islands: slaughtering performances and alternative feeding strategies / Élevage de cerfs rusa (Cervus timorensis rusa) dans les îles tropicales du sud : performances d'abattage et stratégies alternatives d'alimentation by/par P. GRIMAUD, S. LE BEL & J. SAUZIER ........................................329 L'Association Nationale des Éleveurs d'Aulacodes (Thryonomys swinderianus) du Cameroun : quand la société civile africaine s'approprie les politiques de développement de l'élevage et de préservation de l'environnement / The National Association of Grasscutter (Thryonomys swinderianus) Breeders in Cameroon: when the civilian African society takes the policies of breeding development and environment preservation into hand par/by L.F. PEYO & D. EDDERAI. ............................................................343 The potential of wildlife ranching in Uganda using residual wildlife populations outside protected areas: the case study of the Kiryana Ranch in the river Kafu basin / Potentiel du ranching de faune sauvage en Ouganda à partir des populations résiduelles situées hors des aires protégées : étude du cas du Ranch de Kiryana dans le bassin de la Kafu by/par B. TWINOMUGISHA .....................................................................351 Capture et élevage du potamochère (Potamochoerus porcus) en forêt équatoriale gabonaise / Red river hog (Potamochoerus porcus) capture and breeding in the equatorial forest of Gabon par/by O. DOSIMONT ..............................................................................375

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Conservation de l'autruche (Struthio camelus) au Cameroun par sa valorisation : perspectives offertes par l'élevage / Ostrich (Struthio camelus) conservation in Cameroon through its valorization: prospects coming from breeding par/by I.N. NJIKAM, , S. NDAM & P. LEROY............................................387 L'élevage d'aulacodes (Thryonomys swinderianus) : présentation des résultats préliminaires de la vulgarisation dans trois pays d'Afrique centrale / Grasscutter (Thryonomys swinderianus) breeding: presentation of preliminary results of its vulgarization in three countries of Central Africa par/by P. HOUBEN, D. EDDERAI, C. NZEGO, M. NTSAMÉ, L. AKOUA, P. ENGAMBA & C. WANZIE ...................................................395 Wildlife production by rural producers in controlled systems in the Brazilian Cerrado / Production de faune sauvage par des éleveurs ruraux dans des systèmes contrôlés dans le Cerrado brésilien by/par P.B. SILVA NETO, C.S.F. BARRETO & G. BARQUERO.................407 A large-scale commercial farming of collared peccary (Tayassu tajacu) in northeastern Brazil / Un élevage commercial à grande échelle de pécaris à collier (Tayassu tajacu) dans le nord-est du Brésil by/par S. NOGUEIRA-FILHO, S. NOGUEIRA, A. MENDES & F. JORI....413 PART III/THÈME III BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT/GESTION DE LA BIODIVERSITÉ Session chairmen/Présidents de session: Raymond Mbitikon (ECOFAC, République Centrafricaine) & Louis Tsagué (École de Faune de Garoua, Cameroun) Diets of sympatric hippopotamus (Hippopotamus amphibius) and zebus (Bos indicus) during the dry season in the "W" National Park (Niger Republic) / Régimes alimentaires de l'hippopotame (Hippopotamus amphibius) et du zébu (Bos indicus) vivant en sympatrie pendant la saison sèche dans le Parc National du "W" (République du Niger) by/par C. NOIRARD, M. LE BERRE, R. RAMOUSSE, C. SÉPULCRE & P. JOLY .................................................................................................423 Nine years of research on a lion (Panthera leo) population in the Waza National Park (Cameroon): a review / Bilan de neuf années de recherches sur une population de lions (Panthera leo) du Parc National de Waza au Cameroun by/par H. DE IONGH, H. BAUER & P. HAMLING.....................................433 Problèmes juridiques pour l'utilisation de la faune sauvage autour de la réserve de Binder-Léré (Tchad) / Juridical problems related to wildlife use around the BinderLéré Reserve (Chad) by/par B. BONNET & A. LARTIGES.........................................................447 Sustainable use and conservation of the urial (Ovis vignei) in Pakistan: comparison between two management models / Utilisation durable et conservation de l'urial (Ovis vignei) au Pakistan : comparaison entre deux modèles de gestion by/par G.A. AWAN, T. AHMAD & R. GARSTANG.....................................461 Factors affecting brown hare (Lepus europaeus) production in large enclosures / Facteurs agissant sur la production de lièvres (Lepus europaeus) en grands enclos by/par F. SANTILLI, R. MAZZONI DELLA STELLA, A. GUERRINI, L. MORI, G. BISOGNO & M. BAGLIACCA ...............................................471 Perception et utilisation de la faune sauvage par les habitants de Kacha-kacha à l'est du Parc National de Zakouma au Tchad / Wildlife perception and use by the Kachakacha inhabitants east of the Zakouma National Park, Chad by/par E. BEMADJIM N'GAKOUTOU .......................................................481

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PART I/THÈME I Community-based wildlife management and sustainable development/ Gestion participative de la faune sauvage et développement durable

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3), 2004, p. 157-177 ISSN 1622-7662

COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN NAMIBIA: THE CONSERVANCY PROGRAMME AND NYAE-NYAE CONSERVANCY CASE STUDY

P. SKYER Namibian Association of Community-based natural resource management Support Organizations (NACSO), PO Box 98353, Pelican Square, Windhoek, Namibia. E-mail: [email protected]

KEY WORDS : Natural resource, wildlife, community-based management, Conservancy Programme, trophy hunting, tourism, Nyae-Nyae Conservancy, Namibia.

ABSTRACT Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has made its contribution to the Environment and Development Agenda of most Southern African countries, and perhaps even in other parts of the world. In Namibia, it has gained its merit and widespread support in the wildlife sector, through the internationally-acclaimed Conservancy Programme. This Programme was launched in 1998 and has demonstrated that wildlife stands a better chance of success and growth by giving the wildlife resource economic values to those who live and interact with the wildlife on a day-to-day basis. These economic values are realized through usufruct rights given to rural communities through a strong policy and legislative framework, which defines, clarifies and guarantees such rights. The result is a vibrant community-driven programme, encompassing over 60 communities mobilized into governance and wildlife management bodies, called Conservancies, involving over 200,000 people (in both registered and emerging Conservancies). This represents over 10% of the total population of Namibia, and close to 20% of the rural population. The 29 registered Conservancies alone involve 95,000 people and cover over 7 million hectares of land. This accounts for 22% of communal land and close to 9% of the total land area. Communities are not only empowered to manage the wildlife, but are also in a position to reap direct financial and other benefits as a result of their management effort. Financial and non-financial benefits accrued to Conservancies from wildlife and wildlife-based tourism, have nearly doubled annually since 1998. In 2003, Conservancies earned over US$ 2,430,000 from a diversity of wildlife and tourism ventures. The Ju/’hoansi San of Nyae Nyae in northeastern Namibia is one of the Namibia’s most poverty-stricken and marginalized communities. This community

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158 The Conservancy Programme of Namibia

created a 9,030-km2 Conservancy in 1998. Largely as a result of the game reintroduction effort made since 1999, the game numbers increased, contributing significantly to the livelihoods of the members. The Conservancy provided 28% of all jobs (n = 97) and about 44% of all incomes (US$ 341,390) during 2003. The CBNRM has the potential of broadening community rights and benefits beyond wildlife to also include other natural resources, but this will require careful consideration and planning when integrating wildlife with other forms of land use, and further advancing the CBNRM as mainstream strategy for rural development. Considering the current inequities in the agricultural sector between the elites and the rural poor, the major future stake of rural communities in the wildlife sector will be to safeguard the fundamental principles of the CBNRM.

I. INTRODUCTION Wildlife management, or conservation, is generally regarded to be of lesser importance, compared to most other production sectors of the economy. Conservation has never been a high profile political portfolio in most governments, and therefore generally under-funded in terms of the national budget. In Namibia, the national budget allocation to the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (MAWRD) during the 2003/2004 financial year was N$ 545,981,000, which is 320% more than the N$ 171,438,000 that was allocated to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) (KANGUEEHI, 2003 in WEAVER and SKYER, 2003). This is despite the fact that almost all factors that ought to drive decision-making at a national level, are pointing towards wildlife management and production to be one of the most appropriate forms of land use for much of Namibia’s arid environment. Namibia is the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa, with more than 50% of the country receiving less than 300 mm of rainfall a year. As is typical of semiarid and arid lands, the rainfall is highly sporadic, variable and unpredictable. Most of it however falls during the hot summer from December to March, when the rate of evaporation is very high. It is estimated that about 83 % of all rain evaporates as soon as it falls and only 1% recharges ground water reserves (MARSH and SEELY, 1992). The vast majority of the country’s population find themselves in rural areas (outside of urban areas) where they try to make a living off their land. Not all of them, however, are able to refer to the land on which they find themselves as their own, as it is owned by the State, and made available to them in accordance with the Communal Lands Act of 2002. Communal lands make up about 41% of the total land area (335,000 km2) and are home to about 120,000 households. On the other hand, privately owned commercial farmland covers about 44% of the total land area (362,000 km2) and are home to about 6,200 private farms, where some farmers may own more than one farm (EURATA, 2002). The total population of about 1,826,854 people (CENSUS OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, 2002) may seem few in relation to the total land area of 823,988 km2, but the uneven population distribution pattern creates a situation where the communal areas are over-populated and even over-exploited in terms of land and resource use. Rainfall and/or water availability is a major limiting factor for conventional agriculture or industrial development in most of Namibia, thus the need to explore and develop alterGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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native livelihood options for the rural people (both commercial and communal) of Namibia. Tourism- and wildlife-based developments began to increase significantly following independence in 1990 and currently contribute an estimated 9-10% to the GDP, third to mining and fisheries, and way more than agriculture despite existing market distortions in favor of agriculture which frequently undermine the wildlife industry (i.e., veterinary regulations). The tourism and wildlife potential is just starting to be explored and developed since enabling legislation has been put in place and actively implemented. Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has made its contribution to the Environment and Development Agenda of most Southern African countries, and perhaps even in other parts of the world. In Namibia, it has gained its merit and widespread support in the wildlife sector, through the internationally-acclaimed Conservancy Programme. This Programme was launched in 1998 and has demonstrated that wildlife stands a better chance of success and growth by giving the wildlife resource economic values to those who live and interact with the wildlife on a day to day basis. These economic values are realized through usufruct rights given to rural communities through a strong policy and legislative framework, which defines, clarifies and guarantees such rights. In this paper we present, for Namibia, (1) the history of the conservation policies and the framework that established the Conservancy Programme, (2) the impacts of such a programme at a national scale, (3) a case study (the Nyae-Nyae Conservancy) at a regional scale, and (4) the development and future of the CBNRM.

II. THE CONSERVATION POLICY AND THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSERVANCY PROGRAMME History of the conservation policies Wildlife policies and legislation prior to the independence of Namibia in 1990 have been highly characterized by major imbalances and inequities, as they gave ownership over huntable game (buffalo, Syncerus caffer, kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, gemsbok, Oryx gazella, springbok, Antidorcas marsupialis, and warthog, Phacochoerus africanus) to white farmers on commercial land, but totally disregarded the black farmers on communal lands. Wildlife thus became a valued income generating resource for the commercial farmers, resulting in a booming wildlife industry on commercial land. In contrast, communal area residents were alienated from wildlife, as all wildlife on communal land was declared State property, and only the State had any say over them. This led to declining wildlife numbers, and, in some cases, even the disappearance of some species from areas where they naturally occurred in the past, due to poaching by both insiders and outsiders, as well as unsustainable harvesting practices by the State (including the former South African Defense Force) and those granted permits to hunt on communal lands (JONES, 1999). The success of the wildlife industry on commercial lands has led to predominantly cattle farmers opting to diversify their farming activities towards game farming and tourism, and some even switching to game ranching Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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entirely. Extensive game farming is however hampered by the fact that most commercial farming units are fenced and too small in size. The average commercial farm is about 5,000 ha in size and this size of management unit is not fully suited to Namibia’s arid and semi-arid environment, where wildlife require big open spaces of unfenced land to move freely during low rainfall years. The pressure to expand the wildlife industry has led to the development of the policy on “Establishment of Conservancies in Namibia”, in 1992. Under this policy, individual neighboring freehold farmers could pool their land and other resources together (removing the fences between them), for joint management and equitable sharing of their profits (MINISTRY OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION AND TOURISM, 1992).

Framework of the Conservancy Programme This entire situation was assessed through socio-ecological surveys that were conducted during 1991-1992 in key wildlife areas on communal lands to gather community opinion and develop a vision for the future wildlife policy and legislation. The focus at this stage was on wildlife, as the disparities between communal and commercial land were more visible and could make a major difference in the day-to-day lives of people, compared to other resources. The findings of the socio-ecological surveys of 1992, led to the development of the policy on “Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal Areas” of 1995. The primary objectives of this policy are: “to establish … an economically based system for the management and utilization of wildlife and other renewable living resources on communal land … ; to redress past discriminatory policies and practices …; to allow rural communities on state land to undertake tourism ventures, and to enter into co-operative agreements with commercial tourism organizations to develop tourism activities on State land.” (MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM, 1995a). This policy further paved the way for the Amendment of the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975, with the Nature Conservation Amendment Act of 1996 (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, 1996a, 1996b). The policy and legislative framework now made it possible for communal area residents to also gain limited wildlife use rights if they formed Conservancies that would be recognized and legally registered by government. The legal framework also outlines specific conditions Conservancies are required to meet in order to be recognized. To start with, communities who decide to form Conservancies need to define themselves in terms of who they regard as members of their Conservancy, and as such keep a register of all members. Conservancies also need to define the geographical area they occupy, and to negotiate and agree on their boundaries with their neighbors. Finally, they are required to develop their own constitution, which will also provide for the development and implementation of a game management and utilization plan. The Conservancy Constitution normally outlines, amongst other things, their overall purpose and objectives, a definition of their membership, a description of boundaries (with attached maps), their management structure, and how these will be elected and function, as well as over-all decisionmaking within the Conservancy. An ad-hoc Committee/task force selected from within their own ranks usually facilitates this entire process with support from technical support agencies. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The Constitution provides the framework for the election of a representative Management Committee or the adoption of an existing local structure as their governing body. The Constitution also makes provision for the development of an equitable benefits distribution plan, which will guide the Conservancy in making decisions about how revenue and other benefits generated will be shared amongst their members or partially reinvested into sustaining the conservancy operations.

III. IMPACTS OF THE CONSERVANCY PROGRAMME So far, the acquired experience shows that there is an enormous scope for wildlife, and overall natural resource, management and development in communal lands. The following results are indicative of the success of the Communal Area Conservancy Policy and Legislation, which not only granted rights to people, but also outlined under what conditions these rights would be best utilized for the benefit of both people and the environment.

III.1. INSTITUTIONAL (GOVERNANCE) IMPACTS The Communal Area Conservancy legislation allowed for the formation of representative local governance structures with a legal constitution and elected Management Committee. By the end of 2003 there were 29 legally registered Conservancies in place, representing over 95,000 communal area residents. Furthermore, an additional 30-40 Conservancies are emerging, potentially representing a further 100,000 people. Thus, all in all, the Communal Area Conservancy movement involves over 60 communities mobilized into governance bodies, representing over 200,000 people (in both registered and emerging Conservancies). This accounts for close to 20% of the total communal area residents, and 10% of the total population of Namibia. This is a critical mass of people, and is already having some impact on regional and local level decision-making processes. Conservancies are recognized as an organized voice of the vast majority of the people where they occur. They often represent their communities on Regional- and Constituency Development Coordinating Committees, under the decentralization policy of the Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing. They also serve on other very important local decision making structures like Communal Land Boards, which are responsible for the allocation of land in communal areas under the Communal Land Reform Act of the Ministry of Lands Resettlement and Rehabilitation (GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA, 2002).

III.2. NATURAL-RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IMPACTS The Conservancy Programme has directly contributed to increasing wildlife numbers, which indicates that habitat and game management are improving. Dedicated wildlife production zones in many Conservancies reflect the increased values communities are placing on their wildlife resources. Similarly, strategic game translocations have been done into several Conservancies where numbers had previously declined. The changing values Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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and increasing wildlife populations are also indicators of the positive attitudes rural communities have developed towards wildlife. This is in sharp contrast to the hostilities that prevailed prior to rights granted to communities over wildlife. In 2003, 29 registered Communal Area Conservancies covered over 74,000 km2 of land (Figure 1), which accounts for 22% of the communal land and 9% of the total land area. As the protected areas cover only about 14% of the total land area of the country, Communal Conservancies will soon more than double the amount of land under some active resource/wildlife management regime. Furthermore, 17 of the 29 registered Conservancies are adjacent to National Parks, thus increasing the buffer zone area around parks, as well as providing important corridors for the movement of wildlife between Parks, e.g. Etosha National Park and Skeleton Coast Park, or Mudumu National Park and Mamili National Park in the Caprivi Region. Area under Conservancies 80000

Area (km2)

70000 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Years Figure 1: Cumulative area (ha) of the registered communal Conservancies between 1997 and 2003 in Namibia. Figure 1 : Surfaces cumulées (ha) des Conservatoires communautaires enregistrés entre 1997 et 2003 en Namibie.

Recent game counts in northwestern Namibia have shown a general upward trend in the numbers of most plain game (Figure 2). Most notably are the numbers of springboks, gemsboks and Hartmann’s zebras, Equus hartmannae, which grew from less than 1,000 animals each in 1982 to over 100,000 for the springboks, 35,000 for the gemsboks and 14,000 for the Hartmann’s zebras by 2002. These increased populations are attributable to a number of factors, including: community involvement and ownership of the wildlife resource base in this region since 1984 through a community game guard programme; reduced poaching; improved rainfall during the past two decades; and most recently, active management of the wildlife resource base through Conservancies. To date, Conservancies have been predominantly associated with wildlife management. However, efforts are underway to identify potentials for integrated resource management with other natural resources. In this vein, the Forestry Policy of 1992 and 1999, as well as the upcoming Forestry Bill, provides for community involvement in forest management, and links rural development and conservation goals by granting property rights to forest users. The institutional arrangements and requirements for community forests are

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Gemsbok

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2000

2001

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Springbok

300 250 200 150 100 50 0 2000

2001

2002

2003

2002

2003

Zebra

25 20 15 10 5 0 2000

2001

Figure 2: Population trends (animals observed per 100 km driven) for gemsbok, Oryx gazella, springbok, Antidorcas marsupialis, and Hartmann’s zebra, Equus hartmannae, in northwestern Namibia between 2000 and 2003. Source: MET/WWF/NACSO (2003). Figure 2 : Tendances d'évolution (animaux observés par 100 km parcourus en voiture) des populations de gemsboks, Oryx gazella, de springboks, Antidorcas marsupialis, et de zèbres de Hartmann, Equus hartmannae, dans le nord-ouest de la Namibie entre 2000 et 2003. Source : MET/WWF/NACSO (2003).

compatible with the Conservancy model (JONES, undated). Similarly, the Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Policy of 1993 is aiming at improving water supply to rural communities, by transferring management responsibility of water supply facilities to communities. Also the institutional arrangements and requirements of Water Point Committees and Water Associations are compatible with the Conservancy model (JONES, undated). Additionally, the Inland Fisheries Policy of 1995 aims at devolving management and utilisation of inland fisheries to communities living along rivers. The scale of fisheries management units tend to be much smaller than Conservancies, but are still compatible with the Conservancy model through institutional linkages (JONES, undated). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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III.3. ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL IMPACTS As communities are becoming better organized and starting to play an active role in the management of their wildlife and other resources, they are starting to reap the fruits of their efforts. Wildlife- and tourism-related benefits accrued to Conservancies have nearly doubled annually since the official launch of the Conservancy Programme in 1998. The financial and non-financial tangible benefits to Conservancies were more than N$ 14,600,000 (US$ 2,433,333) by the end of 2003 (Figure 3).

Namibian National CBNRM Programme 2003 - Benefits N$14,606,431

16,000,000 14,000,000 12,000,000 10,000,000

N$

8,000,000 6,000,000 4,000,000 2,000,000 0 1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Year Conservancy Non-Financial Benefits NR-Based Household / Wage Income Conservancy / Enterprise Income

Figure 3: Benefits generated by the Namibia National Programme of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), or Conservancy Programme, in 1994-2003 (US$:N$ ~1:6 by end 2003). Figure 3: Bénéfices générés par le programme national namibien de gestion participative des ressources naturelles (CBRNM), ou Programme des Conservatoires, de 1994 à 2003. ($US:$N ~1:6 à la fin 2003). De haut en bas : bénéfices non-financiers acquis par le Conservatoire, revenus provenant des salaires des ménages travaillant dans le domaine des ressources naturelles, revenus des entreprises reversés aux Conservatoires.

In addition, a recent economic analysis of the CBNRM Programme for 2003 indicates that the total contributions of the by-CBNRM-supported enterprises to the net national income (NNI) amounted to an estimated N$ 88,000,000 (US$ 14,700,000), while the increase in the asset value of growing game populations was valued at an additional N$ 30,000,000 (US$ 5,000,000). Thus, the total estimated economic returns of the CBNRM Programme in 2003 amounted to an estimated N$ 118,000,000 (US$ 19,666,667) (NACSO, 2004). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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IV. THE CASE STUDY OF THE NYAE NYAE CONSERVANCY IV.1. GAME POPULATION INCREASE AND LIVELIHOOD IMPROVEMENT BETWEEN 1999 AND 2003 The Ju/’hoansi San of Nyae Nyae in northeastern Namibia is one of the Namibia’s most poverty-stricken and marginalized communities. This community created a Conservancy in 1998. The Nyae Nyae Conservancy (9,030 km2) and Khaudom National Park (3,842 km2) jointly covers an area of about 13,000 km2 of wilderness wildlife habitat. Recognizing the huge potential of the area, and the extremely low numbers of wildlife, the WWF/LIFE Project has been supporting a game reintroduction effort sine 1999, in collaboration with the conservancy, MET and private sector partners. Largely as a result of this game reintroduction effort, the game numbers increased in the Nyae Nyae Conservancy (Table I).

TABLE I Population numbers censured in 1998 (MET, 1998), introduced in 1999-2003, and estimated in 2003 from an annual growth rate of 7% for elephants, 20% for springbok and 15% for the other species, of the potential-meat-producing animals in the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, northwestern Namibia. From WEAVER and SKYER (2003). TABLEAU I Effectifs de population recensés en 1998 (MET, 1998), introduits de 1999 à 2003 et estimés en 2003 à partir de taux de croissance annuels de 7 % pour les éléphants, 20 % pour les springboks et de 15 % pour les autre espèces, d'animaux-gibiers potentiellement fournisseurs de viande dans le Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae au nord-ouest de la Namibie. De WEAVER et SKYER (2003). Species

Population numbers (individuals) CensIntroduced in Estimated ured in in 2003 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total

Red hartebeest Alcelaphus buselaphus 18 Gemsbok Oryx gazella 429 Blue wildebeest Connochaetes taurinus 204 Springbok Antidorcas marsupialis 0 Eland Taurotragus oryx 12 Greater kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros 283 Elephant Loxodonta africana 558 Total 1,504

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

42 48

43 81

230 48

226 97

0 0

541 274

727 1,171

33

0

0

53

0

86

548

89

92

0

209

243

633

880

0

83

0

0

150

233

268

0

215

0

88

0

303

947

212

514

278

673

480

2,157

733 5,274

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The recovering wildlife populations have the potential to contribute significantly to the livelihoods of the Conservancy members. The Conservancy- and non-Conservancy-related activities provided many employments and income opportunities (Table II), according to recent surveys (WIESSNER, 2003). According to the survey results, the Conservancy provided 28% of all jobs (n = 97) only from their hunting operations, and about 35% of all incomes (N$ 2,048,344) from hunting (N$ 235,428) and cash-benefit distribution (N$ 477,672), to its members during 2003. The benefit distribution of N$ 477,672 was premised upon accumulated trophy hunting revenues from the 2000, 2001, and 2002 hunting seasons and does not reflect an annually viable sum of money available for distribution. Based upon a hunting revenue of N$ 845,697 received in 2002, an amount of N$ 414 per member or a total of N$ 318,828 was allocated to the benefit distribution. This sum was added to the funds available from 2000 (N$ 82,940) and 2001 (N$ 75,904) to arrive at the total distribution of N$ 477,672. TABLE II Numbers of pensioners and jobs, and cash incomes (Namibian $) among the Ju/’Hoansi residents of the Nyae Nyae Conservancy in northwestern Namibia in 2002 and 2003. Adapted from WEAVER and SKYER (2003). TABLEAU II Nombres de pensionnés et d'emplois, et revenus monétaires ($ namibien) chez les résidents Ju/’Hoansi du Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae au nord-ouest de la Namibie en 2002 et 2003. Adapté de WEAVER et SKYER (2003). Source

Wiessner & NNC Records No. of No. of Incomes pensioners jobs N$ Pensions/Pensions 46 138,000 Government/Gouvernement 47 709,764 Mining/Mines 12 60,480 Church/lodge/clinic/Eglise/Hôtel/Clinique 11 87,000 Handicrafts sales/Ventes artisanales 240,000-300,000 Tourism/Tourisme 60,000 Devils claw sales/Ventes de coquillages 10,000 Conservancy/Hunter/Conservatoire/Chasse 27 235,428 Conservancy cash benefit distribution(*)/ Répartition des bénéfices monétaires du Conservatoire* 477,672 Total 46 97 2,018,344 –2,078,344 (*) Accumulated trophy hunting revenues from the 2000, 2001, and 2002 hunting seasons. / Revenus provenant de la chasse sportive, cumulés pour les saisons de chasse 2000, 2001 et 2002.

If one also adds the income generated from craft sales because of the Conservancy’s role in supporting the craft producers through marketing, facilitation of access to craft materials, etc., the total contribution from the Conservancy amounts to about N$ 924,256 or 44% of the total income earned by the Conservancy members. Thus, from the 2003 per capita income of N$ 1,039/year, the Conservancy contributed to N$ 457. The Conservancy has a total population of 1,800-2,000 people (BERGER et al., 2003). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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IV.2. PERSPECTIVES FOR 2005-2015 Game meat contribution Additionally, the Conservancy contributes game meat from both trophy hunting and subsistence hunting. Based on a meat off-take of 2% for trophy hunting and 6.5% for meat harvesting, the meat off-take for local consumption would yield 66 tons in 2007 and 117 tons in 2015. These off-take rates would still allow population growth rates of 11.5% per annum for springboks, and 6.5% for the other plain game species (Figure 4, WEAVER and SKYER, 2003).

Nyae Nyae Population Projections for Meat Producing Species Through 2015 4000 3500

Number

3000 Hartebeest

2500

Oryx Kudu

2000

Springbok Eland

1500

Blue Wildebeest

1000 500 0 1998

2001

2004

2007 Year

2010

2013

Figure 4: Extrapolated population growth rates for Nyae Nyae (northwestern Namibia) plain-game species, based upon sustainable off-takes of 2% for trophy hunting through 2015 and 6.5% for meat harvesting from 2007-2015. Source: WEAVER and SKYER (2003). Red hartebeest, Alcelaphus busephalus caama, gemsbok, Oryx gazella, greater kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, springbok, Antidorcas marsupialis, Cape eland, Taurotragus oryx, wildebeest, Connochaetes taurinus. Figure 4: Taux de croissance extrapolés des populations de gibier de plaine de Nyae-Nyae, au nordouest de la Namibie, d’après un prélèvement durable de 2 % par la chasse sportive jusqu’en 2015 et de 6,5 % par la récolte de viande de 2007 à 2015. Source: WEAVER et SKYER (2003). De haut en bas : bubale caama, Alcelaphus busephalus caama, gemsbok, Oryx gazella, grand koudou, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, springbok, Antidorcas marsupialis, élan du Cap, Taurotragus oryx, gnou bleu, Connochaetes taurinus.

It is further estimated that the human population of Nyae Nyae would increase to 2251 in 2007, and 2851 by 2015 at a 3% growth rate. Thus by 2007 and 2015 respectively, the Conservancy would contribute to 29 kg and 41 kg of meat per year per capita. “At today’s market value of N$ 8/kg for venison, the present-day value of this meat benefit would be N$ 528,000 in 2007 and N$ 936,000 by 2015 (WEAVER and SKYER, 2003).

Trophy hunting In addition to the above escalating benefits, it is anticipated that revenue from trophy hunting will grow with increasing game numbers. As a conseGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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quence, the Conservancy may be in a position to potentially accommodate two hunting concessions in 2007, and as many as five concessions by 2015. The trophy-animal numbers and their cash values (Table III) are expected to be 145 and US$ 207,000 in 2007, and 300 and US$ 589,000 in 2015 (according to the expected population growth, excepted for the leopards, Panthera pardus, brown hyenas, Hyaena brunnea, bush duikers, Sylvicapra grimmia, steenboks, Raphicerus campestris, and roan antelopes, Hippotragus equinus, as these species were not been included into the model). “These projections are based upon several factors, including: harvest rates of 0.015% and 2% respectively for the elephants, Loxodonta africanus and plain-game species; annual growth rates of 7% for the elephant, 20% for the springbok, and 15% for the remaining plain game species; and a meat harvesting rate of the plain game of 6.5%, for the respective populations from 2007 onwards” (WEAVER and SKYER, 2003). TABLE III The current (2003) and projected (2007 and 2015) numbers (individuals) of trophy animals and their values (US$, based upon current values of each species in the concession, and concession conservation payments) in the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, northwestern Namibia, and other sources of revenue. From: WEAVER and SKYER (2003). TABLEAU III Nombres (individus) actuels (2003) et en prévision (2007 et 2015) d'animaux chassés pour leur trophée, et leur valeurs ($US sur la base des valeurs actuelles des prix d'abattage de chaque espèce dans la concession de chasse, et de l'argent payé pour la conservation de la concession) dans le Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae au nord-ouest de la Namibie, et autres sources de revenu (revenu provenant d'emplois). D'après : WEAVER et SKYER (2003).

Species

Elephant Loxodonta africana Greater kudu Tragelaphus strepsiceros Gemsbok Oryx gazella Leopard Panthera pardus Brown hyaena Hyaena brunnea Wildebeest Connochaetes taurinus Red hartebeest Alcelaphus buselaphus Springbok Antidorcas marsupialis Eland Taurotragus oryx Bush duiker Sylvicapra grimmia Steenbok Raphicerus campestris Roan antelope Hippotragus equinus (Concession conservation payments) Total Other revenue source Employment income Total

n

4 8 8 3 2 5 8 3 3 4 4 1 53 1

Trophy animals (individuals, value) 2003 2007 2015 Total n Total n Total value value value US$ US$ US$ 60,000 7 105,000 26 390,000 6,400 27 21,600 53 42,400 5,600 34 23,800 65 45,500 3,000 3,000 3,000 600 600 600 2,500 18 9,000 33 16,500 4,000 21 10,500 40 20,000 750 29 7,250 67 16,750 3,000 9 9,000 16 16,000 600 600 600 600 600 600 2,000 2,000 2,000 7,000 14,000 35,000 92,050 145 206,950 300 588,950 4,375 100,425

2

8,750 205,325

5

21,875 610,825

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Live-game sales Additionally, the option of selling live some of the plain game, instead of just harvesting them for the meat, was considered, but found not worthwhile economically because of the associated costs of capturing, quarantining, testing for disease, feeding, transporting, mortalities, etc. Alternatively, high value species such as roan and buffalo might be worthwhile to consider for live sales, provided the veterinary restrictions against the reintroduction of buffalo into the commercial areas are reconsidered. The Conservancy currently has a herd of 90 disease-free buffalos in a 2,400ha camp. Thirty free roaming buffalos were captured in 1996 and tested for Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), theileriosis (corridor disease), tuberculosis and lung sickness, of which one was found with FMD and destroyed. The herd was retested in 2002, and reconfirmed disease-free (REUTER, 2002). Efforts are underway to enlarge the 2,400-ha camp to about 9,000 ha, which could also potentially accommodate a breeding herd of 40 roan antelopes by 2005. Since the growth rate for the buffalos from 1996/1997 to 2003 was 15%, we assumed that both species would reproduce at 15% per annum, to project the possible incomes from live sales. If the buffalo and roan populations would be supposed to grow up to 100 and 50 animals respectively, live animals from both species be sold at 6% per annum, and a growth be maintain at a rate of 9% per year, the Conservancy could potentially earn N$ 1,362,000/year in 2007 and N$ 3,228,000/year by 2015 (Table IV, WEAVER and SKYER, 2003).

Tourism Tourism developments are also expected to pick up as a result of the growing wildlife populations. Additionally, the recently opened border gate between Namibia and Botswana on the eastern boundary of the Conservancy will allow the development of a popular southern African tourism route between the Okavango Delta and the Etosha National Park, with stopovers in the Nyae Nyae / Khaudom area (WEAVER and SKYER, 2003). TABLE IV Projected annual incomes (Namibian $, based upon current values of 1 individual) from live sales of buffalos, Syncerus caffer, and roan antelopes, Hippotragus equinus, for the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, northwestern Namibia, for 2005, 2007, and 2015. TABLEAU IV Revenus annuels en prévision ($ namibien, sur la base des valeurs actuelles d'un individu) provenant des ventes de buffles d'Afrique, Syncerus caffer, et d’hippotragues, Hippotragus equinus, vivants, pour le Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae au nord-ouest de la Namibie pour les années 2005, 2007 et 2015.

Species

Buffalo Roan antelope Total

Current value of 1 individu N$ 126,000 160,000

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

n

6 0 6

Expected numbers and value of 2005 2007 Total n Total value value N$ N$ 756,000 7 882,000 0 3 480,000 756,000 10 1,362,000

live sales 2015 n Total value N$ 18 2,268,000 6 960,000 24 3,228,000

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The Nyae Nyae Conservancy just signed a 9-year-and-11-month tourism joint venture agreement, which is renewable for a further 9 years and eleven months, with Namibia Country Lodges, one of the leading tourism operators in Namibia. According to this agreement, the Conservancy will contribute land, wildlife, and resource management to the venture, while the lodge company will capitalize the development. The 16 bed lodges will immediately contribute N$ 100,000/year (US$ 16,667) and will employ up to 20 Conservancy members, bringing at least N$ 300,000/year (US$ 50,000) in employment benefits to Conservancy members. It is anticipated that the lodge will be generating at least N$ 250,000/year (US$ 41,667) by year five of operation. It is believed that the area can potentially accommodate two more lodges by the year 2015, with additional cash benefits of N$ 900,000/year and employment benefits of N$ 750,000/year flowing to the Conservancy (WEAVER and SKYER, 2003).

Total incomes and benefits The Nyae Nyae Conservancy is one of only 4 Conservancies who reached financial viability by 2003 since it was officially registered in 1998. The conservancy is currently earning enough revenue from its hunting and tourism ventures, to cover its entire operational costs, and still distribute dividends to its members on an annual basis. The benefits per capita generated from hunting, live game sales and tourism ventures were N$ 635 in 2002, and are expected to be N$ 2,031 in 2007, and N$ 4,038 in 2015 (Table V). The Nyae Nyae Conservancy is a clear case of legal rights over wildlife given to communities, leading to an improved management of their wildlife resources, resulting in increased game populations, which in turn generate increased cash and in-kind benefits to the Conservancy and its members. Some of the current projected incomes are dependent on the removal of barriers, which continue to over protect and promote the beef industry at the expense of game and game products. There is a need to increase game production and marketing, in order to allow a flourishing game industry optimally contributing to rural development through Conservancies.

V. DEVELOPMENT AND LONG-TERM FUTURE OF THE CBNRM Namibia's Vision 2030 Conservancies are clearly providing an institutional model for the management of common property resources, but the full integration of all these resources including wildlife, forestry, water, inland fisheries and land, under one management mechanism has yet to be realized. Development scenarios predicted under Namibia’s Vision 2030 document (Table VI, NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, 2004) suggest the following growth targets for Communal Area Conservancies, where in scenario 1, Conservancies still have limited rights over just wildlife and tourism by the year 2030, and in scenario 2, Conservancies hold group tenure over their rangeland, woodland, water, freshwater fish and the land itself, in addition to their wildlife and tourism rights. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLE V Actual (2002) and projected (2007, 2015) incomes and/or benefits generated by the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, northwestern Namibia, if increased game populations facilitate the expansion of the trophy hunting operation and introduction of game harvesting, tourism lodges and high-value game production operations. Source: WEAVER and SKYER (2003). TABLEAU V Revenus et/ou bénéfices ($ namibien, monnaie, emploi/en nature) réels (2002) et en prévision (2007, 2015) générés par le Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae au nord-ouest de la Namibie, s'il y a une augmentation des populations de gibier permettant l'expansion de la chasse sportive, de la collecte du gibier, de l'hôtellerie de tourisme, et de la production de gibier de grande valeur. Source: WEAVER et SKYER (2003).

Source

Actual and projected values (N$) of incomes and/or benefit 2002 2007 2015 Cash EmployCash EmployCash Employment/ ment/ ment/ In kind In kind In kind

Hunting concession payment/Paiement de 845,697 1,655,600 4,711,600 la concession de chasse Wages from professional hunter/Salaires des 36,101 70,000 175,000 chasseurs professsionnels Handicrafts sales (1)/ Ventes provenant 264,334 406,711 810,396 de l'artisanat Value of game meat consumed/Valeur de la 124,442 528,000 936,000 viande consommée JV tourism lodge revenues/Revenus des 300,000 900,000 hôtels de tourisme JV JV tourism employment benefits/Bénéfices des emplois de tourisme JV 250,000 750,000 Live-game sales/Ventes 1,362,000 3,528,000 de gibier vivant Annual subtotal 845,697 424,877 3,317,600 1,254,711 8,839,600 2,671,396 Annual total (2) 1,270,574 4,572,311 11,510,996 Per-capita benefit (3) 635 2,031 4,038 (1) Handicraft sales have been increased at a rate of 9% per year, which is in-line with the current annual tourism visitation increases in Namibia./Les ventes provenant de l'artisanat ont été augmentées au rythme de 9 % par an, ce qui est en conformité avec le taux d'augmentation annuel actuel du nombre de visites de tourisme en Namibie. (2) Figures represent present-day values, not considering inflation increases, potential market value increases of products offered or long-term trend of the devaluation of the N$ against the US$ or Euro (currency used for most tourism products)./Ces chiffres sont des valeurs d'aujourd'hui ne tenant pas compte de l'inflation, ni de l'augmentation potentielle des prix du marché, ni des tendances à long terme à la dévaluation du $ namibien par rapport au $ US ou à l'euro (monnaies utilisées pour la plupart des transactions liées au tourisme). (3) Per capita benefit based on 3% population growth rate, for the population of 2000 people in 2002./Bénéfices par tête sur la base d'un taux de croissance de la population de 3 %.

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLE VI 2003 situation and 2030 targets for communal area Conservancies in Namibia in the cases of 2 scenarios. In Scenario 1, the Conservancy legislation primarily supports the development of wildlife and tourism resources; and in Scenario 2 it is expanded to allow the management of other common resources (i.e. rangelands, community forests, water, etc.) Adapted from: Government of the Republic of Namibia, Office of the President: Namibia Vision 2030, Policy Framework for Long-term National Development. TABLEAU VI Situation actuelle (2003) et objectifs 2030 (nombre de Conservatoires enregistrés - + émergeants -, terres et ressources naturelles gérées au travers des Conservatoires communaux - ha, % de la totalité des terres en Namibie, % des terres communales -, nombre de personnes dans les Conservatoires tirant bénéfice des Conservatoires) pour les Conservatoires en zone communale en Namibie dans le cas de 2 scénarios. Dans le scénario 1, la législation des Conservatoires aide en priorité le développement des ressources issues de la faune sauvage et du tourisme. Dans le 2, elle favorise en plus celui d'autres ressources (c'est-à-dire les pâturages, les forêts communautaires, l'eau, etc.). Adapté de : Cadre pour une politique de développement national à long terme, Bureau du Président : Namibie Horizon 2030, Gouvernement de la République de Namibie.

Key indicator

2003

Number of registered 29 Conservancies (+33 emerging) Land and natural resources managed through communal Conservancies ha 7,405,200 % of Namibia's land mass % of communal lands Number of people benefiting from Conservancies in the 95,000 registered Conservancies

2030 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 (development of (scenario 1 + wildlife and tourism development of other resources) common resources) 65

> 160

15,000,000 18.2 44

24,000,000 29.2 71

> 250,000 (*)

> 900,000 (*)

(*) Estimated by means of a 2%-per-annum population growth rate taking into consideration the impact of HIVAIDS/Estimé à l'aide d'un accroissement annuel de la population de 2 % tenant compte de l'impact du HIV du sida

Under the above 2030 scenarios and given the robust growth of the Conservancy Programme and affiliated enterprises, tourism and wildlife utilization enterprises could generate as much as N$ 4,000,000,000 to Namibia’s Net National Incomes (NNI). Thus, the CBNRM offers an immense potential to the growth of the wildlife and tourism industry, while contributing directly to the alleviation of poverty amongst the most marginalized communities in Namibia. There are however a number of factors that may enhance or inhibit the development of CBNRM as a rural development strategy. In this vein, genGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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uine commitment and political will to devolve and secure rights over wildlife and other resources to Conservancies, is essential to allow an integrated approach to the management of natural resources. It is equally important that Conservancies remain representative of, and working in the interest of the majority of their members.

Fundamental principles Additionally, experiences of implementing CBNRM programmes in Southern Africa, have led to the realization that there are 5 fundamental principles that have to be followed or honoured for the CBNRM to be successful (MUROMBEDZI, 2003). (1) Effective management of natural resources is best achieved by giving the resource a focused value. To determine whether the benefit of managing a resource exceeds the cost, the resource must have a measurable value to the community. (2) Differential inputs must result in differential benefits. Those communities living with the resource and thus bearing a higher cost should receive higher benefits than those who do not bear this cost. (3) There must be a positive correlation between the quality of management and the magnitude of derived benefit. An incentive for good management must reward greater investment in the resource with greater benefits. (4) The unit of proprietorship (i.e. who decides) should be the same as the unit of production, management and benefit. The group which manages the resource should also form the local management institution. (5) The unit of proprietorship should be as small as practicable, within ecological and socio-political constraints. Smaller groups are better at managing themselves and the resource than large anonymous institutions.

Challenges The current realities and experience in implementing the CBNRM in Namibia brings to light a number of potential challenges. Continued sectoral planning and development could potentially undermine conservancy rights to wildlife and tourism, e.g. the Communal Lands Act, which grants decisionmaking authority over land to the Communal Land Boards. The concern is that the Communal Land Boards may grant tourism leases in Conservancy areas to private sector investors, with or without the consent of the relevant Conservancy. This means that tourism revenues from communal lands could potentially just benefit the Communal Land Boards and the private sector, at the expense of Conservancies. Another potential challenge, is that Conservancy leadership and influential structures might increasingly become dominated by urban based week-end farmers and the rural elites. Should this happen, then the incentives for active community involvement in wildlife management might be reduced, as decision-making and material benefits would be largely captured by the rural elites and/or other legal structures like Communal Land Boards. This would lead to a decline in community involvement and support for wildlife management, leading to decline in importance and value of wildlife to local people, which in turn might lead to increased poaching, declining wildlife numbers, and ultimately affect the entire industry.

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Long-term future While the CBNRM has made its in-roads and impact, it still remains a relatively untapped area of development, compared to agriculture. It certainly does not enjoy the same level of national government support and recognition as agriculture, as reflected by the national budget allocations, and the national development plan. This may seem an unfair bias against the wildlife sector in many ways, but perhaps might be a blessing in disguise for the longer-term survival of the CBNRM in other respects. It requires careful consideration and planning when integrating wildlife with other forms of land use, and the further advancement of the CBNRM as a mainstream strategy for rural development. For the foreseeable future, one could assume that sectoral planning and development would continue, thus reducing the chances of Conservancies managing the full range of resources, and remaining largely with rights over wildlife and tourism. Additionally, there is a chance that the increased Conservancy revenues being taxed to contribute to regional government budgets. Thus, Conservancies might capture only part of the wildlife and tourism revenue, and share the rest with Communal Land Boards and Regional Councils. Also, Conservancy expenses might increase almost as fast as its income, thus larger share of Conservancy income used to cover operational expenses and little left for the individual members or households. This is particularly likely if the Conservancy leadership and employed staff are dominated by the rural elites. Considering the current inequities in the agricultural sector between the elites and the rural poor, the future stake of rural communities in the wildlife sector is of critical importance, to safeguard the fundamental principles of the CBNRM. The potentials for, and threats to the success of the CBNRM are huge, so is the need for all concerned and involved to increase their efforts in advancing and supporting the CBNRM as a mainstream strategy for rural development. These efforts can be pursued at the local and national levels, as well as the sub-regional and international levels. Local and national level efforts could include: increased mobilization and conscientisation of rights at village, household and individual levels within all existing and emerging conservancies, in order to reduce the chances of wildlife and tourism benefits being captured by the rural elites, at the expense of the broader community. Technical support agencies thus need to move from “neutral” facilitators to pro-poor facilitators. Additionally, there is need for increased advocacy to raise the profile of the CBNRM by emerging Conservancy Associations at a national level. All these efforts might be perceived as instigating people to assert their rights, thus one should expect some opposition from the rural elites and middle or local level government. Sub-regional and international level support could include: conditional donor support in favor of pro-poor development initiatives, as most of the current CBNRM initiatives are largely donor funded. There is also need for increased support for the marketing of game and game products regionally and internationally, in order for the wildlife industry to become more competitive with the livestock industry. Additionally, increased awareness and information dissemination through international convention meetings are very important to sustain the desired level of support over a long term period, in order to consolidate and build on the initial gains so far made through the CBNRM. In this Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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vein, it is important to support the active participation and influence of game producing communities/countries in international convention meetings, both in terms of logistics (ability to attend) and the structure and nature of proceedings at international gatherings, e.g. meetings of the Conventions on Biological Diversity, Combating of Desertification, International Trade in Endangered Species, etc. so the agendas of these gatherings become more driven by practice and less theory. In the end, it can only pay off to increase support to translate international agreements into national and local level commitments, programmes and actions. REFERENCES BERGER D.J., OMA K.M., HONEB H. & VIALL W. (2003). - The making of a conservancy: the evolution of the Nyae Nyae Conservancy, restoring human dignity with wildlife wealth: 1997-2002. WWF/LIFE Programme, Windhoek, Namibia. CENSUS OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION (2002). - 2001 population and housing census. Preliminary Report, Windhoek, Namibia. EURATA (2002). - A rural profile and strategic framework for Namibia. Rapport for the Namibian Government and European Commission. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA (1996a). - Nature Conservation Amendment Act, 1996. Government Gazette No. 1333, Windhoek, Namibia. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA (1996b). - Amendment of Regulations Relating to Nature Conservation, 1996. Government Gazette No. 1446, Windhoek, Namibia. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA (2002). - Communal Land Reform Act, 2002. Government Gazette No. 2787, Windhoek, Namibia. JONES B.T.B. (1999). - Rights, revenues and resources: the problems and potential of conservancies as community wildlife management institutions in Namibia. Evaluating Eden Series, Discussion Paper No. 2, IIED, London. JONES B.T.B. (Undated). - Lessons learned and impacts of the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project Phase 1: CBNRM policy/legislation review and analysis. LIFE Project, Windhoek, Namibia. MARSH A. & SEELY M., eds. (1992). - Oshanas: sustaining people, environment and development in Central Owambo. Environmental Evaluation Associates in Namibia (Pty) Ltd, Windhoek, Namibia. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM (1995a). - Wildlife Management, Utilization and Tourism in Communal Areas. MET Policy Document, Windhoek, Namibia. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM (1995b). - Promotion of Community-Based Tourism. MET Policy Document, Windhoek, Namibia. MINISTRY OF WILDLIFE, CONSERVATION AND TOURISM (1992). - Establishment of Conservancies. MET Policy Document. Windhoek, Namibia. MUROMBEDZI J. (2003). - Revisiting the principles of community-based natural resources management. In: Proceedings of the Regional Conference on CBNRM in Southern Africa: "Sharing best practices for the future", March 3-7, Windhoek, Namibia. Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations (NACSO), Windhoek, Namibia. NACSO (Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations) (2004). - Namibia State Conservancy Report. NACSO, Windhoek, Namibia. (In prep.). NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION (2004). - Namibia Vision 2030, policy framework for long-term national development. Windhoek, Namibia. WEAVER C. & SKYER P. (2003). - Conservancies: integrating wildlife land-use options into the livelihood, development and conservation strategies of Namibian communities. WWF/LIFE Project and NACSO, Windhoek, Namibia. WIESSNER P. (2003). - Employment and income of Ju/’Hoansi community members resident to the Nyae Nyae Conservancy. Windhoek, Namibia, Unpublished Data.

GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES EN NAMIBIE : LE PROGRAMME DES CONSERVATOIRES ET LE CAS DU CONSERVATOIRE DE NYAE-NYAE P. SKYER Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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MOTS-CLÉS: Ressource naturelle, faune sauvage, gestion participative, Programme des Conservatoires, chasse sportive, tourisme, Conservatoire de Nyae-Nyae, Namibie.

RÉSUMÉ La gestion participative des ressources naturelles (CBRNM) a apporté sa contribution aux programmes concernant le développement et l’environnement de la plupart des pays d’Afrique australe, et peut-être même dans d’autres parties du monde. En Namibie, la gestion participative a eu un grand succès et s'est grandement développée dans le secteur de la faune sauvage grâce au programme internationalement reconnu des Conservatoires. Ce programme a démarré en 1998 et a fait la démonstration que la faune sauvage a une bonne chance de survie et de développement quand on attribue sa valeur économique aux personnes qui vivent quotidiennement avec elle. Cette attribution s'est concrétisée par l’octroi du droit d’usufruit aux communautés locales, au travers d'un solide cadre législatif et politique qui définit, clarifie et garantit ce droit. Le résultat a été un programme participatif très actif avec plus de 60 communautés mobilisées dans des entités de gouvernance et de gestion de la faune sauvage, appelées Conservatoires, impliquant 200 000 personnes (à la fois dans les Conservatoires enregistrés/déclarés et ceux en devenir). Cela représente plus de 10 % de la population de Namibie et près de 20 % de la population rurale. Les 29 Conservatoires enregistrés impliquent à eux seuls 95 000 personnes et couvrent une surface de 7 millions d’hectares. Cela représente 22 % des terres communautaires et près de 9 % de la surface totale des terres. Les communautés n’ont pas seulement le pouvoir de gérer la faune sauvage, mais elles peuvent aussi récolter les bénéfices directs et indirects issus de leurs efforts de gestion. Les bénéfices financiers et non-financiers issus de la faune sauvage et du tourisme ont presque doublé annuellement depuis 1998. En 2003, les Conservatoires ont rapporté plus de 2 430 000 $US grâce à diverses entreprises de tourisme et de faune sauvage. Les Ju/'hoansi Sans de Nyae Nyae dans le nord-ouest de la Namibie constituent l'une des communautés les plus pauvres et les plus marginales. Cette communauté a créé un Conservatoire de 9 030 km2 en 1998. En grande partie grâce à des réintroductions de gibier effectuées à partir de 1999, les effectifs de gibier ont augmenté, ce qui a entraîné une amélioration significative des conditions de vie des membres du Conservatoire. En 2003, celui-ci a été à l'origine de 28 % des 97 emplois existants et de près de 44 % du revenu total existant de 341 390 $US. La gestion participative offre la possibilité d’étendre les droits et les bénéfices des communautés, acquis pour la faune sauvage, à d'autres ressources naturelles, mais cette dernière possibilité nécessitera une attention et un suivi particulier quand on intégrera la faune sauvage aux autres formes d’utilisation de la terre, et quand on intégrera préférentiellement la gestion participative à la stratégie de développement rural. Compte tenu des inégalités actuelles qui règnent dans le secteur agricole entre les élites et les ruraux défavorisés, l’enjeu futur majeur dans le secteur de la faune sauvage pour les communautés rurales sera la sauvegarde des principes fondamentaux de la gestion participative.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 177-187 ISSN 1622-7662

THE TORGHAR CONSERVATION PROJECT: MANAGEMENT OF THE LIVESTOCK, SULEIMAN MARKHOR (CAPRA FALCONERI) AND AFGHAN URIAL (OVIS ORIENTALIS) IN THE TORGHAR HILLS, PAKISTAN M.H. WOODFORD (1), M.R. FRISINA (2) & G.A. AWAN (3) ( ) Apdo 1084, 8100 Loule, Algarve, Portugal. E-mail: [email protected] (2) Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks, 1330 W. Gold, Butte, MT 59701, USA. E-mail: [email protected] (3) World Wide Fund For Nature, Lahore, Pakistan. E-mail: gaawan@ yahoo.net 1

KEY-WORDS: Suleiman markhor, Capra falconeri megaceros, Afghan urial, Ovis orientalis cycloceros, livestock, conservation, range and livestock management, veterinary service, Torghar Hills, Balochistan, Pakistan.

ABSTRACT The Torghar Conservation Project (TCP) is a private conservation programme founded in 1986 following consultation by local Pathan tribal leaders and professional wildlife biologists from the USA. The TCP originally had as its main objective the restoration and conservation of the Suleiman markhor, Capra falconeri megaceros, and the Afghan urial, Ovis orientalis cycloceros, on Pathan tribal lands in the Torghar Hills of Qilla Saifullah District, Balochistan, Pakistan. Other objectives, some of which are in the process of implementation, have been adopted later. These include important social and economic welfare programmes for the people of the TCP area and play a vital role in creating the incentives for the involvement of the tribesmen and their families in conservation. Schools and a Medical Centre have been set up and agricultural assistance also has been provided. This paper describes the TCP protected area and the successful restoration of valuable populations of markhor and urial after the imposition of a total ban on hunting and the recruitment of 64 local Game Guards and 10 other staff. Trophy hunting, which provides the majority of the TCP funding, has been introduced and a small, conservative annual harvest of markhor and urial is now permitted. Some additional financial support has also been contributed by international conservation organisations. Following upon five years (1997-2001) of severe drought, which greatly reduced the numbers of their livestock, the local people within the TCP area have decided to develop and introduce a sustainable management plan for their livestock, wildlife and range-land resources. This plan involves sustainable range management, wildlife conservation and a community-based veterinary service.

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I. INTRODUCTION The local Kakar tribesmen, who live in the Torghar Hills of Balochistan, Pakistan, are semi-nomadic and are almost entirely dependent on domestic livestock, comprising large flocks of sheep and goats. Each year in early spring, most of the Kakar herdsmen, along with their families, move away to the north along traditional migration routes. Other tribal groups follow the same migratory pattern, accompanied by up to two millions of sheep and goats. These transhumants pass through the Torghar Hills twice a year, and grazing pressure is intense during these biannual migrations. The Suleiman markhor, Capra falconeri megaceros, and the Afghan urial, Ovis orientalis cycloceros, are largely sedentary in the area of the Torghar Hills. In the 1950s the mountains of northern Balochistan were rich in wildlife and held significant populations of these two species. Due to uncontrolled hunting, by the mid 1980s the total combined population of markhor and urial was estimated at about 200 heads (JOHNSTON, 1997a). Therefore, these two species were threatened of extinction, due to both poaching and competition for grazing with livestock, and there was a need to manage the wildlife and the livestock. The tribal lands in Balochistan are largely autonomous and are beyond the effective control of the federal and provincial governments. They are governed by tribal law in most matters, including access and permission to hunt, although wildlife is nominally controlled by the Provincial Administration. However, while the Provincial Forest Department is technically responsible for wildlife management in the Torghar Hills, it has been unable to fulfill its duties satisfactorily. The Torghar Conservation Project (TCP) was originally conceived and developed in 1985 to address this problem. It had the restoration and conservation of the Suleiman markhor and the Afghan urial as its main objective, and at the same time to develop some welfare programmes for the people of Torghar. In this paper we present (1) the context of the TCP, (2) the realizations of the TCP improved by an NGO, called the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection (STEP), created for the purpose of managing the TCP as a community-based, government-recognised, and non-profit conservation organization, and (3) the future threats to the wild caprines and the remedies.

II. THE TORGHAR-CONSERVATION-PROJECT CONTEXT II.1. THE PROTECTED AREA Location, surface and topography The TPC protected area is located in the Torghar Mountains (Black Mountains) in the Toba Kakar Range (31°12'N, 68°28'E). They are a chain of rugged sandstone ridges, approximately 90 km long and 20-25 km wide. The lack of good topographical maps at the 1:25,000 to 1:50,000 scales has presented a constant problem for the estimation of the TCP protected area, developing accurate surveys and conducting land-use planning. Using Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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1:50,000 maps, JOHNSON (1997a) estimated the area of the TCP area to be about 1,000 km2. However, in 2001 the survey team, using a 1:250,000 map, and traveling the boundaries using a GPS, clearly defined the boundaries and estimated the TCP protected area to be 642 km2. The area of the markhor habitat currently unprotected was further estimated to be 207 km2 (FRISINA et al., 2002). Negotiations are underway to allow the inclusion of this area into the TCP, along with several adjacent tribal areas, which support further populations of Suleiman markhor and Afghan urial, and where the tribes' people are anxious to join the TCP. JOHNSON (1997a) described a "Core Protected Area" within the TCP area to comprise about 300 km2 embracing three parallel ridges separated by two northeast draining streams. This important area is regularly patrolled by TCP Game Guards. The altitude varies between 2,500 m and 3,300 m. The southernmost ridge has a north-facing slope that gradually rises to 2,800 m and is dissected by several deeply incised drainages. The south-facing slopes drop precipitously from the crest forming a series of step-like cliffs to the Khaisore Valley. The northern ridges consist of steep, upturned rock strata resembling a series of parallel, jagged toothcombs.

Climate and vegetation The area is characterised by dry cold winters (average mean temperature 4°C) and warm summers (average mean temperature 26 °C). Heavy snow often falls in winter and violent thunderstorms and dust storms occur in summer. Total annual precipitation is between 180 mm and 270 mm (SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, 1991). From the winter of 1997 to April 2001 there was almost no rainfall and little snow in the Torghar Hills and the consequent drought had severe effects on the livestock of the area. The wildlife was affected to a lesser extent. Shrub-steppe plant communities dominate the semi-desert landscape of the Torghar Hills. Bunchgrasses, forbs, wild almond Amygdalus brahnica trees, Ephedra sp., Artemisia sp., and other shrubs occur on the upland slopes. Cargana sp. and Tamarix sp. are growing in low lying areas and drainage lines where water is available. Trees are scarce but juniper, Juniperus macropoda, wild pistachio trees, Pistacia khinjuk, and almond trees are scattered across the landscape (FRISINA, 1998). The TCP area lies within the “Balochistan juniper and pistachio scrub forest” and the “arid subtropical habitat” described by ROBERTS (1997). The Balochistan Gazetteer (SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING, 1991) provides a general description of the flora of the Balochistan Province.

II.2. PEOPLE AND ECONOMY The total human population of the TCP area in the Torghar Hills comprises about 4,000 members of the Kakar tribe. Most of the +/- 400 families have permanent houses in the mountains while some family members move around seasonally with their flocks. The largest village is Tanishpa with about 25 households. The Torghar Hills lie across several traditional migration routes that are followed by the local Torghar herdsmen and other Pathan tribes on their seasonal treks between the Afghan plains, where some of them Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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spend the summer, and the winter grazings in the Torghar Hills and to the south. The numbers of these transhumants are estimated to be about 200,000, accompanied by up to 2 million heads of livestock. Almost every adult man is armed and they hunt large and small game during their seasonal migrations. The Game Guards of the TCP effectively control this poaching within the TCP area. Torghar society is marked by extreme poverty. There are almost no sources of permanent or temporary employment in Torghar, apart from the jobs provided by the TCP. A little agriculture has been developed at Tanishpa where there is some level ground and a source of water for irrigation. Crops grown include grains, alfalfa, almonds and apricots. Many wild products, pistachio nuts, wild rhubarb, Rheum sp., and other edible plants are collected. The wild pistachio tree is a main source of fuel, food and income. Unfortunately the wild pistachio trees are badly damaged by porcupines, Hystrix indica, whose population has greatly increased since the local extermination of the leopard, Panthera pardus. The local Kakar tribesmen are semi-nomadic and are almost entirely dependent on domestic livestock, comprising large flocks of sheep and goats and a few donkeys and camels for their survival. Small numbers of cattle and horses are also kept. The size of the flocks of sheep and goats depends on the affluence of the owner and the season. There has been a recent upward trend in the numbers of livestock that poses a direct threat to the ecology of the habitat and its biodiversity. There has also been a concurrent abandonment of the traditional “Pagor” system of rotational grazing of common pastures. Each year in early spring, most of the Kakar herdsmen, along with their families, move away to the north along traditional migration routes, out of the Torghar Hills and into the plains of Kakar Khorasan. Nearly 20 other tribal groups from nearby areas, said to number over 200,000 people, follow the same migratory pattern, accompanied by up to two millions of sheep and goats. These transhumants pass through the Torghar Hills twice a year on their way to and from their tribal summer pastures in Khorasan and further north in Afghanistan. While grazing pressure is intense during the biannual migrations, once these are over in the spring, the ranges of Torghar are almost devoid of livestock during the dry summer months. On their return in autumn, the local tribesmen graze their domestic livestock on the valley floors and on the lower slopes of the Torghar Hills throughout the winter. The resident population of domestic sheep and goats within the TCP/STEP area is said to approach +/- 40,000 heads after good rains. However, in 1999, when there had been very little rain in the three previous years, a limited survey of 245 (out of a total of about 400) households indicated that their domestic livestock population had fallen to 34,624 sheep and goats, 125 cattle, 184 camels, 22 horses and 618 donkeys (RAJA, 2000). A further survey carried out in May 2000, while the drought was still having a marked impact, revealed that the livestock numbers held by the same 245 households had further declined to 24,298 sheep and goats, 119 cattle, 184 camels, 22 horses and 562 donkeys (RAJA, 2000). By April 2001, it was estimated that only about 17,000 sheep and goats, owned by the 245 households, had survived. The impact on other domestic animal species was not as severe (FRISINA et al., 2002). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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II.3. WILD FAUNA General wild fauna In the 1950s the mountains of northern Balochistan were rich in wildlife and held significant populations of Suleiman markhor, Afghan urial, leopards, Asiatic black bears, Ursus thibetanus, etc. Due to uncontrolled hunting, accelerated by the easy availability of cheap automatic weapons from the political unrest in Afghanistan, the leopard and the black bear, were either wiped out or were on the verge of extinction in the Torghar Hills by the mid 1980s, and the total combined population of markhor and urial was estimated at about 200 heads (JOHNSON, 1997a). There now remain small populations of the following species: Suleiman markhor, Afghan urial, wolf, Canis lupus, hyaena, Hyaena hyaena, fox, Vulpes vulpes and V. cana, Pallas’s cat, Felis manul, steppe wild cat, F. sylvestris ornata, and stone marten, Martes foina. The porcupine, which in the past was controlled by the leopard, is now a serious agricultural pest. However, the TCP is prepared to help reintroduce the leopard if the people wish it. Small mammals include the pika, Ochotona rufescens, and the Afghan mole vole, Ellobius fuscocapillus. About 78 bird species have been recorded, many of which breed in the area. The area is rich in reptiles, including the horned viper and the leafnosed viper.

Suleiman markhor and afghan urial The biology (population dynamics, genetics, habitat requirements and disease situation) of the Suleiman markhor and the Afghan urial in the Torghar Hills have not been studied in any great detail, but they are well enough understood to allow conservative management of their populations and habitats (FRISINA et al., 1998; FRISINA, 2000; FRISINA et al., 2002). The markhor and urial in the area are largely sedentary, although extensive local movements occur when prompted by deteriorating grazing conditions or disturbance. The Afghan urial is more widespread than the markhor in Torghar and has a greater tendency to travel through the mountain range, using the long, open ridges as corridors. Markhor are said to prefer the most rugged areas with bare screes, rock faces and precipitous cliffs, interspersed with patches of vegetation. However, habitat usage by the two caprines is not mutually exclusive and there is a considerable overlap (WOODFORD, 1997; FRISINA, 1997).

III. REALIZATIONS OF THE TORGHAR CONSERVATION PROJECT III.1. MARKHOR AND URIAL POPULATION MANAGEMENT Since its inception, the TCP (later managed by STEP) has achieved an almost complete cessation of unauthorised hunting of markhor and urial by both local tribesmen and outsiders throughout the TCP protected area (JOHNGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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SON, 1997a). This has been accomplished because Torghar is a tribal society and the tribal chieftains have given their full support to a hunting ban. As a result, the markhor and urial populations of the TCP area, which were almost exterminated by 1983-1984, have grown steadily and continue to do so. From 1985 to 1999, several surveys have been carried out to determine the population status of the Suleiman markhor and Afghan urial in the Torghar Mountains (JOHNSON, 1997a, 1997b; FRISINA et al., 1998; FRISINA, 2000; FRISINA et al., 2002). A further survey, planned for November 2004, has been postponed until April 2005 for security reasons. All surveys have been conducted during the rut in November, were supervised by biologists sponsored by the US Fish and Wildlife Service and were accompanied by the TCP Game guards. Torghar’s markhor and urial populations in the whole TCP area have recently (November 1999) been estimated at 1,684 and 1,742 respectively (FRISINA, 2000). Thus a sustainable trophy harvest of markhor could be up to 18 trophy males a year and up to 13 for the urial. In the past, while their populations have been steadily increasing, harvest levels at Torghar have not been more than three markhor and four urial in any one season. Since the markhor and urial have polygynous mating systems, the populations’ overall reproductive rate would be little affected by the loss of a small number of adult males (CAUGHLEY, 1977). At present STEP/TCP receives two markhor and five urial permits per annum from the Pakistan National Council for Conservation of Wildlife (NCCW). The urial permits are often not used because of the current political situation and the high price of the urial trophy in comparison with the rates for the same or similar species in Central Asia. Current trophy hunting has had no impact on the ability of the Torghar markhor and urial populations to increase the male population segment. For similar species and populations, HARRIS (1993) concluded that the annual harvests of trophy males could be equivalent to one or two percent of the total population without negative consequences. The harvesting of males within a limit of 10 to 20 percent of the replacement of the trophy-sized segment is considered by WEGGE (1997) to be a safe and conservative harvest level for stable or increasing wild sheep and goat populations. Harvest levels at Torghar have thus been conservative. In 1992, the Suleiman markhor was placed on Appendix 1 of CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Species). Appendix 1 includes species threatened with extinction. Trade in specimens of these species is permitted only in exceptional circumstances. In 2000, the Afghan urial was placed on Appendix 11 of CITES. Appendix 11 includes species not necessarily threatened with extinction, but in which trade must be controlled in order to avoid utilization incompatible with their survival. The Suleiman markhor is currently listed as Endangered by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) under the Endangered Species Act, and at present (2004) permits cannot be issued for the import of trophies from this species into the United States of America. Attempts are at present being made to have the markhor downlisted to “Threatened” which would enable a limited number of markhor trophies to be imported into USA. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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III.2. FUNDING, AND DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMMES The TCP/STEP has been self-sufficient since its creation and has depended almost entirely on revenues derived from limited trophy hunting fees paid by international sportsmen. However, throughout the 19 years of the TCP’s existence in Balochistan, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of International Affairs has provided much valuable technical assistance without any cost to the Project. The TCP has also received grants from the World Wildlife Fund-Pakistan, the Houbara Foundation, Safari Club International and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Small Grants. A Global Environment Fund (GEF) Medium-sized Project “Conservation of Habitats and Species in Arid and Semi-arid Ecosystems in Balochistan” has recently been approved and is ready for implementation in the Torghar Mountains and the Chagai Desert. The development and welfare programmes initiated by TCP/STEP included the construction of water tanks, dams and irrigation channels to provide water for the people and livestock during droughts. Young fruit trees have also been supplied to those who live in suitable places. A Medical Camp has set up by TCP/STEP at Torghar, especially for those women, children and the elderly who are unable to travel the 90 km to Qilla Saifullah or to Quetta. Funds are also made available each year by the TCP for emergency drought relief, the provision of tents and food and for those families in need of immediate financial support. Over sixty local Pathan tribesmen are currently employed as Game Guards with salaries and benefits derived directly from the TCP/STEP. The TCP/STEP has thus succeeded in providing considerable social and economic incentives for the Kakar people of the Torghar Hills to manage their domestic livestock sustainably and to conserve their wildlife wisely.

IV. FUTURE THREATS TO THE WILD CAPRINES AND REMEDIES There are, however, some possible future threats to the populations of wild ungulates in the Torghar Hills. These include competition for grazing by uncontrolled numbers of domestic livestock (some purchased with money acquired from the trophy-hunting programme), and the possibiIity of disease transmission from livestock, particularly those of the nomads from Afghanistan, to the wild caprines (WOODFORD, 1997). These threats are particularly severe during periods of drought when contact between wild caprines and domestic livestock at water points or on the higher pastures is more intimate and frequent. Any substantial increase in the numbers of domestic sheep and goats grazing the Torghar Hills in winter could severely compromise the continued expansion of the valuable markhor and urial populations. Marketing of surplus livestock in the fall is said to be difficult and sometimes this results in more animals being overwintered on the over-grazed ranges than is desirable. Thus improved marketing and slaughter facilities are needed. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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In 2001, following five years of severe drought, the local people of the Torghar Hills, in consultation with the TCP/STEP and with external advisors supplied by the USFWS, made the decision to tie their future more to the management of their valuable wildlife populations and less to traditional livestock production. As a result, they have decided to undertake a new system of conservative range management that emphasizes flock-size reduction and maintenance at the “drought level,” and thus the protection of the markhor and urial populations from competition for forage, especially in winter.

IV.1. COMPETITION FOR GRAZING AND RANGE MANAGEMENT Two land use types have been identified within the TCP area. The Type 1 recognises an area reserved for wildlife alone and Type 2 is set aside for sustainable use by both domestic livestock and wildlife. These areas are designed to provide year-round habitat for both markhor and urial. The local herdsmen of Torghar have agreed to work towards the cessation of livestock grazing in these areas and have, except for a few instances during the recent drought, avoided grazing these areas for several years. It is very important that the herdsmen understand and agree with the necessity to allow the forage plant communities periodic rest from grazing during the growing season so that the plants can perform their essential biological processes of photosynthesis, food storage in roots, seed production etc. (FRISINA, 1989; FRISINA et al., 2002). The new strategy for range management will include the reintroduction and implementation of the “Pagor” rotational grazing system. This system will be adapted to maintain the soil and vegetation in harmony with the wild and domestic ungulates.

IV.2. DISEASE TRANSMISSION AND ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICE Since it is impossible to vaccinate wild caprines against the common diseases of sympatric domestic sheep and goats, strategic veterinary extension work for the domestic livestock is needed to ensure that the available vaccines and drugs are used to the maximum economic and strategic advantage to immunize and treat the livestock. A number of infectious diseases, some of which could be transmissible to the markhor and urial, frequently afflict the domestic livestock of Torghar. These diseases include: Contagious ophthalmia, Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Peste des petits ruminants (PPR), Contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP), Anthrax, Contagious ecthyma, Sheep and goat pox and Sarcoptic mange (TAJ MUHAMMAD, pers. comm. 1997). There is at present no evidence of disease transmission from the domestic livestock to the wild Caprines. However, it must be recognised that there is little to be gained from improved veterinary care of the domestic livestock if this results in more under-nourished sheep and goats continuing to over-graze the range, especially in winter. It is thus of supreme importance that the livestock numbers are strictly controlled and that the veterinary service demonstrates that livestock productivity from a smaller, healthier flock is greater than that derived from a very large flock managed in the traditional manner. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The provision of a Community-based Animal Health Service for the domestic livestock within the TCP/STEP area has been discussed and agreed with the herdsmen. This service will involve the selection, training and equipping a small number of young, local tribesmen to act as “Barefoot Vets” throughout the Project area. These young men will travel throughout the TCP area on donkeys or camels and will undertake a strategic vaccination programme for sheep and goats and will administer appropriate anthelmintics (WOODFORD, 1997; FRISINA et al., 2002). It is plain that any veterinary intervention must be conditional on agreed and implemented range and livestock management policies that will also minimise contact between the wild caprines and the domestic livestock. There is evidence that the tribal herdsmen and their leaders understand this and will be prepared to cooperate if presented with logical overall management plans designed specifically for the sustainable maintenance of their environment upon which they, their livestock and their wildlife resources so precariously depend.

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS The TCP was founded in 1985 through the efforts of the local Pathan tribal chieftain, the late Nawab Taimur Shah JOGEZAI and of Sardar Naseer TAREEN, in consultation with wildlife biologists from the United States of America (JOHNSON, 1997a). Up until April 1994, Sardar TAREEN and members of the local Pathan ruling family, the Jogezais, executed the programme. At that time, Sardar TAREEN and his associates also formally established the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection (STEP). Much of the material used in this paper has been gleaned from the Torghar Conservation Plan 2003 (Society for Torghar Environmental Protection, 65, 3rd Floor, Regal Plaza, Circular Road, Quetta, Balochistan, Pakistan).

REFERENCES CAUGHLEY G. (1977). - Analysis of vertebrate populations. John Wiley and Sons, New York, 234 p. FRISINA M.R. (1989). - Implementing effective rangeland management in Montana: what works? Proceedings Montana Academy of Sciences, 49: 19-21. FRISINA M.R. (2000). - Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri jerdoni) and Afghan urial (Ovis orientalis cycloceros) population status in the Torghar Hills, Balochistan Province, Pakistan. A report to the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of International Affairs, 16 p. FRISINA M.R., WOODFORD M.H. & AWAN G.A. (2002). - Habitat and disease issues of concern to management of straight-horned markhor and Afghan urial in the Torghar Hills, Balochistan, Pakistan. Report to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of International Affairs and to the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection, 30 p. FRISINA M.R., WOODS C. & WOODFORD M.H. (1998). - Population trend of Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri jerdoni) and Afghan urial (Ovis orientalis cycloceros) with reference to habitat conditions, Torghar Hills, Baluchistan Province, Pakistan. Report to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service Office of International Affairs and to the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection, 12 p. HARRIS R.B. (1993). - Wildlife conservation in Yenuiqou, Qinghai, China. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, USA, Executive Summary, 10 p. JOHNSON K.A. (1997a). - Status of Suleiman markhor and Afghan urial populations in the Torghar Hills, Balochistan Province, Pakistan. In: S.A. MUFTI, C.A. WOODS and S.A. HASAN, eds. Pakistan Museum of Natural History and Florida Museum of Natural History, Islamabad, 12 p. JOHNSON K.A. (1997b). - Trophy hunting as a conservation tool for Caprinae in Pakistan. In : Harvesting wild species, implications for biodiversity conservation, C.H. FREESE, ed. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London: 393-423.

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RAJA N.A. (2000). - Drought in Torghar. Report to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of International Affairs, 8 p. ROBERTS T.J. (1997). - The mammals of Pakistan. Revised Edition. Oxford University Press, Karachi, Pakistan, 525 p. SUPERINTENDENT OF GOVERNMENT PRINTING (1991). - A Gazetteer of Baluchistan. A reprint of the first edition 1989. First published in 1908. Superintendent of Government Printing, Calcutta, 216 p. WEGGE P. (1997). - Preliminary guidelines for sustainable use of wild caprins. In: Wild sheep and goats and their relatives, D.M. SHACKLETON, ed. IUCN/SSC Caprinae Specialist Group, Gland, Switzerland: 365-372. WOODFORD M.H. (1997). - Disease risks to the Suleiman markhor (Capra falconeri jerdoni) and Afghan urial (Ovis vignei) in the Torghar Mountain Range, Zhob District, Balochistan. Report to the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Office of International Affairs and to the Society for Torghar Environmental Protection, 5 p.

PROJET DE CONSERVATION DU TORGHAR : GESTION DU BÉTAIL, DES MARKHORS DE SULEIMAN (CAPRA FALCONERI) ET DES URIALS D’AFGHANISTAN (OVIS ORIENTALIS) DANS LES MONTAGNES DU TORGHAR, PAKISTAN M.H. WOODFORD, M.R. FRISINA & G.A. AWAN

MOTS-CLÉS: Markhor de Suleiman, Capra falconeri megaceros, urial d’Afghanistan, Ovis orientalis cycloceros, bétail, conservation, gestion du bétail et des habitats, service vétérinaire, Balouchistan, Pakistan.

RÉSUMÉ Le projet de conservation du Torghar (TCP) est un programme de conservation privé, fondé en 1986 après consultation des chefs des tribus Pathans et des experts biologistes de la faune des Etats-Unis. Le TCP avait comme objectif initial principal de restaurer et de conserver le markhor de Suleiman, Capra falconeri megaceros, et l’urial d’Afghanistan, Ovis orientalis cycloceros, sur les terres tribales des Pathans dans les montagnes de Torghar du district de Quilla Saifullah au Balouchistan (Pakistan). D’autres objectifs, dont certains sont en cours de réalisation, ont été fixés par la suite. Ces objectifs comportent des programmes importants d’aide sociale et économique aux populations concernées par le TCP et jouent un rôle vital d'incitation des hommes de la tribu et de leur famille à s’impliquer dans la conservation. Des écoles et un centre médical ont été construits et une assistance agricole a aussi été fournie. Cet article décrit la zone protégée du TCP et la restauration réussie de populations conséquentes de markhor et d’urial après l’imposition de l’arrêt total de la chasse et le recrutement

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de 64 gardes-chasse locaux et de 10 autres personnes. La chasse sportive, qui fournit la plus grande partie du financement du TCP, a été introduite, et un petit prélèvement durable de markhor et d’urial est maintenant autorisé chaque année. Une aide financière supplémentaire a aussi été fournie par des organisations internationales de conservation. Suite à cinq années de grande sécheresse (1997-2001), qui ont sérieusement réduit la quantité de bétail, les populations locales de la zone du TCP ont décidé de développer et d’introduire un plan de gestion durable pour leur bétail, pour leur faune sauvage et pour leurs ressources naturelles présentes dans l’habitat. Ce plan implique une gestion durable de l’habitat, la conservation de la faune sauvage et un service vétérinaire géré par les communautés.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3), 2004, p. 189-196 ISSN 1622-7662

WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT BY FOREST PEOPLE IN THE BRAZILIAN EXTRACTIVIST RESERVE OF CAZUMBÁ P.B. SILVA NETO (1), J.O. GUIMARÃES (2), A.C. DE PAULA (3) and G. BARQUERO (1) 1 ( ) Pro-Fauna, Caixa Postal 188, Iguape, São Paulo, Brazil 11920-000. E-mail: [email protected] (2) IBAMA/CNPT, Rio Branco, Acre, Brazil. (3) IBAMA/CNPT, Brasília, Distrito Federal, Brazil.

KEY WORDS: Wildlife ranching, traditional population, forest, extractivist reserve, sustainable development, conservation, Cazumbá, Amazonia, Brazil.

ABSTRACT In the Brazilian Amazonia there are 18 extractivist reserves, totaling an area of 4,842,721 ha, with an average population density of 0.16 inhabitants per km2. Extractivist reserves (Resex) are defined as "natural areas utilized by traditional extractivist population, where subsistence is based on extractivism (the extraction of renewable natural resources from the land) and on complementary subsistence agriculture and small animal husbandry". The basic objectives of these reserves are to protect these peoples' ways of life and culture, and to improve the sustainable utilization of the reserve’s natural resources. Animal wildlife is the most utilized natural resource within an extractivist reserve and is part of traditional communities’ subsistence culture, serving as a source of leisure as well as nutrition. The present study focuses on a wildlife management program within the 750,794-ha Resex of Cazumbá, State of Acre, Brazil. This program envisages regulating utilization of wildlife by presenting two different strategies: (1) establishing hunting agreements restricting and organizing subsistence hunting, and (2) implementing controlled wildlife production modules. This pioneer project, initiated in 2002, has implemented a semi-extensive capybar, Hydrochaeris hydrochaeris, production unit, an extensive white-lipped peccary, Tayassu pecari, management plan, and a tortoise, Goechelone denticulate, production unit. Development of multi-disciplinary wildlife programs within extractivist reserves allows for higher environmental awareness, environmental education, unifies the community through a common interest, and adds and organizes adequate use of wildlife resources. This project has increased the value of wildlife for the forest people, maintained ecosystem biodiversity, inhibited community predatory practices and, most importantly, stopped deforestation caused by traditional ranching systems.

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I. INTRODUCTION In the Brazilian Amazonia there are 18 extractivist reserves, totaling an area of 4,842,721 ha. The average population density is 0.16 inhabitants per km2 (CNPT/IBAMA, 2003). In the law n# 9,985 of 18 of July of 2000, extractivist reserves (Resex) are defined as: "natural areas utilized by traditional extractivist population, where subsistence is based on extractivism (the extraction of the renewable natural resources from the land) and on complementary subsistence agriculture and small animal husbandry. The basic objectives of these reserves are to protect these peoples ways of life and culture and to improve the sustainable utilization of the reserve’s natural resources" (SISTEMA NACIONAL DE UNIDADES DE CONSERVAÇÃO, 2000). Animal wildlife is the most utilized natural resource within an extractivist reserve and is part of traditional communities’ subsistence culture, serving as a source of leisure as well as nutrition. Studies done on the utilization of game animals by a traditional Amazonian population, in the State Forest of Antimary - Acre, showed that 47.8% of the meals of rubber harvesters consisted of wildlife derived meats, providing approximately 77.1% of the local population’s protein necessities (FLORESTA ESTADUAL DO ANTIMARY, 1996). The present study focuses on a wildlife management program (BODMER et al., 1994) within the 750,794-ha extractivist reserve (Resex) Cazumbá, State of Acre, Brazil, with a population of 754 inhabitants. The Project was carried out in the reserve’s largest community of 27 families. Its primary objective is to regulate communal use of animal wildlife. Two different consumption strategies have been proposed: hunting agreements restricting and organizing subsistence hunting, and implementing controlled wildlife production modules. This pioneer project, initiated two years ago, has implemented a semi-extensive capybara, Hydrochaeris hydrochaeris, production unit, an extensive white-lipped peccary, Tayassu pecari, management plan, and a tortoise, Goechelone denticulate, production unit. The project is undertaken by the Associação dos Seringueiros do Cazumbá (Association of the Rubber Tappers of Cazumbá). Pró-Fauna provides technical assistance. The three main objectives of the program are: (1) the economic valorization of wildlife species as a strategy for social improvement;(2) the evaluation of the status of the ecosystem and its improvement by restoring biodiversity; and (3) training the community in self sufficiency to manage and coordinate the project. Combining knowledge of the forest people with scientific knowledge makes sustainable use of animal wildlife within the extractivist reserve economically feasible.

II. PRESENTATION OF THE PROGRAM II.1. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND TECHNICAL ORIENTATION The Associação dos Seringueiros do Cazumbá is composed of 56 partners, representing the workforce directly involved in the project’s implementation. The 150 members of the population are distributed in a community nucleus of Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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27 families totalizing 88 members, plus another 33 families living in surrounding areas, totalizing 62. The project has set up a technical orientation program, in which those people most directly involved are trained in the necessary aspects of wildlife management. In May 2004, six of the Resex’s most deeply involved project members took three weeks of training in central and southern Brazil. Training was organized by PróFauna at several of its own or partner wildlife production locations. The technical orientation program included training in various wildlife production and management techniques, including basic environmental impact assessment, animal capture and handling, identification and treatment of diseases, nutrition, pre and post natal care, live animal transportation, carcass and meat processing, and wildlife product and sub-product commercialization.

II.2. STUDY AREA The Cazumbá extractivist reserve is located in the State of Acre, south-western Amazonia, almost in its entirety in the Caeté Micro-Basin. Access to the reserve varies with seasons. During the dry seasons, from about June to October, the community can be reached by land. During the rainy seasons, from about November to May, the main access to the community is through the Caeté River and its main tributaries (CNPT/IBAMA, 2003). The white-lipped peccary management study area is 15,000 ha large, and there is no direct anthropic impact on this area. The capybara production units were cut out of a deforested cattle pasture area. These pastures were modified by the digging out of capybara ponds. The tortoise production module is found in a 0.5-ha area, where a “pupunha” palm, Bactris gasipaes, Palmae family, plantation was previously located. No direct impact was caused in this location except by fencing around the area.

II.3. HUNTING AGREEMENTS An initial part of the program was to come to temporary and long-term hunting agreements. The temporary hunting agreement strongly restricts hunting of most large mammal species in an area of approximately ten kilometers radius surrounding the community. The white-lipped peccary management project was initiated with a binding two-year restriction on hunting and through the consequent restoration of natural peccary stocks.

II.4. CONTROLLED WILDLIFE PRODUCTION MODULES The capybara production unit is made up of 50 breeding females. Five capybara production modules were set up. These substitute cattle ranching activities. Each capybara production module consists of a water reservoir, pasture and forest. The five modules use a total of 14 ha. It was not necessary to create pasture areas because the area contained pasture from previous cattle ranching activities. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The tortoise production module supplies food ad libitum to its 40 mature females and 15 mature males, from both pupunha trees, and the community provided fruits and tubers.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM AND ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS III.1. EFFECT OF THE LAND REFORM ON THE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION In mid 1976, the Instituto Nacional Colonização e Reforma Agraria (INCRA, National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform) repossessed several seringais (areas where latex is extracted from the “seringueira”, rubber tree), to carry out the Assentamento Boa Esperança land reform project in the Sena Madureira municipality. Assentamentos are redistributed land areas providing landless people with a basis for farming. Seringal Cazumbá, a part of Seringal Iracema, located in the Caetés River basin, was among these. This land reform expansion affected the Cazumbá community. Community leaders organized and subsequently concentrated many households in one habitation nucleus. This was done to counter allotment of Cazumbá Seringal. The objective was to maintain the habitants of the seringal grouped together, and not risk the undermining piecemeal selling off of seringal lands, a common cause of land speculation. Along with continuous population growth in the surrounding region came an outgrowth of social and economic problems. There is a lack of political strategies which would stimulate sustainable community extractivist activity. Most people in the communities have been forest residents since birth, living exclusively from extractivist activities. Traditionally these communities utilize game meat as a primary source of animal protein. Most animal protein for these communities comes directly from white-lipped peccary populations. Conventional animal production systems usually need high initial capital investment and are not accessible to low income rubber harvesters. Such factors result in unregulated, predatory hunting regimes which in turn create overbearing pressure on the already considerably decreased regional wildlife populations. There follows a spiraling decrease in readily available animal protein for the community. Few forest people have the habit of eating domestic animal meats (CALOURO, 1995). Their nutritional base is wildlife, some cereals, and, when possible, fish. The constantly decreasing availability of animal protein in the diet of the community is a serious problem. Reduction of wildlife populations can be attributed to disorganized and unregulated use of fauna resources. This same problem extends to the city of Sena Madureira, where the majority of workers are of seringais origin. These people, now living in an urban centre, also habitually and traditionally consume wildlife meat. The only available meat is illegally hunted in the surrounding forests and illegally sold at street markets. Major environmental impacts ensue. The government, moreover, is concerned about large quantities of wildlife meats commercialized without sanitary and legal processing. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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III.2. EFFECT OF THE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ON THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION The social organization of the community of Cazumbá has been vital to the initial success of the program. The community directly participated in all aspects of the program. The whole community sensed that this project was theirs, thus increasing enthusiasm to work with and to learn from the professionals involved. This provided a strong basis for ulterior project self-sufficiency. The considerable hunting pressure on wildlife populations which has considerably affected wildlife populations within reach of the community has also now decreased thanks to the community involvement. Wildlife populations are healthier because disorganized and unsustainable hunting habits have been stopped. Illegal poaching within the reserve is better controlled now that the community is aware poaching destroys their main source of animal protein. The community now bars poachers from entering the reserve.

III.3. WILDLIFE PRODUCTION AND COMMERCIALIZATION The present phase of the project uses the production of wildlife meat for the community. In a second phase, excess production will be used for the legal trade of wildlife products and sub-products. A result of the hunting agreements is numerous sightings of white-lipped peccary groups in community immediacies, not witnessed before the implementation of the project (GUIMARÃES, 2000). There have also been numerous sightings of other wildlife species with sustainable harvest potential, including the tapir, Tapirus terrestris, paca, Agouti paca, and agouti, Dasyprocta agouti. The white-lipped peccary project works with a herd of 320 mature females and 32 mature males. The second part of the project will consist of capturing 17% of the herd’s offspring to be reared under an extensive management regime for direct use by the community. The direct and indirect environmental impacts caused by herd management will be monitored. The capybara production modules show tremendous animal protein production potential, as has been demonstrated in many projects throughout South America. The modules consist of eight females with a reproductive mean of six offspring per female per year. This amounts to, by weight, twice the potential yearly protein production of cattle, Bos indicus, in the region (SCHALLER, 1983; ROBINSON and REDFORD, 1986). The tortoise production module demonstrates a sustainable alternative to consuming tortoise meat. Wild tortoise populations are in dire straits because tortoise meat is highly sought after. Animals in the production module formed five viable nests last year (2004), thus beginning the module reproductive phase. Newborns will be reared for food as well as sold for the legal pet trade. The module reduces hunting pressure near the community on wild tortoise populations, and increases awareness for and supply of this natural resource. The project’s excess production can be commercialized in several manners. Processing within the community to produce products with higher aggregate value is preferable. Surplus animals have been bartered within the community, creating a small local market for people participating directly in Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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production. A priori, surplus animals can also be sold alive to entities that want to start a wildlife production project, thus expanding production potential in the larger community. The project plan also includes a small abattoir in which the animals can be processed and meat properly inspected and sold to nearby markets. Leather is a sub-product with high income potential as well. It can be sold in natura or processed.

III.4. BENEFITS PROVIDED BY THE WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT The overall benefits provided to the community by wildlife management are (1) protection and conservation of the species studied within their natural habitat, (2) conservation of an ecosystem in equilibrium, (3) maintenance of species in their natural environment conserving their seed dispersing role for the habitat, (4) low cost animal protein production due to the low cost of necessary production infrastructure maintenance, (5) systematic meat production for the community, (6) practical implementation of the effective function of an extractivist within a Resex, in other words actual survival from extractivism, and (7) generation of work and income from extractivism as opposed to small scale agriculture.

IV. CONCLUSIONS The inclusion of community-based conservation strategies into Brazilian reserves management is of extreme importance. With the creation of the extractivist reserves the government has created a conservation strategy which is directly affected by the communities living within these areas (ALLEGRETTI, 1987). Extractivist Reserves currently in place consist of almost five million hectares of delimited land. More than double this amount is being planned in new reserves. It is extremely important to include wildlife management programs for the communities. It must be understood that in the Amazonia, wildlife accounts for about 70% of the diet and is very present in the culture and traditions of forest people. The project has improved, for men, women, and children, community social and economic standards. Availability of legal wildlife meats has been guaranteed to the 180 families surrounding the community. Improved health, education, transportation and environmental conditions have been brought to the community. It can be assumed that there will be no difficulty selling wildlife products and sub-products at local and city markets. Wildlife meat is consumed in quantity in the region, even though currently purchased illegally. Wildlife product clients are much concerned because they need a legal alternative to continue to buy such products. The Cazumbá community is aware that a market for legally authorized wildlife products is guaranteed. They also understand that adhering to practices of sustainable use will return more animals and improved biodiversity to the reserve. Development of multi-disciplinary wildlife programs within extractivist reserves allows for improved environmental education and awareness, unifies Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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the community through a common interest, and valorizes and organizes adequate use of wildlife resources. Perpetuation of selected wildlife species in regulated semi-extensive and extensive production regimes guarantees constant animal protein supply and promotes social, economic and ecological improvements. This project has increased the value of wildlife for the people of the forest, has maintained the biodiversity of ecosystems, inhibited predatory hunting practices used by the community and, most importantly, put an end to deforestation for traditional ranching systems.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Financial support was provided from the Coordinator for Secretariat of the Amazonia and Extractivism, and logistic aid in executing the project from the National Center for Traditional Populations, IBAMA/CNPT.

REFERENCES ALLEGRETTI M.H. (1987). - Reservas Extrativistas: uma proposta de desenvolvimento da floresta amazônica. Instituto de Estudos Amazônicos, Curitiba. BODMER R.E., MOYA L. & GILL R. (1994). - Managing wildlife to conserve Amazonian rainforest: population biology and economic considerations of game hunting. Biological Conservation, 67: 29-35. CALOURO A.M. (1995). - Caça de subsistência: Sustentabilidade e Padrões de uso entre seringueiros ribeirinhos e não ribeirinhos do Estado do Acre. Dissertação de Mestrado, UNB, Brasília, 113 p. CNPT/IBAMA (2003). - Plano de manejo da reserva Extrativista do Cazumbá. Versão preliminar. Documento do IBAMA, 300 p. FLORESTA ESTADUAL DO ANTIMARY (1996). - Estudos Basicos – Estudos de Fauna Sinopse. FUNTAC, Vol. 1, 206 p. GUIMARÃES J.O. (2000). - Relatório faunístico para criação da Reserva Extrativista da área Cazumbá-Iracema. Sena Madureira. ROBINSON J.G. & REDFORD K.H. (1986). - Body size, diet and population density of neotropical forest mammals. The American Naturalist, 128(5): 665-680. SCHALLER G.B. (1983). - Mammals and their biomass on a Brazilian Ranch. Arquivos de Zoologia, 31(1): 1-36. SISTEMA NACIONAL DE UNIDADES DE CONSERVAÇÃO (2000). - Lei n° 9,985 de 18 de Julho de 2000. SOUZA F.K. (2001). - Pasture instead of rubber? The ranching tendencies of family-based agriculture in extractive reserves and colonization projects. In: Southwestern Amazonia. Syntheses of the Open Meeting of the Human Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Research Community, Acre, Brazil. Rio de Janeiro.

GESTION DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE PAR LES HABITANTS DES FORÊTS DANS LA RÉSERVE BRÉSILIENNE EXTRACTIVISTE DE CAZUMBÁ P.B. SILVA NETO, J.O. GUIMARÃES, A.C. DE PAULA et G. BARQUERO Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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MOTS-CLÉS: Élevage de faune sauvage, population traditionnelle, forêt, réserve extractiviste, développement durable, conservation, Cazumbá, Amazonie, Brésil.

RÉSUMÉ Dans l’Amazonie brésilienne, il y a 18 réserves extractivistes, d’une superficie totale de 4 842 721 ha, avec une densité moyenne de 0,16 habitants au km2. Les réserves extractivistes sont définies comme "des espaces naturels utilisés par les populations traditionnelles vivant de cueillette, pour qui la cueillette (cueillette des ressources naturelles renouvelables de la terre) est leur moyen de subsistance, en complément d’une agriculture de subsistance et de l’élevage de petits mammifères". Les objectifs principaux d’une telle réserve sont de protéger le style de vie traditionnel et la culture de ces populations, et d’améliorer l’utilisation durable des ressources naturelles de la réserve. La faune sauvage est la ressource naturelle la plus utilisée dans une réserve extractiviste et fait partie de la culture de subsistance des communautés traditionnelles, représentant à la fois une source de nourriture et une source de loisir. Cet article présente le programme de gestion de la faune sauvage de la réserve extractiviste de Cazumbá, d’une superficie de 750 794 ha, située dans l’État d'Acre au Brésil. Le programme vise à réguler l’utilisation de la faune sauvage en présentant deux stratégies: (1) établir un accord sur la chasse qui restreint et organise l’exploitation de subsistance et (2) mettre en place des modules de production contrôlée de la faune sauvage. Ce projet pionnier, initié en 2002, a mis en place une unité de production semi-extensive de capybaras, Hydrochaeris hydrochaeris, un plan de gestion extensif du pécari à lèvre blanche, Tayassu pecari, et une unité de production de tortues, Goechelone denticulate. Le développement de programmes de faune multidisciplinaires dans les réserves extractivistes permet une plus grande prise de conscience de l'environnement et une éducation à l'environnement. Il permet d'unifier la communauté à travers un intérêt commun, et propose et organise une bonne utilisation des ressources fauniques. Ce projet a augmenté la valeur de la faune pour les habitants des forêts, maintenu la biodiversité de l’écosystème, empêché une pratique prédatrice par la communauté et, surtout, a permis d'arrêter la déforestation causée par l’élevage traditionnel.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 197-216 ISSN 1622-7662

NEW APPROACHES FOR INVOLVING COMMUNITIES IN WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT INCLUDING COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVANCIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA C. CHINHOYI Zimbabwe trust, Box 4027, 4 Lanark Road, Belgravia, Harare, Zimbabwe. E-mail: [email protected] KEY-WORDS: Natural resource, wildlife, Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), communal conservancy, Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), Chivaraidze Community Ranch, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia.

ABSTRACT The story of the evolution of the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Southern Africa has its roots in the Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), which provided the driving force for policies supporting community-based wildlife management in the early 1980s. The key principles on which CAMPFIRE was premised (clearly defined property regimes, i.e. who is entitled to what, and established use values for natural resources, i.e. what is wildlife worth) apply beyond wildlife to natural resource management in general, and they also strike at the heart of some of the fundamental social policy issues which affect much of the developing world. In its design CAMPFIRE was seen as representing a coherent response to social, political, economic, ecological and ethical issues. Now, it is reflected in many world debates on the management of common pool resources, the sustainable use of wild resources, the relationship of Indigenous peoples and local communities to the State, and the issue of devolution of political authority from the centre to the periphery. Since the inception of CAMPFIRE in the mid-1980s, Southern Africa has seen the emergence of an array of wildlife management systems, including: (1) management by individual freehold farmers, (2) corporate conservancies on pooled freehold land, and (3) management regimes on communal land. This paper is concerned with management regimes on communal land in terms of challenges confronting the CBNRM in building robust and effective community-based institutions for the management of shared common resources. These challenges are: economic incentives and conditions, devolution of tenure over land and land resources, collective ownership, scale (social and ecological), and the community empowerment (the extent to which communities can constitute themselves into effective institutions that are able to take decisions about their CBNRM). The paper uses the recent experiences of Chivaraidze Community Impala Ranch in Zimbabwe as a case study to highlight new and innovative approaches being attempted by CAMPFIRE to involve local communities in taking ownership, control and management of their natural resources. The design of CBNRM in Southern Africa took a programme approach as opposed to a project approach to provide space for further evolution and innovation in face of chan ging situations, contexts and settings.

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I. INTRODUCTION In recent decades the Southern African region has seen the emergence of an array of wildlife management systems, including: (1) management by individual freehold farmers, (2) corporate conservancies on pooled freehold land, and (3) community management regimes on communal land (JONES, 2003). This paper is concerned with management regimes on communal land. It analyses the institutional models/approaches taken by the Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe countries in implementing their Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programmes and challenges, being faced in building robust and effective community-based institutions for the management of shared common resources. These are analysed under three principal themes: (1) economic motivation under changing market and trade conditions, (2) resource appropriation, and (3) centre-periphery relationships in governance. Finally we present the case study of the Chivaraidze Community Impala Ranch in Zimbabwe to highlight new and innovative approaches being attempted by the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) to involve local communities in taking ownership, control and management of their natural resources.

II. ZIMBABWE WILDLIFE POLICY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE CBNRM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA The Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE grew out of the folly and failure of colonial legislation, which banned all utilization of wildlife for commercial as well as traditional hunting. Because people were not allowed to benefit from wildlife, they simply replaced it with crops or domestic animals that did benefit them. As far back as 1955, the inevitable outcome of this folly was recognised. In the early 1960s, the Wildlife Department started agitating for a radical shift in wildlife policy, away from protectionist philosophy to one of conservation through sustainable use. The essence of the new approach was that the proprietorship and ability to earn direct economic benefit from wildlife would provide a more effective incentive for wildlife conservation. A related hypothesis was that in certain ecological contexts wildlife ranching could economically outperform cattle ranching because of the ability of wildlife to utilise a greater variety of flora. Research on ranches in the South East Lowveld of the country at the time concluded that comparative meat production was relatively equal, with somewhat lower values for game meat because of marketing constraints although game ranching was found more environmental friendly. However, with the introduction of the international safari hunting industry in the mid-1960s, wildlife values rose sharply, tipping the economic scales towards wildlife dramatically in these ecological contexts. These developments accumulated in a formalisation of the policy shift through the promulgation of the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act. The Preamble of this Act indicates inter alia the objective “to confer privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife, fish and plants”. The Act designates these “owners or occupiers of alienated land” as “appropriate Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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authorities” over wildlife effectively making farms and ranches into proprietary wildlife units, combining “ownership”, management, cost and benefit. Certain conditions remained, allowing for the exemption of specially protected species and the ability of the government to impose restriction orders in cases of flagrant abuse. Since the inception of the Act, wildlife populations have increased on farms and ranches, their ecological health has improved and the wildlife industry in Zimbabwe has boomed. The amendment of the Act in 1982 at Zimbabwe’s independence to accord the same rights over wildlife to residents of communal land sector gave birth to the CAMPFIRE and laid the foundations for the development of the CBNRM in Southern Africa. The two fundamental conditions on which Zimbabwe’s wildlife policy was premised: (1) to clearly define property regimes (i.e. who is entitled to what), and (2) to establish the use values for natural resources (i.e. what is wildlife worth) were brought into the CAMPFIRE issues of community empowerment, organisational development, and democratisation. Arising from such a policy framework, the CAMPFIRE has since inception become a driving force for policies supporting community-based wildlife management in Southern Africa. The strong principles, which underpin the concept, apply beyond wildlife to natural resources in general, and they also strike at the heart of some fundamental issues, which affect much of the developing world. In its design, the CAMPFIRE was seen as representing a coherent response to social, political, economic, ecological and ethical issues which are occurring in many places around the world, reflected in debates on the management of common pool resources, sustainable use of natural resources, relationship of Indigenous Peoples and local communities to the State, and devolution of political authority in the context of the globalization of economic markets. Given such principles, it is not surprising that the CAMPFIRE quickly became controversial at home and abroad. Nationally because it advocates the devolution of authority over wild resources to the lowest accountable level of rural community, and internationally because it encourages unfettered trade in wildlife species. At present the CBNRM programmes in Southern Africa depend on the existence of an international sport hunting trade, of which elephant, Loxodonta africana, is a key species. This trade continues to be vigorously contested in the face of international pressure symbolised in a persistent ideological struggle between “utilizationists” and “preservationists”. Basically, the “use” school believes that, outside protected areas, unless wildlife is a positive land-use option it will lose out to monospecies (livestock) production systems, the opposite effect to the one both ideologies support. These insights and CAMPFIRE’s success on the ground inspired similar programmes in several countries in Southern Africa, especially Botswana, Namibia and Zambia and exciting pilot projects in Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania.

III. CAMPFIRE AND CBNRM PHILOSOPHY One of the critical major outcomes of the CAMPFIRE was the development of a set of principles, which guided CBNRM implementation in the region. The CBNRM in Southern Africa is concerned with providing communal landholders with the appropriate incentives to manage land and renewable natural Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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resources sustainably. It rests on a perception that it is not the over use of specific resources or species that is the greatest threat. Rather the greatest threat in terrestrial situations lies in natural systems being replaced with other land uses. Several sets of overlapping theories come together in the CAMPFIRE and Southern Africa’s CBNRM philosophy. The issues involved were more economic and institutional than ecological, and their conceptual foundation was based on an institutional formulation taking into account the game ranch experience and modifying it for the communal land context. The first stage involved the identification of the major impediments involved in the replication in communal lands of the essential institutional profile providing success, i.e. the tight proprietorial unit combining ownership, management, cost and benefit. The identified key issues were the devolution of tenure over land and land resources, collective proprietorship, and conferment of appropriate authority and policy change.

Devolution of tenure over land and land resources The key question here was how could strong property regimes be created under state tenure in communal lands. The important fact to note here in connection with tenure is that all communal lands in southern Africa are in law unalienated state land. This also applies to natural resources on the land. Communal land farmers are accorded usufruct rights to arable land and commonly used natural resources such as pasturage and wood products for fire wood and building, but they, individually or as groups, have no ownership status over these in law. Commercially valuable species of flora and fauna are claimed by the state. In this regard what became fundamental to the issue of devolution was a tenurial assumption. It was postulated that neither the current state tenure nor the alternative of the individualisation of tenure would viably address the requirements involved for the transplant. State tenure could not provide the required institutional profile. Individualisation of communal land holdings, extended to common pool resources, would result in a fragmentation of management to levels where any possible benefits would be negated. The only other viable alternative was a third tenurial category: a societal sanctioned communal common pool property regime legitimated by title or lease granted to it as body corporate. Such a communal property regime is one in which use rights to common pool resources are controlled by an identifiable group and are not privately owned or managed by governments; there exists rules concerning who may use the resource, who is excluded from the resource and how the resources should be used. This identification of a communal property regime with strong tenurial rights as the appropriate management unit in communal land contexts became the second fundamental conceptual root of the CAMPFIRE, following on from the first mentioned in section II above concerning economic instrumentalism.

Collective proprietorship The key issue here was the realisation that appropriate proprietorship units analogous to farms and ranches were communities of collective interest; management is therefore more complex. How are they to be defined and what management structures do they require? Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The concept of collective proprietorship raised a number of challenges in terms of implementation, not least of which is dealing with the issue of scale. Scale is important at the community level because collective decision-making is easier between smaller, relatively cohesive social units where there is direct interaction between decision makers, and peer pressure can also play a part in ensuring conformity to resource use rules. Scale is also important in terms of resource management, particularly with a “fugitive” resource such as wildlife where some species range over large tracts of land. It can therefore be difficult sometimes to match appropriate size social units with appropriate size wildlife management units. Scale is important in terms of the level at which decision-making is located. The bigger the geographic scale, the bigger the trade-off between highly interactive and participatory decision-making and representative forms of decision making that begin to blur the lines of accountability. Another challenge of collective proprietorship is to enable participants in collective management regimes to define the membership themselves and to define the boundaries of their jurisdiction. This is important for the development of common property management regimes that have internal legitimacy. In 1989, MURPHREE suggested that the problems associated with scale can be approached through the use of three linked approaches: (1) the starting point should be small local jurisdictions which combine authority with responsibility; (2) where necessary these jurisdictions should aggregate upwards through delegating authority to larger jurisdictions in order to manage resources across larger spatial scales, (3) in all cases the principle of downward accountability should be applied.

Conferment of appropriate authority and policy change The key issue here was how could appropriate authority be accorded to management units, which had no status in law, and the time needed to change national policies to allow devolution of tenure and the creation of strong communal property regimes. Typically the CBNRM programmes in Southern Africa are based on trying to operationalize the key principles outlined above. Throughout the region governments have enabled local communities to gain directly, or share in, the income from various forms of wildlife use including trophy hunting and photographic tourism. Governments have also made attempts to devolve authority to lower, mostly non-state levels of decision-making; rights have been given to units of collective proprietorship, which in some cases are selfdefining, while on others are based on existing state administrative units.

IV. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT ON COMMUNAL LAND REGIMES: THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH The development of new wildlife management systems and the implementation of the CBNRM on communal land relied heavily on experiences of wildlife management systems that emerged on freehold land in Zimbabwe. An institutional formulation taking the game ranch experience into account, and modifying it for the communal land context is what a number of CBNRM proGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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grammes have attempted to do. The modification entailed development of new policies or alignment to existing policies leading to different institutional approaches in different countries.

IV.1. THE ZIMBABWE MODEL The Zimbabwe model quietly shelved issues surrounding devolution of tenure and units of collective interest. Appropriate Authority was simply granted to councils and management entrusted with council sub-structures of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDOCs). A Rural District Council (RDC) is the lowest legal administrative unit of government responsible for the administration of communal and resettlement land. Its sub-structures of WADCOs and VIDCOs have no legal status in law. A village is the lowest unit of social organisation comprising roughly of 100 households. Six villages make up a Ward. At Ward level the six villages elect a councillor to represent them in council. Owners of private land are allowed to appoint representatives to sit as councillors. At subdistrict level, apart from WADCOs and VIDCOs there exists a parallel structure of traditional leadership, which until year 2000 was not part of local government structures in law. The authority granted to councils is however conditional, requiring councils to ensure that: (1) wildlife management is the responsibility of those communities living with it (termed producer communities); (2) at least 50% of the revenues from wildlife utilization are returned to the producer communities, 35% is ploughed back into wildlife management, 13% is retained by the council as tax, and 2% goes to the CAMPFIRE Association; (3) the marketing of the safari concessions is made through competitive bidding; and (4) an annual report and audited accounts are submitted to the Wildlife Department. Another important condition is that the producer communities had the full autonomy to decide on the use of the earned revenues. The Wildlife Department retains the right to approve hunting quotas. The conditions requiring devolution ofrevenues to producer communities and autonomy of such communities to decide on the use of funds revolutionarized wildlife management on communal land. The revenues disbursed to the communities increased from about Zw$ 400,000 in 1989 to about Zw$ 47,300,000 in 2001 (Table I).

IV.2. THE BOTSWANA MODEL The rights and responsibilities of the communities over natural resources in Botswana are defined in the 15-year “Community Natural Resources Management Lease” between the legally registered Community Trust and the Land Board. This gives the community trusts exclusive use (not ownership) of their area (including controlled hunting areas) for all tourism related activities, hunting, game capture and commercial use of veld products. The Wildlife Department retains the right to set quotas. The governance of communal land in Botswana is under the authority of councils and differs with Zimbabwe in that its council sub-structures are firmly under the leadership of the Chiefs and their Village Heads. Powerful Land Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLE I Allocation of the 1989-2001 revenues (Zw$) of the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in 15 districts including 145 wards in Zimbabwe. TABLEAU I Attributions (aux communautés, à la gestion de la faune sauvage, au Conseil, à d'autres destinations, sommes non attribuées, total) des revenus ($ zimbabwéens) du programme d'aménagement des zones communales pour les ressources indigènes (CAMPFIRE) dans 15 districts, comprenant 145 cantons, du Zimbabwe entre 1989 et 2001. Variation annuelle des revenus (%). Year

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

Communities

Allocations of the revenues (Zw$) to Wildlife Council Other Not Management allocated

396,005 509,994 1,203,673 3,074,278 5,560,958 7,794,511 8,259,680 8,388,566 10,681,392 22,185,225 51,443,942 45,757,567 47,294,474 212,550,265

173,180 60,386 25,579 88,549 743,699 300,310 129,854 55,623 379,721 1,375,502 823,441 451,786 213,544 213,372 2,905,816 1,059,673 589,914 91,185 1,404,609 6,219,659 2,331,210 1,639,316 210,050 (53,326) 9,688,208 2,583,326 1,219,653 349,137 1,542,985 13,489,612 3,086,311 1,684,426 228,688 625,709 13,884,814 4,085,950 3,031,985 78,504 1,931,342 17,516,347 369,096 332,829 154,491 11,397,266 22,935,072 12,707,938 1,722,402 2,021,547 7,472,791 46,109,904 23,335,512 9,709,178 1,130,108 19,962,506 105,581,246 14,320,530 21,924,782 5,678,560 6,244,347 93,925,786 29,658,311 25,014,536 11,585,227 15,316,957 128,869,506 94,834,788 67,511,046 21,822,244 66,526,827 463,245,170

Total

Annual change of the revenues % 85 111 114 56 39 3 26 31 101 129 -11 37

Boards at council level assist traditional leadership in administering land affairs. The creation of democratic Natural Resources Community Trusts with a strong income base has meant the emergence of a parallel and rival structure at local level. The number of these Trusts (motivated by formal use rights and the increasing value of wildlife) has grown rapidly from a mere 3 in 1993 to 61 in 2003. Another element that has helped the growth and strength of community trusts in Botswana has been the development of Joint Venture Arrangements with the private sector. Almost all community trusts in Botswana are under some form of Joint Venture Arrangement.

IV.3. THE NAMIBIA MODEL Namibia had the advantage of learning from Botswana and Zimbabwean models. Recognizing the institutional bottlenecks that prevented the Zimbabweans from properly applying their own CAMPFIRE principles, the new “Conservancy” legislation promulgated in 1997 allowed for self-definition and formation of bodies corporate at any level. This new legislation allowed the devolved management of wildlife to communities, provided they were registered. With a strong support from the donor community and NGO's sector, the Namibian CBNRM programme grew rapidly to achieve what can now be termed a model status in the region. From 1997 to date, 29 conservancies Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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involving 37,163 members and covering about 71,394 km2 have been registered (Table II, source: MET/CSD, 2003, in Evaluation Findings of the Wild, March 2004). A number of challenges however confront the Namibian model. Given the vast nature of the country and low population densities, Namibia has not yet TABLE II Registered communal area conservancies in Namibia from 1998 to 2003. Source: MET/CSD (2003). TABLEAU II Conservatoires communautaires enregistrés en Namibie entre 1998 et 2003. Nom, région, biome (bois, désert, savane, broussailles), date d'enregistrement, surface (km2), nombre total de membres enregistrés, effectif moyen de population. Source: MET/CSD (2003). N°

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 Total

Name of the Conservancy

Region

Biome

Date of registration

Nyae Nyae Otjozondjupa woodland Feb. 98 Salambala Caprivi -id.Jun. 1998 Torra Kunene desert -id.Khoadi/Hôas -id.desert/savanna -id.Uibasen* -id.-id.Dec. 99 Doro!Nawas -id.-id.Kwandu Caprivi woodland -id.Mayuni -id.-id.-id.Wapuro -id.-id.-id.Purros Kunene desert May 00 Tsiseb Erongo -id.Jan. 2001 Ehirovipuka Kunene savanna -id.Marienflüss -id.desert -id.Oskop Hardap shrub/savanna Feb. 01 Sorris Sorris Erongo desert/savanna Oct. 01 Mashi Caprivi woodland Mar. 03 Omatendeka Kunene savanna -id.Otjimboyo Erongo desert/savanna -id.Uukwaluudhi Omushati savanna -id.!Khob-!Naub** Hardap shrub/savanna Jul. 2003 Gamaseb Karas -id.-id.Huab Kunene desert/savanna -id.Orupembe -id.desert -id.Sanitatas -id.-id.-id.Anabeb -id.savanna -id.Sesfontein -id.-id.-id.Okongundumba -id.-id.-id.N'a Jaqna Otjozondjupa woodland -id.Ozondundu Kunene savanna -id.-

Size Number Average (km2) registered populamembers tion size 8,992 752 1,500 930 3,500 7,000 3,493 450 1,200 3,364 1,600 3,500 286 61 200 3,979 430 6,000 190 1,800 6,000 151 148 1,700 4,300 3,568 85 260 2,500 7,912 950 1,980 500 300 3,034 121 120 96 20 800 2,990 380 3,900 297 718 7,000 1,619 374 3,000 448 148 1,437 25,000 30,000 2,747 429 13,000 1,748 495 14,000 1,817 364 10,000 3,565 132 20,000 1,446 76 20,000 7,000 1,570 337 7,000 2,591 438 1,131 448 20,000 8,000 9,120 782 745 173 20,000 71,394 37,163 226,080

* Uibasen-Twyfelfontein ** Kalk Plateau

established local government structures, except for central and provincial governments. The country is in the process of establishing local government structures for the governance of communal land. Currently, the governance of communal land falls under the control of powerful chiefs. Division of powers Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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between conservancies and proposed local government structures needs to be carefully handled. Like in Botswana, the emergence of well-resourced democratic conservancies has meant the establishment of a parallel and rival structure to that of traditional leadership. CBNRM projects in Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia are still going through stages of development and refinement along similar lines.

V. CHALLENGES FOR BUILDING ROBUST COMMON PROPERTY REGIMES AND INSTITUTIONS The three models outlined above show that the development of new wildlife management systems and the implementation of the CBNRM on communal land has not been as straightforward as that on freehold land. A number of factors contribute to the complexity of the situation in communal areas. These include: the large numbers of people involved in collective proprietorship, the internal differentiation within communities, the need for communities to gain knowledge and understanding of some of the technical aspects of the wildlife management, and the need for communities to gain access to capital and markets. These and other factors have led to a number of challenges in building robust common property regimes and institutions for the CBNRM in communal areas.

V.1. PROBLEMS IN DEVOLVING AUTHORITY The problems surrounding the devolution of the authority over resources to local communities probably constitute the single biggest challenge that the CBNRM is facing in the region. All CBNRM approaches in the region bestow resource rights on local communities but not land rights. The tenure situation of communal land farmers has therefore remained less secure and vulnerable to the planning and regulation imposed from outside their communities. Typically, all CBNRM approaches in the region have failed to meet the key requirement calling for the identification of a common pool property regime with strong tenurial rights over land and land resources as the appropriate management unit in communal land contexts. The Zimbabwe model attempts to empower communities indirectly with tenure over only one resource (wildlife) in a holistic bundle of natural resources. An overall tenurial framework for integrated village common property regimes therefore does not exist. The Botswana and Namibian models attempt to empower communities directly with tenure over all natural resources thereby approximating an overall tenurial framework for integrated common property regimes. The absence of tenure rights over land in all the three models and the inherent risks associated with this weakness are best illustrated by the emergence of the so-called community private sector partnerships, and of a crusade promoting direct foreign investment. The high and escalating values of the wildlife resource have had the effect of intensifying political conflict over the appropriation of these values at community, district and national levels. Within communities and districts the CBNRM programmes have brought into sharper focus competing interests Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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drawn on class, status and ethnic lines. At the national level the economic performance of the industry has attracted the attention of the political elite and their private sector allies. In a recent article, CHILD reported on massive appropriation of communal and other land in Mozambique and Zambia. According to the article, communal and other land in the two countries is being given to commercial farmers and companies often for free or for very little under the guise of building economies of scale and growth in neighbouring communities. A similar article by TAYLOR reported on a government-led programme of privatization of communal rangelands in Botswana. Under the well known 1975 Tribal Lands Grazing Policy, about 335,000 ha of communal lands were fenced into ranches that were allocated to individuals and syndicates, displacing an estimated 30,000 people. This process is said to have accelerated under the 1991 National Policy on Agricultural Development, which since the 1990s has authorised the enclosure of a further 2 million ha of communal grazing land into 539 ranches. A further 250 ranches are planned for 2006. These ranches come with exclusive rights to renewable natural resources contained therein, and are allocated on a 50-year lease at 1 cent US per ha per year. The strong emphasis on community / private sector partnerships of the Botswana and Namibian models demonstrates the lack of trust by NGOs and government officials on the ability of communities to manage themselves the wildlife- and tourism-related activities. The events outlined demonstrate the vulnerability of the communal residents to the planning and regulation from outside. This scenario has had the net effect of undermining the other two fundamental principles regarding economic instrumentalism and collective proprietorship.

V.2. CHALLENGES FOR INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACHES On the principle of economic instrumentalism the three above-described institutional models of wildlife management reveal similar challenges. The Zimbabwe model delegates proprietorship over wildlife to Rural District Councils (RDC) with conditions and guidelines requiring further devolution of management and revenues to WADCO sub-units (devolution through persuasion and conditionality rather than statutory mandate). The model gives RDCs wider discretion given their statutory powers. As a result some district councils have appropriated the bulk of the revenues generated by their WADCO producer communities, made promises which they have never kept, marginalised any participation in marketing safari operations by communities, and created district level structures which serve the interests of RDC bureaucracies. In such instances the “decentralisation” of the CAMPFIRE has become the “recentralisation” of a district elite. Whilst the model provides for collective decision making on the use of funds at local level, problems related to the domination of decision making and appropriation of funds by the elite are common. The result has been ignorance of or hostility to the CAMPFIRE, mistrust of councils and officials concerned, increasing intolerance of wildlife in localities where benefits are not sufficient and a continued lack of communal environmental controls, e.g. land use planning. The Botswana and Namibian models delegate proprietorship to community body corporates of trusts and conservancies respectively. Although commuGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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nities in both countries have the rights to control revenues as a private asset, they have not generally taken up these rights. The same problems of local elites appropriating funds are common. This weakness stems from the fact that both structures (of trusts and conservancies) were externally engineered to circumvent the weaknesses of the Zimbabwe model and as such have remained heavily dependent on the support of NGOs and donors. Another problem relates to the issue of Joint Venture Arrangements where resource management responsibility is left in the hands of private sector operators, and where communities merely become passive recipients of benefits. This situation has had the effect of weakening issues of community organisation and governance. The internal mechanisms of control are largely absent, as are systems of participatory democracy. In such instances elected representatives become the key control point, with accountability upwards to NGOs and donors, instead of downward accountability to constituent communities. The danger facing the two models is that, when funding dries up, the programme can be captured by mid-level institutions as happened in Zimbabwe.

V.3. APPLYING COLLECTIVE PROPRIETORSHIP Definition of the "community" The principle of “collective proprietorship” has been the most difficult to apply in all contexts around the region. The major challenge lies in using “community” as an organising principle. In 1993, SHORE described "community" as one of the most vague and elusive concept in social science given the complex relationships between conditions, actors and institutions operative at a range of scales, from the local to the global. In countries such as Botswana and Zimbabwe, policy and legislation predefined communities through use of existing administrative units to determine the boundaries of membership and jurisdictions. This was seen as simpler and less time-consuming, but had the effect of bringing together villages and groups that would not necessarily co-operate. Namibia opted for community self-definition, but this led to the re-opening of some long standing land, ethnic and tribal disputes between different groups. Whilst this was necessary, there is still no guarantee that cohesion will be maintained over time.

Collective proprietorship vs individual initiative The inherent weakness in using community as an organising principle becomes evident in difficulties that communities face in implementing some of the institutional aspects implied by the notion of collective proprietorship. Enforcement of by-laws governing natural resource use and those related to poaching and embezzlement of funds has been generally weak. The other relates to problems of balancing individual and collective gain. Whereas community-based approaches put a high value on social consensus and equity considerations, market-based approaches encourage individual initiative to accumulate personal wealth. This possibly explains why elites, both modern and traditional tend to dominate at all levels. Why would large livestock owners support a wildlife common, which threatens to control their access to forage resources? Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Competing and overlapping authorities The other related crucial challenge is the perceived status of these institutions. There is confusion as to the exact status of these institutions in terms of whether they are institutions of governance or of production. This becomes important given an array of overlapping and competing authorities that typically exist in most communal areas of the region, and the need for CBNRM institutions to find space for themselves and gain internal legitimacy. Using powers conferred on them by government statutes, District Councils and Traditional Leadership claim ultimate ownership over issues of policy, regulation and governance on communal lands. Sectoral policies that entrust management of different resources with different technical ministries further complicates the problem of competing and overlapping authorities. The establishment of CBNRM institutions was motivated by the high utility value of wildlife and tends to operate only in rich wildlife areas. Consequently, polices regarding the CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe, Community Trusts in Botswana and Conservancies in Namibia only apply to rich wildlife areas leaving out non wildlife producing areas in the same locality. The legitimacy of these CBNRM institutions is further complicated by their dependence on donor and NGO support. The Botswana and Namibian institutions are particularly vulnerable upon withdrawal of donor and NGO support. Despite these challenges CBNRM in southern Africa has achieved some measure of success. Through devolving state control over wildlife benefits to local level institutions, the principle of empowerment of communities over resources has been established and conservation costs internalised by the local level institutions.

Key achievements of the wildlife management systems By establishing high values on wildlife, through the consumptive and nonconsumptive utilization of wildlife, the land use potential has been advanced. More land is available to wildlife today in southern Africa than at any other time this century, a direct result of allowing both the communal and private sector to manage the resource. Another key achievement of the CBNRM is the emergence of Trans-Boundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) programmes in the region (Figure 1). Institutions at community level have evolved and indicate the capacity for communities, motivated by benefits of valuable resources, to organise themselves thereby demonstrating the validity of tenure over common property resources.

VI. THE CHIVARAIDZE COMMUNITY IMPALA RANCH: A CASE STUDY IN RELATIVE SUCCESS It is against this background of CBNRM successes and challenges that the main focus is now on developing new and innovative approaches geared at involving local communities in taking ownership, control and management of their natural resources. One such innovation is the Chivaraidze Community Game Ranch under the CAMPFIRE. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Figure 1: Wildlife conservation and utilization areas, and potential trans-frontier conservation areas (delineated by polygons and greyed) in Southern Africa. Figure 1 : Zones de conservation et d'utilisation de la faune sauvage et zones potentielles transfrontalières (limitées par des polygones et grisées) en Afrique australe. En gris foncé : zones de conservation protégées par l'État (parcs nationaux, réserves de gibier, zones de safaris: ce sont des zones non habitées sauf au Mozambique, et où la chasse peut être pratiquée); en gris clair : zones d'utilisation de la faune sauvage (habitées par les populations locales, utilisation sous contrôle de l'État); en gris moyen : zones de gestion participative des ressources naturelles (les communautés locales contrôlent l'utilisation et reçoivent les bénéfices directement, mais l'État peut mettre en place des quotas); en noir : réserves de chasse privées non figurées.

VI.1. RANCH LOCATION AND INVOLVED HUMAN POPULATION The Chivaraidze Community Impala Ranch (introduced and supported by CIRAD-Zimbabwe under its Biodiversity Project) is located in the Chiriwo Ward 4 of the Guruve Rural District Council. The Guruve Rural District Council straddles the Zambezi escarpment in the Mashonaland Central Province of Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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northern Zimbabwe. Below the escarpment, to the north of the district, eleven wards constitute the Dande Communal Land which is bordered by Mozambique to the north, the Chiwore Safari Area to the west, the Rukowakoona Mountains (which make up the escarpment) to the south and the Muzarabani Rural District Council to the east. Chiriwo Ward is part of the eleven wards that constitute the Dande Communal Land. The Dande Communal Land falls wholly within the Zambezi Valley region, which is the Natural Region V. The region experiences fairly low total rainfall (450-600 mm), and is subject to periodic seasonal droughts and severe dry spells during the rainy season. The area is suitable for livestock production but the incidence of the tsetse fly, Glossina spp., in the Zambezi valley has precluded cattle as a viable land use option until very recently, following a concerted EU funded tsetse eradication programme in the late 1980s. Even with the eradication of the tsetse, the potential for livestock production is still very limited, due to constant invasions by the fly from Mozambique. Above the escarpment, a further 13 wards make up the Bakasa, Kachuta and Guruve communal lands. Before the eradication of the tsetse in 1989 and the introduction of the CAMPFIRE at the same time, the Dande communal land was regarded as a harsh environ with limited economic opportunities. The 1982 census estimated that some 18,000 people were living in Dande, an average of 4 persons per km2, while some 40,000 people inhabited the Guruve communal land alone, an average of 70 persons per km2. The significance of these differences is the strong positive correlation between population density and perceived potential economic well being. Clearly people considered their livelihood security was more assured in the Guruve communal land than in the valley below; at least prior to the implementation of the CAMPFIRE. The eradication of the tsetse and introduction of the CAMPFIRE changed the economic fortunes of Dande. These two major events opened Dande to more human settlement, because of economic opportunities unleashed by a wildlife-based economy, complimented by subsistence agriculture, which is being driven by cotton as a cash crop. Apart from wildlife production, cotton has emerged to be a major cash crop in Dande mainly because of early subsidies from government and provision of inputs in advance by private cotton companies. By the time of the 1992 census the population of Dande had doubled in ten years while in the Guruve communal land it had increased by only 20% during the same period. The 2002 census results seem to show the same trend.

VI.2. THE CIRAD-ZIMBABWE BIODIVERSITY PROJECT The CIRAD-Zimbabwe’s Biodiversity Project began operative in 1996 in three wards (wards 2, 3 and 4) of the Dande communal land. Its efforts have been oriented towards the reinforcement of the CAMPFIRE principles through sustainable conservation practice. Many initiatives have been undertaken to assist local communities to develop land use plans and to implement income-generating projects that improve their standards of living. The project played a vital role in setting up the Chivaraidze Community Impala Ranch in the Chiriwo ward 4, which supplies cheap meat to the local community and the Shange Conservancy and Training Centre in Ward 3, whose revenues are used to fund community projects. Other promoted projects include beekeeping, tannery and guinea fowl production. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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VI.3. THE CHIVARAIDZE COMMUNITY IMPALA RANCH Free ranching The Chivaraidze Community Impala Ranch is the first of its kind to be introduced on communal land. Wildlife being managed on communal lands is free ranging. The ranch is about 3,500 ha in extent, and plans exist to expand the size of the ranch to accommodate increased wildlife populations. The ranch is stocked with impalas, Aepyceros melampus, and other species of plains game such as the greater kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, sable antelope, Hippotragus niger, giraffe, Giraffa camelopardalis, and Burchell's zebra, Equus burchelli. The ranch infrastructure includes an electric fence, sophisticated abattoir facilities for the cropping of game meat, tourist lodges and safari hunting facilities. Capital investment of about Euros 350,000 was put into setting up the ranch. The bulk of this investment went into buying and translocating the impala.

Institutional aspects: ZimTrust Since the ranch project was being implemented under the auspices of the CAMPFIRE, management of the project was placed under existing CAMPFIRE structures. The CAMPFIRE management structure was from the very outset found not to be an appropriate institutional vehicle for the management of the ranch, given the strict business nature of the project. Realising the weaknesses associated with CAMPFIRE structures, CIRADZimbabwe invested considerable sums of money in setting up a management team for the ranch, comprising ranch manager, accounts clerk and game guards. A deal was also struck with the Bindura University’s Department of Environmental and Wildlife Studies to attach students to the project for a sustained and continued technical input. Community / private sector partnerships associated with Community Trusts in Botswana and Conservancies in Namibia, where communities become passive recipients of benefits, were also identified as not providing the right institutional profile. In this regard, CIRAD-Zimbabwe approached Zimbabwe Trust (ZimTrust) to assist with institutional support services for the management of the ranch. ZimTrust is a nongovernmental organisation, which is principally engaged in facilitating local level institutional development and provision of related skills training within Zimbabwe’s communal lands for effective and sustainable community development initiatives. The organisation was also instrumental in operationalizing the CAMPFIRE activities on the ground. The terms of reference given to ZimTrust were to investigate an appropriate institutional vehicle for the ownership, control and management of the ranch by the beneficiary community, taking the common nature of the resource (the need for all ward residents, about 1,300 households to benefit from the operations of the ranch) into account, and whilst at the same time retaining a firm business outlook. The key requirement was to use a business model that could provide lessons on how to commercialise communal natural-resourcebased activities, and on how to further devolve the wildlife-use rights from the council to the local levels. The challenge that the assignment presented to ZimTrust, was to come up with an institutional model that was going to be acceptable to both communities and council. Apart from council and commuGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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nities the model had to have legal standing in Zimbabwe laws. ZimTrust proposed a Co-operative Company as the appropriate institutional model. It took a lot of cajoling to convince both council and communities to accept the model.

VI.4. CO-OPERATIVE COMPANY AS A MODEL TO EMPOWER COMMUNITIES Company outline In Chapter 24:03, the 1996 revised edition of the Zimbabwe’s Companies Act defines a co-operative company and sets the broad limits to its structure and operations. The key points of the legislation indicated in the memorandum and articles concerning the association are as follows. (1) The Act sets a provision for its members concerning the production of agricultural produce or livestock, and/or the sale of goods. (2) There are some restrictions on the right to transfer the shares: they can only be sold back to the company and not directly to the members. (3) Ordinary shares are of only one class (though preference shares are permitted). Holders of preference shares are not allowed to vote except if the Articles permit on matters which directly affect their investment. (4) The Act sets limits to a number of ordinary shares by any one member. (5) The Act regulates the voting rights of its members so that no member may exercise more than six votes based on share holding or six votes based on business with the company. Every member must have at least one vote. (6) The Act limits the dividend which may be paid on its shares to a rate not exceeding 10% per annum. (7) It provides for the distribution of a part of the, or all, profits amongst its members, on the basis of certain or all of their business transactions with the company, e.g. rebates on purchases and bonus on sales. (8) Subjected to the permission of the Minister, co-operative companies may form or acquire one or more subsidiary co-operative companies. (9) Non-producing members are allowed to buy shares but, of course, are not eligible for rebates on purchases or bonus on sales. This applies to holders of preference shares as well. (10) A co-operative company is free under the law to undertake any business transaction, whether financial, manufacturing, trading or otherwise, such as an individual businessman may lawfully undertake. This includes the raising and issuing of loans, and purchase of shares in other companies. (11) The rebates and bonuses paid from profits are paid from untaxed income, whilst dividends are normally paid from taxed income. This is a valuable concession shared with co-operative societies and unions but not available to ordinary private or public companies. The advantages of a co-operative company are as follows: (1) no member can acquire the control by buying up large numbers of shares from members, (2) there is no restriction in the numbers of members, (3) many or all profits can be returned to members out of untaxed income, (4) the voting rights are equitable, (5) a high flexibility is accorded to the co-operative societies and unions, (6) the statutory reporting requirements are not too onerous, and (7) the spirit of a co-operative society is combined with the commercial outlook of a public company.

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VI.5. APPLICATION TO THE CHIVARAIDZE COMMUNITY RANCH Giving preference shares to CIRAD and the Safari Operator The application of the company concept was not without problems. The original articles of the association had proposed that donors and private sector parties, CIRAD and the Safari Operator who had invested funds during the project period, be given preference shares to the value of their investment, but on condition that dividends to preference shareholders be withheld for a period of 5-7 years. This proposal nearly killed the idea at inception, because of what communities read as a ploy by CIRAD and the Safari Operator to take back the ranch through the back door. This was despite the inclusion of a clause on disposal of donor equity and conversion of private sector shares to ordinary shares. It was clear in the clause that after the 5-7 year period, the CIRAD shares will be reverted back to the communities in relation to earlier agreements of grant funding under the Biodiversity project, and that the safari-operator preference shares will be converted to ordinary shares, thereby allowing the operator to receive dividends and not rebates or bonuses. The idea of giving preference shares to both CIRAD and the safari operator was eventually dropped to make the concept acceptable. The strategy of giving preference shares was to allow CIRAD and the safari operator to sit on the board on the strength of shares and to have the advisory capacity to provide technical assistance and guidance until the company was well established.

Definitions of the company members and business The other problem was the idea of communities buying shares and the definition of company member. On the issue of shares, the problem was the idea of asking poor community members to buy shares in a project whose objective in the first place was poverty alleviation. On membership, the key question was whether to define this by household or by the majority age of 18 years and above. The suggestion from the community to allow an independent and neutral person of their choice to explain the concept of shares eventually solved the problem. Finally, the communities realised that buying shares was a powerful empowerment tool and that defining company membership by household had the advantage of minimising registration costs. The share capital of US$ 6.73 per household is expected to raise about US$ 9,000 towards the operations of the ranch. Also rejected by the communities was a clause proposing joint procurement of agricultural inputs and marketing of agricultural produce to be part of the company business. The advantage here was the economies of scale obtained through joint purchasing and marketing, and income from levy charges. It is hoped that with time the communities will be able to understand these issues and hopefully take them on board.

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From the control by the council to the independance For the council, the idea of a company meant the loss of control over the ranch and the wildlife living in it. Before the existence of the company, sporthunting quotas approved by the Department of Parks under the general CAMPFIRE and the ranch was being granted to the council as per CAMPFIRE guidelines. This also meant the council had the right to market the quotas to safari operators, receive revenues directly, and later disburse the funds to communities after all the necessary deductions. The combination of the two concepts of wildlife ranching and body corporate, gave the ranch a status in law equal or equivalent to that of commercial farms, leaving the council virtually with no control. Like with commercial farms the ranch does no longer require its hunting quotas to be approved by the Department of Parks, is now free to enter into contracts with safari operators and to receive revenues directly. As with other private companies investing and operating on communal land, the company is allowed to negotiate a lease arrangement with the council regarding the use of the communal land. Lease fees are normally based on profitability and performance of the company. The overwhelming support that the company idea eventually received from communities, and the precedence set by private companies operating businesses on communal land, left the council with no option but to approve and underwrite the concept. The company was successfully registered and a board of directors is now in place. The board comprises 12 members, ten of which were elected by shareholders among themselves, and two of which incorporated from outside. The household-share certificates are currently being processed. The other legislative requirements relative to the setting up a management team for the company, maintaining a set accounts, ensuring annual audits and holding of annual general meeting, are already in place.

VI.6. IMPACT OF THE COMPANY MODEL Though relatively new the impact of the company model has been sudden and swift. Upon registration, the board quickly intervened to challenge an earlier contract that had been signed between the ranch and the safari operator. The contract was successfully changed and down payment for the hunting concession effected, indicating the potential of the model. Down payment for the hunting concession is a guaranteed sum that a safari operator is required to pay, regardless of the fact the hunt has been successful or not. Under previous contracts with council, safari operators never used to honour this clause in the contracts. The confusion regarding the exact status of the ranch has been completely removed. It has become clear to the council and safari operator that the ranch is an institution of production with the same status in law as other private businesses operating on communal land. The acceptance by the communities to buy shares coupled with legislative requirements obligating the company to produce audited accounts and hold annual general meetings, is bound to the introduction of a culture of downward accountability and control of the company by shareholders. Whilst the idea of a company as body corporate holds much hope, there is Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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good reason to be cautious about regarding it in its specifics as a “model” to be generalized in the CBNRM projects and programmes. The company is still in its stages of establishment. Its legitimacy and acceptability within the communities still needs to be tested. Its management demands on communities are to be assessed, and also its ability to generate sufficient benefits, to diversify and grow over time. These caveats having been noted, the company model does provide an instructive case study for the CBNRM in terms of institutional innovation and community empowerment.

VII. CONCLUSION Despite some problems and constraints, there are sufficient evidence from experiences on communal land in southern Africa to suggest that successful conservations of wildlife and other natural resources need to be associated with State-protected areas only. The lessons from the philosophy and practice of the CBNRM point to the need for new and innovative strategies that can improve the performance of community-based approaches. The strategies should focus on: (1) introducing alternative and innovative approaches, such as the company model, to influence policy and legislation revision on the basis of linking sustainable management with strong proprietorship and strong economic incentives; (2) seeking to empower communities through business approaches which put less emphasis on social and equity considerations; (3) increasing the impact of economic benefits, so that there is a balance between collective and individual gains; and (4) lobbying for the devolution of secure group tenure over communal land to the lowest appropriate level of jurisdiction. From there scaling up should take place.

REFERENCES JONES B.T.B. (2003). - Lessons learned and impacts of the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project Phase 1: CBNRM policy/legislation review and analysis. LIFE Project, Windhoek, Namibia.

NOUVELLES APPROCHES POUR IMPLIQUER LES COMMUNAUTÉS EN AFRIQUE AUSTRALE DANS LA GESTION DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE INCLUANT LA GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES ET LES CONSERVATOIRES C. CHINHOYI MOTS-CLÉS: Ressource naturelle, faune sauvage, Gestion participative des ressources naturelles (CBNRM), conservatoire communal, Programme de gestion des zones communales pour les ressources indigènes (CAMPFIRE), ranch communautaire de Chivaraidze, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibie.

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RÉSUMÉ L’histoire de l’évolution des gestions participatives des ressources naturelles (CBNRM) en Afrique australe a commencé avec le Programme de gestion des zones communales pour les ressources indigènes (CAMPFIRE) mis en place au Zimbabwe, qui fut le moteur de politiques visant à encourager la gestion participative de la faune sauvage au début des années 1980. Les principes clefs sur lesquels le programme CAMPFIRE a été établi (des régimes de propriétés clairement définis, à savoir "qui est responsable et de quoi", et des valeurs d’usages des ressources naturelles établies, à savoir "que vaut la faune sauvage") s’appliquent au-delà de la faune sauvage à la gestion des ressources naturelles en général, et ces principes sont au cœur de certains problèmes fondamentaux de politique sociale qui affectent bien des pays en développement. La conception du programme CAMPFIRE a été perçue comme représentant une réponse cohérente aux problèmes sociaux, politiques, économiques, écologiques et éthiques. Il est maintenant présenté dans de nombreux débats internationaux sur la gestion de ressources communes, l’utilisation durable des ressources sauvages/naturelles, les relations des peuples indigènes et des communautés locales avec l’État, et les questions de décentralisation. Depuis la mise en place du programme CAMPFIRE au milieu des années 1980, une panoplie de systèmes de gestion de la faune sauvage en Afrique australe a vu le jour, incluant : (1) la gestion par des fermiers individuels propriétaires, (2) des conservatoires coopératifs sur des regroupements de propriétés foncières, et (3) des régimes de gestion de terres communales. Cet article concerne seulement la gestion sur les terres communales et décrit les défis auxquels la CBNRM a été confrontée pour la mise en place d'institutions communautaires solides et efficaces pour la gestion des ressources communes partagées. Ces défis sont : l’incitation économique et ses conditions, la transmission de la propriété de la terre et de ses ressources, la propriété collective, les échelles sociale et écologique, et l'attribution des pouvoirs aux communautés (dans quelle mesure les communautés peuvent-elles créer elles-même des institutions efficaces capables de prendre des décisions dans le cadre du programme CAMPFIRE). L’article présente l’expérience récente menée au Ranch d’impalas de la communauté de Chivaraidze au Zimbabwé comme étude de cas, afin de mettre en lumière des approches nouvelles et innovantes tentées par le programme CAMPFIRE pour impliquer les communautés locales dans la prise de possession, le contrôle et la gestion de leurs ressources naturelles. La conception des CBNRM en Afrique australe, consistant en une approche de programme à l’opposé d’une approche de projet, permet de prendre en compte l’évolution et l’innovation en cas de changements de situation, de contexte et de cadre institutionnel.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 217-226 ISSN 1622-7662

LES ZONES CYNÉGÉTIQUES VILLAGEOISES : UNE EXPÉRIENCE DE GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES EN RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE R. MBITIKON Ecofac ZCV/RCA, BP 1608, Bangui, République Centrafricaine. E-mail: [email protected]

MOTS-CLÉS : Ressource naturelle, faune sauvage, gestion participative, Zone Cynégétique Villageoise (ZCV), partage équitable des revenus, République centrafricaine.

RÉSUMÉ Depuis plusieurs décennies, la gestion des ressources naturelles en République Centrafricaine avait été une exclusivité de l’État qui définissait seul leurs modes d’utilisation et de conservation. Ce principe a connu ses limites, et l’implication des populations locales dans la gestion des ressources naturelles, la faune sauvage en particulier, est maintenant une réalité depuis la création de Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV) en 1992. Les populations riveraines des aires protégées et des zones de chasse qui, jadis, ne bénéficiaient pas ou très peu des retombées de l’exploitation de la faune, connaissent maintenant un début de solutions à leurs problèmes de développement social et économique grâce aux revenus générés par les ZCV. Le territoire centrafricain est, en matière de gestion de la faune, divisé en deux zones : une Zone d’Intérêt Cynégétique où se trouvent les parcs nationaux, les réserves de faune et les zones de chasse, et une zone banale pour les autres activités de cueillette. La Zone Cynégétique Villageoise est une zone de chasse créée sur des superficies n’appartenant pas aux autres catégories d’aires protégées, et qui est réservée aux activités traditionnelles des populations des villages limitrophes. Elle est créée en collaboration avec les populations concernées ou à la demande de celles-ci. Elle a pour objectif de développer une gestion participative de la faune sauvage et des autres ressources naturelles en vue d’améliorer les conditions de vie des populations locales sur la base d’un partage équitable des revenus provenant d’une exploitation durable de cette richesse naturelle. Les revenus générés par l’exploitation des ZCV proviennent des taxes d’abattage des animaux, des taxes foncières, des loyers des campements de chasse, des taxes d’utilisation des infrastructures (pistes), et des produits de la vente de la viande provenant des animaux abattus par les touristes chasseurs, récupérés par les membres du Comité de gestion de la ZCV. Ces recettes sont réparties entre l’État, les Communes et les Communautés villageoises. Actuellement, dix ZCV ont été créées et fonctionnent. Au cours des cinq dernières années, le montant le plus élevé de leurs recettes annuelles cumulées d'exploitation a été de 100 millions de FCFA. Cette expérience a eu un impact sur la conservation de la faune sauvage grâce à une participation effective et régulière des villageois à la lutte contre le braconnage (auto-défense et gardes-chasse villageois), ce qui a contri-

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bué à réduire sensiblement le grand braconnage dû à des individus étrangers aux ZCV. De plus, les ZCV constituent des zones tampons tout autour des parcs nationaux. Les conditions de vie des populations se sont améliorées grâce, notamment, à la création de plus de deux cent postes d’emplois permanents et aux accès à l’eau potable, à l’école et aux soins de santé. Bien que les résultats obtenus soient prometteurs, il convient de relever que l’expérience de cette gestion participative de la faune sauvage reste fragile, car les communautés villageoises ont grandement besoin d’être encadrées et formées pour garantir la pérennité de l'expérience.

I. INTRODUCTION La République Centrafricaine (RCA), avant et quelques décennies après son indépendance, disposait d’une richesse exceptionnelle en faune sauvage sur l’ensemble du pays, en particulier dans l’est, le centre, et le nord. L'habitat y était favorable pour la faune et la densité en population humaine y était très faible (un habitant au kilomètre carré pour le nord). À cause de cette population peu nombreuse, les pressions humaines sur la faune sauvage pour la satisfaction des besoins en protéines animales étaient insignifiantes et ne pouvaient mettre en péril les richesses naturelles nationales. Aussi, le commerce et la détention des armes de chasse se pratiquaient-elles selon les procédures requises, et les lois en matière de la chasse étaient rigoureusement appliquées par les services en charge de la gestion de la faune sauvage en cas de délit. Le territoire est divisé en deux zones : une Zone d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZIC) au nord et nord-est du pays qui couvre les préfectures du Mbomou, du HautMbomou, de la Haute-Kotto, de la Basse-Kotto, de la Vakaga et du BaminguiBangoran, et une zone banale qui couvre les autres régions de la RCA. La zone d’intérêt cynégétique, où on trouve essentiellement les aires protégées et les secteurs de chasse, est soumise à une règle de gestion rigoureuse et bien contrôlée. À partir des années 1980, malgré les pressions de toutes sortes exercées sur sa richesse naturelle, la RCA a continué d’être la région d’Afrique Centrale réputée pour sa faune riche et diversifiée. Le déclin a commencé avec la peste bovine vers les années 1982-1983, la grande sécheresse de 1984, l’intensification de la guerre civile au Soudan et au Tchad, et enfin le commerce de l’ivoire pour ce qui concerne les éléphants, Loxodonta africana, gros porteurs. L’Est de la RCA s’est rapidement vidé de ses éléphants gros porteurs puis de la faune sauvage tout court avec l’affluence des réfugiés soudanais. Les nombreux secteurs de chasse de cette région se sont appauvris et l’insécurité qui s’y est établie a conduit à la fermeture des sociétés de chasse, principales sources d’emploi et de recettes fiscales de cette zone. Malgré le braconnage, la région Nord était en ce temps restée la partie du pays encore intéressante en matière de faune sauvage. Toutefois, elle a commencé à être sérieusement menacée par les incursions des braconniers étrangers venant des deux pays frontaliers à la RCA qui étaient à la recherche de l’ivoire et de la viande du gibier. Tous les efforts du Gouvernement pour la protection et le développement du tourisme cynégétique furent ainsi portés Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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sur cette région Nord où la relique de la grande faune centrafricaine a trouvé refuge dans les deux parcs nationaux Manovo-Gounda-Saint-Floris et Bamingui. Plusieurs initiatives et projets sont nés et ont été mis en route tels que : le Projet CAF/72/010 FAO "Étude préliminaire pour l’Aménagement de la Faune en Zone Nord", le Projet CAF/78/006 "Aménagement de la Faune en RCA", et le Projet CAF/86/001 "Appui à l’Aménagement de la Faune". Le dernier Programme de grande envergure mis en œuvre dans cette région a été le "Programme de Développement de la Région Nord" (PDRN). Il a été financé par l’Union Européenne en deux phases (phases I et II), a démarré ses activités en 1988 et s'est terminé en septembre 2000. Il a été remplacé par un programme régional dénommé ECOFAC ("Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des ECOsystèmes Forestiers en Afrique Centrale") avec une composante "Programme de Développement des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises" (PDZCV) pour une durée de trois ans. Les objectifs poursuivis par le PDRN étaient la préservation et la valorisation des ressources naturelles, et l’amélioration des conditions des populations locales, tandis que le Programme ECOFAC a pour objectif global de contribuer à la préservation de la bio-diversité et à l’utilisation rationnelle et durable des écosystèmes en Afrique Centrale, en particulier des écosystèmes forestiers. Ces programmes ont d'ores et déjà permis : (1) une régression très significative des braconnages local et étranger dans la zone d’action du Projet, (2) le retour de certaines espèces de faune dans des zones où elles avaient disparu, (3) une nette augmentation des populations de la grande faune : éléphants, élands de Derby, Taurotragus derbianus, bongo, Boocercus euryceros, etc., (4) un début de meilleure utilisation de la faune par la maîtrise des quotas d’abattage dans le cas du tourisme cynégétique, (5) une compréhension par la plupart des populations locales de la nécessité de mieux gérer les ressources et leur implication effective dans les actions de conservation, (6) la mise à la disposition des populations d'infrastructures sociales (écoles, centres de santé, forages, puits, portions de routes nationales aménagées, pistes rurales, etc.), (7) l’aménagement d'aires protégées avec la création d’un important réseau de pistes de surveillance, (8) la création d'infrastructures nécessaires au bon fonctionnement des services de conservation des aires protégées du Nord de la RCA (plus de 180 bâtiments servant de logements et de bureaux), (9) l'acquisition de retombées financières de l’exploitation de la faune et leur mise au bénéfice des Communautés villageoises à travers le partage des recettes des activités de safari-chasse dans les Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises, et (10) la mise en place d'un plan d’aménagement de l’ensemble de la région Nord disponible. Ces résultats ont été obtenus en particulier dans les préfectures de Bamingui-Bangoran et de la VAKAGA où les parcs nationaux, les réserves de faune, les réserves intégrales et la réserve de la Biosphère occupent 45 000 km2 sur les 105 000 km2 que représente la superficie des deux préfectures. La stratégie développée en matière de lutte contre le braconnage par le programme a ramené une quasi quiétude, ce qui a permis de passer à une seconde phase du Projet à savoir : utiliser les ressources naturelles pour contribuer au développement socio-économique de la RCA et améliorer la conservation et l’utilisation durable du patrimoine naturel. Dans cette seconde phase, l’accent a été particulièrement mis sur le développement des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV) une expérience originale en République Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Centrafricaine en matière de gestion de la faune sauvage que nous nous proposons de présenter dans cet article.

II. MISE EN PLACE DES ZONES CYNÉGÉTIQUES VILLAGEOISES II.1. CADRE JURIDIQUE ET MOTIVATIONS Depuis 1956, le territoire centrafricain est divisé en deux zones : une zone banale et une zone d’intérêt cynégétique (ZIC) par l'arrêté n° 687 CH du 17.2.1956 créant en Afrique Équatoriale Française (AEF) des zones d’intérêt cynégétique, par modification des arrêtés n° 2314 du 16.7.1953 et n° 2928 du 3.9.1955 sur la réglementation de la chasse en AEF. Ces zones ont été incorporées à la loi n° 60.104 du 20.6.1960 portant remaniement de la zone d’intérêt cynégétique, des parcs nationaux et des réserves de faune de la République Centrafricaine, modifiée par l'ordonnance n° 66/62 du 30.8.1966. Dans la ZIC, on trouve les aires protégées traditionnelles : Parcs Nationaux, Réserves de faune, Réserves intégrales, Réserve de Biosphère, etc., et les secteurs de chasse qui, jadis, n’étaient pas considérés comme des aires protégées. Désormais avec les nouvelles définitions de l’IUCN (Union Mondiale pour la Nature) les secteurs de chasse peuvent être classés parmi les "aires protégées de type aires d’utilisation de la faune". Depuis 1992, des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises ont été créées dans la périphérie des zones de chasse et des aires protégées, constituant des zones tampons. Depuis de nombreuses années, la gestion de la faune sauvage et pratiquement de toutes les ressources naturelles en République Centrafricaine était une exclusivité de l’Etat (Exploitation et Conservation). Les populations locales n’étaient pas, ou étaient très peu, impliquées dans la gestion des ressources naturelles. Elles ne se sont jamais considérées comme co-propriétaires de ces biens, mais plutôt comme des utilisateurs de façon limitée. Cette situation a été l’une des causes de la dégradation des ressources naturelles en général en RCA, et en particulier de la faune sauvage. Ce constat négatif est aussi visible dans plusieurs autres pays de notre sous-région africaine. Les organisations nationales et internationales ont finalement reconnu les limites de ce mode de gestion, car de nombreuses espèces de faune disparaissaient de plus en plus et les superficies des forêts connaissaient des régressions inquiétantes, notamment en Afrique tropicale avec l’exploitation incontrôlée tant par les autochtones (culture sur brûlis) que par les industriels du bois. Très peu de mesures de reconstitution de ces ressources avaient été prises et mises en application. Celles qui ont été prises, mais mises en œuvre sans implication effective des populations, n’ont été que des échecs. Désormais, la participation des Communautés locales dans les actions de conservation et d’utilisation rationnelle des ressources est perçue comme une voie incontournable vers une gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Toutefois, cette participation pose le problème de la responsabilisation des populations et celui de la retombée financière provenant de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, au niveau des populations concernées. La Zone Cynégétique Villageoise est, par conséquent, une action de mise en pratique de cette nouvelle approche de gestion communautaire de la faune sauvage. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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II.2. DÉFINITION, OBJECTIFS ET ATTRIBUTIONS Une Zone Cynégétique Villageoise est une zone d’intérêt cynégétique instaurée sur le territoire d’un ou plusieurs villages dont les ressources fauniques sont gérées par la population locale au bénéfice de celle-ci. Elle est créée (1) lorsqu'il y a une faune suffisante et diversifiée pour supporter une utilisation durable, (2) lorsqu'il n'y a pas d’activités qui peuvent engendrer des conflits, et (3) lorsqu'il y a une volonté réelle de la population d’accepter sa création. En outre les limites des ZCV sont déterminées de manière à ce qu'elles soient distinctes des secteurs de chasse. Les ZCV ont comme objectifs principaux : (1) l’utilisation rationnelle et optimale des ressources fauniques au bénéfice de la population locale, (2) la contribution à la conservation de la faune et (3) l’appui au développement socio-économique de la partie du territoire concerné. Les activités des ZCV sont conduites par un Comité de gestion mis en place par l’Assemblée Générale constituée par les populations de la zone concernée. Le Comité reçoit des populations locales les missions suivantes : organiser des safaris chasse et de vision, veiller à la bonne utilisation des produits de la chasse, gérer les fermes à gibier, prendre des mesures de conservation (notamment proposer des quotas d’abattage, contrôler l’abattage et lutter contre le braconnage), percevoir les taxes et redevances et rétrocéder les parts prévues des recettes aux organismes bénéficiaires, déterminer les zones de chasse et celles réservées aux autres activités villageoises, proposer les quotas d’abattage de la ZCV à l’administration, et contrôler les abattages dans les ZCV. Les ZCV doivent procéder aux aménagements et opérations suivantes : identification de la zone, opération de comptage de la faune sauvage (inventaire), création de salines, création de barrages pour les points d’eau, ouverture de pistes de chasse et de surveillance, et construction de campements de chasse.

III. RÉALISATIONS Après près une phase expérimentale qui a duré sept ans (1992-1999) dans la zone pilote de Sangba avec une, puis deux, Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (Idongo-Da-Bangoran et Bohou-Kpata), on en comptait dix en 2003, réparties dans les deux préfectures du nord de la RCA (deux dans la VAKAGA et huit dans le Bamingui-Bangoran, figure 1).

Revenus À l’heure actuelle, la principale activité développée au niveau des ZCV est l’organisation des safaris de chasse. Les recettes produites par cette activité proviennent des taxes d’abattage, des loyers des campements, des frais d’utilisation des infrastructures (pistes, salines, barrages, etc.), de la vente de la viande des animaux abattus par les chasseurs et récupérés par le personnel des ZCV, et des taxes foncières relatives à ces Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises. Ces recettes sont perçues par le Comité villageois avec l’appui des responsables du Projet Programme Nord et reversées sur les comptes bancaires des ZCV ouverts dans les banques à Bangui. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Figure 1 : Localisation des 10 Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (en gris clair) dans la zone d’intervention du Programme ECOFAC (Conservation et Utilisation Rationnelle des ECOsystèmes Forestiers en Afrique Centrale) au Nord de la République Centrafricaine. On notera que les ZCV constituent une zone tampon autour des aires protégées (en gris très foncé : Parcs nationaux de Manovo-GoundaSaint-Floris et de Bamingui-Bangoran, Réserve Intégrale de Vassako-Bolo et zone pilote de Sangba). En gris moyennement foncé : secteurs de chasse amodiés. Figure 1 : Location of the ten Village Hunting Zones (Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises, ZCV, in light grey) in the intervention zone of the ECOFAC (conservation and wise use of the Forest ECOsystems in Central Africa) program, northern Republic of Central Africa. We will note that the ZCVs constitute a buffer zone around the protected areas (in very dark grey: national parks of Manovo-Gounda-SaintFloris and Bamingui-Bangoran, integral reserve of Vassako-Bolo, and pilot zone of Sangba). In medium grey: rented hunting areas.

À la fin de chaque saison, une répartition, selon des taux fixés, est faite suivant les divers bénéficiaires, à savoir : le Fonds Forestier (désormais CA.S.D.F.T Compte d’Affectation Spéciale pour le Développement Forestier et Touristique), les Communes et les Communautés villageoises. À titre d’exemple, pour la saison cynégétique 1999/2000 (figure 2) les revenus des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises, après reversement des parts aux autres bénéficiaires, ont été d'environ 56 millions de FCFA, dont 34 millions pour les ZCVs de Bamingui-Bangoran et 12 millions pour les ZCVs de VAKAGA. À ces montants annuels s’ajoutent les reliquats des revenus des précédentes saisons. Il est à relever que ces montants sont uniquement affectés au développement des villages concernés, ce qui n’exclut pas que les parts reversées aux communes soient investies dans le cadre d’un programme général de développement de l’ensemble des Communes concernées. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Recettes annuelles des Z.C.V. depuis leur création 30 000 000

25 000 000

Montant en FCFA

20 000 000

15 000 000

10 000 000

5 000 000

0 1992/1993 1993/1994 1994/1995 1995/1996 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001 2001/2002 2002/2003

Figure 2 : Recettes annuelles (francs CFA) des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises du Nord de la République Centrafricaine entre 1992 et 2003. Chaque colonne correspond à une ZVC. Figure 2: Annual incomes (CFA francs) in the Village Hunting Zones in northern Republic of Central Africa, 1992-2003. Each column corresponds to a Village Hunting Zone.

Utilisation des fonds des communautés Ces revenus sont un bien communautaire. À la fin de chaque saison cynégétique, l’assemblée générale est convoquée pour être informée des résultats financiers de la saison cynégétique. Elle procède ensuite aux affectations des fonds selon les besoins prioritaires des populations, parmi lesquels les travaux d’aménagement de la zone pour la prochaine saison touristique. Les affectations budgétaires courantes sont les suivantes : achat de médicaments ; achat de fournitures scolaires ; prise en charge des salaires des enseignants, infirmiers, comptables, gardes-chasse villageois et membres du staff technique (responsables des aménagements, du suivi écologique et de la gestion financière) ; versement de pensions aux vieux ; appui aux petits éleveurs (achat des caprins, construction des enclos et fourniture des produits vétérinaires) ; appui aux groupements d'agriculteurs et de pêcheurs ; frais d’organisation de funérailles pour les membres des communautés ; acquisition d'équipements pour les campements de chasse ; aménagement des ZCV ; construction de bâtiments sociaux (cantine, économat, écoles, dispensaires) ; et entretien des pistes rurales.

IV. DISCUSSION-CONCLUSION Impact de la gestion participative La gestion participative a un impact sur la conservation de la faune sauvage. D'abord, les ZCV constituent une zone tampon autour des aires proGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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tégées. Les actions de lutte anti-braconnage menées conjointement avec les populations sont destinées à empêcher les braconniers de pénétrer dans les parcs nationaux et les réserves. Ensuite, avec la formation et la prise en charge des gardes-chasse villageois par le budget des Comités de gestion des Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises, il sera possible de pérenniser les actions de conservation après que le Projet sera arrivé à son terme. Le tout est d’arriver à une autonomie réelle et à une bonne gestion des ZCV. Enfin, les populations ayant une meilleure connaissance de la valeur économique de la faune, elles sont mieux à même de contrôler elles-mêmes le braconnage local. La gestion participative a aussi un impact sur le plan socio-économique. En effet, les revenus générés sont gérés par les populations et pour leur bénéfice. On assiste à une vraie redistribution des revenus à travers les salaires payés aux employés s'occupant des ouvertures des pistes et de divers travaux d’aménagement, ceux payés aux gardes-chasse villageois et au personnel employé des Comités de gestion, et à travers les pensions versées aux vieux. Les investissements et les charges à caractère social sont désormais financés par les revenus des ZCV. À noter que, dans la plupart des villages appartenant aux Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises, il n’y avait autrefois ni école, ni puits, ni dispensaire. Le premier enfant du village Idongo qui a été scolarisé grâce aux bénéfices de la ZCV a eu son brevet et est en ce moment en classe de première au lycée. Depuis le démarrage de l'expérience des ZCV, toutes les infrastructures sociales énumérées ci-dessus ont été mises en place et fonctionnent normalement.

Conditions pour une bonne gestion participative de la faune sauvage La viabilité de la gestion participative de la faune sauvage à travers les Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises nécessite : (1) une meilleure connaissance des ressources fauniques des zones, (2) une meilleure délimitation des différentes aires protégées, (3) une bonne répartition des terroirs pour les besoins des populations (zonage), (4) une législation adaptée à la nouvelle forme de gestion, (5) une volonté politique de mener une gestion communautaire, (6) une bonne information et sensibilisation sur les objectifs et les bénéficies d’une telle approche, (7) une gestion saine des revenus des ZCV, (8) une autonomie effective des ZCV, et (9) des membres de Comité et un personnel de gestion bien formés en matière d’aménagement de la ZCV et de comptabilité, et ayant le respect des règles de gestion des biens communautaires. Tout ce qui précède est essentiel pour prétendre à une pérennisation des actions entreprises au niveau des ZCV du Nord de la République Centrafricaine La gestion exclusive des ressources naturelles par l’État a atteint ses limites et les dégradations très importantes que subissent les forêts et la faune en sont les conséquences. La gestion participative est bien l’une des voies sûres à suivre pour réduire les disparitions de certaines richesses naturelles, à condition que certains préalables soient observés. Toutefois, les ZCV, jusqu’à l’heure actuelle, fonctionnent sans base juridique spécifique, ce qui est de nature à inquiéter la survie de cette expérience assez prometteuse. Les textes Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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de loi proposés par le Programme ECOFAC, et amendés par un Comité technique il y a quelques mois, devront mettre fin à cette inquiétude s’ils sont promulgués.

VILLAGE HUNTING ZONES: AN EXPERIMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC R. MBITIKON KEY-WORDS: Natural resource, wildlife, community-based management, village hunting zone, equitable sharing of profits, Central African Republic.

ABSTRACT Management of wildlife in Central African Republic over the past few decades has been exclusively in the hands of the State, who was the only actor in defining the methods of its use and conservation. This principal of State-run conservation reached its limits, and thanks to the creation in 1992 of the Zones Cynégétiques Villageoises (ZCV, village hunting zones) the involvement of local population in the management of their natural resources has now become a reality. Thanks to the revenues generated by the ZCVs, the populations next to the hunting zones and protected area, whom previously had not been able to benefit from the profits generated by the exploitation of the wildlife, are now beginning to see improvements in some of their difficulties with social and economic development. As far as wildlife management goes, the central African territory is divided into two types of zones: a Zone of Hunting Interest (Zone d’Intérêt Cynégétique) where are national parks, wildlife reserves and hunting areas, and a common zone for all the other gathering activities. The ZCV is a hunting zone which doesn’t belong to any other category of protected area, and is reserved for the traditional hunting practices of the bordering villages. This ZCV is created with the collaboration or at the request of the local populations. The main objective of the ZCV is to develop a participative management of wildlife and other natural resources in order to improve the living conditions of the local populations by setting up an equitable sharing of the profits earned from a sustainable exploitation of these natural resources. The revenues generated by the ZCVs come from the taxes collected for the slaughtering of animals or from the usage of the area, from hunting camps rent, from infrastructures fees, and from meat sale which comes from animals killed by tourists and collected by members of the Management Committee. Profits from the ZCVs are divided up between the State, the communes, and the village communities. Ten hunting zones have been created so far, and they are now running. Among the last five tourist seasons, the maximum annual exploitation income of the total ZCVs was 100 million FCFA. This experiment has greatly affected wildlife conservation through an effective and regular participation of villagers in protecting the wildlife from poa-

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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ching, which has resulted in a notable decrease in poaching from individuals foreign to the zones. In addition, these hunting zones act like a buffer zone surrounding the national parks. The living conditions of the local populations have been improved, thanks namely to the creation of more than two hundred permanent jobs and a better access to drinkable water, schools and medical facilities. Although the results of this experiment have so far been very promising, we should note that this project of community-based wildlife and natural resource management remains very fragile, because the village communities still lack the proper training and support structures to guarantee that this project will last over the long term.

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 227-235 ISSN 1622-7662

GESTION DE LA FAUNE INTÉGRÉE AU DÉVELOPPEMENT RURAL DANS LE COMPLEXE ÉCOLOGIQUE DU PARC NATIONAL DU W DU BÉNIN A. EL HADJ ISSA et O. NOVELLI Programme Parc W/ECOPAS, BP 75 Kandi, République du Bénin. E-mails : [email protected] [email protected]

MOTS-CLÉS : Aire Protégée, gestion participative, structure villageoise, concertation, gestion intégrée, Parc National, Complexe Écologique du W, Bénin.

RÉSUMÉ La gestion des ressources naturelles en général et celle des aires protégées en particulier ont longtemps été à la charge unilatérale des institutions étatiques. Cette situation a entraîné une quasi- exclusion des populations. Au nombre des raisons qui ont engendré la faible protection des ressources naturelles, on peut citer cette relative marginalisation des populations riveraines. Depuis les années 1990, le Bénin fait partie des pays qui expérimentent des stratégies d’implication des premiers bénéficiaires de la conservation des ressources naturelles. À ce titre, plusieurs méthodes testées et éprouvées ont été appliquées afin d’assurer une participation effective des populations riveraines. À partir de la création, en 1998, du Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (CENAGREF), organe autonome qui gère les Parcs Nationaux et dans le souci de garantir une meilleure conservation et une gestion durable de ces réserves, les populations riveraines ont été associées à la gestion des aires protégées. Une nouvelle approche de partenariat réel de gestion de ces espaces a été mise en application avec la création des Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF). Aujourd’hui 78 AVIGREF participent à la gestion du Parc National du W et de sa zone périphérique formant le Complexe écologique du W permettant aux villageois de mieux appréhender les enjeux, d’être partenaires dans la recherche de solutions aux problèmes du parc et enfin d’être bénéficiaires des activités initiées. Les AVIGREF bénéficient de 30 % des revenus du parc et de ses zones cynégétiques, co-gère les activités écotouristiques et cynégétiques et gèrent l’entretien ordinaire des pistes et des points d’eau du parc. Les revenus sont investis dans des réalisations communautaires ou distribués sous forme de contrats de travail aux populations riveraines

I. INTRODUCTION Le Parc National du W (563 280 ha) avec la zone cynégétique de la Djona (115 200 ha) et la zone de chasse de la Mékrou (102 000 ha) représente la plus vaste aire protégée du Bénin. Il abrite une vingtaine d’espèces de grands mammifères tels que le lion, Panthera leo, le gué-

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pard, Acinonyx jubatus, le lycaon, Lycaon pictus, l’hippopotame, Hippopotamus amphibius, l’éléphant, Loxodonta africana, le buffle, Syncerus caffer, l’hippotrague, Hippotragus equinus, le bubale, Alcelaphus buselaphus, le damalisque, Damaliscus korrigum, et plusieurs espèces de cobes, Kobus sp. (SZANIAWSKY, 1982 ; KASSA, 1998). Plus de 280 espèces d’oiseaux ont été recensées (ADJAKPA, 2002). Le Parc et ses zones cynégétiques sont administrés par le Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (CENAGREF). Le CENAGREF est appuyé par le Programme Parc Régional du W/ECOPAS (Ecosystèmes Protégés en Afrique Soudano Sahélienne), financé par la Commission Européenne qui intervient sur le Bénin, le Burkina Faso et le Niger pour la conservation des écosystèmes des savanes du Complexe écologique du W, au bénéfice des populations locales. Le Complexe du W a obtenu en 2002 le statut de Réserve Transfrontalière de la Biosphère UNESCO-MAB (environ 10 200 km2), la toute première en Afrique. Les communautés riveraines sont estimées en 1997 à 109 116 habitants établis dans 61 villages (CENTRE NATIONAL DE GESTION DES RÉSERVES DE FAUNE, 1999). Ces communautés sont essentiellement rurales et composées de plusieurs ethnies. La situation foncière très contrastée autour du Complexe et la pression démographique sur les terres agricoles rendent l’expérimentation des formes durables de mise en valeur des ressources naturelles particulièrement intéressante. La nécessité d’impliquer les populations locales à la gestion des Aires Protégées remonte à environ deux décennies dans les États africains et certainement autant dans certains pays asiatiques. Toutefois, de nombreux obstacles culturels et juridiques existent encore (PROGRAMME DE GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES / VGFER, 1994). L’inefficacité des différents systèmes de gestion des ressources naturelles basée sur l’exclusion des communautés locales et de la mise en œuvre de la méthode coercitive ont montré leurs limites dans toute l’Afrique Occidentale (EL-HADJ ISSA, 1998). Au Bénin, l’implication des populations riveraines à la gestion des ressources naturelles a été entérinée par la loi 93-009 du 2 juillet 1993 portant régime des forêts en République du Bénin. Depuis la promulgation de cette loi, les populations ont été organisées dans les villages riverains en organes de gestion des ressources naturelles. En ce qui concerne les Aires Protégées particulièrement, le Programme de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (PGRN) a tenté cette participation par l’organisation des populations dans des Associations Villageoises de Chasse (AVC). Pour s’aligner sur la dynamique mondiale relative à la protection et à la conservation des richesses fauniques et de ses espaces, le gouvernement du Bénin a créé en 1996 le CENAGREF dont la mission est la gestion rationnelle des Parcs Nationaux, des zones cynégétiques et des zones tampon en liaison avec les populations riveraines. À partir de sa création et dans le souci de garantir une meilleure conservation et une gestion durable de ces réserves, une réorganisation a été proposée par le Programme de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles (PGRN) et l’Union mondiale pour la nature (UICN, 1994). Une nouvelle approche de partenariat réel de gestion des aires protégées a été mise en application. Les AVC ont donc été remplacées par les Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF). Le CENAGREF a obtenu le statut d’office d’État doté d’une autonomie financière Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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et géré par un conseil d’administration dont les AVIGREF font partie. Tous les revenus provenant du Parc et de ses zones de chasse sont administrés par le CENAGREF et 30 % sont reversés aux AVIGREF. Ces revenus sont investis dans des réalisations communautaires ou distribués sous forme de contrats de travail aux populations riveraines.

II. L’ORGANISATION DES AVIGREF Les Associations Villageoises de Chasse mises en place par le PGRN n’ont pas été fonctionnelles parce qu’elles n’étaient pas pleinement représentatives et ne correspondaient pas aux réalités sociales des villages. C’est dans l’optique de rendre opérationnelles ces structures que les AVIGREF ont été créées. C’est donc au démarrage des activités du Programme Parc W/ECOPAS et du Programme de Conservation et de Gestion des Parcs Nationaux (PCGPN) dans le Parc W en 2001, qu’une restructuration et une dynamisation des AVIGREF ont été opérées. À travers un diagnostic participatif mené avec les différents acteurs en périphérie, un plan de développement a été élaboré dans tous les villages riverains du Parc W. Suite à ce diagnostic, les AVIGREF ont été mieux organisées, et elles sont devenues des partenaires privilégiés du CENAGREF. L’organisation des AVIGREF (figure 1 et tableau I) prévoit au niveau national une fédération dont les statuts et les attributions sont en train d’être rédigés. Au niveau des parcs nationaux avec leurs zones cynégétiques, l’Union Régionale coordonne les activités et gère les fonds provenant du CENAGREF ; en outre son président est représentant permanent du conseil d’administration du CENAGREF. Les Unions de Zone et les Bureaux AVIGREF gèrent les activités à l’intérieur du Parc et des zones cynégétiques et tampon en collaboration avec les directions des parcs nationaux. En plus, les Unions de Zone introduisent à l’Union Régionale les projets de budgets et d’infrastructures communautaires à réaliser. Fédération

Niveau national (en projet)

Union Régionale Niveau Parc Union de Zone Bureau AVIGREF Chasseurs Eleveurs Femmes apiculteurs

pêcheurs

Niveau commune ou groupe de villages Niveau village

Cultivateurs Autres catégories artisans

Figure 1 : Organisation des Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF) dans le Parc National W du Bénin. Figure 1: Organization of the Village Associations for the Management of Wildlife Reserves (AVIGREF) in the W National Park of Benin. From bottom to top: first level (hunters, breeders, apiarists, women, fishers, craftsmen, farmers, other), village level (AVIGREF office), village-group level (Zone Union), Park level (Regional Union), national level in project (Federation).

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TABLEAU I Caractéristiques et missions des organismes aux différents niveaux territoriaux, constituant les Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF) du Complexe du W au Bénin. L'organisme au niveau fédéral est en projet. Durée de vie des organismes : 99 ans; mandat : 3 ans renouvelables une fois; rémunération des fonctions : bénévolat; ressources financières : cotisations, recettes de chasse, dons, legs, etc.; adhésion : volontaire. TABLE I Characteristics and missions of the organizations at various territorial levels of the Village Associations for the Management of Wildlife Reserves (AVIGREF) in the W Complex of Benin. The federal organization is in project. Organization life-span: 99 years; mandate: 3 years with one repetition; salary: on a volunteer basis; financial resources: contributions, hunting takings, gifts, legacies, etc.; adhesion: voluntary. Type de caractéristique Type of characteristic

Caractéristiques des organismes d'AVIGREF aux différents niveaux AVIGREF organisms' characteristics at various territorial levels Bureau local (BL) Union de zone Union régionale Local office Zonal union Regional union

Constitution Participation

Populations de toutes catégories socio-professionnelles Population of all socio-professional categories

Bureaux locaux Unions de zone ayant cotisé ou ayant cotisé ou souscrit souscrit Local offices that Zonal unions that paid contributions or paid contributions subscribed or subscribed

Ressort territorial Territorial impact

Terroir villageois et périphéries Village localities and surroundings

Zone déterminée de Karimama, Kandi, manière concertée Malanville, Kérou, Zone delimited by Banikoara 1 et 2 concerted action

Objet/Subject

Participer aux Assemblées Représenter le BL, Générales, proposer former, renforcer les des candidats, Gestion rationnelle capacités des AVIinformer, consulter des réserves de GREF la documentation faune To represent the BL, To participate in Rational use of wild- teach people, General Meetings, life reserves improve the propose candiAVIGREFs capacidates, inform ties people, use literature

III. AVIGREF ET GESTION DE LA FAUNE Les AVIGREF en tant que partenaires de la direction du Parc prennent part activement à la gestion de l’aire protégée et de ses zones cynégétiques.

III.1. LA GESTION DU TOURISME CYNÉGÉTIQUE Le tourisme cynégétique est, avec le domaine de la vision, le principal centre d’intérêt qu’offrent les réserves de faune du Bénin. Les zones de chasse Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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sont données en concession par l’administration à des sociétés privées de chasse, souvent étrangères ou en partenariat entre des nationaux et des étrangers. Les revenus directs de la chasse sportive représentent la principale source d’autofinancement pour le Parc et donc pour les AVIGREF. Au cours des trois dernières années, 72 000 € provenant des taxes d’abattage, permis de chasse et frais d’amodiations de la zone de chasse, ont été investis dans 28 villages pour des réalisations communautaires telles que forages, écoles, centres de santé, etc. (figure 2).

40%

Gestion tourisme de chasse Gestion tourisme de vision

55%

Gestion du parc 5%

Figure 2 : Les différentes sources de revenu (%) des Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF) dans le Parc National W du Bénin. Figure 2: The different sources of revenue (%, from top to bottom: hunting activities, eco-tourism activities, park) of the Village Associations for the Management of Wildlife Reserves (AVIGREF) in the W National Park of Benin.

Les AVIGREF gèrent aussi l’organisation des pisteurs et les porteurs des zones cynégétiques : les revenus bruts de cette activité sont en moyenne de 5 150 € par an dont 5 % sont reversés dans la caisse régionale AVIGREF pour les infrastructures communautaires. Les 95 % restant représentent le salaire des pisteurs et des porteurs. La commercialisation de la viande (3/4 des dépouilles) dans les villages riverains donne en moyenne un revenu de 1 200 € par an, somme utilisée pour des réalisations communautaires. Les activités du tourisme cynégétique représentent aujourd’hui, avec les travaux d’aménagement du Parc, la plus importante source de revenus pour les AVIGREF et pour les populations riveraines.

III.2. LA GESTION DU TOURISME DE VISION À la différence du tourisme cynégétique, le tourisme de vision est une activité qui vient de démarrer au W. En effet, la direction du Parc en accord avec le Programme ECOPAS a préféré mettre en place toutes les infrastructures nécessaires (pistes, points d’eau, miradors, campements touristiques, etc.) et former des guides-nature avant de promouvoir cette activité. Néanmoins, le site aux éléphants d’Alfakoara, où une mare permet la vision des éléphants à seulement 150 m de la route inter-États Cotonou-Niamey, est ouvert aux touristes depuis deux ans sous la gestion directe des AVIGREF. Le site, qui comprend une mare fréquentée 5 mois par an par plusieurs groupes d’éléphants, est équipé de miradors, d’un centre de visite, d’une maison de passage et d’un restaurant qui fait la promotion de la cuisine locale en utilisant aussi la viande de gibier provenant des zones cynégétiques. Trois villageoises salariées par les AVIGREF travaillent de façon permanente pour la gestion du site qui a eu un chiffre d’affaires pour la dernière saison touristique de 3 650 € dont 1 900 € utilisés pour des réalisations communautaires. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Pour la prochaine saison touristique, des pisteurs AVIGREF formés guideront les safari pédestres, en vélos tout terrain ou en pirogue, et effectueront des visites de villages riverains. Les AVIGREF seront aussi associées avec des opérateurs privés dans la gestion de deux campements touristiques.

III.3. LA GESTION DU PARC L’entretien ordinaire des pistes, des ouvrages, des points d’eau, des salines et des infrastructures touristiques est assuré par les Unions de zones AVIGREF. Ces travaux sont financés par le CENAGREF, les bailleurs de fonds et des opérateurs privés qui travaillent dans le Parc et ses zones cynégétiques. Chaque année, en moyenne 8 500 hommes x jours de travail sont distribués par les Unions AVIGREF aux populations riveraines. Les ouvriers sont payés sur une base journalière de 4,6 € par personne pour un total de 39 100 € ; cette somme doit être augmentée des 5 % reversés dans la caisse de l’Union Régionale AVIGREF pour la contribution aux actions communautaires.

IV. DISCUSSION La demande constante de nouvelles terres à cultiver, liée à la croissance démographique et à la pauvreté encore bien présente dans les villages riverains du Parc, représente le plus grand danger pour la conservation du W. Les complexes écologiques tels que le W sont de plus en plus importants dans la conservation des écosystèmes naturels et contribuent au bien-être des populations humaines (McNELLY, 1989). La faune sauvage n’aura de chance d’avoir un futur que si elle est à même de financer son existence à travers les safaris de vision, la chasse sportive et les autres revenus provenant des aires protégées (MURPHREE, 1993 ; MARTIN, 1994). La figure 3 résume en moyenne les différentes sources de revenus des AVIGREF. Comme on peut le noter, la gestion du tourisme de chasse et les travaux de gestion du Parc représentent les 95 % des revenus des AVIGREF. Il faut souligner que les données du tourisme de vision se référent au seul site des éléphants d’Alfakoara. En prospective, dans les cinq prochaines années, les revenus des AVIGREF provenant de la gestion du parc devraient rester constants si le parc continue 1% 37%

Revenus pour actions communautaires Revenus aux particuliers

62%

Fonctionnement

Figure 3 : Répartition (%) des fonds récoltés dans le Parc National W du Bénin aux réalisations communautaires, aux villageois qui travaillent pour l’aménagement du Parc et au fonctionnement des bureaux des Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (AVIGREF). Figure 3: Distribution (%) of the funds collected in the W National Park of Benin to (from top to bottom) communal projects, to the villagers who work to upkeep the park, and to the villagers who run the offices of the Village Associations for the Management of Wildlife Reserves (AVIGREF).

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à disposer des fonds nécessaires à l’entretien et à la création des pistes, des salines et des points d’eau. Jusqu’à nos jours, ces fonds ont été couverts à 35-40 % par les recettes du Parc et de ses zones cynégétiques et, pour le reste, par les bailleurs de fonds. Les revenus du tourisme cynégétique devraient augmenter de 15-20 % grâce aux nouveaux contrats signés entre le CENAGREF et les gestionnaires des zones de chasse. Pour ce qui concerne le tourisme de vision, on peut prévoir, grâce à la mise en place de deux campements touristiques et à la constante augmentation des effectifs des grands mammifères sauvages, une augmentation de deux ou trois fois par rapport aux recettes actuelles. La performance des AVIGREF dans la gestion des fonds et dans la programmation des activités est encore influencée par la présence des projets d’appui qui accompagnent les Unions AVIGREF. Ces associations et leurs membres sont un miroir de la réalité des villages riverains du W avec un pourcentage important d’analphabétisme qui, ajouté à la jeunesse de l’organisation et au conflit latent entre membres cultivateurs et éleveurs, constituent le principal handicap pour faire des AVIGREF des organisations performantes dans un délai très bref.

V. CONCLUSION Les AVIGREF du Bénin représentent sans doute l’un des exemples les plus intéressants de co-gestion entre des groupements villageois et les directions des parcs nationaux en Afrique de l’Ouest. L’expérience pourra encore être renforcée grâce à la cogestion de la zone tampon du parc et à la création de deux zones de chasse villageoises complètement gérées par les AVIGREF. L’alphabétisation des populations riveraines adultes et la scolarisation des plus jeunes, accompagnées par des programmes d’éducation, de communication sociale et d'information, pourrait améliorer sur le long terme les performances des AVIGREF. Dans tous les cas, il faut souligner que la durabilité des résultats obtenus dépend dans une large mesure de la gestion performante du Parc national W et de ses zones de chasse et, indirectement, de celle de tout le Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune du Bénin. Dans le plan de gestion rédigé pour la période 2006-2010, ECOPAS estime que le Parc ne pourra assumer, par ses propres recettes, qu’entre 35 et 40 % des coûts annuels de fonctionnement. Les financements provenant des bailleurs de fonds seront donc encore indispensables pour une gestion correcte de l’aire protégée. BIBLIOGRAPHIE

ADJAKPA J.B. (1995). - Étude ornithologique sur le Parc National W Bénin. CENAGREF, Cotonou, 2002, 40 p. CENTRE NATIONAL DE GESTION DES RÉSERVES DE FAUNE (1999). - Schéma Directeur du Complexe du Parc National du W. Ministère du Développement Rural, juillet 1999. EL-HADJ ISSA A. (1998). - Comparaison de processus d’aménagement participatif des forêts au Bénin : cas du Projet UNSO (BEN-93-G31) et du Programme de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles. KASSA B.D. (1998). - Problématique de l’aménagement écologique pour la conservation des

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ressources fauniques dans le Parc National du W du Niger : Périmètre de Kérémou au NordBénin. FSA, Abomey-Calavi, 1998, 145 p. MARTIN R.B. (1994). - Alternative approaches to sustainable use: what does and doesn’t work. Non published paper presented at the Symposium on Conservation Through Sustainable Use of Wildlife, University of Queensland, Brisbane, 8-11 February 1994. Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, Harare, Zimbawe, Mimeo, 16 p. McNELLY J. (1989). - Protected area and human ecology: how national parkscan contribute to sustaining societies of the twenty-first century. In: Conservation for the Twenty-first Century, D. WESTERNAND & M. PEARL, eds. Oxford University Press, New York: 150-157. MURPHREE M.W. (1993). - Communities as Resources Management Institutions. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, Gatekeeper Series N° SA36. PROGRAMME DE GESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES / VGFER (1994). - Séminaire de formation des agents des parcs et des réserves cynégétiques à la participation des populations riveraines. Programme de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles / VGFER, 36 p. SOULÉ N. (1997). - Organisation de la chasse villageoise et implication des populations villageoises dans la lutte anti-braconnage. Programme de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles / VGFER, Rapport d’Atelier de Réflexion, 81 p. SZANIAWSKY A. (1982). - Développement des parcs nationaux du Bénin : plan directeur du Parc National du W du Niger. PNUD – FAO, Rome.

WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT INTEGRATED WITH RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ECOLOGICAL COMPLEX OF THE W NATIONAL PARK, BENIN A. EL HADJ ISSA and O. NOVELLI

KEY WORDS: Protected Zone, participative management, village structure, dialogue, integrated management, National Park, W Ecological Complex, Benin.

ABSTRACT The management of natural resources in general, and of those in protected zones in particular, has for a longtime been under the unilateral control of state institutions. This situation has led to a quasi-exclusion of the local populations. This relative marginalization of the local populations is one among the various reasons that could be cited as a cause for the lack of protection of natural resources. Since the 1990s, Benin has been one of the countries which has experimented strategies that involve the local people in the conservation of natural resources. For this purpose, several different methods have been tested and applied in order to ensure an effective participation of the local populations. Since the creation of the Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (CENAGREF) – an autonomous organization which manages the national parks in 1998, one of whose primary concerns is to guarantee a better conservation and a sustainable management of these reserves, the local populations have become involved in the management of the protected zones. A new approach,

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made through a real partnership of the management of these areas was put into action with the creation of the Associations Villageoises de Gestion des Réserves de Faune (Village Associations for the Management of Wildlife Reserves - AVIGREF). Today, 78 AVIGREF participate in the management of the W National Park and its periphery forming the W Ecological Complex, thereby enabling the villagers to understand the stakes at hand, to be partners in the research for solutions to the park’s problems, and also to be themselves beneficiaries of the activities initiated. The AVIGREF receive 30% of the revenues of the park and the hunting zones, co-manage the eco-tourist and hunting activities in the park, and take care of the upkeep of the trails and watering holes in the park. The revenues are then invested in communal projects or distributed in the form of work contracts to the local populations.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 237-247 ISSN 1622-7662

CO-MANAGEMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE WAZA-NATIONAL-PARK AREA IN NORTHERN CAMEROON F.N. TARLA (*) and M. BACHIROU (**) (*) École de Faune, BP 271 Garoua, Cameroon. E-mail : [email protected] (**) CEDC, BP 410 Maroua, Cameroon. E-mail: [email protected]

KEY-WORDS: Natural resource, local population, co-management, protected zone, socioeconomic survey, Waza National Park, Cameroon.

ABSTRACT In 1997, a collaborative scheme for the management of the park’s resources has been put in place in the area of the Waza National Park (WNP) in northern Republic of Cameroon. We analysed the legislative and judicial framework of this scheme. To identify all relevant involved stakeholders and their perception of the co-management, we carried out a social survey in 10 villages by means of interviews of 184 householders belonging to 5 ethnic groups (48 Choa Arabs, 32 Bournouas, 28 Kotokos, 43 Mousgoums and 28 Peuls). The Management Plan of the Park was elaborated in line with the recommendations of international conventions. Unfortunately, the national laws were found to remain ambiguous and this often acts like a precursor for conflicts between stakeholders. Co-management here stands for a management contract negotiated and signed freely between the State and the local stakeholders. The majority (62%) of the stakeholders (including 132 crop farmers, 36 livestock breeders and 16 fishermen) were of the opinion that their role was never well defined in the development of the co-management process. Nevertheless, most of them were informed on its existence, except the pastoralist Peuls (25% informed) and the Bornouas (22% informed). The main motivation of the local population for their participation in the co-management process was to have access to the resources of the park (land, pastures, water, straw, fish and various plant products), especially to the pastures in the dry season (when the WNP is the only area with pastures), and to social amenities (schools, health centres, etc.). The results of the co-management showed that the lack of transparency, the poor coordination of the various committees, the absence of social communication, the insufficient motivation of the local actors, the conflict of competence between the various technical services, and the land tenure insecurity have all hampered the smooth takeoff of the process. It is therefore imperative to take the interest of all present and absent stakeholders into account, and to better re-define the national rules and regulations governing the management of the protected areas after integration of the land-tenure aspects.

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I. INTRODUCTION Cameroon has manifested over the years its political will to better manage its biodiversity by signing many international conventions. This will has been manifested in the establishment of a number of protected areas mainly Reserves, national parks, and hunting zones. In 1992, Cameroon elaborated a new forestry policy making room for the possibility of enhanced involvement of local communities (DJOMO, 1995), following the creation of a ministry in charge of environment and forestry in 1993 and the passing of law 94/01 on January 20, 1994 with its accompanying ordinances involving local people in conservation programmes. These efforts of the Cameroon government are supported by programmes initiated by international and local NGOs and have made co-management a reality in Cameroon even though it is still far from perfect (BAUER, 2000). Co-management according to BORRINI-FEYERABEND et al. (2000) is a project in which at least two social actors negotiate, define and guarantee equitable sharing of duties, rights and responsibilities in the management of a territory, of a zone or a given set of natural resources. In the case of the resources in the Cameroon’s protected areas, it became necessary that one of the actors - the State - recognise the valuable contributions of the other the local communities - and that their relationship be concretised by a written signed contract (Agreement) that is flexible and mutually acceptable (KOULAGNA and WELADJI, 1996; WILD and MUTEBI, 1996). Co-management came therefore to the rescue in a desperate situation created by the ineffectiveness of classical and repressive conservation approaches. The establishment of national parks before the independence of African countries with the goal of protecting wild fauna and flora was done at the expense of the land of local people with neither their consultation nor compensation. The remains and relics of human occupation or settlements in some of these protected areas testifies to this assertion (HALILOU, 2002), as is the case with the Waza National Park. The result was that many villages were displaced and today constitute neighbouring villages to the protected areas while others like Baram have remained inside the park. These village communities have suffered from a series of social, cultural and economic problems following their relocation. Institutional barriers were erected to prevent local populations from having access to natural resources that once were open to them with no restrictions (KONÉ, 1997). However, these resources have continued to degrade under the combined effects of poaching, transhumance and wood cutting. A reason advanced for this degradation is the indifference to conservation programmes on the part of local population who do not feel concerned with the protected areas as they do not have access to benefits attached to the management of these resources. Relationships between the populations and the conservation services, when they existed, have been mostly conflict-ridden leading to the continual degradation of natural resources and the impoverishment of the local communities (BARTON et al., 1998). This paper describes the Cameroonian experience in the use of the participatory approach to attempt a more sustainable management of the natural resources in protected areas in the Far-North Province. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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II. THE WAZA NATIONAL PARK Localisation Situated in the Sudano-sahelian zone, the Waza National Park (PNW) is located between the parallels 11°03'N and 11°30'N and the meridians 14°20'E and 14°66'E. Administratively, it is situated in the Far-North Province of Cameroon, precisely in the Logone-and-Chari Division. On the regional level, this park is found in a trans-boundary zone bordered in the west by the Republic of Nigeria for a distance of 10 km and in the east by the Republic of Chad for a distance of 20 km. The Waza Park is found some 120 km from the city of Maroua, the administrative capital the Far-North Province, and 130 km from Kousseri, the Divisional headquarters of Logone and Chari. The main access into the park is from the main asphalt road from Maroua to Kousseri. The registration of people wanting to visit this park is at a reception Centre with a restaurant and lodges managed by the local population. Otherwise, there is no physical barrier that prevents access to the park predisposing it to assault of the poachers and illegal livestock breeders, mostly transhumant herders.

The problem In 1997, as a result of the endangered existence of the park and the desire to return to a more efficient conservation of natural resources of the WNP, the Waza-Logone Project (WLP) of the IUCN (KOUOKAM, 1995) and the Cameroonian government put in place a participatory management approach in which the local population are asked to play a determining role. The involvement of the populations should indeed provide insurance for the durability of these conservation initiatives (BARTON et al., 1998). In the cases where the riparian populations don't adhere effectively to conservation initiatives of co-management, the risks of an anarchical destruction of the natural resources are prominent, as it is confirmed by BABIN and BERTRAND (1998). In the case of the Waza National Park, the following questions need to be considered for the effectiveness of the co-management approach: who are the stakeholders in the participative management process, what do the Cameroonian law and the international conventions say on matters of comanagement, what are the perceptions of the various stakeholders of the process put in place, what is the level of involvement of the local populations in this process, what are the problems that hinder or risk hindering the efficient involvement of the local populations, and what are the possibilities to improve the process?

The Management Plan At the time of the recent adoption of the rules and regulations governing the management of wildlife, the State of Cameroon instituted an indispensable instrument for the management of Protected Areas. The Management Plan of a Protected Area is a technical document that fixes in time and space the nature and programme of activities and studies to be executed in that Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Protected Areas and to which the latter is subjugated as defined in article 2, alinea 2 of the decree N° 95/466/PM of July 20, 1995 fixing the modalities applying to the wildlife laws. It is an indispensable work and planning for the execution of the new forestry policy. The main objectives of the Management Plan are: the conservation of the national biological resources, the sustainable use of these resources in order to improve the living conditions of the riparian populations and contribute to the development of the nation, and the participatory management of the natural resources which supposes the involvement of all stakeholders at each stage of the process. The Waza-Logone Project received a mandate of the Cameroonian government to elaborate the Management Plan following the participatory process with the supervision and guidance of the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry.

III. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH A total of 184 out of 1,191 households from 10 out of 20 villages was retained for a survey. The 10 villages were chosen according to the position of the village in relation to the park and the accessibility during the humid season. The five ethnic groups were selected on the basis of their population size and level of social organization. To be chosen, the ethnic group had to have at least a leader (Djaoro or Blama) chosen by his people. The ethnic group also must have lived the two types of management periods, before and after the setting up of the co-management programme. People sampled for the interviews were family heads, old or young, and most often in the company of his family members (women, children), other relatives, and sometimes friends who are visiting. Those selected were also persons in position of responsibility at the head of one of the management structures in the co-management process according to the framework elaborated by the Waza-Logone Project. Structured and semi-structured interviewing tools were used.

IV. RESULTS IV.1. CO-MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE WAZA NATIONAL PARK The co-management institutions of the Waza National Park are institutions set up by the Waza-Logone Project to participate in the execution of the Management Plan of the Waza Park, following the co-management approach. They include technical governmental services, the civil society and traditional institutions (existing or created with the help of the Project). The Inter-ministerial Committee regroups representatives of technical ministerial departments. They have the decisional power to operate regulatory and legislative changes. They play an important role in the signing and follow-up of international conventions that are liable to impact the management of natural resources in the study area. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The Permanent Committee is the committee responsible for the management of the land-use planning in the Logone floodplain. Presided by the Governor of the province of the Far-North Province, this committee has the responsibilities to initiate and to manage all actions for the sustainable development of the zone. Its effective functioning constitutes an efficient means of better involving the technical services in the research of the solutions to the management problems of the zone. Its members include the delegates of the technical ministerial service, the traditional chiefs, the administrative authorities and persons responsible of the Waza Logone Project. The Committee of management of the natural resources is responsible for the regulation and follow-up of problems (conflicts) related to the exploitation of natural resources of the region. It watches over the exploitation methods in order to authorise only those compatible with conservation objectives. The traditional chiefs are mainly in charge of following the application of the rules and regulation decreed by this committee. In order to facilitate the management of information in the participatory process, the local populations were grouped into activity zones, and Local Management Committees were created. These committees have as mission to defend the interests of the populations at the local level. In the elaboration of the Management plan of the Waza National Park, three fundamental criteria were at the basis of the selected strategy: biodiversity conservation, sustainable development and participatory management. In the setting of the third criteria, a committee grouping the local populations and the conservation service was created: the Dialogue and Management Committee. It was endowed with a statute of defining and organizing the roles of each stakeholder in the joint management of the natural resources of the park and its peripheral zone. While putting in place the process of co-management with the aim to better manage the natural resources of the Waza National Park and its peripheral zone, the Waza-Logone Project of IUCN initiated the creation of the Self-help Organizations known by the French acronym OAP (Organisations d’Auto-promotion) as relay structures to offer technical support to local population in their empowerment process as managers of their environment. The objective of these structures was to strengthen the achievements of the Project. However, at the end the mandate of the Project, they still needed financial, technical and strategic support. The structure that received the mandate to ensure this is better known by its French acronym as CACID/WL (Cellule d’Appui à la Conservation et aux Initiatives de Développement Durable dans la région de Waza-Logone).

IV.2. THE STAKEHOLDERS AND KNOWLEDGE OF ROLES The results of the survey showed that more than half (62%) of the investigated populations (n = 184 householders) were of the opinion that their role was never well defined in the development of the co-management process, and this in spite of their determination to collaborate. The local stakeholders included the farmers who were the majority (71,7%) and composed of several ethnic groups, the livestock breeders (19,6%) who were essentially Peuls, and the fishermen (8,7%) composed mainly of the Kotokos. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The administrative authorities are represented by the delegates of the technical services of ministries (Husbandry, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Forestry) and the Conservation services. The traditional authorities include Sultans and other leaders, and elites who are natives of the area. The presence of these authorities on the field and their use of the power to support and defend the cause of this participatory process is not yet felt by the local population. CACID/WL, a funding agency supported by the IUCN, the World Fund for the Conservation of Nature, is continuing its investigations in the riparian villages of the park of Waza. It is supported in this endeavour by the Centre for Environmental Studies and Development in Cameroon (CEDC), a consultancy, research and education centre attached to the University of Dschang in Cameroon and the University of Leiden in The Netherlands. The management committees put in place by the Waza-Logone Project have found difficulties in finding their feet in this co-management process. And today, the management model is threatened by the end of the CACID/WL funding and advisory body. The different management committees were linked and formed an entity that needed to be kept intact to guarantee the success of the process. The Dialogue and Management Committee of the Waza National Park and its peripheral zone (or the Park Committee, as popularly known), which constituted the central unit (core) of the model, is today abandoned to its own fate by the Permanent Committee which itself has been unable to hold a single steering committee meeting. The local management committees are today only vague memories of the past. They are even completely absent from the daily conversations of the riparian village populations.

IV.3. THE PERCEPTIONS OF THE STAKEHOLDERS The local actors The results showed that the local populations consider the park a lot more as a source of income, employment and/or danger, and this independently of ethnicity. Indeed the park provides straw, dead wood for energy and arabic gum some of which is partly destined for commercial purposes. The dangers of the park is represented by the elephants, Loxodonta africana, the warthogs, Phacochoerus africanus, the monkeys, and the birds who constitute the greatest threat to their crops, and lions, Panthera leo, jackals, Canis aureus and C. adustus, and hyenas, Hyaena hyaena, that prey on their livestock. What is interesting to notice here is that the park as an ecological heritage does not retain the attention of anyone, as their priority is survival. This may therefore explain why the the Peuls and the Bornouas think that the park represents more a source of problems than solutions, and they need to see more direct benefits (Table I). Women were not interested by the direct financial benefits from the park, which are mainly the concerns of men (Table II). They are more worried of the damage to their crops and animals (76,9%). The extraction of Arabic gum, honey and other products collected from the park for local consumption or for sale are the principal activities of the women. Some of these products are today almost indispensable sources of income of certain families in the riparian villages of the park. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLE I Perception (% of the population) of the Waza National Park, northern Cameroon, by the local tribes. TABLEAU I Perception (% de la population ayant une perception donnée) du Parc National de Waza au nord du Cameroun par les ethnies locales.

Perception

Indirect revenue source Source de revenus indirecte Source of danger Source de danger Direct revenue source Source de revenus directe Heritage patrimony Source de patrimoine

% of the population having a given perception of the WNP among the Choa Bornouas Kotokos Mousgoums Peuls Arabs (n = 32) (n = 28) (n = 43) (n = 28) (n = 48) 60,4 65,6 53,5 76,7 50,0 75,0

87,5

75,0

72,0

82,0

4,2

3,0

14,2

9,3

0,0

0,0

3,0

3,5

2,3

0,0

TABLE II Perception (% of the population) of the Waza National Park, northern Cameroon, by the local population according to the sex. TABLEAU II Perception (% de la population ayant une perception donnée) du Parc National de Waza au nord du Cameroun par la population locale en fonction du sexe.

Perception Indirect revenue source Source de revenus indirecte Danger for crops and livestock Danger pour les cultures et le bétail Direct source of revenue Source directe de revenus Heritage patrimony Source de patrimoine

% of the population having a given perception of the WNP among the Men Women Hommes Femmes 65,7 58,9 87,8

76,9

12,0

0,0

6,4

10,0

The perception on having access to land, pasture and water resources was not dependent on the ethnicity but rather on the main traditional activity of the people. Among the livestock breeders (n = 36), 20% considered that the pastures were available, 30% available depending on season, and 50% non available. In the dry season when conditions are more difficult, the National Park is the only area with pastures. The farmers (n = 132) and fishermen (n = 16) did not face the same level of difficulty as the pastoralists: 72,7% of the farmers and 87,5% of the fishermen confirmed that neither cropland nor fishing lakes were limited in the area. The problems of the damages to crops by elephants and birds push some villagers to abandon their farm works in favour of collecting resources in the park. This is the case of an increase in fishing activity in the park by Kotokos Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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around the village of Tchédé and honey collection (extraction) by the Bornouas of the village of Ndiguina.

Access to information on the process It was observed that 89.4% of those interviewed (n = 184) were informed on the existence of the co-management process. All Kotokos (n = 28) and Mousgoums (n = 43) were informed of the process. These two tribes share either the same village (Mbilé and Mahé) or a common border (Diéguéré and Tchédé), as both are traditional fishermen. 25% of the Peuls (n = 28) and 21.8% of the Bornouas (n = 32) were not informed. The Peuls are naturally an exclusive people whose culture does not encourage contacts with other tribes on a regular basis, and their principal activity, the pastoralism keeps them on the move in search of pastures and water. 98% of the Choa Arabs (n = 48) were informed. Women are not left out of the co-management process. A good proportion of women (87.2%) are informed on the process. The remainder (12.8 %) is essentially made up Peul women of the Waza area.

The decision making power The participation of the local population in the co-management process is operating through expressing their opinion and providing information (67% of the local population is considering to be involved in both opinion and source of information). The system is driven by the other stakeholders, which keep the local population on the sidelines of the main decision making process (0% of the local population is considering to influence the important decisions). It was also noted that the local population did not even share responsibilities with the other stakeholders. True partnership as recommended in the comanagement process was therefore absent between them and the other stakeholders. Instead of participating equally in the decision making process, they are simply informed and sensitised. Participation here is simply used as a facilitation tool (McCALL, 1987). This type of participation does not favour the construction of a solid social barrier for the protection of natural resources. Sixty-two percent (62%) of the population feel that their role in the process is not well defined while 38% think that their role is to inform the conservation service of the presence of poachers. An efficient system will only be constructed in a setup where all stakeholders know and accept their role.

Motivation and expectations of the local populations The main motivation of 93.4% of the local population for their participation in the co-management process is material gains. They participate in order to have access to resources of the park such as water, straw, fish and various plant products (13.0%) and other development programmes like schools, health centres, cereal mills and other social amenities (87.0%). The views of the population vary from village to village depending on the level of satisfaction of their expectations (access to resources or social amenities). While the populations of Mbilé, Goulou and of Ndiguina find little or no Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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problems with the process, those from Andirni, Diéguéré and Niwadji are of the opinion that the process was very poorly managed. In effect, the development of a rice cultivation programme in the first case and the still awaited promise (not realised) of the installation of boreholes for drinking water in the second case better illustrates this situation. On the whole 49.4% of the population think that the process has been well managed. This also includes representatives of various villages and user-groups on the different management committees. Kick-backs received and other undue advantages motivate them to positively evaluate the process.

V. DISCUSSION-CONCLUSION The introduction of the co-management process was a welcome initiative especially at a time when the classical repressive methods had shown their limits coupled with the fact that the conservation service was working without means to recruit sufficient number of rangers and equip them adequately to perform their duties. The population and all the other stakeholders were excited about the process and its attractive benefit in terms of direct and indirect revenues. Unfortunately, the reality on the field has not reflected this rather positive beginning as the process has faced a number of setbacks. The first and probably the most important setback was the inappropriate institutional framework characterised by the absence of transparency in the management process, the ineffective communication mechanism and the lack of an appropriate follow-up system. The rules and regulations governing community management of natural resources in Cameroon are not clearly understood at the various levels of stakeholders. The second weakness, which is derived from the first, is the divergent interests of the stakeholders which lead to confusion on and the non respect of rights and responsibilities. The result is the development of rivalry and a number of conflicting relationships interand intra-stakeholders and user-groups. Any attempt to revitalise the process has to start with a review of the rights and responsibilities of all stakeholders (women, men, poor, pastoralists, nomads, fishermen, farmers, etc.) irrespective of their size and social statute. At the institutional level, there are needs to better define the rules and regulations governing the management of the protected areas by integrating the aspects of land ownership and management. Regular dialogue meetings are indispensable to re-negotiate the relationships, rights and responsibilities, and to establish a forum for conflict management. There is a constant need to build programmes for both the technical services and the local population. It is imperative to build such programmes taking any co-management model aspects of the cultural heritage of each stakeholder into account, as well as gender concerns, because these indirectly affect their level and dimension of participation in the process. Participatory processes are generally slow to establish, and results should therefore not be expected only after 2 years since its inception. A good followup programme needs to be put in place to accompany the process as concrete actions are executed with various stakeholders. The co-management scheme established by the Waza Logone Project in 1997 around the Waza National park did not give enough considerations to these aspects and the Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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results observed today are mitigating despite the efforts of the Project. The number of stakeholders engaged in the process has decreased while the institutional framework has collapsed, only to be replaced by some chaotic structure leading to a faster degradation of the park resources. Finally, there is still a possibility to revive the process but this has to be urgent, as more wasted time will only render the situation more and more irreversible.

REFERENCES

BABIN D. & BERTRAND A. (1998). - Comment gérer le pluralisme? Subsidarité et médiation patrimoniale. Unasylva, 49(3): 19-25. BAUER H., (2000). - Population et parc: les enjeux de la cogestion. In: People, park and wildlife. Maroua, Cameroun: 1-6. BORRINI-FEYERABEND G., FARVAR M.T., NGUINGUIRI J.C. & NDANGANG V.A. (2000). - La gestion participative des ressources naturelles: organisation, négociation et apprentissage par l’action. GTZ & UICN, Kasparek Verlag, Heidelberg, Allemagne. DJOMO L. (1995). - Participation communautaire et conflits liés à la gestion des ressources naturelles. In: Atelier sur la gestion communautaire des ressources naturelles au Cameroun, 6-9 décembre 1995, Mbalmayo, Cameroun: 26-30. HALILOU M. (2002). - Séminaire sur l’inondation et le fonctionnement d’un écosystème: pour les besoins de recherche en plaine. CEDC, Maroua, Cameroun. KONÉ P.D. & TOMPSON J. (1997). - Nature et faune. FAO, Accra, Ghana, 47 p. KOULAGNA K.D. & WELADJI R.B. (1996). - Gestion participative des aires protégées dans la province du Nord-Cameroun. Edition SNV, Cameroun, 31 p. KOUOKAM R. (1995). - Gestion communautaire des ressources naturelles et processus de participation dans le contexte du PWL. In: Atelier sur la gestion communautaire des ressources naturelles au Cameroun, 6-9 décembre 1995, Mbalmayo, Cameroun: 81-90. WILD R.G. & MUTEBI J. (1996). - L’utilisation des ressources végétales par les communautés, un moyen de conservation. Mise en place d’une cogestion dans les parcs nationaux de Bwinndi Impénétrable et Mgahinga Gorille, Ouganda, 48 p.

COGESTION DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES DANS LA RÉGION DU PARC NATIONAL DE WAZA AU NORD DU CAMEROUN F.N. TARLA et M. BACHIROU MOTS-CLES : Ressource naturelle, population locale, aire protégée, cogestion, enquête socio-économique, Parc National de Waza, Cameroun.

RÉSUMÉ

Un projet de cogestion de ressources naturelles de parc a été mis en place en 1997 dans la région du Parc National de Waza (PNW) au nord de la République du Cameroun. Nous avons analysé le cadre législatif et judiciaire de ce projet. Pour identifier toutes les parties prenantes impliquées et leur perception de la cogestion, nous avons mené une enquête socio-économique dans dix villages Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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auprès de 184 ménages appartenant à 5 ethnies (48 Arabes Choa, 32 Bornouas, 28 Kotokos, 43 Mousgoums et 28 Peuls). Le plan d’aménagement du PNW a été élaboré conformément aux conventions internationales. Malheureusement, les lois camerounaises renferment encore des ambiguïtés qui sont des précurseurs de conflits entre les parties prenantes. La cogestion est considérée dans cette étude comme un contrat de gestion négocié et signé entre l’État et les populations. La majorité (62 %) des parties prenantes (132 agriculteurs, 36 éleveurs de bétail et 16 pêcheurs) ont considéré que leur rôle dans la mise en œuvre de la cogestion n'avait jamais été bien défini. Néanmoins, la plupart d'entre eux étaient informé de son existence, sauf les Peuls pratiquant le pastoralisme (25 % d'informés) et les Bornouas (22 % d'informés). La motivation principale de la population locale pour leur participation à la cogestion était d'avoir accès aux ressources du parc (terres, pâtures, eau, paille, poisson, et divers productions végétales), en particulier aux pâtures pendant la saison sèche (quand les seules pâtures se trouvent dans le WNP). Les résultats de la cogestion ont montré que l’absence de transparence, le manque de coordination entre les différents comités de gestion, le manque de communication sociale, une motivation insuffisante des acteurs locaux, les conflits de compétence entre les diverses administrations concernées, et l’insécurité en matière foncière ont entravé la bonne marche de la cogestion. Il serait donc impératif d’assurer la prise en compte des intérêts de tous les acteurs présents et potentiels, et de mieux redéfinir les lois et règlements régissant la gestion des aires protégées en intégrant les aspects relatifs au foncier.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 249-265 ISSN 1622-7662

UNE GOUVERNANCE ORIGINALE POUR METTRE EN ŒUVRE LE DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE : L’EXPÉRIENCE DES PARCS NATURELS RÉGIONAUX DE FRANCE G. MOULINAS Fédération des Parcs naturels régionaux de France, 9, rue Christiani, F-75008 Paris. E-mail : [email protected] MOTS-CLÉS : Parc naturel régional, co-gestion, gouvernance locale, développement durable, Projet de territoire, Charte, coopération internationale, France.

RÉSUMÉ Le réseau français des 44 Parcs naturels régionaux constitue un outil privilégié, pour les collectivités locales, de coordination et de mise en œuvre des politique de développement durable. L'avantage des Parcs régionaux naturels réside dans le fait qu'ils sont en adéquation à la fois avec les objectifs de protection de l'environnement, avec ceux du développement local et avec ceux de la "gouvernance du Parc". À l'initiative de la Région, les personnes et organismes locaux intéressés (élus, organismes non-gouvernementaux, habitants, industries privées, etc.) définissent un Projet qui corresponde aux enjeux d'une zone rurale reconnue pour la valeur de son patrimoine naturel et culturel riche mais menacé, avec un équilibre socio-économique fragile. La dimension et le type des écosystèmes concernés par une telle classification varient beaucoup, depuis les zones de montagne, de collines et côtières jusqu'aux zones boisées, humides, etc. La taille moyenne d'un Parc naturel régional est de 1 500 km2, correspondant à environ 80 communes. Chaque Parc naturel régional élabore un Projet de développement durable avec pour base la protection et la mise en valeur des patrimoines et des savoir-faire locaux. Ce Projet est élaboré par un organisme qui regroupe les élus des divisions territoriales concernées (Régions, Départements, Communes) auxquels sont associés, pour les prises de décision, les personnes et organismes intéressés localement. Une Équipe technique pluridisciplinaire le met en œuvre. Ce Projet territorial est basé sur un contrat : la Charte. Élaborée par les intéressés locaux, elle engage les signataires et l'État pour dix ans. Elle précise les enjeux, les buts, les actions, aussi bien que les moyens financiers. Après la période de dix ans, la Charte est évaluée et, en fonction des résultats de l'évaluation, le Parc est renouvelé. Les Parcs n'ont pas de pouvoir de régulation. Leurs missions consistent à protéger le patrimoine, qu'il soit naturel ou culturel, à participer aux programmes ruraux ou urbains de développement économique et social, à informer le public et à pratiquer des expérimentations. Agissant comme un médiateur, le Parc rend cohérentes la politique d'aménagement à l'échelle du pays et celle à l'échelle plus locale. Les Parcs naturel régionaux sont organisés en réseau et réunis au sein de la Fédération des Parcs naturels régionaux de France. Elle a, en plus de sa fonction de représen-

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tation, des fonctions de coordination des échanges entre Parcs, de mise en valeur de leurs expériences, et de contrôle du maintien d'une éthique commune. Les Parcs et leur Fédération sont activement impliqués dans la coopération internationale au niveau européen et mondial. Le but est de faire partager leur expérience concernant le développement durable et la "bonne gouvernance". Actuellement la Fédération est en relation avec 30 pays.

I. INTRODUCTION En France, les Parcs naturels régionaux sont nés d’une volonté commune de protéger et de développer des espaces fragiles qui recèlent un patrimoine naturel et culturel riche. Ils constituent un outil de gestion du territoire négocié et concerté, qui se matérialise par un Projet de protection et de développement élaboré, débattu et porté collectivement par les Communes, les collectivités locales et l'Etat : la Charte. Ainsi, développement durable et gouvernance locale sont les deux principes du fonctionnement des Parcs qui régissent l’élaboration du Projet de territoire et sa mise en œuvre. En effet, l’exercice d’une démocratie participative garantit que le Projet de chaque Parc intègre les composantes sociales, environnementales et économiques du territoire, et que sa mise en œuvre repose sur un large consensus social, garant de durabilité. Dans les Parcs, le concept de gouvernance repose sur un dosage subtil de démocratie élective et de démocratie participative dans les différents processus de décision et d’action. Se posent ainsi les questions pour les Parcs naturels régionaux : comment intégrer de façon opérationnelle les principes de bonne gouvernance (tels que définis notamment par l’Union mondiale pour la Nature, l'UICN) dans leur fonctionnement ? Avec quels dispositifs et quels partenaires ? À quelles étapes du Projet de territoire ? Après avoir fait une présentation de ce que sont les Parcs naturels régionaux, nous nous interrogerons sur leur système original de gouvernance. Pour finir, nous ferons une présentation rapide de la Fédération des Parcs naturels régionaux et de son ouverture internationale.

II. ÉLABORATION DU PROJET DE TERRITOIRE ET DE SON ACCORD LOCAL : LA CHARTE II.1. DIVERSITÉ DES TERRITOIRES DES PARCS En France en 2004, on comptait 44 Parcs naturels régionaux, couvrant 13 % du territoire national métropolitain, ce qui représente 3 685 Communes, 7 millions d’hectares et 3 millions d’habitants (Figure 1). Les Parcs naturels régionaux représentent une mosaïque d’écosystèmes différents : haute montagne, bocages, plaines, littoral, forêts et zones humides. La superficie moyenne des Parcs naturels régionaux est de 150 000 ha, pour environ 80 communes. Les territoires des Parcs naturels régionaux comportent de nombreux villages et petites villes mais les espaces densément urbanisés en sont exclus. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Les Parcs naturels régionaux de France

Figure 1 : Carte des Parcs naturels régionaux de France en 2004. Figure 1: Map of the Parcs naturels régionaux (Regional Natural Parks) of France in 2004: 44 Parks over 23 Regions, 68 Départements and 3,685 Communes (territorial communities), covering 7 millions hectares (i.e. about 13% of the Metropolitan country surface) and including 3 millions inhabitants.

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La forêt couvre 35 % de la surface totale des Parcs naturels régionaux (contre 26 % de la surface de la France métropolitaine) avec de grandes variations (de 80 % pour le Parc naturel régional du Haut Languedoc à 2 % pour celui des Marais du Cotentin et du Bessin). La surface agricole représente près de 40 % de la surface totale des Parcs naturels régionaux. La moitié de cette surface est constituée de pâturages. La densité de population des Parcs naturels régionaux est en moyenne de 41 habitant au km2 (contre 104 habitants au km2 en France métropolitaine).

II.2. DÉFINITION DE LA CHARTE DES PARCS NATURELS RÉGIONAUX En 1967, dans une France encore très centralisée, les Parcs naturels régionaux ont été conçus par l’Etat comme première expérience de territoires intercommunaux échappant aux limites administratives et s’organisant de façon décentralisée pour porter un projet adapté à des enjeux spécifiques de protection de l’environnement et de qualité du cadre de vie. Par rapport aux autres espaces protégés, la spécificité des Parcs naturels régionaux réside non seulement dans la complémentarité entre des objectifs de préservation du patrimoine et de développement de territoires habités et fragiles d’un point de vue socio-économique, mais aussi dans le caractère négocié de ce projet de territoire : la Charte du Parc, contrat social pour l’avenir du territoire. Si les Parcs nationaux et les Réserves naturelles sont régis par une logique réglementaire, les Parcs Naturels Régionaux obéissent à une logique d’engagement contractuel de tous les partenaires concernés : les Communes qui constituent le territoire du Parc, les autres collectivités concernées et l’État qui classe le Parc par décret. En 1982, les lois de décentralisation font des Régions des collectivités territoriales de plein exercice, avec un budget, des compétences et une assemblée de représentants élus. Ces Régions ont alors l’initiative de la création des Parcs naturels régionaux dans le cadre de leurs compétences d’aménagement du territoire. L'État conserve le rôle fondamental de l'agrément de la Charte et du classement en « Parc naturel régional ». En 1993, une nouvelle loi renforce ce contrat social qu’est la Charte en lui conférant une portée juridique (opposabilité dans l’aménagement territorial, etc.) (article 2 de la loi Paysage). Les gestionnaires du Parc et la société civile ont alors des possibilités de recours en cas de non respect de la Charte. Ainsi, parce qu’il est collectivement soutenu et s’appuie sur des engagements formels des élus des collectivités signataires, ce contrat social local qu’est la Charte, sans portée réglementaire directe, permet la mise en œuvre d'une véritable politique et vient s’inscrire dans un droit positif de l'environnement où l’adhésion responsable remplace la contrainte réglementaire. En 2000, le Code de l’Environnement a intègré les disposition législatives concernant la politique des Parcs (Articles L 333, 1 et 2 du Code de l’Environnement).

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II.3. ÉLABORATION DE LA CHARTE : UN PROCESSUS OUVERT, PARTENARIAL ET PARTICIPATIF (JENKINS ET AL., 2003) Qui construit la charte ? La Charte d’un Parc naturel régional est l'expression d'une volonté locale forte, exprimant des choix qui orientent à long et moyen terme (dix ans renouvelables) le développement et la protection d’un territoire. Sa légitimité repose sur le nombre et la nature de ses signataires, sa reconnaissance par l’État, l'affirmation publique qui en est faite, et le rôle reconnu à la structure qui la porte. Sa crédibilité repose sur sa durée, la précision des engagements des partenaires, les moyens financiers, humains ou techniques qu'ils entendent dégager pour en assurer la mise en oeuvre. Le processus d'élaboration d’un projet de Parc naturel régional implique de mener une réflexion politique s’appuyant sur un travail technique préalable. Ces niveaux politiques et techniques se retrouvent au sein d'une structure d'étude qui comprend (1) un organe politique (Conseil d’Administration ou Comité de Pilotage) qui valide les décisions stratégiques, (2) un dispositif de concertation et de propositions (les Commissions et groupes thématiques) qui discute et élabore les propositions stratégiques et (3) une petite Équipe technique qui anime et prépare les travaux. D’une manière générale, les réflexions et le pilotage politique du projet associent les partenaires publics et privés suivants : les élus des Communes du territoire et des collectivités territoriales concernées (et non leurs services techniques), les Fédérations de Chasse et de Pêche, les organismes socioprofessionnels et les associations locales. Ainsi, l’instance décisionnelle peut regrouper 30 à 50 personnes représentatives à des titres divers qui s'engagent, pour la durée nécessaire à l’élaboration du projet de Charte (trois à cinq ans), à participer gratuitement aux réunions de travail. Les services déconcentrés de l’État apportent leurs contributions aux travaux. Cette structure politique doit suivre une démarche responsable, constructive, recherchant le consensus fondé sur l’intérêt général du territoire et de ses habitants. Il est important de souligner qu’une large concertation et un travail en collaboration ne sont pas synonymes d'unanimité, et que la négociation n’est pas la "loi du plus fort". C'est dans cet esprit que doivent être réalisés les arbitrages et orientations du Projet de Parc. Les Commissions ou groupes de travail ont pour vocation de nourrir la conception du Projet de Parc naturel régional en s’appuyant sur un bilan initial. Elles représentent le lieu où le débat sur l'élaboration du Projet de Parc doit être le plus ouvert. Les commissions doivent permettre à tous, professionnels (agriculture, forêts, tourisme, commerces, artisanat, entreprises, etc.), associations, responsables administratifs et partenaires institutionnels, particuliers, acteurs de la chasse et de la pêche, élus et représentants locaux, d'être représentés afin d'exprimer leurs préoccupations. Les élus qui arbitrent au sein de l’organe décisionnel participent à ces commissions et en assurent souvent l’animation, afin de faire le lien entre réflexions et décisions. Ce travail peut être organisé par secteur géographique et en commissions thématiques et permet de préparer les décisions du Comité de Pilotage. Chacun Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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des champs d'intervention du futur Parc doit être analysé en Commission. Le fonctionnement de ce dispositif nécessite une information préalable importante (courrier personnalisé, réunions publiques, permanences dans les communes, information par voie de presse) afin de susciter une participation maximale à leurs travaux. Composée généralement de trois à cinq personnes, l'Équipe technique a pour tâche de préparer le travail des Commissions et les décisions du Comité de Pilotage pour rédiger la Charte et établir le plan du Parc. Elle peut également mener des actions de préfiguration, c’est-à-dire un certains nombres de réalisations concrètes sur le terrain à valeur démonstratives et qui préfigurent ce que pourrait être le Projet de territoire. L'interlocuteur institutionnel national des Parcs est le Ministère de l'Environnement. C'est lui qui valide le contenu de la Charte de chaque Parc naturel régional et propose le classement du Parc par décret interministériel. Par ailleurs, le Ministère de l'Environnement est propriétaire de la marque "Parc naturel régional" qu'il accorde au territoire classé et qu'il retire si le Parc est déclassé. L'appellation "Parc naturel régional" est une marque collective déposée à l'Institut national de la propriété industrielle (INPI, organisme français gérant l'ensemble des marques commerciales). Les services déconcentrés du Ministère chargé de l’Environnement sont chargés du suivi de l’élaboration de la Charte et, à ce titre, sont invités aux travaux de l’organe politique local susmentionné. Les autres ministères directement concernés par les Parcs (généralement ceux des Collectivités locales, de l'Agriculture, du Tourisme, de l'Équipement et de l'Aménagement du territoire, de l'Urbanisme, de l'Industrie, et de la Planification) sont appelés à donner un avis consultatif au Ministre de l'Environnement avant classement du Parc. Leurs services déconcentrés sont donc invités à participer aux groupes de travail et commissions qui les concernent.

Les trois étapes de l'élaboration de la Charte La Charte d’un Parc nécessite une démarche participative de qualification et de planification de l'espace ainsi qu’une démarche participative pour déterminer comment le projet de protection et de développement local sera mis en œuvre. L'élaboration de la Charte de territoire se réalise suivant trois étapes : l'identification et la délimitation de l’état initial du territoire, l'élaboration d'un Projet pour le territoire et la définition des modalités de mise en œuvre du Projet. Dans la première étape d'identification et de délimitation de l'état initial du territoire, le périmètre d’étude d'un Parc naturel régional est proposé par la Région avec l’accord des Communes concernées. Le territoire définitif correspondra à celui des Communes qui auront adhéré volontairement à la Charte du Parc. La délimitation précise du périmètre du Parc se fonde sur la valeur du patrimoine naturel et paysager et sur la cohérence des enjeux du territoire pressenti. Les limites d’un Parc ne sont donc pas fixées par rapport à des limites administratives, elles peuvent être à cheval sur plusieurs divisions administratives (Départements, Régions, États d'un même pays, etc.). Ainsi, une Commune peut être amenée à adhérer au projet de Parc pour une partie de sa superficie seulement. Une lecture partagée et "un regard commun" sur le territoire sont la première étape de la construction de la Charte, ce qui nécessite de mener un diagnostic territorial. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Parce qu'il alimentera les réflexions de tous les partenaires pour une action à venir, cet état initial ne peut se limiter à une expertise technique. Au-delà de ses propres préoccupations, chaque partenaire doit prendre conscience des caractéristiques de l’identité du territoire, à savoir (1) de la richesse patrimoniale et les menaces qui pèsent sur elle, (2) des liens entre les enjeux culturels, sociaux, économiques et écologiques, (3) des différents niveaux de solidarité territoriale (régional, national et international), (4) de la pertinence et les conséquences des choix pour son évolution à long terme, (5) de la manière dont d’autres institutions ou groupes sociaux se représentent le projet, et (6) de la "situation" du futur Parc par rapport aux autres aires protégées et projets territoriaux. Une large restitution de l'état initial et des axes d’intervention possibles qui en découlent est une phase importante d'appropriation du projet. C'est la première pierre à l'édifice commun. Par ailleurs, une meilleure connaissance renforce le sentiment d'appartenance des populations à leur territoire. Ainsi, cette phase doit suivre une méthodologie précise, tant dans l'élaboration de l'état initial que dans le mode de restitution des données objectives obtenues. La deuxième étape de l'élaboration de la Charte consiste en l'élaboration du Projet de territoire. Il importe pour cela de déterminer collectivement quelles sont les orientations du Projet. Chaque partenaire doit prendre conscience de la pertinence des objectifs communs, analyser les réussites ou les difficultés actuelles dans son fonctionnement, partager les raisons qui les poussent à vouloir modifier la situation. Cette étape nécessite une large concertation entre les élus locaux et les principaux acteurs du territoire, et une approche qualitative d’analyse avec des outils de diagnostic du territoire (inventaires du patrimoine, carte des populations, fréquentation touristique, analyse socio-économique, etc.). Elle doit aboutir à une grande lisibilité des choix collectifs, et se traduire par les règles du jeu à respecter et des responsabilités à assumer pour chacun. Elle permet de se mettre d'accord sur les actions de protection et de développement pour les dix ans à venir et sur leurs différentes zones d'application. Les échanges doivent être organisés de manière à favoriser le dialogue, stimuler la recherche d'idées et la confrontation et, étape par étape, l'accord des parties concernées. Ce travail sur le futur doit aboutir à la définition d'espaces en leur donnant des vocations ancrées sur leurs atouts majeurs de développement et sur le respect de leur patrimoine. Ces vocations spécialisées devront mettre en évidence les orientations, les principaux axes d'intervention et des choix techniques et politiques définis. Le Projet de territoire hiérarchise les problèmes à résoudre, dégage les orientations de développement et de protection, définit les actions structurantes du projet, au titre de l’ensemble des missions (protection et valorisation des patrimoines, aménagement du territoire, développement socioéconomique, accueil du public et éducation au territoire, innovation et expérimentation) des Parcs naturels régionaux. Les priorités d’action étant définies, il y a lieu ensuite de passer à la troisième étape de l'élaboration de la Charte, à savoir de réfléchir à leur mise en œuvre pour les dix ans à venir, et aux responsabilités de chaque partenaire en fonction de ses compétences et de ses moyens. Ceci revient à envisager le "chemin" qui permettra à chacun de mettre en œuvre la Charte (ou de participer à sa réalisation). Toutes les formes de concrétisation sont à Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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rechercher : programmes d'actions, conventions avec les partenaires privés, associatifs, institutionnels ou professionnels ; statuts et moyens financiers de l'organisme de gestion du futur Parc ; organisation et composition de l'équipe technique du futur Parc. Tous ces éléments font partie intégrante de la Charte. Les compétences respectives des Régions, des Départements et des Communes et des structures intercommunales, obligent les Parcs naturels régionaux à rendre très lisibles les modes d'intervention de leurs propres structures de gestion.

II.4. CONTENU DE LA CHARTE ET ENGAGEMENT DES PARTENAIRES La formalisation (ou ritualisation ?) de l’accord La Charte du Parc naturel régional est un document approuvé par les collectivités locales. Par délégation, les partenaires publics et privés, parties prenantes de l'avenir du territoire, sont également consultés officiellement. C'est un document public, largement diffusé et consultable par tous, qui comporte un rapport écrit qui exprime clairement le contrat social sur un projet à long terme (dix ans, renouvelables après révision de la Charte), et un plan de Parc, document cartographique, qui traduit la qualification et l’aménagement du territoire. La carte s’accompagne d’un commentaire précis qui devra : (1) traduire les usages et fonctions donnés au territoire par la communauté (dans son ensemble et pour ses différents espaces) selon ses enjeux dominants ; (2) identifier les secteurs d’intervention prioritaires ; (3) matérialiser les grands principes d'intervention selon la nature et les vocations de tel ou tel espace (équipements à créer, sites ou monuments à préserver, types d’activités à soutenir, etc.) ; et (4) définir, dans des annexes, les moyens financiers nécessaires à la réalisation du programme d’action au titre des diverses politiques publiques, et les moyens propres nécessaires à la structure de gestion du Parc. Cet ensemble rédactionnel et cartographique est soumis à l’accord de l’ensemble des partenaires. À l’examen des accords locaux, la Région par délibération approuve la Charte et sollicite le classement du territoire en Parc naturel régional. La création du Parc est effective lorsque l’État valide la Charte et classe le Parc par décret sur proposition du Ministère chargé de l’Environnement.

Les atouts et limites de l’accord L'union fait la force : cette devise pourrait seule justifier l'engagement des partenaires dans une démarche de Parc naturel régional. Mais ce principe simple, suffisant pour traduire l'intérêt de travailler en commun, est un peu faible pour fonder un accord de fond et lancer un processus opérationnel. Tout le travail d’animation et de gouvernance présenté ci-dessus pour élaborer la Charte est essentiel pour parvenir à cette adhésion de fond et permettre l’engagement d’une action collective organisée au delà de l’acte formel de signature. L'adhésion collective recèle une force d'entraînement, qui va au-delà de la simple juxtaposition des engagements propres à chaque partenaire. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Si la Charte est un document juridico-institutionnel, elle tire surtout sa force de l’accord moral qui lie les partenaires. Autrement dit, ce n'est pas l'ensemble des signatures au bas d'un document qui fait charte, mais ce sont l’appropriation par chaque acteur des objectifs collectifs et la manière dont il entend les mettre en œuvre. De ce point de vue, la liste des opérations à réaliser est secondaire par rapport à l'entente sur des principes d'action (MOCKAY et al., 2000). Ce projet partagé par les partenaires pourra trouver des occasions et des formes d'expression multiples et évolutives dans le temps. Cet accord sur les principes d'action est, du moins en théorie, l'apport spécifique de la Charte par rapport à une simple convention de partenariat. En ce sens, et quel que soit son support juridique, une Charte a bien une double dimension : c’est un acte constitutionnel qui aide le projet, et un cadre pour l'organisation des acteurs et le fonctionnement du « gouvernement » du territoire qu’il instaure.

Engagement des partenaires L'adhésion des élus du territoire à la charte est un acte volontaire. Une commune qui n’approuve pas la charte ne sera pas incluse dans le territoire du Parc. Les acteurs locaux s’engageront en approuvant la charte à travers leurs instances (associations, organismes professionnels, etc.) et en signant des conventions de partenariat. Il importe en effet que chacun des protagonistes adhère pleinement aux principes collectifs, dans la mesure où ceux-ci vont orienter et justifier leur action. L’engagement moral et l’intérêt individuel pour l’action invitent à une participation de chacun dans la durée. L’objet du processus participatif d’élaboration de la Charte est donc bien de convaincre chaque acteur d’adhérer et de contribuer à ce projet collectif. La Charte étant un document juridico-institutionnel, elle engage tous les niveaux publics : le Département, la Région et l’État. Les Départements et la Région approuvent la Charte et participent directement aux processus de décision et aux financements des programmes d’action. Une convention d'application de la Charte signée avec le représentant de l’État en Région précise comment les services déconcentrés de l'État participent à la réalisation des objectifs de la Charte. Dans ce sens, la Charte est un outil performant de mise en cohérence des politiques publiques. Si l'adhésion des acteurs à la Charte est volontaire, ceux-ci ne sont pas toujours totalement libres de leurs choix. Dans les faits, deux types de pressions influencent les positions des acteurs locaux, et notamment des responsables municipaux. Les premières proviennent des relations de contrôle que l’État peut exercer, et des relations inégalitaires entre les collectivités locales et territoriales sur le plan des moyens financiers, et de l'accès à l’information (connaissance des dispositifs ou d'exemples extérieurs, accès à l'expertise). Les relations entre pouvoirs publics « subventionneurs » et les collectivités ou groupes sociaux demandeurs influencent les décisions ou peuvent créer des liens de subordination. Les secondes contraintes sont liées à ce qui peut être perçu comme « l’opinion publique ». Des groupes de pression ou des campagnes médiatiques peuvent influencer la décision des élus. Cela justifie d’autant plus les mécanismes de participation, et favorise une meilleure information des popuGame Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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lations intéressées, de façon à ce que l’accord collectif repose sur un large consensus social. La construction de l'accord local est forcément complexe. Cela tient non seulement à la diversité des partenaires qui ont des intérêts divergents pour le projet, mais aussi aux délais nécessaires pour des arbitrages qui s’inscrivent dans des horizons temporels différents. Cette prise en compte de la dimension temporelle est importante parce qu'elle permet de passer d'un accord ponctuel à une vision durable de l'action collective (dans une approche patrimoniale). Mais il est souvent difficile d’articuler des objectifs à moyen et long terme avec des procédures administratives et financière à durée déterminée. Cette gestion du long terme, dont la nécessité est évidente en matière d’environnement, doit également inspirer les choix collectifs tels que la programmation des équipements, l'action économique, notamment dans ses implications foncières (GORGEU et al., 1997), etc.

III. LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DE LA CHARTE DU PARC : UNE APPROCHE PARTICIPATIVE En plus de 30 ans d’expérience, les Parcs naturels régionaux ont acquis un réel savoir-faire de ce processus long et complexe qu’est l’élaboration d’une Charte, processus qui repose essentiellement sur des capacités d’animation, de médiation, de concertation et d’information. Ces pratiques de bonne gouvernance se poursuivent-elles dans la mise en œuvre de la Charte et dans son évolution ? La charte d’un Parc Naturel Régional définit un partage des rôles entre l’organisme de gestion du Parc et les autres partenaires du territoire (Communes, acteurs économiques locaux) ou intervenant sur le territoire (Départements, Régions, services de l’État). Le dispositif participatif nécessaire à la réalisation de la Charte se situe donc à deux niveaux : celui le plus large de participation des différents acteurs au financement de l’organisme de gestion, et celui plus limité de la participation directe aux actions, programmes et manifestations du Parc. Le système participatif d’un Parc régional naturel est donc relativement complexe. Au-delà du système de concertation interne à l’organisme de gestion, les instances consultatives et les groupes de concertations thématiques évoluent dans le temps, en nombre comme en manière de fonctionnement. Tout cela dépend des programmes engagés, des domaines nouveaux qui apparaissent, du niveau d’implication citoyenne de la population. Mais l’obligation de réviser la Charte tous les dix ans et de solliciter à nouveau un accord individuel de tous les partenaires en projet collectif est un atout important pour la participation. L’élaboration et la révision de la Charte sont donc des périodes d’intense activité participative.

III.1. VOCATIONS ET MISSIONS DES PARCS NATURELS RÉGIONAUX EN 2003 Un Parc naturel régional a pour vocation de protéger et de faire vivre le patrimoine naturel, culturel et humain de son territoire pour construire son Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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avenir. Dans cette optique, il met en œuvre une politique d'aménagement et de développement économique et social durable de son territoire fondée sur la gestion de son patrimoine. Les cinq missions fondamentales des Parcs naturels régionaux sont : (1) la protection du patrimoine naturel, culturel et paysager, (2) le développement économique et social, (3) l'accueil et l'information du public, (4) la participation à l'aménagement du territoire, et (5) l'expérimentation (Décret n° 94-765 du 1er septembre 1994 du Code rural complété par la loi d’orientation pour l’Aménagement et le développement durable du territoire). La protection du patrimoine naturel, culturel et paysager consiste en la gestion harmonieuse des espaces ruraux, le maintien de la diversité biologique, et la préservation et la valorisation des ressources et des sites les plus remarquables et les plus fragiles. Le Parc peut, par exemple, mener des recherches scientifiques préalables au classement de sites naturels sensibles en Réserve naturelle, mettre en œuvre des mesures de protection de la faune, de la flore et des paysages, etc. Le développement économique et social consiste à assurer une qualité de vie pour les habitants en soutenant l'économie locale et en valorisant son territoire et ses ressources naturelles et humaines, notamment par le développement d'un tourisme de qualité. Le Parc peut, par exemple, soutenir l’agriculture durable et les activités économiques traditionnelles de son territoire, promouvoir des produits, services et savoir-faire de qualité à travers l’attribution de la marque “Parc naturel régional”, appuyer les entreprises pour une meilleure prise en compte de l’environnement, etc. L'accueil et l'information du public se manifeste en favorisant son contact avec la nature, sa compréhension et sa sensibilisation aux problèmes de l'environnement, et sa découverte de la culture locale, à partir d'activités et d'équipements respectueux de la nature et des paysages. Le Parc peut, par exemple, mettre en place des activités de découverte et de loisirs de pleine nature, développer des activités éducatives pour les jeunes du Parc et des villes proches, notamment en lien avec les écoles, etc. La participation du Parc à l'aménagement du territoire fait partie intégrante des politiques nationale et régionale d’aménagement du territoire. Le Parc contribue à définir et orienter les projets d’aménagement menés sur son territoire, dans le respect de l’environnement. L'expérimentation consiste d'abord en la mise au point de procédures et de méthodes d'actions expérimentales qui peuvent être reprises sur tout autre territoire. Les actions expérimentales sont ensuite menées en fonction du projet global de chaque Parc et des problèmes concrets rencontrés dans sa mise en oeuvre. L’expérimentation menée par les Parcs naturels régionaux permet d’imaginer de nouveaux processus de planification et de gestion de l’espace rural, de les tester, etc.

III.2. LA PLURALITÉ AU SEIN DE L’ORGANISME DE GESTION La Charte définit la composition et l’organisation fonctionnelle de l’organisme de gestion du Parc. La réglementation prévoit qu’un Parc soit géré par un Syndicat mixte qui regroupe des représentants de toutes les collectivités qui ont approuvé la Charte. C’est donc un système de démocratie élective. Le Syndicat mixte, toujours présidé par un élu territorial, a plein pouvoirs pour Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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piloter la mise en œuvre de la Charte, de l’évaluation préalable à la révision, et mener ses propres actions. Il constitue l’instrument juridique qui permet à différentes collectivités locales de travailler et de décider ensemble des modalités de réalisation du Projet de territoire. L’État qui classe le Parc par décret, n’est pas membre de la structure de gestion (à l’exception près du Parc naturel régional de Camargue). On pourrait considérer que les représentants des collectivités peuvent décider seuls de la mise en œuvre de la Charte : ils ont la légitimité du suffrage universel. Dans les faits, tous les Parcs naturels régionaux se dotent d’un système participatif propre, adapté aux caractéristiques de leur territoire : la richesse ou la faiblesse de la vie collective (associations, groupements de professionnels locaux, etc.), la plus ou moins grande complexité de l'organisation intercommunale, l’implication ou non des villes périphériques, etc. On ne peut en effet comparer les processus de concertation et de dialogue avec ses citoyens d’un Parc naturel régional regroupant quelques dizaines de Communes et moins de 10 000 habitants, à ceux d'un Parc naturel régional de 150 à 200 Communes regroupées en une vingtaine de structures intercommunales; ni comparer un Parc concerné par un Département et une Région, à un Parc concerné par plusieurs Départements ou Régions, avec tout ce que cela entraîne comme nombre d’organismes publics et professionnels partenaires. Chacun des 44 Parcs naturels régionaux possède, néanmoins, un « cœur fonctionnel » du même type composé d'un organe de décision et de gestion financière (le Comité syndical), des commissions du Syndicat mixte, et d'un Conseil scientifique. Le Comité syndical désigne en son sein un bureau qui est le lieu de débats et d’arbitrages préalables aux décisions. Ce niveau décisionnel est composé, exclusivement ou très majoritairement selon les Parcs, d'élus des collectivités concernées. Les commissions du Syndicat mixte, à l’image de celles constituées lors de l’élaboration de la Charte, sont largement ouvertes et actives. Y participent surtout les élus du territoire, les acteurs économiques et associatifs, des techniciens des services administratif et des habitants intéressés. Elles élaborent des propositions, débattent du programme, visitent les réalisations, etc. Le Conseil scientifique intègre des associations et personnalités scientifiques hors territoire (universités, centre de recherche) ou du territoire (spécialistes locaux) des sciences biologiques et des sciences humaines. Le Parc le met à contribution pour sa capacité d’expertise, de suivi scientifique des actions, et d’évaluation des impacts.

III.3. LA GOUVERNANCE PAR L’ACTION SUR LE TERRITOIRE À ce « cœur fonctionnel » du Parc naturel régional sont adjoints des instances consultatives et des groupes de pilotage des principaux programmes. Le nombre et le mode de fonctionnement de ces instances consultatives est adapté à la réalité de chaque territoire. Certaines instances visent à renforcer le dialogue avec une catégorie particulière de partenaires (lieu d’échange entre le Parc et les élus municipaux ; regroupement des associations du Parc), d’autres ont un objectif uniquement opérationnel et regroupent toutes les personnes intéressées ou concernées par un thème. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Ces groupes d’animation thématique peuvent être de pilotage ou de réflexion et d'échanges. Les groupes de pilotage sont liés à la mise en œuvre de procédures publiques, visant en particulier l’attribution de subventions spécifiques. Dans ce cas, ces groupes comportent à la fois des représentants des collectivités locales, des services administratifs et des acteurs privés concernés. On citera, par exemple, le Comité local de pilotage de l’eau organisé par bassin-versant et le Comité de pilotage d’une charte forestière de territoire. Des groupes de réflexion et d’échanges nécessaires à l’évolution des pratiques professionnelles et des activités sur le territoire visent à faire émerger des « modes de faire » (ou savoir-faire) particuliers, des collaborations nouvelles et des constructions de « réseau ». Ces groupes sont plus informels et plus libres dans leurs méthodes de travail, ce qui leur donne beaucoup de créativité et de convivialité. Ils comprennent une proportion très importante, voire exclusive, de représentants de la société civile concernés par le thème de travail : socioprofessionnels, enseignants, simples habitants ou usagers. On peut citer des groupes de producteurs ou de prestataires touristiques, groupes « Éducation », groupes « Communication », groupes de pilotage des plans de paysage, etc. Ces groupes informels, avec l’appui du Parc, ont tendance à prendre de l’ampleur, à se constituer en associations qui viennent ainsi enrichir le système de gouvernance du territoire. Parce qu’ils mettent en œuvre des politiques publiques financées sur des fonds publics, le processus délibératif reste aux élus qui composent le Comité syndical. Il ne faut cependant pas sous-estimer le poids de la société civile dans ces décisions. La réflexion participative alimente les débats du Comité syndical, après travail d’aller/retour pour affiner les projets. Dans un grand Parc naturel régional comme celui des Ballons des Vosges, avec 20 communes et plus de 250 000 habitants, 381 structures (associations, services publics) représentant les « forces vives du territoire » participent aux 9 Commissions du Parc. Le dialogue avec l’instance décisionnaire s’établit par un « aller/retour » de près de 80 fiches-projets par an, et les propositions sont retenues à 90 % par le Comité syndical, dans la limite des budgets disponibles. Plutôt qu’un organigramme décisionnel prédéterminé additionnant les acteurs concernés par la Charte, les Parcs naturels régionaux développent donc un système de gouvernance souple et évolutif fondé sur la définition des actions et la participation à celles-ci.

III.4. LA COMMUNICATION ET L’INFORMATION, ÉLÉMENTS INCONTOURNABLES D’UNE BONNE PARTICIPATION La participation effective des forces vives du territoire à la réflexion et à l’action nécessite toujours une étape préalable d’information et de sensibilisation. Cette étape de communication s’organise selon deux niveaux : une communication générale destinée à tous publics et une communication pour des publics « ciblés ». La communication « générale » d’un Parc naturel régional s’appuie sur ses rapports écrits, comme le « journal du Parc » distribué dans les boîtes aux lettres des habitants, sur des supports informatiques comme le site web du Parc consultable par tous, et sur des manifestations grands publics, du type fête du Parc, rallye de découverte, expositions, concours Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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photos, etc. Au-delà de la simple information, il y a dans ce domaine un vaste champ d’expérimentation sur les moyens de développer, au sein de la population du Parc, un sentiment d’appartenance et de solidarité, et sur la possibilité d’identifier des « personnes ressources » potentielles. La communication ciblée vise à mobiliser les acteurs économiques et les associations, pour inciter à une participation opérationnelle à l’action du Parc. Des publications spécifiques et des appels à projets ou à contribution à travers la presse locale sont des moyens assez classiques. Mais l’efficacité de cette communication est aussi liée aux contacts directs sur le terrain, des élus et des techniciens du Parc avec les personnes concernées. Par ailleurs, la mise en place de formations professionnelles, intégrant une sensibilisation à l’environnement, est un moyen d’inciter à une participation active les différentes catégories socioprofessionnelles. Mais cette proximité et tout ce travail d’animation mené avec les acteurs du Parc ne saurait être une réalité sans l’Équipe Technique du Parc. En effet, parce qu’elle prépare et coordonne les travaux de la structure de gestion et des différents groupes participatifs, qu’elle conçoit les documents de communication et les manifestations du Parc, l’Équipe technique est la cheville ouvrière du système de gouvernance. Sans une équipe pluridisciplinaire de haut niveau, relativement restreinte (20 à 30 personnes), la gouvernance territoriale exposée ici aurait du mal à être une réalité quotidienne.

III.5. LA DÉMARCHE D’ÉVALUATION : UN ATOUT POUR LA PARTICIPATION La révision de la Charte, pilotée par l’organisme de gestion du Parc naturel régional, peut être assimilée à une « re-création », puisque chaque partenaire devra à nouveau valider le Projet de territoire et s’engager à y contribuer pendant dix ans. Chacun a alors tout loisir de s’interroger sur l’avenir du territoire, sur l’intérêt de continuer ou non à s’inscrire dans les objectifs du Parc et sur ce qu’il en attend dans l’avenir. Cette révision s’appuie sur un processus d’évaluation des résultats de la Charte précédente, identifiant les acquis, les difficultés et le mode de fonctionnement des partenariats et du système participatif du Parc. Cette évaluation repose sur le travail de suivi et d’appréciation des Commissions et groupes de travail, et sur la recherche d’indicateurs de résultats consensuels. Ce travail nécessite la mise en place d’un dispositif d'évaluation associant le suivi des actions et le suivi de l’évolution des caractéristiques patrimoniales et socio-économiques du territoire du Parc. Ce dispositif ne peut être que partenarial. Il associe très généralement, avec l’appui du Conseil scientifique, le bureau du Parc et les présidents des Commissions et groupes thématiques. De plus, il est enrichi par des « regards extérieurs » résultant d'expertises scientifiques, d'enquêtes auprès de la population, ponctuellement d'observations de partenaire étrangers, etc. L’évaluation constitue un important outil de pilotage de la mise en œuvre de la charte, de consolidation de la participation et de responsabilisation des parties-prenantes. De fait, de nombreux Parcs, sans attendre la fin des dix ans de validité de leur charte, instituent un autre temps fort d’évaluation à mi-parcours de la charte. Cela leur permet d’identifier les actions qui ont eu un effet Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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« levier » important, les changements survenus sur le territoire qu’il vaut mieux prendre en compte, et de qualifier et de stimuler leur processus participatif. Une large restitution de l’évaluation est essentielle pour rendre compte de l’action du Parc, non seulement auprès des organismes financiers et des partenaires techniques, mais surtout auprès des habitants du territoire et plus largement des citoyens.

IV. UN RÉSEAU GARANT DE VALEURS PARTAGÉES ET OUVERT VERS L’INTERNATIONAL : LA FÉDÉRATION DES PARCS NATURELS RÉGIONAUX DE FRANCE IV.1. LES MISSIONS DE LA FÉDÉRATION Les Parcs naturels régionaux fonctionnent en réseau au sein de la Fédération des Parcs naturels régionaux de France. Au-delà de ses fonctions de représentation, elle anime l’échange entre Parcs, coordonne et valorise leurs expériences, et veille à une éthique commune aux Parcs. Ainsi, la Fédération a trois objectifs majeurs. En premier lieu elle a pour objectif de promouvoir la politique des Parcs naturels régionaux en France et à l’étranger. À ce titre elle est l’interlocuteur de différents ministères concernés par l’action des Parcs (Tourisme, Environnement, Affaires Etrangères, Agriculture, etc.). Elle représente par ailleurs les Parcs naturels régionaux au sein de la section française de l’UICN et de l’association européenne des Parcs (EUROPARC). Le deuxième objectif de la Fédération est d'impulser des réflexions stratégiques et techniques en matière d’environnement et de développement durable et de participer à l’élaboration de la politique nationale des Parcs naturels régionaux (avis sur la création et le renouvellement des Parcs, élaboration du règlement de la marque déposée, etc.). Pour cela elle propose et anime des programmes expérimentaux inter-Parcs, anime des réunions stratégiques, réunit des groupes techniques, édite des guides méthodologiques, élabore des formations, etc. Enfin, son troisième objectif est d'informer le public et les partenaires.

IV.2. L’OUVERTURE DES PARCS NATURELS RÉGIONAUX À L’INTERNATIONAL Mais ce réseau de territoires ne s’arrête pas aux frontières de l’hexagone. En effet, les Parcs naturels régionaux ne cessent, depuis plus de dix ans, de partager leurs pratiques en Europe et au-delà. Les Parcs naturels régionaux et leur Fédération sont ainsi activement engagés dans la coopération européenne et internationale avec plus de 30 pays. Par exemple, depuis 1998, la Fédération a aidé le Brésil à mettre en place un Parc (créé en 2002 et adapté de la démarche française) dans la plus grande zone humide au monde, le Pantanal. Des plates-formes de dialogues ont ainsi été mises en place entre éleveurs de bovins, ONG de conservation et scientifiques pour gérer les dégâts causés par le puma, Puma concolor, et le jaguar, Panthera onca, et envisager des actions permettant de faire de cette Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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faune sauvage un atout touristique. Autre exemple : en 2003, les Parcs naturels régionaux ont été sollicités pour proposer une approche concertée intercommunale pour la gestion de la population d’éléphants, Loxodonta africana, et pour l’écotourisme dans le Gourma, au Mali. Au total, plus de 30 Parcs naturels régionaux sont impliqués dans des projets de coopération internationale, souvent aux côtés de leurs Régions ou de leurs Départements dans le cadre de la coopération décentralisée. La mise en réseau international des expériences de gestion de la faune sauvage aux côtés de l’Homme, dans des projets de développement durable, permettra demain de convaincre les gouvernés et les gouvernants que la biodiversité n’est non seulement pas opposée au développement et à la vie des territoires, mais encore qu’elle y contribue.

BLIBLIOGRAPHIE CODE DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT (2000). - Articles L 333, 1 et 2. CODE RURAL (1994). - Décret n° 94-765 du 1er septembre 1994. GORGEU Y., GENTIL A. & JENKINS C. (1997). - La Charte de territoire, pratiques de l’intercommunalité. La Documentation française. JENKINS C., HALALI-PUZ H. & BECHAUX E. (2003). - Gouvernance et démocratie locale dans les Parcs naturels régionaux. UICN, Commission CEESP, Policy Matters. LOI PAYSAGE (1993). - Article 2. MOCKAY P., GORGEU Y. & POULLE F. (2000). - L’accord local-contrat moral : aux fondements des territoires. Collection « Gouvernance des territoires de Charte », Le Développement territorial.

AN ORIGINAL GOVERNANCE TO IMPLEMENT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE FRENCH REGIONAL NATURAL PARKS EXPERIENCE G. MOULINAS KEY WORDS: Parc naturel régional, co-management, local governance, sustainable development, Projet de territoire, Charter, international cooperation, France.

ABSTRACT The network of the 44 French Parcs naturels régionaux (PNR, regional natural parks) consists in a privileged framework for the territorial communities to coordinate and implement territorial policies of sustainable development. The advantage of the PNRs is that they can at the same time meet objectives of environment protection, local development and governance. On a Regions’ initiative, local interests (elected people, NGOs, inhabitants, private industries, etc.) define a project that meets the stakes of a rural area recognized for its rich but threatened cultural and natural heritage which has a fragile socio-economical balance. After a validation process, the State classifies the area as “Parc naturel régional”. The size and type of the ecosystems concerned by a classification vary greatly from

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mountains, lowland and coastal areas, to woodland, wetlands, etc. The average size of each PNR is 1,500 km2, corresponding to about 80 villages. Each PNR implements a Project of sustainable development, based on preservation and enhancement of local heritages and know-how. This project is managed by an organisation gathering the elected people at a local level (Regions, Départements, villages) and associates local interests in their decision-making. A multi-disciplinary technical team implements it. The territorial project is based on a contract: the “Charter”. Elaborated by the local interests, the Charter commits the signatories and State for ten years. It specifies the stakes, aims, actions, as well as the financial means. After a 10-year period, the Charter is evaluated and according to the results, the Park is renewed. The PNRs have no regulatory power. The PNRs missions consist of protection of the heritage whether cultural or natural; participation in economic and social development of town and country; tourist information and experimentation. Acting as a mediator, it makes coherent sector-based and geographical-based policies. The Parcs naturels régionaux are network organised and gathered in a Fédération nationale des Parcs naturels régionaux (National Federation of Regional Natural Parks). Beyond its representative functions, the Federation is in charge of the coordination of exchanges between the Parks, enhancement of their experiences and ensures a common ethic. PNRs and their Federation are actively involved in the cooperation at European and international levels. Their aim is to share experiences of sustainable development and of good governance. Nowadays, the PNRs are linked with more than 30 countries.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 267-273 ISSN 1622-7662

GAME MANAGEMENT AND HUNTING IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION Y. LECOCQ Fédération des Associations de Chasse et Conservation de la Faune Sauvage de l'Union Européenne (FACE), rue F. Pelletier 82, B-1030 Brussels. E-mail: [email protected] KEY-WORDS: Hunting, conservation, hunting model, subsidiarity, EU enlargement, bird, habitat, directive, European Union, Europe.

ABSTRACT In Europe, there is a wide diversity of landscapes, flora and fauna. This multiplicity also applies to human cultures and traditions, including hunting practices, and that constitutes a great value. It is more or less possible to distinguish in a "Europe of hunting" four models or traditions: Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Anglo-Saxon countries and Central Europe. There are also many common features foremost of which is the profound interest and respect which the hunters have for Nature. The hunters do a great deal of work on a voluntary basis for wildlife conservation, game management, habitat restoration, and so on. Hunting is also important for its economic and social impacts (e.g., 120,000 jobs generated by hunting, mainly in rural areas). With these “characteristics” of hunting, it is understandable that the principle of subsidiarity applies to hunting in the E.U. which is why there is no E.U. hunting policy as such. There are however a number of legal instruments and policies that constitute a framework with a considerable impact on hunting of which the “Birds” Directive and the “Habitats” Directive are the main ones.

I. INTRODUCTION Since the first of May 2004, an enlarged European Union includes 25 Member States, and further enlargements are likely in the years to come. This will bring important political, economic and social benefits for hundreds of millions of citizens, but we should also take a careful and even critical look at its implications in relation to hunting and wildlife management and conservation. Living together in one "European House" implies that we need certain standardised rules, built upon a common system of values. But for the proper implementation of the so-called principle of subsidiarity, it is generally accepted that Europe should only regulate those matters which are best dealt with at European or international level. All other issues or topics, which are more appropriately handled at the national, regional or even local levels, should indeed remain the competence of the corresponding authorities. How does all this apply to hunting?

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II. HUNTING “MODELS” IN EUROPE In Europe, we are fortunate to have a wide diversity of landscapes, flora and fauna. But this diversity also applies to human cultures and traditions, and this socio-cultural diversity constitutes a great asset and value. The historical development or evolution on our Continent over many centuries has also resulted in considerable differences in hunting culture, traditions and practices (FACE, 1996). Although it is not always easy to draw strict boundaries, we believe it is possible to distinguish in a "Europe of hunting" four models or traditions. In Northern Europe, hunting is probably practiced in its most “natural” form. Even today, it is primarily intended to generate food. Meat from small and large game is considered a similar natural resource as wild berries, mushrooms or fish. Hunting is popular and democratic, and is supported by all political parties, including the Green parties. Compared to the total population, the Nordic countries have the highest proportion of hunters in Europe: in average 1 hunter per 20 citizens. In Southern Europe, hunting is very much a social event; what counts is enjoying nature as well as the company of friends. Here too the hunters harvest what nature provides: in the first place the many birds migrating through each year. Management is thus often focusing more on habitats rather than on species, even if an evolution towards a more integrated approach can be observed. Hunting is widespread: about 1 out of 40 citizens is a hunter. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, hunting is seen much more as a sport, and this expression has not such a negative connotation as in other countries. It incorporates a kind of "fair play" towards the game, in giving it a good chance to escape. That’s why a difficult shot on a highflying pheasant, Phasianus colchicus, or wood pigeon, Columba palumbus, is often much more appreciated that shooting a roebuck, Capreolus capreolus, from a high-seat. Even the behaviour of a hunter towards other hunters, dogs and non-hunters (not necessarily in that order), has to be “sportive” or that of a gentleman. These high standards are also expressed in professional habitat and game management, providing jobs for many game-keepers. About 1 out of 60 citizens is a hunter. In Central Europe, hunting is marked by a long tradition and strict rules, probably best described with the German expression or concept of Waidgerechtigkeit, even if such traditions may evolve and are quite often not as ancient as claimed. Fact is however that hunting in these countries is well regulated, sometimes maybe over-regulated. Hunting is above all management of larger game species. The combination of these factors results in a relatively low proportion of hunters, in average 1 to 300.

III. HUNTING AND HUNTERS: COMMON FEATURES ALL OVER EUROPE Despite this diversity in hunting practices, from Lapland to Andalusia and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea, there are also many common features. Above all, hunters, wherever they are, have a deep interest in and love Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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for Nature. They always try to learn more about wild species, how to identify them, their behaviour, their requirements. And this not only for game species, but just as well for non-huntable animals and for plants. It is this combination of practical knowledge, of active interest in wildlife management, of passion for outdoor activities and of love for nature in a wide sense which distinguishes hunters from most other outdoor lovers who too often experience the natural environment merely as a scenic theatre for their activities, or who focus on particular species without looking into the complexity of the ecosystem as a whole. As mentioned earlier, hunting in most of its forms incorporates a strong social dimension, the aspect of being together with likeminded people. In such a social context, specific traditions and rules might develop, such as the Waidmannssprache in the German speaking countries, which is a technical and sometimes romantic inspired language, often quite difficult to understand for non-hunters and therefore risking to appear peculiar to outsiders who lack appreciation for such traditions. Another very important common denominator is the close link between hunters and their four-legged companions, the hunting dogs. For most hunters, regardless their background or specific hunting interest, the work of their dog or dogs is an essential element of the satisfaction they get out their hunting activity. And the existence of international kennel clubs and the popularity of international field trials or other working dog competitions, illustrates these links between hunters across national and cultural borders. We should also acknowledge that hunting, as a recreational activity, brings people of different social classes, cultures and religions closer together. An example of this is given by the three hunters’ associations of BosniaHerzegovina, a country until very recently deeply divided by a horrible internal war. Despite the fact that each of these associations represents one of the communities involved in this war, they agreed a few months ago to jointly become member of the Fédération des Associations de Chasse et Conservation de la Faune Sauvage de l'Union Européenne (FACE), where they will speak with one voice, in a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding. Finally we have to underline all the work done, entirely on a voluntary basis, by the hunters for wildlife conservation, game management, habitat restoration, and so on. This commitment to conservation often implies direct and personal ties to the local hunting area, the countryside and its people, i.e. other hunters, but also farmers, foresters, nature lovers, etc. It is however difficult to assess the significance of this voluntary work for conservation, since it is rarely well documented. It is however clear that this commitment of hunters to habitat management and to biodiversity is just as valuable as the 3 billion Euros spent by hunters in Europe for their activity, or the more than 120,000 full-time jobs generated by hunting, mainly in rural areas.

IV. EUROPEAN HUNTING POLICY? This importance of hunting for conservation and for rural development is a leitmotif in FACE’s lobbying work to promote hunting at the level of the Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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European institutions. The European Commission, the steering force of the E.U. in Brussels, as well as the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, are increasingly aware of this aspect, as well as of the socio-cultural diversity of hunting in the different Member States. That is why there is no European hunting policy as such and why the European institutions believe that the principle of subsidiarity we mentioned earlier should apply as much as possible to hunting. There is therefore and there will be no uniform European hunting law. There is however a number of legal instruments and policies that constitutes a framework with a considerable impact on hunting since these need to be transposed by all Member States into national law. For all 10 new countries having joined the E.U., these texts are part of the so-called "Acquis communautaire", but fact is that even the previous 15 Member States have serious difficulties to fully implement these EU rules. Which are the most important European “laws” from the point of view of hunting?

“Birds” directive It is first of all the Directive on the conservation of wild birds from 1979 (EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1979), indeed adopted already a quarter of a century ago but since then never amended or reviewed, which covers “the protection, management and control” of all bird species in Europe and which “lays down rules for their exploitation”. Under its provisions, all species benefit from “a general system of protection” with however an exception for 81 species listed in Annex II of the Directive, which “may be hunted under national legislation”. Birds should however not be hunted “during the various stages of reproduction or during their return to their rearing grounds”, and large-scale or non-selective means and methods are to be prohibited. Derogations are possible for hunting other bird species, for using certain traditional methods and / or for periods outside the “normal” hunting season, on the condition they do not constitute a threat to the population concerned and if appropriate control by competent authorities is foreseen (e.g. spring hunting of black grouse, Tetrao tetrix, capercaillie, Tetrao urogallus, or of woodcock, Scolopax rusticola, falconry). Further derogations to the Directive may be granted to prevent serious damage to agricultural crops (wood pigeon in spring), to fisheries (cormorant, Phalacrocorax carbo, heron, Ardea cinerea) or to other flora and fauna (corvids, Corvidae, during rearing periods). For the species listed in Annex I, Member States have designate Special Protection Areas in general to protect and maintain habitats in sufficient numbers, size and diversity, and to ensure the conservation of birds.

“Habitats” directive This habitat-protection aspect is even more clearly expressed in a second wildlife Directive, the "Fauna Flora Habitat" (FFH) or "Habitat Directive” of 1992 (EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 1993), on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, covering all other wild species, from plants to invertebrates and fish to mammals. It is however interesting, that this particular directive takes a totally new approach, insofar as it doesn’t call for the protection of all species or habitat-types, but only of those explicitly mentioned in its annexes. For example otter, Lutra lutra, lynx, Lynx lynx, and brown bear, Ursus arctos, generally benefit from strict protection as being listed in Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Annex IV. But for certain countries or regions of the EU, the wolf, Canis lupus, is classified under Annex V and may therefore be hunted under a management plan. This Directive also foresees derogations enabling damage prevention, population management or strictly controlled hunting. This more pragmatic approach to wildlife conservation is, at least partly, the result of FACE’s interventions and political lobbying from the moment the very first drafts were available, something which couldn’t be done when the “Birds” Directive was under preparation, simply because FACE didn’t exist then. One of the main objectives of the "Habitats" Directive is the creation of a European Network of protected areas, better known under the name NATURA 2000. Today it covers already some 15 % of the E.U. territory, or more than the size of Germany. The European Commission has publicly stated on several occasions that hunting is not incompatible with the NATURA 2000 status of a site, and that hunting might even be necessary if it is part of its management. A general ban on hunting in NATURA 2000 areas, as intended for instance by the Netherlands, is certainly in contradiction with the objectives of the Directive. FACE has conducted an ongoing and intensive dialogue with the European Commission and other bodies, such as the World Conservation Union (IUCN) on the subject of hunting in protected areas, as a tool for the conservation and management of these habitats.

Other directives and regulations Without going into further details, I would like to also mention the directive and recent regulations on food hygiene and public health as they fully apply to game meat. There is a directive on firearms, having introduced, thanks to the efforts of FACE, the concept of a "European Firearms Pass", intended to facilitate the free movement of hunters with their shotgun or rifle from one Member State to another. In the future, we will have to expect in one way or another some EU rules on trapping and a possible ban of the use of lead-shot for hunting is already under discussion at the European Commission. All this means that the European hunters have to be prepared for more legal instruments and rules, coming from Brussels and Strasbourg, which will have a mostly restrictive impact on hunting.

V. IMPACT OF HUNTING ON RURAL LIVELIHOODS As a fair proportion of people participating in this Symposium has a personal or professional interest in hunting tourism or trophy hunting as it is sometimes called, I would like to address this issue from a European point of view. Another common feature for the 7 million European hunters I didn’t mention before is that for at least 75 % of them, hunting takes only place in their own, local area, close to their village or town. But as a consequence of the availability of more leisure time, the economic climate and, last but not least, the interest for other regions, game species or hunting methods, more and more hunters will more or less regularly hunt abroad, in other EU Member States or in other Continents. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Wild game species constitute a wild living resource. The use, in particular through hunting, of such a renewable natural resource, on the condition it is sustainable, can contribute to the conservation of biological diversity (species and habitats, FACE, 2004). This principle has been formally recognised in the Policy Statement of the World Conservation Union (IUCN), adopted at the World Conservation Congress in October 2000 in Amman, Jordan. This Statement explicitly recognises that the sustainable use of wild living resources constitutes “an important conservation tool” and this “because the social and economic benefits derived from such use provide incentives for people to conserve them”. This principle is fully applicable to the use through hunting of “hindering” game -species, such as large herbivores (often causing serious damage to farming and/or forestry) but also carnivores (bear, wolf, lynx, etc.). There is no doubt that hunting, in particular by foreign hunters, constitutes for many countries with “an economy in transition” an important activity and source of income for rural development. But in that case, it needs to be guaranteed that only the “interest” is used and not the “capital” of game-species. Competent authorities, at national, regional and local levels, must therefore create and maintain the appropriate legal and administrative framework (including monitoring and enforcement systems) to guarantee the sustainable character of the use of biological resources through hunting. This implies in particular the strict application of all relevant international legal and administrative provisions, such as CITES and the other wildlife conventions, agreements, etc. For the hunting of migratory species (mainly birds, such as waterfowl, or for species that do not respect political boundaries such as large carnivores) even greater care should be taken to avoid over-harvesting of this resource and international management and conservation plans are required. Such framework will have to be accompanied by measures of information, education and awareness raising for all socio-economic sectors concerned hunters’ organisations, travel agencies, hunting area managers, local authorities, etc. Do I need to point out how important it is that hunters, visiting another country or region to hunt there, behave themselves as guests and strictly adhere to all relevant legal and administrative rules, while at the same time respect the traditions, customs and socio-cultural sensitivities of the local populations? Such behaviour is of course not something which can be laid down in binding laws, but is the responsibility of all individual hunters, hunt organisers and hunting agencies.

VI. CONCLUSION What is the future for hunting in Europe? A basic requirement for a positive future is solidarity: solidarity between hunters from different regions and countries, but also between those practising different forms of hunting (small game hunting, wildfowling, deerstalking, falconry, even angling). All together, they are a strong political force. Divided, they will lose! Our message is simple, and we can demonstrate it with many case studies: sustainable hunting is good for conservation and for rural development. Or even more straight forward: hunting is good for wildlife and mankind. If we, all Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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together, succeed in bringing this message in a convincing way to the public, I am confident that hunting has a good future in Europe.

REFERENCES

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1979). - Council Directive n° 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds. EEC Official Journal L 103, 25/04/1979: 1. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1993). - Council Directive n° 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora. EEC Official Journal L 176 , 20/07/1993: 29-30. FACE (1996). - Handbook of hunting in Europe. Fédération des Associations de Chasse et Conservation de la Faune Sauvage de l'Union Européenne (FACE), Brussels, 2 Volumes, 280 p. FACE (2004) - Hunting, an added value for biodiversity, 27 case studies from European countries. Fédération des Associations de Chasse et Conservation de la Faune Sauvage de l'Union Européenne (FACE), Brussels, 109 p.

GESTION DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE ET CHASSE DANS UNE UNION EUROPÉENNE ÉLARGIE Y. LECOCQ MOTS-CLÉS: Chasse, conservation, modèle de chasse, subsidiarité, élargissement de l'Union européenne, oiseau, habitat, directive, Union européenne, Europe.

RÉSUMÉ En Europe, il existe une grande diversité de paysages, de flore et de faune. Cette diversité existe aussi dans les cultures et les traditions humaines, y compris dans les pratiques de chasse, et elle constitue une grande richesse. On peut distinguer approximativement quatre modèles ou traditions dans l’"Europe de la chasse" : l’Europe du Nord, l’Europe du Sud, les pays Anglo-Saxons et l’Europe Centrale. Il existe aussi beaucoup de points communs entre les chasseurs, et parmi lesquels, surtout, un profond intérêt et un profond respect des chasseurs pour la Nature. Les chasseurs contribuent de façon importante et bénévole à la conservation, à la gestion de la faune, à la restauration des habitats, etc. La chasse est aussi importante au niveau économique et social (par exemple, la chasse génère 120 000 emplois surtout dans les milieux ruraux). De par ses "caractéristiques", il est compréhensible que le principe de subsidiarité s’applique à la chasse dans l’Union Européenne, ce qui explique pourquoi il n’existe pas de politique de la chasse propre à l’Union Européenne. Il existe cependant un certain nombre d’instruments légaux et de politiques qui constituent un cadre réglementaire avec des répercussions considérables sur la chasse, la Directive sur les "Oiseaux" et celle sur les "Habitats" étant les plus importantes.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 275-290 ISSN 1622-7662

COMMUNAL GAME RANCHING IN ZIMBABWE: LOCAL EMPOWERMENT AND SUSTAINABLE GAME MEAT PRODUCTION FOR RURAL COMMUNITIES S. LE BEL (1), N. GAIDET (2), S. MUTAKE (3), S. LE DOZE (2) and T. NYAMUGURÉ (1) (1) CIRAD-Zimbabwe, PO Box 1378, Harare, Zimbabwe. E-mail: [email protected] (2) CIRAD-emvt ECONAP, Campus international de Baillarguet TA/30, F-34398 Montpellier Cedex. E-mail: [email protected] (3) Guruve Rural District Council, PO Box 110, Guruve, Zimbabwe.

KEY WORD: Game ranching, bush meat, sport hunting, co-operative company, Zambezi Valley, Zimbabwe.

ABSTRACT Game ranching, considered as a more suitable land use option within the semiarid and unproductive areas of Africa, has been supported in the Southern Africa Region by adequate policy and legislative changes. In Zimbabwe, a radical shift was undertaken in the 1960s, giving white farmers proprietorship and benefit from wildlife utilisation. The roots of this policy were wildlife conservation based on sustainable management and devolution of responsibility for wildlife resources to land owners. After independence in 1980, the wildlife usage rights were extended to the rural areas. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) managed this dynamic. Despite the initiative of CAMPFIRE, game ranching didn’t have a great success in communal land due to loose tenure arrangement in communal land. Since 1997, the Biodiversity Project has focused on promoting natural resources management in the Lower Guruve District of north-eastern Zimbabwe. One of the micro-project has been to set up a communal game ranch (the "Gonono" game ranch situated in the ward 4 of the district) to supply meat for community members. Since the establishment of the ranch on 32 km2 of mixed mopane, Colophospermum mopane, woodland and acacia, Acacia nilota, shrub land in 1999, it had built up its own experience by iterative approaches and adaptive management. The economic carrying capacity of the ranch was estimated to be 230 large animal units. With a small initial population of 25-50 large mammals, translocations of 520 impalas, Aepyceros melampus, and 200 plain games were organized between 1999 and 2002. The actual population represents the optimum economic carrying capacity of the ranch. In 2002, a management toolbox had been put in place. The ranch team was trained on how to monitor game and artificial water points and organize early burning. In 2003, cropping was organized during the dry season (70%), harvesting 133 animals, focusing on impalas (82%), wildebeests Connochaetes taurinus (12%) and zebras Equus burchelli (4%) from an

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initial quota of 165 heads. Most of the hunts were conducted during the day utilizing a drop boma erected around water points. In 2002-2003, harvested impalas (n = 96) were mainly males (89%), adults or sub-adults (92%) with an average live weight of 48±1(SE) kg (n = 50) and an average carcass weight of 29±1(SE) kg (n = 49) for an adult male. Measurements done on cropped impalas were used to predict carcass weight by measuring the thoracic perimeter. Five tons of meat were produced, 20% given to the staff and 80% sold on the local market at 0.5 US$ per kg. For 2003, current expenditure and maintenance were estimated at 12,170 US$ (380 US$ per km2). Income generated 10,138 US$ through sport hunting (65%), sale of meat (33%) and marginal activities (2%). This covered 83% of the total expenditure, due to the sale of only one third of the sport-hunting quota. In 2004, the registration of the ranch as a co-operative company will enable the ranch to increase its capital through distribution of ordinary shares to every household of the ward and also to renew its agreement with safaris operators. With a sport-hunting quota of 47 animals (5 tons of meat) the ranch is expected to generate an income of 23,000 US$ covering its running cost. A cropping quota of 70 impalas will bring an additional production of 2 tons sold at 2 US$ per kg. The major challenge of the Gonono communal game ranch is to ensure that it is economically sustainable without prejudicing the local community to get cheap meat.

I. INTRODUCTION Game ranching, defined as the exploitation of wild species in an area demarcated by a peripheral fence, was developed in the 1970’s through the first pilot game ranching experiments with the Kruger and Ubizana Parks in South Africa, the Theunis Ranch in Natal, and the Doddieburn and Mkwasine ranches in Zimbabwe (HOPCRAFT, 1976). Compared to actual farming (game farming), ranching is characterised by human intervention limited to regular cropping aimed at maintaining the wildlife at a density compatible with the equilibrium of its natural environment. Although sport hunting remains the principal method of exploitation, other activities have been developed, such as game-viewing tourism, meat production and the marketing of live animals (BOTHMA, 1996). Amongst the factors explaining the development of ranching in Southern Africa, one will note the development of barely productive arid or semi-arid areas (2/3 of Southern Africa), the use of wildlife species well adapted to their environment and offering a better numerical and weight productivity, and finally the existence of a favourable legislative framework. In other countries, particularly in East Africa, the regulatory choices have, on the contrary, curbed the development of a similar industry (MUIR, 1989; PETERS, 1993). The economic importance of game ranching is considerable as there are 9,000 game ranches in South Africa, including 4,000 mixed ranches, annually generating more than 300 million RD (approx. US$ 51 million) in revenues thanks to sport hunting. In South Africa, game ranching concerns 16 million ha, being 13% of the farmed land. In Zimbabwe, where 22% of the land is allotted to wildlife, 2.7 million ha were until now consecrated to game ranching Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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on commercial farms. In the communal areas, representing 42% of the territory for 76% of the population, a rich and varied wildlife, which is the source of numerous animal-man conflicts, more than 1,000 cases per quarter in certain districts, is almost exclusively exploited by sport hunting. The absence of game ranches comes from a land tenure system which favours methods of short-term extractive exploitation like annual crops as cotton farming or small family stock breeding (FAO, 1997). The study lead by TRAFFIC INTERNATIONAL (2000) in seven countries of the region (Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) underlines the importance of the game meat. In many cases, it is the only source of animal protein (unfortunately most often cut-priced: 75% of the cost of beef meat in Zimbabwe) for health reasons although it represents an annual volume of 8,500 tons to a value of 7.7 million US$. In Zimbabwe, the 2,400 tons produced each year by the game ranches represent 55% of the national game meat production (total 4,355 tons). In the communal areas, it was estimated at 874 tons in 1996 and comes essentially from sport hunting and the killing of dangerous animals. When the game density allows it, targeted cropping operations are organised as is the case in the Nyaminyami district (TAYLOR, 1990). The game meat is often badly distributed, sold at a loss or freely distributed, and only covers 30% of the meat protein needs (TRAFFIC INTERNATIONAL, 2000). In Zimbabwe, legislative changes in the 1960’s allowed for the laying down of the basis for game ranching according to the hypothesis that the rational exploitation of game species would contribute to their conservation and would fall upon the manager or owner of the ranch. After independence in 1980, the wildlife usage rights were extended to the rural areas in 1988 by designating the « Rural District Council » as the administrative entity responsible for the exploitation and conservation of wildlife (JONES and MURPHREE, 2001). The CAMPFIRE programme, abbreviation for the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources, manages this dynamic and in 1989 designated the districts of Nyaminyami and Guruve as the first two pilot sites benefiting from CAMPFIRE status. In 2002, 36 district councils benefited from the CAMPFIRE programme representing an area of 30,700 km2 (JONES AND MURPHREE, 2001; CAMPFIRE Association, 2002). With 86% of the revenues coming from sport hunting, 10% from hides and ivory, and 3% from ecotourism, the portion of the CAMPFIRE income derived from the sale of game meat remains marginal due to the informal character of its distribution and marketing. Accompanying the CAMPFIRE dynamic, the first French Fund for the World Environment Project was initiated in 1997 in the Mid-Zambezi Valley. On a pioneering front opened following the eradication of the tsetse fly, the Biodiversity Conservation Project devoted itself to (1) reducing the fragmentation of the natural habitats through a negotiated land-use plan, (2) increasing the community revenues generated by the use of natural resources, and (3) improving agricultural productivity and stabilising cotton, Gossypium sp., farming zones. After a phase of studies and inventories, the accent was placed in 2000 on the actual implementation of community micro-projects. It is in this spirit that the Gonono game ranch situated in ward 4 of the Guruve Rural district was initiated (CIRAD, 2001). In this paper we present this micro-project: how the project was elaborated, what were the characteristics of the ranch and Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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management methods, what were the results of the 2003 hunting season and what are the perspectives.

II. LOCATION OF THE GAME RANCH AND SOURCES OF INCOME IN WARD 4 The Mid-Zambezi Valley is an ancient flood basin of 1.3 million km2 situated on an east-west axis between the Victoria Falls in the west of Zimbabwe and the artificial Cabora Basa Lake in the east in Mozambique. The Dande communal area, within the Guruve district, is situated in this flood plain, in the extreme north of Zimbabwe. Dande is subdivided into 11 wards, and ward 4 is the area concerned by this project (Figure 1). The average altitude is 405 m, the climate being of a tropical nature characterised by an average temperature of 25°C, a short rainy season from November to March, and an average rainfall of 450-700 mm with great inter-annual variability. Five vegetation types have been identified including Miombo and Mopane woodlands (TIMBERLAKE, 1995; CIRAD, 2001).

Figure 1: Location of the ward 4 of the Dande communal area, in the Lower Guruve district, northeastern Zimbabwe, where the Gonono communal game ranch was established. Figure 1 : Localisation de la juridiction 4, ou ward 4, de la zone communale de Dande dans le district de la Basse Guruve au nord-est du Zimbabwe, où a été établi le ranch communal à gibier de Gonono.

On a rhombus of 817 km2 bordered in the north by Mozambique, the 1,246 families of ward 4 are spread over 7 villages, of which the largest, Gonono, has a school, a health centre and shops. In ten years, the population has more than doubled to reach 4,823 inhabitants during the last census in 2002. The principal source of income is cotton farming which has gone up from 82 tons for 141 farmers in 1992 to 188 tons (+ 130%) for 625 farmers in 2002. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The food crops grown are those of maize, Zea mays, groundnuts, Arachis hypogea, sorghum, Sorghum bicolor, and millet, Pennisetum typhoides. Between 1992 and 2002, the percentage of cultivated land rose from 3 to 14% (116 km2). During this period, the CAMPFIRE revenues from sport hunting remained almost stable for the whole ward with an annual revenue of 10,000 US$, but in 2002 this only represented 8 US$ per family, i.e. one tenth of the value of a bale of cotton. The legal production of meat remained rather low due to the ban on traditional hunting and a domestic herd reduced due to its purchase cost. The contribution from sport hunting remains episodic with the hunting zones located at important distances from the villages. In this context, poaching activities with the aid of snares or dogs remains important, contributing to the production of 75% of the meat consumed by the households in the ward (BALLAN et al., 1998). The population counts undertaken in 1992 and 2002 show that the increase in cultivated zones was accompanied by a decline in game species (Figure 2, FRITZ et al., 2003; GAIDET et al., 2004).

Figure 2: Evolution of the density (individuals per km2) of 5 large game-mammal species (grysbock, Raphicerus sharpei, kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, duiker, Sylvicapra grimmia, elephant, Loxodonta africana, and impala, Aepyceros melampus) from 1992 to 2002 in the East-Guruve hunting block, northeastern Zimbabwe. Figure 2 : Évolution des densités (individus par km2) de 5 espèces de grand mammifère-gibier (grysbock, Raphicerus sharpei, koudou, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, céphalophe couronné, Sylvicapra grimmia, éléphant, Loxodonta africana, et impala, Aepyceros melampus) de 1992 à 2002 dans la zone de chasse de Guruve-Est, au nord-est du Zimbabwe.

III. ELABORATION OF THE PROJECT III.1. COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS, CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS It is in this context of a decline in hunting that the request of the ward-4 community fell, being to (1) produce meat for the local communities, (2) produce

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wealth and create local jobs, (3) reduce poaching, and (4) protect an environment threatened by the spread of the cotton farming. These elements were included in a feasibility study undertaken from 1988 to 1997 setting itself the objective of producing game meat for less than 1 USD per kg from species reputed for their proliferation and their butchery quality, and by using vegetation types unsuitable for farming (CHARDONNET and LEBEL, 1998). In real terms the setting up of the ranch generated a series of inquiries and questions related to the following points: (1) the access to animal resources, (2) the choice of the implantation site, (3) the choice of the management techniques to be transferred to the communities, (4) the level of infrastructure required, (5) the necessary amount of investment, (6) the duration of the technical assistance (3 years), (7) the appropriation of the tool by the families of the ward, (8) the implication of political elite and traditional chiefs, (9) the control exercised by the District Council and the National Parks, (10) the absence of local skills, (11) the absence of marketing networks, (12) the existence of an unsuitable land tenure system, and (13) the absence of an ad hoc institutional framework. These were recapitulated under 3 major challenges: (1) the community empowerment or how to consolidate the appropriation of the ranch by the ward, (2) the management of the ranch or how to go from cotton farming to the exploitation of herd of multi-species game through hunting, and (3) the economic cost-effectiveness or how to attain a degree of financial autonomy in the short term in a disrupted national context. The rooting of the game ranch in the community is the result of a long process implicating participants as diverse as the District Council, a decentralised government structure, the ancestral spirits and the villages located within the ward.

III.2. THE ROLE OF THE DISTRICT COUNCIL AND THE VOICE OF THE ANCESTORS As a beneficiary of the Biodiversity project, the District Council played a driving role in the initiative of the community micro-projects aimed at promoting the exploitation of natural areas or of wild species. This « top-down » type of approach had the merit of defining the process for the selection of micro-projects, of leading the feasibility studies and legitimising its existence by an order of the district’s constituent assembly. In the case of ward 4, the elected representative of the ward, a charismatic person and member of the ward’s animal management committee and of the project’s steering committee, used the expectations of his community to initiate the pilot project for the ranch but not without political ulterior motives. The specifications of the micro-projects defined by the District Council were built around the following points: (1) an individual or community initiative from the district, (2) the conservation of wildness areas and wild species, (3) the improvement of the living conditions of the local populations, (4) the sustainability of the exploited natural resources, and (5) the economic cost-effectiveness. On the basis of the feasibility study, the District Council endorsed the community ranch project. During the choice of the implantation site, the community intervened through the « spirit medium », the link between the ancestral Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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world and the community of the living. The initial site was declared unsuitable for game ranching due to the presence of a sacred pond and baobab, Adansonia digitata, tree as well as a funeral site (Figure 3). For the second placement, the Council’s agents guided by the spirit medium marked out the boundaries of the ranch. Rectangular in shape, it extends over 3,200 ha on a north-south axis and partly covers old fallow land abandoned due to the poorness of the soils and the repeated intrusion of elephants, Loxodonta africana. In the south, it is served by a track leading to the Gonono village. The Gonono agricultural land is to the west and to the east is the Chauti sacred site and the agricultural land of the Majinga village.

Figure 3: Choice of the Gonono game ranch localization (dotted and broken line) in ward 4 of the Dande communal area, northeastern Zimbabwe, among other sites rejected due to their sacred or funeral features. Figure 3 : Choix de la localisation du ranch à gibier de Gonono (trait en pointillé et en tireté) dans la juridiction 4, ou ward 4, de la zone communale de Dande au nord-est du Zimbabwe, parmi d'autres sites rejetés à cause de leur caractère sacré ou funéraire.

III.3. COMMUNITY EMANCIPATION AND TRAINING OF BENEFICIARIES The definition of an adequate constitutional framework was done in stages, over a period of 5 years. In November 1999, a first workshop allowed the community aspirations to be detailed and laid down the basis for a first constitution. This stage was followed by the recruitment of 12 employees originating from the ward, paid by the Biodiversity Project, including a manager seconded by a foreman, a bookkeeper and 9 workers. Except in the case of the manager, formerly employed by the Biodiversity Project as an eco-guard, the other members were recruited by the ward whilst respecting the political and social equilibrium of the ward. In October 2000, the Chivaraidze Game Ranch become a CAMPFIRE company and opened a bank account in its name. The new constitution defined its mandate in 5 clauses: the provision of meat at a reduced cost, the reduction of poaching, job creation, the search for a financial and ecological equilibrium and the creation of wealth. In November 2001, the constitution of the ranch was amended with 3 additional clauses detailing the role of the ranch in community development with Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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notably the mechanisms for decision making and training of officers. In January 2002, a first exploitation contract was signed with a local safari operator. In June 2003, the officially inaugurated ranch functioned with its own income generated from the sale of meat and sport hunting. In November 2003, the ranch was transformed into a community co-operative centred on the production of meat, the sale of game, of its by-products and the promotion of eco-tourism in ward 4. The functioning of this co-operative is defined by 21 clauses stipulating that: (1) each family is a share-holder in the ranch, sales and purchases of shares being managed by mechanisms preventing any holding of shares from outside of the ward; (2) the profits of the ranch are distributed annually before taxation in kind (meat) or in dividends; (3) an administration council made up of a dozen members, representing the 7 villages of the ward, decides the major orientations of the ranch (price of the meat, negotiation of the culling quotas, recruitment, etc.) with the manager being charged with applying them; (4) the financial accounts are audited annually; and (5) the private and institutional sectors can be integrated. In January 2004, the co-operative reduced its personnel to a nucleus of 6 people, turning to the employment of temporary workers for seasonal work. In March 2004, the exploitation contract linking the co-operative to the hunting operator was reviewed on the basis of a minimum hunting right of 15,000 US$ to be paid. In April 2004, the 10 members of the co-operative management committee were elected and the cooperative was officially registered. In June 2004, the distribution of shares to the families in the Ward allowed the co-operative’s capital to be increased. Most of the beneficiaries being small cotton producers, the taking over of the ranch was accompanied by long work on the training of staff in the management of community property (bookkeeping, personnel management, organisation of work, etc.) and in the exploitation of the animal resources (counts, estimation of animal densities, cropping and handling of carcasses, management of bush fires, driving and maintenance of a mechanised machine and the use of agricultural tools).

IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RANCH AND MANAGEMENT METHODS IV.1. NATURAL RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT The ranch extends over 3,200 ha, demarcated by 23 km of electrified fence on the outside to warn of the intrusion of predators and elephants. The size of the ranch was a compromise between the level of finance available and the objective of providing meat. The ideal would have been to begin with 50 km2 as such an area offers more flexibility in terms of game management. Five vegetation types have been identified on the ranch: open mixed scrubland, mixed acacia Acacia nilotica scrubland, mixed monopane Colophospermum mopane woodland, mixed scrubland, and monopane woodland. Two blocks of Colophospermum mopane are distinguished in the centre and in the south of the ranch (52% of the surface area) separated by bands of Diospyros kirkii, Terminalia brachystemma and Combretum apiculatum scrub land (43% of the surface area). An old piece of fallow land (5% of Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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the surface area) situated in the north-west has become an Acacia nilotica and Combretum sp. scrubland. Grasses dominate the herbaceous cover with the principal kinds being Aristida sp., Digitaria sp., Heteropogon sp., Schimidtia sp. and Urochloa sp. The biomass measurements taken have evaluated the annual average production of dry matter at 2 tons of dry matter per hectare (HOVE, 2003). The economic carrying capacity (70% of the ecological carrying capacity) calculated from the different types of the vegetation is estimated at 230 large animal units (BOTHMA, 2002). Other methods of calculation taking into account the rainfall give us an average production of 4.5 tons per km2 (COE et al., 1976). The ranch’s water resources are restricted to a few natural water points located in the south of the ranch and in the Kadzi river bed. The ranch’s animals being limited to small populations (25 to 50 head) of impalas, Aepyceros melampus, kudus, Tragelaphus stepsiceros, duikers, Sylvicapra grimmia, warthogs, Phacochoerus aethiopicus, and bush pigs, Potamochoerus porcus, representing a community contribution of 35,000 US$, it’s enrichment in game species was planned and undertaken from 1999 to 2002. From 1999 to 2000, 459 impalas were introduced by CIRAD and the Biodiversity Project representing an investment of 25,000 US$. Due to the late period of translocations during the dry season, the mortality level linked to the capture reached 10% of the total number. In 2002, a private operator translocated 50 impalas and a mixed population of 200 individuals of zebra, Equus burchelli, sable, Hippotragus niger, wildebeest, Connochaetes taurinus, tsessebe, Damaliscus lunatus, waterbuck, Kobus ellipsiprymnus, and cape eland, Taurotragus oryx, valued at 56,000 US$. The population currently comprises 12% browsers, 28% mixed feeders and 60% strict grazers. The last counts (700 individuals) revealed a reduction of the impala population (-38%) in favour of selective grazers (wildebeest, +24 %, and sable, + 84%), and non-selective grazers (zebras, +34%). Despite the placing of droppers on the peripheral fence from 1999 to 2000, it is quite probable that a fraction of the impalas, particularly juveniles and pre-adults, were able to escape from the ranch during the period of acclimatization. Three boreholes were sunk: near the butchery, in the south to feed the principal natural water hole, and in the north of the ranch to improve the distribution of the carrying pressure during the dry season. Ten tracks have been opened along the north-south and east-west axes, dividing the ranch into thirty blocks of 50 to 100 ha separated by firebreaks. An enclosure of 6 ha constructed around the south water point allows for the acclimatization of introduced animals. At the main entrance in the south of the ranch, a group of buildings comprising a 60 m2 butchery, toilet blocks, an office and two storerooms were constructed in 2002. These facilities were completed by the installation of a smokehouse and a solar meat dryer as well as a hunting camp. The ranch’s equipment is limited to working material (4x4, tractor, trailer, rotational slasher and grader), a generator, two pumps of which one is a solar pump, as well as a mobile catching trap or « drop boma ». For the cropping and handling of the carcasses, the ranch has a 223-calibre rifle and basic butchery material at its disposal. Guards equipped with 12 calibre rifles and portable VHF radios assure the ranch security. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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IV.2. GAME MONITORING Horse patrols regularly inspect the condition of the fence, the water points and collect indicators allowing the frequentation of the habitats by the wildlife to be assessed. An annual count at the natural and artificial water points during the dry season allows the state of the populations to be evaluated. After the counting exercise, a cropping and hunting quota is submitted to the National Parks by the District Council. In 2003, the ranch obtained a sport hunting quota of 47 heads (zebra, wildebeest, sable, kudus, impalas, grysbok, Raphicerus sharpei, eland, duiker) and a cropping quota of 165 heads including 135 impalas, 15 wildebeests, 10 zebras and 5 tsessebes.

IV.3. MANAGEMENT METHODS Early fires are set at the end of the rainy season to clear the fence; open fire breaks along the tracks and favours the regrowth on low ground of Andropogon sp. and Hyparrhenia sp. The feeding of artificial water points allows the pressure on the pasture land to be spread during the dry season. Blocks of salt are placed close to the boreholes to attract the game. The cropping of animals is carried out according to principles in effect in other game ranches, being killing by a shot in the head or the neck, immediate bleeding and transfer to the butchery within 60 minutes for evisceration (BLANKENSHIP et al., 1990). The only difference is in the cropping of animals captured in a « drop boma » and not at night by spotlight, this latter technique proving to be costly and hardly productive due to the density of the vegetation. The sport hunting activities are lead by the safari operator who uses the ranch quota to diversify his quota, which is attributed to him in the Dande communal area, concerning elephants, buffalo, Syncerus caffer, lions, Panthera leo, and leopards, Panthera pardus. The meat and the offal from the hunted animals remain the property of the ranch. The carcasses are processed at the butchery, which has running water, toilets and showers at the disposal of the staff. The dressing of impala carcasses (removal of the head and limbs, skinning, evisceration, cutting up of the carcass) takes place in a room sheltered from dust and flies along a rail. The gastrointestinal tracts are cleaned in a separate room. A rack allows postmortem inspection of the offal (heart, lungs, liver) and the head. The skins are placed out to dry covered with coarse salt on a cement slab then stocked on racks. For the heavier animals, the carcasses are handled outside on a cement slab equipped with a lifting apparatus. The information relative to the hunt, the characteristics of the cropped animals and carcasses produced are systematically recorded. The fresh meat is sold at the ranch’s butchery or in the surrounding villages the same day as the slaughtering, in portions of 1 to 2 kg. The offal is sold by unit. The unsold fresh meat and that of zebra, which is not much liked, is dried or smoked. The dried skins are sold at the end of the hunting season to the Angwa communal tannery, another community micro-project set up by the Biodiversity Project, or in Harare. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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V. EVALUATION OF THE 2003 HUNTING SEASON Hunting data In 2003, 144 animals were cropped including 11 trophies and 133 for the provision of meat. Globally, only 68% of the quota allocated by the National Parks was used (Figure 4), essentially for the production of meat (81% of the quota used) and slightly for sport hunting (11% of the quota used). Most of the hunting activities (70% 50/71) were lead during the dry season (JuneNovember, Figure 5) ensuring 76 % of the cropping carried out (109/144). As far as commercial hunting is concerned, this was undertaken during the day from a vehicle (44%) or from a drop boma (53%). This last technique proved to be very economical, hardly disturbing and very selective on the choice of the target. The average firing distance is 42 m (15-100 m), 33% of the shoots being on the head or the neck.

Characteristics of game cropped In 2002 and 2003, almost all the cropped impalas (n = 96) were males (89%), adults or pre-adults (91%). They weighed on average 48±1(SE) kg (n = 50) for the adults, 35±1(SE) kg (n = 37) for the pre-adults and 23±1(SE) kg (n = 9) for the juveniles respectively providing carcasses of 29±1(SE) kg (n = 49), 21±1(SE) kg (n = 34) et 14±1(SE) kg (n = 9). A linear regression

2003 Quota and Offtake

1 000

Offtake

140 109

Hunting quota

25

25 10

9 3

Kudu

Impala

1

Wildebeest

3

Tsessebe

10

5 2 2

Sable

16

Zebra

Nbr

100

Figure 4 : Quota and offtake (individuals) of 6 large game-mammal species (impala, Aepyceros melampus, kudu, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, wildebeest, Connochaetes taurinus, tsessebe, Damaliscus lunatus, zebra, Equus burchelli, and sable, Hippotragus niger) in the Gonono communal game ranch (32 km2), northeastern Zimbabwe, in 2003. Figure 4 : Quotas et prélèvements (individus) de 6 espèces de gros mammifère-gibier (impala, Aepyceros melampus, koudou, Tragelaphus strepsiceros, gnou à queue noire, Connochaetes taurinus, sassaby, Damaliscus lunatus, zèbre de Burchell, Equus burchelli, et hippotrague noir, Hippotragus niger) dans le ranch communal à gibier de Gonono (32 km2), au nord-est du Zimbabwe, en 2003.

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2003 Hunting Season

30

Hunts Animal cropped

Number

25 20 15 10 5

Ja

nu Fe ary br ua r M y ar ch A pr il M ay Ju ne Ju A ly u Se gu pt st em b O er ct N obe ov e r D mbe ec em r be r

0

Figure 5: Numbers of hunts and of individuals of large game-mammals cropped during the 2003 hunting season in the Gonono communal game ranch (32 km2), north-eastern Zimbabwe. Figure 5 : Nombres de chasses et d'individus de grands mammifères-gibiers prélevés au cours de la saison de chasse 2003 dans le ranch communal à gibier de Gonono (32 km2), au nord-est du Zimbabwe.

line allowed the carcass weight to be estimated from the measurement of the thoracic perimeter [carcass weight (kg) = 0.51 thoracic perimeter (cm) 16.86, F = 274, P < 0.001, n = 92]. The cropping of other species produced carcasses of 115 to 38 kg [115± 10 kg (n = 4)] for the kudu, 106±16 kg for the zebra (n = 9), 92±6 kg for the wildebeest (n = 20), and 38±8 kg for the tsessebe (n = 5).

Game meat production and sales Five tons of meat were produced in 2003 of which half came from the 109 impalas cropped (2.5 tons), a quarter from the 16 wildebeest (1.3 tons) and 18% from the 7 kudus (0.9 tons). Three-quarters of the meat (3.7 tons) was sold fresh (89%) for an average price of 0.5 US$ per kilo or in the form of dried meat (11%) at 2 US$ per kilo. The remainder was given to the ranch employees (20%) or wasted (6%) by the staff. More than half of the marketed meat was sold in ward 4 (57%), generating 29% of the income and the rest to neighbouring communities of which a third (37%) are located along the main road in the valley generating 64% of the income from the sale of meat.

Economic evaluation The total investment amounts to 350,000 US$ including 33% for the stocking of game, 21% for the fences (external fence, acclimatization boma and the capture boma), 21% for the buildings (butchery, office, workshop, meat dryer, hunting camp), 14% for the water points (boreholes, pumps, artificial water Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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points) and 9% for the working equipment (tractor, trailer, grader, rotational slasher). Seventy four percent of this investment was covered by the Biodiversity Project, 16% by the safari operator and 10% by the community of ward 4. The investment of this pilot project being covered by the FFEM, the ranch does not bear the cost of its depreciation. This investment could have been reduced by a third by exploiting the mopane forests for the construction of the fence and by obtaining a contribution from the National Parks for the provision of animals. In 2003, the ranch’s costs were evaluated at 12,170 US$, i.e. 380 US$ per km2. A little less than half was for operational costs, 30% to salaries, 15% to the maintenance of the ranch’s infrastructure and 10% to the setting up of a community co-operative (Figure 6, upper-left). For 2003, the ranch’s income reached 10,138 US$ of which 65% was generated by the sale of 11 trophies, 33% by the sale of meat, offal and skins of 144 animals and 2% by secondary activities such as market gardening, hiring out of the tractor and the hunting camp (Figure 6, lower-left). If the safari operator had paid his cropping fees in US$ and not in Z$ at the official rate, the ranch’s income would have reached 14,479 US$, covering its operational costs. 2003 Current Expenditure and Maintenance Total: 12,170 USD

Cooperative company 10% Training 1%

2004 Expenditure and Maintenance Total: 20,156 USD

Maintenance infrastructure 15%

Training 667 USD Purchase of equipemen 2%

Staff and administration costes 30%

Running costs 42%

Staff and administration costs 4,769 USD

Maintenance of infrastructure 3,111 USD Purchase of equipment 2,244 USD

Running costs 8,222 USD

2004 Expected Incomes Total: 38,674 US

2003 Sources of Incomes Total : 10,138 USD Hunting daily rate 11,163 USD

Other income s 2,2%

Game meat 32,6%

Cooperative company 1,142 USD

Sport Hunting 65,2% Trophee fee 11,835 USD

Other incomes 760 USD

Game Meat 13,560 USD

Co-products 1,356 US

Figure 6: Comparison of the expenditures (upper part) and the sources of income (lower part) between 2003 (left) and 2004 (right) of the Gonono communal game ranch (32 km2), northeastern Zimbabwe. Figure 6 : Comparaison des dépenses (en haut) et des sources de revenu (en bas) en 2003 (à gauche) et 2004 (à droite) du ranch communal à gibier de Gonono (32 km2), au nord-est du Zimbabwe.

VI. EVALUATION AND PERSPECTIVES Objectives of the 2004 hunting season For 2004, the ranch’s management committee set out five priorities with a provisional budget of about 20,000 US$ (Figure 6, upper-right) anticipating Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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38,000 US$ in income (Figure 6, lower-right). The first priority is the strengthening of the co-operative’s structure by proposing to the members of the 1,300 families of the ward to become ranch shareholders. The sale of the shares at 1 US$ or 3 kg of cotton will generate a starting capital of 6,0007,000 US$. It will be used to create a working capital and to make investments intended to complete the equipping of the ranch (second solar pump) or to diversify its activities (purchase of a maize mill). The second priority is to increase the production of meat by 30% (6.5 tons) by using all of the cropping (70 impalas) and sport (45 trophies) hunting quotas. By selling the game meat at the same price as that of beef (2 US$ per kg), the ranch is hoping for an income of 13,560 US$ being an increase of 50% on the sales of the butchery. The third priority is to control the activities of the safari operator by a tri-annual contract guaranteeing a minimum revenue of 11,000 US$ corresponding to 50% of the hunting fees and daily rates. The fourth priority is to use the ranch as the growth point of the ward by creating activities which respond to the wishes of the community: sale of vegetables during the dry season, repairing of agricultural tools and carts, transporting of bales of cotton to the depot or construction materials and milling for the production of maize flour. And the fifth priority is to control expenses, notably by reducing the permanent team to 6 people and employing temporary workers for seasonal work. This arrangement will allow, amongst other things, a more equitable distribution of the seasonal work between the seven village communities.

Lessons to be learnt The creation of this community game ranch in the Mid-Zambezi Valley results from a long iterative process where sport hunting is lead to play an essential role in the maintenance of sustainable production of game meat. The production potential will take 3 to 4 years to reach and will necessitate support as much on the level of exploitation through hunting as well as on the capacity of the community to manage a micro-enterprise. Amongst the elements to be taken into consideration if such an initiative was to recur, it would be necessary to bear in mind: (1) the receptiveness of the community, which can be assessed by the existence of a traditional system for the use and management of natural resources; (2) the existence of a favourable institutional framework notably defining the degree of responsibility of the community in the exploitation of wildlife; (3) the availability of game species which could be locally captured passively or actively, (4) the existence of a land use plan capable of attributing 50 to 100 km2 of mixed savannah with natural water points to the establishment of the ranch; (5) the presence of growing markets as much for the local sale of game meat as for sport hunting; and (6) the recourse to institutional or private donors likely to invest 5,000 to 10,000 Euros per fenced km2. REFERENCES BALLAN E., MAJIRA A., NYAZVOMBO R. & SIRDEY M. (1998). - Bushmeat in Dande: social dynamics beyond legality and illegality. CIRAD, Harare, Zimbabwe, 28 p. BLANKENSHIP L. H., PARKER I.S.C. & QVORTRUP S.A. (1990). - Game cropping in East Africa: the Kekopey experiment. The Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, Nairobi, Kenya.

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BOTHMA J.D.P. (1996). - Game ranch management. Van Schaik, Pretoria,. BOTHMA J.D.P. (2002). - Game ranch management. Van Schaik/Hatfield, Pretoria. CAMPFIRE ASSOCIATION (2002). - The CAMPFIRE Programme: an assessment of progress 2002. AMPFIRE Association, Harare. CHARDONNET P. & LEBEL S. (1998). - Etude de faisabilité d'un micro-projet, le ranch communal de gibier de Gonono. CIRAD, Harare, Zimbabwe, 50 p. CIRAD (2001).- Les hommes et les animaux dans la Moyenne Vallée du Zambèze. CIRAD-emvt, Montpellier, France. COE M. J., CUMMING D.H.M. & PHILLIPSON J. (1976). -Biomass and production of large African herbivores in relation to rainfall and primary production. Oecologia, 22: 341-354. FAO (1997). - Wildlife and food security in Africa. FAO, Rome, Italy. FRITZ H., SAID S. et al. (2003). - The effects of agricultural fields and human settlements on the use of rivers by wildlife in the mid-Zambezi valley, Zimbabwe. Landscape Ecology 18(3): 293-302. GAIDET N., MAPUVIRE G. & LE BEL S. (2004). - Determinants of human – animal interactions in a communal area of the Zambezi valley. CIRAD, Harare, Zimbabwe, 19 p. HOPCRAFT D. (1976). - Productivity comparison between Thomson's gazelle and cattle, and their relation to the ecosystem in Kenya: 3, xvi, 213 p. HOVE J. (2003). - Vegetation dynamics under game ranching: a case study of Chivaidze Game in Lower Guruve. Bindura University of Science of Education, Department of Environmental Sciences, Bindura, Zimbabwe, 37 p. JONES B. & MURPHREE M. (2001). - Conservation policies and institutions. In: African Wildlife & livelihoods: the promose and performance of community conservation, D.H.M. MURPHREE, ed. Weaver, Harare: 38-58. MUIR K. (1989). - The potential role of indigenous resources in economic development of arid environments in Sub-Saharan Africa: the case for wildlife utilisation in Zimbabwe." Society and Natural Resources, 2: 307-318. PETERS H.P.J. (1993). - Wildlife utilisation and rural development in the Centre African Republic. Nature et Faune, 9(1): 3-11. TAYLOR R.D. (1990). - Socio-economic aspects of meat production from impala harvested in a Zimbabwean communal land. In: 2nd International Game Ranching Symposium, Edmonton, Canada. TIMBERLAKE R.C.J. (1995). - Vegetation survey of Gonono Ward, Dande communal land. WWF/ Zambezi Valley Project, Guruve District. TRAFFIC INTERNATIONAL (2000). - Food for thought: the utilization of wild meat in Eastern and Southern Africa. Traffic International.

RANCHING COMMUNAL DE GIBIER AU ZIMBABWE : OCTROI DE POUVOIRS AUX COMMUNAUTÉS RURALES LOCALES ET PRODUCTION DURABLE DE VIANDE DE GIBIER S. LE BEL, N. GAIDET, S. MUTAKÉ, S. LE DOZE et T. NYAMUGURÉ

MOTS-CLÉS : Ranching de gibier, viande de brousse, chasse sportive, coopérative communautaire, Vallée du Zambèze, Zimbabwe.

RÉSUMÉ Le développement du ranching de gibier, comme alternative de mise en valeur des zones semi-arides et peu productives, a été encouragé en Afrique Australe par un environnement législatif approprié. Au Zimbabwe, l’impulsion fut ainsi donnée en 1960 en accordant aux propriétaires terriens blancs le droit de pro-

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priété et d’usufruit de la faune sauvage. Les principes de base de cette politique étaient l’utilisation durable de la faune sauvage et la délégation des responsabilités des ressources fauniques aux propriétaires fonciers. Après l'indépendance acquise en 1980, les droits d'usage du la faune sauvage ont été étendus aux zones rurales. Le programme d'aménagement des zones communales pour les ressources indigènes (CAMPFIRE) a piloté cette extension. Malgré l’initiative du CAMPFIRE, le ranching de gibier ne s’est pas développé en zone communale en raison d’un régime foncier peu adapté. Depuis 1997, le Projet Biodiversité s’est attaché à promouvoir la gestion des ressources naturelles dans le district de Guruve au nord-est du Zimbabwe. Un des microprojets retenus fut la création d’un ranch communautaire de gibier (le ranch "Gonono" situé dans la juridiction 4, ou ward 4, du district) destiné à approvisionner les communautés en viande. Depuis sa création en 1999, ce ranch de 32 km2, établi dans une savane arborée mixte à mopane, Colophospermum mopane, et acacia, Acacia nilota, a acquis sa propre expérience par étapes successives et une gestion appropriée. La capacité de charge économique du ranch a été estimée à 230 UGB (Unités Gros Bétail). Étant donnée la faible population initiale de gibier (25-50 grands mammifères), 520 impalas, Aepyceros melampus, et 200 individus d’autres espèces de gros gibiers de plaine ont été introduites de 1999 à 2002. Depuis 2002, le ranch, en capacité de charge optimale, est géré par une équipe locale, qui a été formée au suivi des animaux, à la gestion des points d’eau et à la pratique des feux précoces. En 2003, la récolte de gibier, pratiquée en saison sèche (70%), a permis de prélever 133 animaux, en particulier des impalas (82%), des gnous à queue noire, Connochaetes taurinus (12%) et des zèbres de Burchell, Equus burchelli (4%) sur un quota initial de 165 animaux. La plupart des prélèvements ont été effectués de jour à l’aide de pièges de capture disposés autour des points d’eau. En 2002-2003, les impalas prélevés (n = 96) étaient principalement des mâles (89%), adultes ou sub-adultes (92%) avec un poids vif moyen de 48 kg ± 1(erreur type) (n = 50) et un poids de carcasse moyen de 29 kg±1(erreur type) (n = 49) pour le mâle adulte. Chez les impalas, la mesure du périmètre thoracique a permis de prédire le poids de la carcasse. Cinq tonnes de viande ont été produites, 20% a été distribué aux employés du ranch et 80% a été vendu localement au prix moyen de 0,5 $US du kg. En 2003, le coût de fonctionnement et de maintenance du ranch a été estimé à 12 170 $US (380 US$ du km2). Les recettes ont été de 10 138 $US en provenance de la chasse sportive (65%), de la vente de viande (33%) et d’autres activités (2%). Elles n’ont couvert que 83% des besoins du ranch en raison de la réalisation de seulement un tiers du quota de chasse. En 2004, son nouveau statut de coopérative communautaire permettra au ranch d’augmenter son capital grâce à l’actionnariat local mais aussi de renégocier ses accords avec les compagnies de safari. Avec la vente de 47 trophées produisant 5 tonnes de viande le ranch devrait générer 23 000 $US de recettes lui permettant de couvrir ses frais de fonctionnement. Un quota de récolte de 70 impalas augmentera la production de viande de 2 tonnes vendues à 2 $US du kg. Le principal enjeu du ranch est de concilier sa rentabilité économique avec sa vocation de production de viande à faible coût. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 291-312 ISSN 1622-7662

BEEKEEPING IN TANZANIA: WHEN THE BEES GET OUT OF THE WOODS… AN INNOVATIVE CROSS-SECTORAL APPROACH TO COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Y. HAUSSER (*) and P. MPUYA (**) (*) University of Applied Sciences of Western Switzerland, Department of Nature Management, 150 route de Presinge, CH-1254 Jussy, Geneva. E-mail: [email protected] (**) Forestry and Beekeeping Division, Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, P.O. Box 426, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. E-mail:[email protected]

KEY WORDS: Bee, Apis sp., natural resource, beekeeping, community-based management, Tanzania.

ABSTRACT The present trend in Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) is focused on development of economic alternatives to destructive environmental practices (slash and burn agriculture, poaching, charcoal production, etc.). Among the activities frequently cited is beekeeping (for Apis sp.) but the few existing examples relate more to an experimental approach with real economic impact generally being marginal. Beekeeping has a long history in Tanzania, but recent degradation trend in forest resources is endangering this activity. The initiative of ADAP, a Swiss ONG, in supporting village-based beekeeping in Tanzania has been supported by different favorable elements: (1) a strong legal framework that supports both CBNRM and beekeeping activities, (2) the existence of a strong “collective” awareness of their common interests among the beekeepers, (3) the presence of a competitive market for bee products, (4) a substantial support from the central government down to the village level, and (5) the “miombo” ecosystem that covers the area is highly favorable for bee products production. The introductory workshop held in Mpanda in 2002 in which all stakeholders participated, confirmed the findings of the 5-month (September 2001-February 2002) village survey realized by ADAP. There was no cooperation, and conflicts among the stakeholders were numerous. The crux of the project is its ability to make stakeholders who have a long conflict relationship and who distrust each other work together. ADAP first supported (20012003) the Inyonga Beekeepers Association (IBA) in training, capacity building, improved beekeeping techniques, and a micro-credit scheme for beekeeping equipment. In addition, ADAP has implemented land demarcation in 13 villages.

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In two years, beekeeping has demonstrated its ability to compete. Rather than competition, which implies exclusion of the non-competitive activities, the interest of the approach relies on its ability to permit the implementation, under the same single management structure, of numerous complementary activities on the same land, but depending on different resources. As beekeeping is dependant on natural factors, ADAP will support on the second phase of the project (2004–2007) other sustainable productive activities benefiting to the local community, such as ecotourism and agro-forestry productions. Uncertainties remain at different levels, in both community reactions to change, institutional support, contradictory policies, and reaction from competitive forms of exploitation not associated to the project (e.g. tobacco companies). Moreover, community behavior remains highly unpredictable, and benefit-maximization strategy seems to be a possible option.

I. INTRODUCTION The present trend in Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) has led research to focus on alternative economic activities to the destructive and environmentally detrimental practices of slash and burn agriculture, forest clearing and poaching that occur in most rural areas in Africa. The development of activities linked to the so-called Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) has received considerably more attention and support than previously from financing organizations, cooperation agencies and national public agencies in charge of natural resource management. The promotion of those environmentally friendly but productive activities is now widely recognized as being among the "good practices" that occur in this field. Nevertheless, in the end, little concrete action has taken place. The keeping of bees, Apis sp., is often cited as being one such activity (CHRISTOPHERSEN et al., 2000). A lot of Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDP) Initiatives include it among other “alternative activities” that should be supported and promoted in the course of the life of a project. Yet few existing examples offer more than experiments or demonstrative experiences that generally have fallen short of expectations regarding the socio-cultural (appropriation of new techniques) and economic sides (profitability) of the issue. Beekeeping has a long history in Tanzania (MPUYA, 2001; NJIRO WILDLIFE RESEARCH CENTER, 1993; MPUYA and HAUSSER, 2004, in prep.) as it is believed that honey hunting predates agriculture. Portuguese, British and German colonial States contributed to an expanded trade in bee products. Along with their trade in beeswax and honey, the Germans introduced box hives and the concept of colony preservation. The post-independence period has seen a strengthening of the beekeeping sector and the introduction of beekeeping development programmes and strong inputs in technological innovations (MPUYA, 2001). In 1998, an innovative, first-time Beekeeping Policy was adopted and a formal Beekeeping Division was developed within the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). Tanzania has a wide variety of ecosystems and climate, and, accordingly, different methods of beekeeping have been developed with several types of Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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hives. It is estimated that Tanzania has about 33.5 million ha of forests and woodlands (1998 National Forest Policy; ALDEN-WILY, 2001; IDDI, 2002). 88% of the forests are of the invaluable miombo woodland type, recognized as being among the most productive for beekeeping purposes (FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000). 14 million ha are legally protected under reserve protection status (ALDEN-WILY, 2001), while the remaining 19 million ha are non-protected areas on public lands (village land or General land – Government owned). But the recent trend in deforestation is threatening the future of forest-based activities, including beekeeping, under the cumulative effect of slash and burn cultivation, deforestation for conversion to rental crops such as tobacco or extended use of pesticides. There is no reliable data about deforestation, estimates varying from 91,200 ha/year (FAO, 2000, quoted by IDDI, 2002) to 300,000-500,000 ha/year (KIHIYO, 1998; GTZ, 2003). Tanzania is rich in beefodder plants that include both natural plants and cultivars. Surveys have so far identified more than 300 beefodders plants. The stocking rates of productive colonies (number of honeybee colonies per km2 for a given area) have been estimated for various vegetation types in the country (KIHWELE et al., 2001) and vary from 2 in grassland areas to 15 in closed forests. It is estimated that from about 9.2 million honeybee colonies, the production potential of bee products in the country is about 138,000 tons of honey and 9,200 tons of beeswax per annum (1998 National Beekeeping Policy). These are worth US$ 138 million and US$ 18.4 million, respectively (using average prices of the year 2003, i.e. US$ 1 per kg of honey and US$ 2 per kg of beeswax). Present utilization of this potential is only about 4 per cent annually (FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000). In this paper we will present, for Tanzania: (1) the legal and institutional framework that permitted the development of CBNRM (including beekeeping), (2) the stakeholders who are concerned by beekeeping activity, (3) the first lessons of an initiative supported by ADAP, a Swiss NGO, dating from September 2001 in western Tanzania, and (4) the environmental, socio-cultural and economical perspectives of beekeeping.

II. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK II.1. HISTORIC EVOLUTION Tanzania is committed to poverty alleviation and improvement in the living standards of its people. Currently, more than 50% of the population still lives below the poverty line and this proportion might be higher in the rural areas (following the criteria of the United Nations Development Program). The TANZANIA DEVELOPING VISION 2025 (2003) and the Macro Economic Development Program on Poverty Reduction and Growth propose several issues and strategies in order to eliminate poverty by 2025. Following IDDI (2002), “over the last quarter of a century, Tanzania’s land policy and law have been built on what is arguably the most decentralized and devolved regime of governance in sub-Saharan Africa, in which governance is lodged first and foremost at the village level”. A complex framework of policies and legislation (Table I) permitted the rapid development of community-based forest management, including beekeeping activity. Nevertheless, there is room for conflict as well, as there are some contradictions between policies. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLE I Legal and institutional framework (policies, programs and acts) of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Tanzania. Sources: MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM (1998a, 1998b, 1998c) and UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (2000a). TABLEAU I Cadre légal et institutionnel (politiques forestière, apicole, concernant la faune sauvage et l'environnement; programme concernant l'apiculture; lois sur la terre, les territoires villageois et le gouvernement local) de la gestion participative des ressources naturelles en Tanzanie. Title (year) National Forest Policy (1998)

Contents Enhances the contribution of the forest sector to the sustainable development of Tanzania and the conservation and management of its natural resources for the benefit of present and futur generations National Beekeeping Policy (1998) Enhances the contribution of the beekeeping sector to the sustainable development of Tanzania and the conservation and management of its natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations National Wildlife Policy (1998) Calls for the creation of Wildlife Management Areas (WMA), defined as “an area declared by the Minister to do so and set asides by village governments for the purpose of biological natural resources conservation” (MNRT, 1998). Transfers the management of WMA to local communities, thus, taking care of corridors, migration routes and buffer zones and ensuring that the local communities obtain substantial tangible benefits from wildlife conservation. National Beekeeping Program Instrument designed to put into practice the (2001) NBP with emphasis on stakeholders’ participation in the planning, management, ownership and sustainable utilization of bee resources for poverty eradication, improved biodiversity development and environmental conservation. Beekeeping Act (2002) Its main objectives are: (i) to make provisions for the orderly conduct of beekeeping; (ii) to improve the quality and quantity of bee products; (iii) to prevent and eradicate bee diseases and bee pests; and (iv) to improve revenue collection. National Environmental Policy The legal framework to confirm government (1997) intentions to empower beekeepers to own and manage the use of resources (e.g. bee reserves) so as to prevent and control degradation of life supporting land, water, vegetation and air. Land Act (1999) Creates the necessary conditions for CBNRM through the recognition of village land as a category of land. Village Land Act (1999) Empowers the village councils with devolution of management rights on the land. Local Government Act (1982) Permits village by-laws to enter statutory laws, through procedures of recognition from the District Council.

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KIHIYO (1998), KAJEMBE et al. (2000) and YLHÄISI (2003) produced a detailed analysis of the historic evolution of the legal and institutional framework that supports the management of natural resources in Tanzania. They found that under the combined effect of economic crises, structural adjustment programs and “a recent common attitude that traditional, pre-capitalist societies were efficient managers of their natural resources“ (YLHÄISI, 2003), there has been a move from the centralized and exclusive “fences and fines” approach that ruled the sector since colonial times, towards decentralized, and mainly community-based regimes. Government and non-government agencies accordingly reshaped their own functions away from direct management towards supporting technical and advisory roles (CAMPBELL et al., 1999, quoted by KAJEMBE et al., 2000). The awaited outcome of this new vision is closely linked to participation. As KAJEMBE et al. (2000) have expressed it, “if governments decentralize, citizens will participate”. Among the reasons quoted by different authors to explain this change is the fact that forest under public land lacked proper management. For KIHIYO (1998), “due to lack of management by the government, the forests on public lands can be considered as open access”. This "open access situation" leads to a quick degradation of forests, as “everybody’s access is nobody’s property” (BROMLEY, 1992, quoted by KIHIYO, 1998). Closely linked to that situation is the question of land tenure. As observed by YHLÄISI (2003), “the insecurity of tenure resulted in a number of environmental problems, including the promotion of open access, particularly in forest and woodlands (…)”. In this context, the New Policy aims at solving all those management problems. As outlined by KIHIYO (1998), quoting OSTROM (1990), "rarely has attention focused on management of resources by communities or has managing them as a common property been considered”. The new Forest and Beekeeping Policies are characterized by “the efforts to strengthen or to otherwise reintroduce earlier management traditions” (IDDI, 2002). Based on the pilot project experiences prior to the adoption of the new policies, the new National Forest Policy (MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM, 1998b) promotes two different tools to implement this new vision. These are CBNRM and Joint Forest Management Agreement (JFMA), for which user rights have been clearly defined. Among the different objectives of the 2002 Forest Act (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, 2002b), one is “to delegate responsibility for management of forest resources to the lowest possible level of local management consistent with the furtherance of the policies” (YHLÄISI, 2003). The Forest Act contributed as well to defining different categories of protected areas that could be managed by the communities. The 1998 National Forest Policy, as quoted by IDDI (2002), “is quite clear on the need to bring unreserved forest and woodlands under the jurisdiction of local communities as “village Forest Reserves”, (…). This also opens the way for forest-adjacent communities to become co-managers of both central and local government Forest Reserves (FR) through the JFMA. KIHIYO summarized the view when saying “this is the idea being proposed in the new forest policy: making communities responsible for managing forest resources as common property in Tanzania whenever possible.” Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The 1999 Land Act and 1999 Village Land Act are complementary to the environmental policies. “In Tanzania, the existence of formal local governments structures at community level is incorporated into community forest based management” (YHLÄISI, 2003). Thus the Land Act is strengthening the role of the village councils with the establishment of a “clear and strong foundation by the introduction into the Law of the “village land” as one of the three land management categories” (IDDI, 2002). YHLÄISI (2003) underscored that the Tanzanian Land Act is one of the few in sub-Saharan Africa to draw a clear distinction between reserved land, general land and village land as management categories. However, as YHLÄISI (2003) has observed, the more important contribution is probably that it permits distribution of state-owned land, not only agricultural land, but also all kind of forests, to communities and groups of people as well as to private individuals. This, YHLÄISI has noted, is unusual in developing countries.

II.2. THE TANZANIAN CHOICE TO GIVE MANAGEMENT RIGHTS INSTEAD OF PROPERTY RIGHTS TO THE COMMUNITIES Different authors (ALDEN-WILY, 2001, YHLÄISI, 2003) consider the Tanzanian framework as the most appropriate to Community-Based Forest Management in East Africa. The choice has been made to give management rights to the community instead of property rights. The main reason for this was the objection to privatize the forests, because of their high importance to the livelihoods of the poorest, who depend on direct access to resources for their survival. Different studies have outlined the direct dependence of the poorest to the forest natural resources for their day-to-day subsistence (CARPANETO and FUSARI, 2000; HAULE et al., 2002). For ALDEN-WILY (2001), it has been decided to devolve power of management instead of access rights, which is not enough to promote sustainable management. The principle behind this new vision has been summarized by KIHIYO (1998) who stated that, “thus, common property is not access open to all but access limited to a specified group of users who hold their right in common.” The property rights are exclusive to the co-owners and are secured because they received appropriate legal support from the government (1998 National Forest Policy and 1999 Land Act). As a result, the village councils have considerable power regarding landmanagement. They can demarcate land (village land) for common use and/or natural resource management. IDDI (2002) underlined “(…) the provision in the Land Law for the ownership of rights in this land to be titled to the appropriate group in the community, or even to the community as a whole”. Village councils have the capacity to promulgate village-by laws, which permits villages to develop their own forest management regulations and their own management mechanisms. YHLÄISI (2003) underlined that “all persons, not only community members, are legally bound to adhere to the by-law once enacted.” Among the motivating facts for CBNRM replication in Tanzania was the low costs of those management systems (ALDEN-WILY, 2001; IDDI, 2002). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The main changes following the introduction of this new legislation are well summarized by YHLÄISI (2003) when he says “that new development, conservation and other projects cannot be planned anymore in the villages without consent and participation of the local communities.”

II.3. BEEKEEPING POLICY The developments presented here regard mainly the Forest Policy and Village and Land Act, but it is clear that numerous other legislative texts have some influence on the issue treated. It needs to be made explicit that the 1998 National Beekeeping Policy (MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM, 1998a) was modelled on the 1998 Forest Policy. The Beekeeping Division is embedded in the Forest and Beekeeping Division; this explains this common shaping of the policies. The 1998 BKP explicit the fact that it was initially planned that beekeeping issues would be integrated in Forest Policy. The 1998 BKP states “it was decided to write a separate beekeeping policy document in order to have a clear vision, mission and adequate coverage of beekeeping (…).” Thus the previous analysis for the forest sector is applicable to beekeeping. For example the different type of reserves that have been defined as “community-based protected areas” in the Forest Policy have been replicated for the beekeeping sector. The Beekeeping Policy is similarly taking into account the different links with the Land and Village Land Act. Regarding CBNRM issues, the framework is very similar.

III. THE STAKEHOLDERS Four main groups of stakeholders, often with competing interests, are concerned by beekeeping activity. The beekeepers themselves are organized in groups, cooperatives, associations, or as individuals or family groups. They ensure the production with the collection and first conditioning of honey in the wild. In the whole country, beekeeping is practised by about 2 million people, which is more than 5% of the population. At the local level it could surpass 20% of the population as revealed by an ADAP survey in the Inyonga division (OGEJO et al., 2002). Beekeeping activity occurs under different land tenure statuses [open land, village land, Game Reserve (GR), Forest Reserve (FR), Game Controlled Area (GCA), Wildlife Management Area (WMA)] covering almost all the country except the National Parks and the urban areas. This can lead to conflicts with other stakeholders. The bee-product buyers, of whom there are different types, are the second group of stakeholders. The local market absorbs part of the production for honey-beer production. At a regional level, there is a potential market provided by some food-shops, hotels and restaurants, and tour-operators. At a national/international level, there are two major companies trading food products, namely Fidda Hussein and Mohammed Enterprise. They are important buyers, collecting beeswax and honey, among other food products, for export. As far as we know, Goldapis Ltd. is the only private specialized organization that works only on bee products and exports a high standard quality honey to the European Union (mainly the German market). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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The trophy hunting and game viewing safari operators do operate on the same land than the other stakeholders. They have a competing interest as they consider beekeeping a threat to their activity, e.g. risk of poaching activities being done under cover of beekeeping, uncontrolled bushfires, disturbance to the game, etc. There have been conflicts recorded between those stakeholders (CLARKE, 2001; FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000; OGEJO et al., 2002) and this was confirmed by professional hunters from Tanzania Big Game Safaris and Robin Hurt Safaris (professional hunters, pers. commun. 2003). Some trophy hunting companies try to prevent any beekeeping activity on the land they have allocated, claiming that beekeeping is always associated with poaching. Those companies are often associated, in the mind of villagers as in reality, to the law enforcement groups that constitutes the fourth group, namely the public agencies in charge of the natural resources management on those different lands [Forestry and Beekeeping Division (FBD), Wildlife Division (WD), Tanzania National Parks (TANAPA)]. The relationship between the fourth group and the first one is often conflict-based as, mostly for lack of information, communication and misunderstanding regarding status of land and boundaries, the conflicts occur on land that falls under their respective jurisdictions.

IV. A LOCAL INITIATIVE OF BEEKEPING A Swiss non-governmental association called ADAP initiated a Beekeeping Support Programme in western Tanzania in September 2001 on the base of the CBNRM principles.

IV.1. PRESENTATION OF THE AREA ADAP’s beekeeping support program was located in the Rukwa region, Mpanda District, Inyonga Division, in south-western Tanzania. The area is of significant importance regarding biodiversity conservation, located between the Katavi-Rukwa-Lukwati protected area complex in the south and the Ugala Game Reserve in the north, while the vast Ruaha–Rungwa protected area complex borders it on the east. The Katavi-Rukwa-Lukwati complex includes the Katavi National Park (3rd in size in Tanzania), Rukwa Game Reserve and Lukwati Game Reserve. It is managed by the Tanzanian National Parks and the Wildlife Division, with strong support from the Katavi-Rukwa-Lukwati Development Project of the GTZ. The Ugala Game Reserve is managed by the Wildlife Division, with support from the Africare Community Conservation Project (project financed through USAID). The program area supports heavy miombo forests woodlands, inhabited by numerous wildlife communities. Human population is low (20,000 inhabitants on 40,000 km2) while economic activities are highly dependent on natural resources. Most of the land is devoted to tourism hunting and reserve land, leaving little space for village-based activities. The migration pressure is high, estimated to be more than 5% (GTZ, 2002), which is among the highest in Tanzania. The population largely consists of the Konongo ethnic group. They are historic Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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inhabitants of the area, mostly hunter-gatherers who recently have been forced to turn to agriculture. Recent migrants are the Sukuma, cattle-breeders who fled out of the dry areas located north to the Rukwa region. Despite the relative good state of the natural resources in the area compared to most rural areas in Africa (heavy forest cover, important wildlife communities) the increasing pressure, mostly with deforestation for tobacco production and poaching for bushmeat, are endangering the sustainability of this typical miombo ecosystem. Beekeeping is typically a traditional activity in Inyonga, with a long local history.

IV.2. PROJECT PREPARATION: IDENTIFICATION OF THE STAKEHOLDERS AND CONFLICTS The findings of a 5-month (September 2001 - February 2002) village survey carried out by ADAP as a preparatory step for its project agreed with those raised with all the stakeholders during the 3-day workshop held in Mpanda in May 2002 (HAUSSER and SAVARY, 2002). At a local level in Inyonga Division, Natural Resource Management stakeholders include, for the community: groups of hunters, fishers, beekeepers, cattle breeders and farmers; for the private companies: trophy hunting, bee products traders, classical crops traders; for the public: parastate organizations (Wildlife Division, Forestry and Beekeeping Division, Tanzanian Natural Parks, District Council, Village Council). Regarding its relative importance at a local level, a fourth group of stakeholders has been considered, the cooperation organizations (GTZ, Africare). This survey (OGEJO et al., 2002) indicates a complex situation for a basically poor rural population that has led to the development of the multiple-use strategy they seem to have. A majority of incomes are from agricultural activities or natural resource extraction activities. The calendar of activity is influenced by both agro-ecological and meteorological conditions and probably as well by the intensity and frequency of law enforcement measures regarding illegal activities (hunting). The complex situation is due to the contradiction between the traditional way of natural resource use that people have in the area, and the regularization and implementation of the modern natural resources policy recently adopted by the government. The village survey also pointed out that “rights of access to natural resources and rights of use seem to be the core problem between the different stakeholders and this issue must be addressed by the project for its future success.” Problems/conflicts arise mainly from recent size extensions of the protected area in the region (extension of the Katavi National Park and Rukwa Game Reserve and creation-extension of the Lukwati Game Reserve) and lack of information regarding the precise new boundaries, as well as from cumulative beekeeping and hunting-poaching activities.

IV.3. THE PROJECT The participatory identification of the project’s objectives was made during the workshop held in Mpanda in May 2002. There were two major objectives: (1) to establish CBNRM mechanisms in the Inyonga Division, and (2) to support the development of village-based sustainable economic activities with a view Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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to increase the local incomes from natural resource management. Following the findings of this first phase, the project strategy was adopted in June 2002, comprising: (1) support to the Inyonga Beekeepers Association (IBA) in training, introduction of modern hives, improved techniques for quality honey collecting, conditioning and packing; (2) support for the introduction of a micro-credit system for beekeeping equipment; (3) support to the local authority in charge of natural resource management and local government in implementation of village land demarcation and registration (stage 1), and then support to the village Participatory Land Use Management Process (stage 2); (4) support to the Village Councils’ Environmental Committees through training and capacity building; (5) support for the Community Participatory identification, implementation and management of a Bee Reserve; (6) negotiation with the different managers clear rights of access for duly-registered professional and organized beekeepers in cross-sectoral areas; and (7) development of other sustainable economic alternatives: launching of an ecotourism project and support to the production of other sustainable crops. ADAP decided as well to increase its participation as a facilitator, a "bridge-actor" (VAN DER DUIM and CAALDERS, 2002) between the different stakeholders so as to be sure to integrate the many-sided interests in the process.

IV.4. FIRST RESULTS At a community level, the most important achievement was probably the implementation of the village land demarcation process and registration, in collaboration with the Land Tenure Office for 12 of the 13 villages of the Inyonga Division. This has helped considerably in solving all remnant land conflicts between villages. As IDDI (2002) pointed out while studying another experience of forest community-based management, “one of the main factors that has contributed to the success of the management of the Duru-Haitemba woodlands is the fact that it is adjacent to organized villages with defined boundaries and democratic government”. The growing size of the Inyonga Beekeepers Association (from 100 members in May 2002 to 300 in December 2003) reflects the strong interests of the beekeepers in the proposed solutions, and its increasingly formal and organized structure is an encouraging sign of its sustainability. The Inyonga Beekeepers Association is now widely and fully recognized among the stakeholders. Public interest and awareness has been greatly improved in the last three years. The production, benefiting from both the effects of the training and excellent natural conditions, increased from 7 t in 2001 to 200 t in 2003. This increase, together with the competitive market in bee products, enables an income of 120,000 US$ in 2003 from beekeeping in the Inyonga Division to be reached. This estimate is based on information from the buyers, the beekeepers and the authorities. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, the Ministry of Local Government, the District Council of Mpanda and local authorities (Division and Village Councils) have expressed their satisfaction with the participatory approach and the results achieved. Following the typology of participation as established by the INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES GROUP (2000), ADAP’s Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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project ranks stage 6 on 7 stages, which go from passive participation to self-mobilization. This 6th stage is Interactive participation, with main components defined as “Joint analysis to joint actions, possible use of new institutions or strengthening existing ones. Enabling and empowering so people have stake in maintaining structures or practices”.

IV.5. COMPARISON WITH OTHER NATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACTIVITY INCOMES: A STATE OF THE SITUATION IN THE INYONGA DIVISION Regarding these facts, it could be estimated that honey production brings back to beekeepers about 120,000 US$ in 2003 and this concerns only the Mpanda District. Compared to the given estimates of 120,000 US$ of incomes for the Mpanda District (District Natural Resources Officer, pers. commun., 2004) from trophy hunting or to the estimates of 70,000 to 100,000 US$ from tobacco crop earnings for the Inyonga Division (representative of Tanzania tobacco Company, pers. commun., 2003), beekeeping proves its ability to compete with the other forms of land use, while playing a considerable role in the micro-economy of the households. At a more global level, for 2003, regarding the figures provided by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division (MAPOLU, 2003), the Inyonga Division honey counted for about 30% of total value of Tanzanian honey export (200 t over 656.9 t). We were not able to collect figures regarding the other important and potentially threatening activity, forest exploitation. It appears that most of this exploitation is illegal, as the area is huge and the services in charge of forestry are lacking the means to work efficiently in such huge natural forest areas. Regarding household micro-economics, different studies (FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000) revealed that per capita incomes are far greater with well established beekeeping than with crop production such as tobacco, which is time consuming, and environmentally destructive (KILON and MASAYANIKA, 1993 ; TEMU, 1998), or through extractive activities such as charcoal production (MONELA et al., 2000, quoted by KILAHAMA, 2000), or poaching, which, despite being economically viable, is becoming a risky business, considering the better organized anti-poaching activities.

IV.6. THE STEP FORWARD: THE BEE RESERVE The Bee Reserve concept The Bee Reserve (BR) concept has been developed through the Beekeeping Policy (1998). It aims at ensuring the long-term conservation and management of forest resources that are essential for beekeeping activity. This new kind of Protected Area has been conceived with a view to permitting the investment of the stakeholders in the activity. Thus, the BR can be owned by the State, the District Council, the Village Council, or even the individual beekeepers as long as they are organized in cooperatives or associations. Regarding the status of land, the BR could be established on Public land (General Land and Village Land). But is has been observed that the activity is Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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definitively forest based (FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000) and thus the most important forest resources are located within the protected area network. Beekeeping in protected areas seems to be an interesting option regarding (1) the availability of forest resources, (2) the security of beekeeping material (risk of vandalism) and (3) the potential role that beekeepers could have in the management of the area (e.g. anti-poaching intelligence). Regarding reserve land, the 2002 Beekeeping Act provides opportunities to practice beekeeping in both Forest Reserves and Game Reserves, under a permitting system. While beekeeping largely occurs in Forest Reserves, despite being obviously possible, only few examples relate experiences of permitting system in Game Reserves. The FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION (2000) stated that from the records and experiences of the permitting system for beekeeping practices in the Ugala, Moyowosi and Kigosi Game Reserves, which were initially Forest Reserves, it is evident that beekeeping itself does not conflict with other forms of land/resource use in the Forest or Game Reserves, Game Controlled Areas and public lands. Instead it is quite compatible as well as complementary. Following this recent trend, the management of the Rukwa Game Reserve has recently accepted to integrate a system of management of beekeeping in the Game Reserve, based on a permitting system. The zoning tool has been used to identify a part of the Game Reserve as a “Community Use Zone”, where beekeeping is allowed. Most of the conflicts between trophy hunting companies and beekeepers occur on Game Controlled Areas. As quoted by the FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION (2000), “there are more conflicts between outfitters and beekeeper in the Game Control Areas where the outfitters assume preferential rights and power over resources than in the Game Reserves.” Among the most important problems at this level is a question of By-Law hierarchy; the gazettement of a reserve is a complex process that goes through the Parliament, while a Game Controlled Area declaration is an unilateral decision by the Director of Wildlife. This has led to a situation where numerous Forest Reserves have been declared as Game Controlled Areas, but with no regard to their original official status. When it comes to the question of activities allowed within those areas, there is usually a de facto situation that favors the outfitters and confirms preferential rights over resources they seem to have, while discouraging beekeepers from staking their claims and rights, despite a favorable de jure situation.

The Inyonga District case Currently, this is the case in the Inyonga Division with the Mlele Forest Reserve. The beekeepers (IBA), the VC and the counselors of Inyonga division have conducted a participatory assessment of the most appropriate area to set up a Bee Reserve. The result of this assessment reveals the high degree of knowledge beekeepers have of their surrounding environment. They have identified a huge forest-covered area that is located in Mlele Forest Reserve. The area has been classified as a Game Controlled Area by the Director of Wildlife and an outfitter is actually conducting trophy-hunting operations on the block. Identified as an intermediate solution was the setting up of a beekeeping zone in the Forest Reserve that could be managed under a Joint Forest Management Agreement with all the stakeholders. A gazetting process in Bee Reserve thus first implies a degazettement of the Forest Reserve and a re-gazetting in Bee Reserve. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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It has been decided to follow two lines: (1) establishment of small Village Bee Reserves on the village land while implementing the Planning of Land Use Management process, and (2) establishment of a Beekeeping Zone in the Mlele Forest Reserve, and establishment of a Joint Forest Management Agreement for the Mlele Forest Reserve. This second axis is a transitory step to the creation of a Bee Reserve. Once established, the Joint Management Agreement will be evaluated after a trial period and will serve as a basis for setting up the management plan for a future Bee Reserve.

V. PERSPECTIVES Environmental Beekeeping activity is more environmentally friendly than many other extractive activities. Even the debarking method used to build hives in different parts of the country is far less destructive than conversion to agricultural land through slash and burn agriculture or forest clearing for tobacco cultivation. The actual trend is to promote intensively the introduction of modern hives in order to cease those practices. The fixed target in the 2002 Beekeeping Act (UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, 2002a) is to abolish this practice by June 2006. The same can be said for the use of the fire to harvest that is progressively converted to the use of smokers. The activity if well done is more a harvest than a take-off. It could produce different kinds of products (honey, wax, propolis, royal jelly, etc.) that could be exploited and valorized. Moreover, beekeeping has definitively a crucial role in biodiversity conservation as it is playing a determining role in pollination services. LWOGA (2003) has stated that “bees are thought to be the most efficient of the insect pollinators” and this demonstrates how they are important for both cultivated crops and natural vegetation formations. In the main, reflecting their highly sensitive reactions to environmental change, bees could be considered as a state of the environment indicator. A key issue regarding environmental impact will be the success of this conversion to modern beekeeping techniques, as it implies financial investment and technical support. But there are different encouraging examples of this progressive conversion, such as the Beekeeping and Development Project implemented by the Forestry and Beekeeping Division in five District Councils of Tanzania, with financial support from Norway (MPUYA and HAUSSER, 2004, in prep.), or the ADAP project. It has been observed that the negative effects of traditional beekeeping (debarking trees, bushfires, etc.) can be stopped by a slight improvement in techniques (FOREST AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION, 2000; ADAP, 2003). Among the most difficult negative impacts to control is poaching. While trained active occupational beekeepers seem to have left poaching, it appears that poachers still use the beekeepers’ camps in the bush in the beekeepers’ absence. The beehives are sometimes used to hide weapons or bush meat (professional hunters, pers. commun. 2003). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Socio-cultural: indigenous beekeeping knowledge Over 90% of beekeeping in Tanzania is carried out by traditional beekeepers. However, participation of women and young people in beekeeping is estimated at 5% of all beekeepers. Therefore strategies to encourage their participation are urgently needed. Traditional beekeepers have indigenous knowledge that has been used to produce high quality honey and beeswax for many years. Existence of high beekeeping potential is a function of the presence of a high density of honeybee colonies, beefodder plants, as well as the presence of traditional beekeepers that are rich in indigenous knowledge of beekeeping. Traditional beekeepers represent a group favorable to participatory approaches as they are aware of their common interests and their shared problems and difficulties. As pointed out by KIHWELE (1983), “they express strong conservation concerns and responsibilities for the sustainability of their beekeeping occupation”.

Economics: from local to global markets Beekeeping touches a wide range of economic stakeholders. In natural resource management activities, it is among the few of direct benefit to households, which represent the basic beekeeping production unit. At a more global level, the different markets reflect the quality of honey produced. The added value is considerably higher with a top quality table honey than with an industrial honey. The good results in the improvement of beekeeping techniques reached in different projects (Couturier Gm, Goldapis Ltd., pers. commun., 2003; ADAP, 2003 ; MPUYA and HAUSSER, 2004, in prep.) give hope for increasing the quality of the honey as well as increasing the average number of hives per beekeeper. Currently, both quality and per unit quantity of production are increasing, leaving appreciable margin of progression for the future. The conversion from bark hives to box hives would further enhance this increase, with an expected ratio of 1:2. The global income of beekeeping can hardly be estimated, as an important part of the business is informal (local traders). Regarding state income, both local governments (District Council) and central government have raised taxes on the trade of bee products, but the only clear figure available pertains to export. Due to competitive pressure, reflecting the increasing value of the produced honey, producers’ prices doubled between 2001 and 2003. Export figures for bee products (Figure 1) may be estimated to be 50-60% of the real entire export business for the bee products. The remaining 40-50% is exported informally through “njia za panya”, an informal trading system that export bee’s products to neighboring countries as Kenya, Burundi, Rwanda. Through the formal export trade, Tanzania has been earning an average of US$ 1.7 million annually from exports of honey and beeswax in the last five years. Regarding international market prices, the highest quality table honey raises 1,200 US$/ton, while industrial honey is only about 700 US$/ton.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS Cross sectoral management of natural resources: the case of beekeeping As demonstrated earlier, the cross sectoral management of beekeeping is the main challenge facing the activity in the coming years. Despite a complex and unclear situation, there is space to move further and to strengthen what already has been established. The experiences held in Ugala-Moyowosi-Kigosi Game Reserves, and more recently in Rukwa Game Reserve revealed how those spaces could and should be exploited. As shown previously, the most problematic issue seems to be the cases of Forest Reserves/Game Controlled Areas double status. In this sense, ADAP experience is innovative as it seeks a solution that tries to save the various interests invested and then addresses the issue of natural resource conservation and management outside protected areas.

Hunting, tourism and beekeeping: complementarity instead of competition The global interest in this integrated approach remains in the ability of Natural Resource managers to integrate these different activities so as to maximize incomes for all of the stakeholders and thus to accrue the value added to the land and the resources it holds. While increasing the incomes, this approach could help to solve conflicts and then contribute to decreasing the level of conflicts between the stakeholders. Rather than competition, which implies exclusion of the non-competitive activities, the interest of the approach relies on its ability to permit the Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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implementation, under the same management structure, of numerous complementary activities on the same land, but depending on different resources. Thus, trophy hunting, beekeeping and ecotourism in the same areas would permit a maximization of the resources and increased benefits for each of the stakeholders, including the State via taxes. Until the present time, the relationships between the different stakeholders were unbalanced in favor of the wildlife stakeholders, which tended to exclude the other stakeholders. As observed by the FORESTRY AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION (2000), the notion that the 1974 Wildlife Conservation Act N° 12 is supreme over the other natural resources legislation is mis-guided and excludes options for joint management of resources. The reason for that unbalanced situation seems to stem from the feeling that big game management is of greater importance with respect to both ecological and economical issues. Yet recent findings tend to shed doubt on this assertion. As pointed out by KOTHARI (2001), there is a bias in considering only the big animal as a wildlife resource. “In many regions of the world, however, Community Conservation is dependent on the use of wild plants, smaller animals, and habitats in general.” This is definitively the case with beekeeping. Another bias cited by KOTHARI is linked to the restricted vision of economic value that western scientists have of natural resource use. There are numerous examples of non-utilitarian Community Conservation initiatives, which tend to achieve both conservation and community livelihood security (ROE et al., 2000; KOTHARI, 2001). ALDEN-WILY (2001) recognized it when she claimed that it also opens the way for communities to manage forests which are important less for their products than for their existence values and environmental services. It is the same understanding that KAJEMBE et al. (2000) showed when they considered that “economic utility does represent an important incentive. However, where community-based forest management authority has been well established, it is frequently apparent that less tangible sociocultural or simple tenurial interests (“it is ours”) play equally as important roles in sustained community management.”

Beekeeping benefits It has been demonstrated that after having realized that the current deterioration in the state of natural resources in Tanzania can be attributed to the State monopoly in the sector (SHAURI, 2001), the State has introduced a decentralization program that has been coupled with the establishment of new policies in natural resources aimed at ensuring the full participation of communities in the management of natural resources as de facto managers (SHAURI, 2001). As summarized by YLHÄISI (2003), “the control of natural resources is being returned, to some extent, to the pre-colonial time (…)”. In Tanzania, in the context of CBNRM and under specific conditions (improvement of techniques, co-management), beekeeping has proven its ability to compete with other forms of land use, generate important, and direct, incomes to the rural community, while being environmentally friendly and compatible with other complementary natural resource management activities such as trophy hunting. But that is an ideal point of view, and while technical questions can easily be answered, legal, institutional, organizational and political issues are hardly predictable and many uncertainties remain. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Different lessons can be drawn from this experience at different levels (local, national, global). At the local level, following community requests and in line with ADAP’s determination that beekeeping is highly dependent on numerous natural factors (agro-ecologic and climatic), it has been decided not to make all economic activity dependent only on beekeeping. Following from this decision, ADAP will support in the second phase of the project (2004–2007) other sustainable productive activities benefiting the local community, such as ecotourism and agro-forestry production. At the national level, communitybased management of beekeeping is not a panacea that will help to solve all the conservation and development problems.

Conditions necessary to implement beekeeping, principles and recommendations The decisive conditions that we have identified so far in this case study are as follows: (1) a favorable and strong legal and institutional framework that supports both CBNRM approaches and beekeeping activities; (2) a favorable social substratum, relatively homogenous and unperturbed, with the key population, the beekeepers in this case, having a strong collective awareness of their common interests with the support of the other determinant stakeholders, e.g. the community as a whole, state agencies, trophy hunting companies; (3) the presence of a competitive market for bee products and the support of a committed buyer; (4) consistent and substantial support from the central government down to the village level; (5) the use of a participatory approach from the initiation of the project, with the inclusion of community actors in decision making processes; (6) a favorable ecosystem for bee product production; and (7) a new role for the implementing agency, more as an advisor and a bridge-builder than an executive manager of the project. At a more global level, as a contribution to the global CBNRM debate, some principles could be derived as well from that experience. Beekeeping is definitively an option for the development of alternatives to environmentally destructive practices. It implies a substantial support through training and seminars both on the technical side (improvement), financial side (micro-credit system), and on the organizational side (capacity building of the local partner). Among the important contributive elements is the real empowerment of communities in the process. This implies not only an adequate legal framework but also a change in the practices of the “project makers” and associated government agencies, in order to leave enough space to permit community appropriation of the initiative. Let’s cite some elements for such a strategy: (1) to ensure regular exchanges of information on the aims and the means of the project with the different relevant stakeholders, (2) to use local languages as the language of work, (3) to promote transparency about the real objectives of the cooperation partner, (4) to ensure the association of the key actors in the decision making process, and (5) to implement a strong policy of communication towards the members of the community and other stakeholders not associated with the project. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Resistances, problems and limits There are numerous resistances, problems and limits that such initiatives have faced when being implemented. Experiences in CBNRM and decentralization of natural resource management in Tanzania and in other countries of Africa have shown that there might be some resistance from central government agencies to this devolution of rights. This often implies a loss of power, social status and financial income. As, KAJEMBE et al. (2000), IDDI (2002) and YLHÄISI (2003) observed, the short-term losers of this devolution process will be the officers of the different Divisions of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. In this sense, such resistance could be seen as “natural” and predictable. As this paper has shown, while policies are definitively community-oriented, there seems to have been a gap regarding cross-sectoral management issues which has led to overlapping jurisdictions. This probably could be linked to some remaining gaps between the policies (particularly between Forest Policy and Beekeeping Policy on one side and Wildlife Policy on the other) and to ancient practices of the traditional conservation management model. As underlined by the LAWYERS ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION TEAM (1999), “these legal opportunities have existed for years, local communities have not used them due to the dominance of the state-centered conservation paradigm, which restricted community participation in wildlife and natural resource management.” It would be interesting to make a detailed comparison of the different CBNRM components in the different policies, acts and legislation of the Forestry Sector, Beekeeping Sector and Wildlife Sector in order to identify those gaps and propose solutions for their resolution. The fragmentation of responsibilities regarding natural resource management between different bodies is weakening the overall capacity of management and calls for strong coordination to be efficient. It seems that only a few of these initiatives are able to raise significant benefits for the community, which is a condition for their investment in establishing and enforcing rules about resource use (KAJEMBE et al., 2000). Here we are back to the question of the economic and non-economic value of natural resources. As underlined by KAJEMBE et al. (2000), no serious attempt has been made to calculate the sum total of all marketed, subsistence and service value of community-based forest resource projects in the region, and a question remains regarding the ability of non-market product values to provide adequate incentives for people to participate in CBNRM initiatives. Another problem cited by KAJEMBE et al. (2000) and IDDI (2002) is the question of the characteristics of communities. It seems commonly recognized today that communities are very rarely homogenous and instead very stratified. This aspect is essential, as observed by AGRAWAL et al. (1999) cited by IDDI (2002), “locally based dominant actors tend to hijack community-based processes and forcefully occupy the political space opened by decentralization”. The only way to prevent such phenomena would be to “create institutional structures of representation and accountability that can undermine existing asymmetries and prevent new ones from becoming entrenched” (KAJEMBE et al., 2000; IDDI, 2002). Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Uncertainties remain at different levels, in both community reaction to change, institutional support, contradictory policies, and reactions from competitive forms of exploitation not associated with the project, e.g. tobacco companies. Moreover, community behavior remains highly unpredictable, and a maximization-of-benefits strategy seems to be a possible option. Despite this critical examination, both economic and ecological analyses tend to show that multiple land use is the key solution, the challenge being to reach integrated management of those different activities on the same land and under the same management structure. It would help to decrease the level of conflicts between the stakeholders, permit a legitimate “come-back” of the local communities as managers of their natural resources, increase the incomes accrued for a given space of miombo woodland for all of the stakeholders through the sum of the value added of the different resources, while ensuring better global management of the land and the associated natural resource management activities. The major interest of this approach is that it provides strong arguments to maintain natural habitats under a strict protection status, ensuring the long-term conservation of the forest cover, while habitat loss remains the most important threat to ecosystems and biodiversity. Bees could be perceived as an umbrella species: the production of natural honey implies the protection of the forests and the other resources it contains. A strategy of support to alternative activities thus could produce substantial environmental conservation outputs at the community level and serve as an efficient complement to the classical “law enforcement strategy” which is still needed.

REFERENCES ADAP (2003). - Project Activity Report, June – October 2003. Inyonga Bee Reserve Program, ADAP Tanzania, 3 p. AGRAWAL A., BRITT C. & KANEL K. (1999). - Decentralization in Nepal: a comparative analysis. A report on the participatory district development program. A publication of the International Centre for Self Governance. Institute for Contemporary Studies, Oakland, California, 95 p. ALDEN-WILY L. (2000). - Forest law in Eastern and Southern Africa: moving towards a communitybased forest future? FAO, Unasylva, 203, 12 p. ALDEN-WILY L. (2001). - Forest management and democracy in East and Southern Africa: lessons from Tanzania. IIED, London, Gatekeepers Series, 95, 20 p. BROMLEY D. W. (1992). - Property rights as authority systems: the role of rules in resource management. Journal of Business Administration, 20(1-2): 453-470. CAMPBELL B., BYRON N., HOBANE P., MADZUDZO E., MATOSE F. & WILY L. (1999). - Moving to local control of woodland resources: can CAMPFIRE go beyond the mega-fauna? Society and Natural Resources, 12: 501-509. CARPANETO G.M. & FUSARI A. (2000). - Subsistence hunting and bushmeat exploitation in central western Tanzania. Biodiversity and Conservation, 9: 1571-1585. CHRISTOPHERSEN K., HAGEN R. & JAMBYIA G. (2000). - Economic opportunities in Wildlife Management Areas. Report prepared for the Wildlife Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism and USAID / Tanzania, June 23, 78 p. CLARKE J. E. (2001). - An evaluation of the Cullman & Hurt Community Wildlife Project, Tanzania. Conservation Force, 24 p. FAO (2000). - Global Forest Resource Assessment 2000, Tropical Countries. FAO Roma, Italy.

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FOREST AND BEEKEEPING DIVISION (2000). - A study on beekeeping in cross-sectoral areas, National Forest Programme Formulation in Tanzania. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salam, Tanzania, 36 p. GTZ (2002). - Katavi – Rukwa Conservation and Development Programme. Available from: http://wildlife-programme.gtz.de/wildlife/krcd.html GTZ (2003). - Tanzanian-German Technical Cooperation. GTZ Office, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 50 p. Available from: http://www.gtz.de/laender/doks/GTZ_Tanzania.pdf HAULE K.S., JOHNSEN F.H. & MAGANGA S.L.S. (2002). - Striving for sustainable wildlife management: the case of Kilombero Game Controlled Area, Tanzania. Journal of Environmental Management, 66: 31-42. HAUSSER Y. & SAVARY J.-F. (2002). - ADAP: A cross-sectoral approach to beekeeping support. Bees for Development Journal, 64, September: 6-7. IDDI S. (2002). - Community participation in forest management in the United Republic of Tanzania. In: Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Participatory Forestry in Africa: 59-67. INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE GROUP LTD. (2000). - Community-based conservation experience in Tanzania: an assessment of lessons learned. Report prepared for USAID / Tanzania, August 2000, Washington DC, 35 p. KAJEMBE G.C., KIHIYO V.B.M.S., BANANA A.-Y., GOMBA–SSEMBAJJWE W. & ONGUGO P. (2000). - Community participation in the management of protected forest areas in East Africa: opportunities and challenges. Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania, 11 p. KIHIYO V.B.M.S. (1998). - Forest policy changes in Tanzania: towards community participation in forest management. The World Bank, WBI’s CBNRM Initiative, February 1998, 12 p. KIHWELE D.V.N. (1983). - A survey on the traditional honeybee hives of Miombo woodlands of Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,18 p. KIHWELE D.V.N., MASSAWE J.A., LWOGA P.D. & BURTON S. (2001). – Beekeeping in Tanzania. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 169 p. KILAHAMA F. B. (2000). - The Tanzania Forest Conservation and Management Project. Forestry Is Wealth Newsletter, 5(1): 1-57. KILON E.N.L. & MASAYANIKA S. (1993). - Benefit and cost sharing in community-based forest management and joint forest management initiatives in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 21 p. KOTHARI A. (2001). - Time to move out of Africa, a response to Adams and Hulme. Oryx, 35(3), 4 p. LAWYERS ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION TEAM (1999). - Recognizing local community interests: the new wildlife policy in Tanzania. Available from: http://www.leat.or.tz/publications/wildlife. policy/community.interests.php LWOGA P.D. (2003). - Pollination services for quality and quantity of high yield of crops in Kakakuona. Tanzania Wildlife Magazine, July-Sept.: 15-16. MAPOLU (2003). - Forestry in Figures. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Forest and Beekeeping Division, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 15 p. MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM (1998a). - National Beekeeping Policy. Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 57 p. MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM (1998b). - National Forest Policy. Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 69 p. MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND TOURISM (1998c). - National Wildlife Policy. overnment Printer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 39 p. MONELA G.C, KAJEMBE G.C., KAONEKA A.R.S & KOWERO G. (2000). - Household livelihood strategies in the miombo woodlands of Tanzania: emerging trend. Tanzania Journal of Forestry and Nature Conservation, 73: 17-33. MPUYA P. (2001). - Beekeeping in Zanzibar. Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, Department of Forestry, Fruits and Trade, Zanzibar, Study Report, 89 p. MPUYA P. (2002). - The potential of honeybees and beekeeping in the Udzungwa Mountains of Tanzania. MSc. Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 299 p. MPUYA P. & HAUSSER Y. (2004). - Beekeeping in Tanzania: a fast-growing industry: the case of the Beekeeping and Development Programme. (In prep.). NJIRO WILDLIFE RESEARCH CENTER (1993). – Sustainable beekeeping for Africa. Njiro Wildlife Research Center, Arusha, Tanzania, 67 p. OGEJO H. F., HAUSSER Y. & BRÜSCHWEILER C. (2002). - Village survey report, Inyonga Bee Reserve Program, Tanzania, September 2001 to February 2002. ADAP, Geneva, Switzerland, 46 p. OSTROM E. (1990). - Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, UK. ROE D., MAYERS J., GRIEG-GRAN M., KOTHARI A., FABRICIUS C. & HUGHES R., eds. (2000). Evaluating Eden: exploring the myths and realities of community-based wildlife management. IIED, London, Evaluating Eden Series, 8, 112 p. SHAURI V. (2001). - The legal aspect of governance in community-based natural resources management in Tanzania. Commons Southern Africa, 3(1): 9-10.

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TANZANIA DEVELOPING VISION 2025 (2003). - Poverty Reduction Strategy. In: 1998 Small and Medium Enterprise Development Policy. Ministry of Trade and Industries, Dar es Salaam,Tanzania: 7-25. TEMU A.B. (1998). - Tobacco production in miombo woodlands of Tanzania. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (2002a). - The Beekeeping Act (Act N°15 of 2002). United Republic of Tanzania Official Gazette: 1283-1333. UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (2002b). - The Forest Act (Act N°7 of 2002). United Republic ofTanzania Official Gazette: 1159-1281. VAN DER DUIM R. & CAALDERS J. (2002). - Biodiversity and tourism: impacts and interventions.Annals of Tourism Research, 29(3): 743-761. YLHÄISI J. (2003). - Forest privatization and the role of community in forest and nature protection in Tanzania. Environmental Science and Policy, 6: 279-290.

L’APICULTURE EN TANZANIE : QUAND LES ABEILLES SORTENT DES BOIS … UNE APPROCHE MULTI-SECTORIELLE INNOVANTE DE GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DES RESSOURCES NATURELLES Y. HAUSSER et P. MPUYA

MOTS-CLÉS: Abeille, Apis sp., ressource naturelle, apiculture, gestion participative, Tanzanie.

RÉSUMÉ La tendance actuelle dans la Gestion Participative des Ressources Naturelles (CBNRM) est de développer des alternatives économiques aux pratiques dommageables à l’environnement (agriculture sur brûlis, braconnage, production de charbon, etc.). Parmi ces alternatives, l’apiculture (pour Apis sp.) est souvent citée, mais les quelques exemples existants sont plus liés à une approche expérimentale avec peu de retombées économiques. L’apiculture a une longue histoire en Tanzanie, mais la récente dégradation des ressources forestières met en danger cette activité. L’initiative d’une ONG suisse, l'ADAP, qui encourage les villageois de Tanzanie à faire de l’apiculture, a été favorisée par différents éléments: (1) un solide cadre légal qui soutient les CBNRM et l’apiculture, (2) une forte conscience collective chez les apiculteurs de leurs intérêts communs, (3) la présence d’un marché compétitif pour les produits de l’apiculture, (4) une aide importante du gouvernement central aux villages, et (5) la présence de l’écosystème "miombo" couvrant la zone, très favorable à la production apicole. L’atelier qui s’est tenu à Mpanda en 2002, auquel tous les acteurs concernés ont participé, a confirmé les résultats d’une enquête de 5 mois réalisée dans les villages par l'ADAP de septembre 2001 à février 2002. Il n’y avait pas de coopération et les conflits étaient nombreux. Le point crucial du projet est donc sa capacité à réunir et faire travailler ensemble différents acteurs qui étaient en désaccord depuis longtemps et ne se faisaient pas confiance. L'ADAP a d’abord aidé l’Association des Apiculteurs d’Inyonga (IBA) entre 2001 et 2003

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en formant les gens, en améliorant les techniques d’apiculture et en proposant des micro-crédits pour l’achat d’équipement. De plus, l'ADAP a délimité des territoires dans 13 villages. En deux ans, l’activité d’apiculture a montré qu’elle pouvait être compétitive. L’intérêt de cette approche réside dans sa capacité à permettre la mise en place, sous une même structure de gestion et sur un même territoire, de nombreuses activités complémentaires faisant appel à différentes ressources, plutôt que dans une compétition impliquant l’exclusion des activités non-compétitives. Comme l’apiculture dépend de facteurs naturels, l’ADAP apportera son aide, dans la seconde phase du projet (2004-2007), à d’autres activités productives rentables pour la communauté locale, comme l’écotourisme et les productions agro-forestières. Des doutes subsistent concernant les réactions des communautés face aux changements, l'aide financière des institutions, les politiques contradictoires et la réaction des participants à d’autres formes d’exploitations compétitives non-associés au projet (par exemple, les compagnies de tabac). De plus, le comportement des communautés reste complètement imprévisible et la stratégie de la maximisation du profit semble une option possible.

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Game and Wildlife Science, Vol. 21 (3) 2004, p. 313-326 ISSN 1622-7662

LA GESTION PARTICIPATIVE DE LA FAUNE SAUVAGE AU BURKINA FASO : LES EXPÉRIENCES DU RANCH DE NAZINGA ET DU PARC DU W C. VERMEULEN Laboratoire de Foresterie Tropicale et Subtropicale, Unité de Gestion des Ressources Forestières et Milieux Naturels, Faculté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux, Passage des Déportés, 5030 Gemboux, Belgique. E-mail : [email protected]

MOTS-CLÉS : Faune sauvage, conservation de la faune sauvage, gestion participative de la faune sauvage, petite chasse, communauté rurale, développement rural, Zone Villageoise d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC), Ranch de Nazinga, Parc du W, Burkina Faso.

RÉSUMÉ Le Burkina Faso reste le seul pays d’Afrique occidentale à posséder une législation où, au moins légalement, la gestion cynégétique de la faune sauvage par les populations locales est devenue une réalité. Les textes de loi prévoient en effet la possibilité pour les populations de délimiter sur leurs terroirs des zones dévolues à la chasse commerciale, d’y faire venir des chasseurs et de rétrocéder à l’État la part des recettes qui lui est due. La loi prévoit également la constitution de Comités Villageois de Gestion de la Faune (CVGF), structures rattachées aux Comités Villageois de Gestion de Terroir (CVGT) et reconnues dans le processus de décentralisation en cours. L’opportunité de construire une conservation de la faune sauvage servant directement le développement local existe donc. Dans la pratique, il reste encore beaucoup d’étapes à franchir avant que des Zones Villageoises d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC) réellement autonomes et indépendantes financièrement ne prennent corps. Les résistances au niveau institutionnel et privé ne manquent pas, et seule la démonstration de la capacité des populations locales à relever ce défi pourra faire évoluer les mentalités. Les premières ZOVIC ont été mises en place à partir de 2000 dans les périphéries du Ranch de Nazinga (1 276 ha de ZOVIC) et du Parc du W (1 790 ha de ZOVIC). Ces expériences ont été la source de riches enseignements dans des contextes particuliers de tensions foncières, liés soit à une importante immigration humaine dans le cas de la ZOVIC du Ranch de Nazinga, soit à une course au coton dans celui des ZOVIC du Parc du W. Elles ont montré que la gestion cynégétique villageoise nécessitait des besoins de formation importants et qu’elle devait faire face aux classiques enjeux techniques (préservation de l’habitat, gestion de la faune, quotas d’abattage dont l’application reste parfois aléatoire en raison de la petite taille des zones délimitées, etc.). Les ZOVIC ont aussi soulevé le problème du rapport de la communauté rurale à l’espace et au foncier, celui fonctionnement des structures locales de gestion et de leur fusion avec le système politique coutumier local, et celui de la réelle volonté de l’univers administratif et privé de la chasse à partager la rente cynégétique

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avec les populations locales. La gestion cynégétique villageoise doit donc être comprise comme un exercice de démocratie directe et comme la voie vers la gestion globale des terroirs villageois. Au-delà de l’aspect technique lié à la faune et à sa gestion durable, la réussite de ces expériences devrait également annoncer la pratique d’une chasse plus sociale et plus équitable, où les populations locales participeraient davantage au partage du flux financier.

I. INTRODUCTION : UNE NOUVELLE LOI, UNE NOUVELLE DONNE Le Burkina Faso reste le seul pays d’Afrique occidentale à posséder une législation où, au moins dans les termes, la gestion cynégétique de la faune par les populations locales est devenue une réalité. Les textes de loi prévoient en effet la possibilité pour les populations de délimiter sur leurs terroirs des zones dévolues à la chasse commerciale, d’y faire venir des touristes chasseurs et de rétrocéder à l’État la part des recettes qui lui est due. La loi prévoit également la constitution de Comités Villageois de Gestion de la Faune (CVGF), structures rattachées aux Comités Villageois de Gestion de Terroir (CVGT) et reconnues dans le processus de décentralisation en cours. Sous des dehors anodins, cette loi présente des avancées remarquables. D’abord elle entérine l’idée d’une conservation de la faune sauvage en dehors des espaces protégés, dans une optique de gestion cynégétique. Ensuite elle concerne les terroirs villageois, à savoir tout espace non classé. Mais elle porte l’originalité plus loin, puisque la communauté villageoise devient le gestionnaire de l’activité cynégétique et son premier opérateur. En outre, elle n’a pas de caractère contraignant. Chaque communauté reste libre de juger de l’opportunité et de l’intérêt que représente cette donne nouvelle dans la gestion de son patrimoine. La loi annonce également, pour le cas spécifique de la gestion des milieux naturels, la décentralisation administrative générale en cours. Enfin, elle affirme de façon claire que la gestion de la faune peut contribuer au développement local des communautés. La présente communication s’attache à décrire les premiers résultats des expériences menées depuis 2000 au Burkina Faso dans la traduction sur le terrain de ces opportunités légales. Il s’agit en particulier des Zones Villageoises d’Intérêt Cynégétiques (ZOVIC) en périphérie du Ranch de Nazinga (de 2000 à 2002) et du Parc du W (de 2002 à 2004).

II. DES PÉRIPHÉRIES EN PÉRIL : LE RANCH DE NAZINGA ET LE PARC DU W Situés respectivement au centre et à l’est du Burkina Faso, le Ranch de Nazinga et le Parc du W présentent pour caractéristiques communes des périphéries menacées par les activités anthropiques. Tandis que le Ranch de Nazinga fait face à une immigration importante, principalement motivée par la recherche de terre (VERMEULEN et MOREAU, 2001; MICHAUX, 2002), le Parc du W affronte une dynamique cotonnière intense doublée d’un vaste Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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problème de transhumance internationale (KLEITZ, 2001). Dans les deux cas, l’anthropisation grandissante des milieux périphériques menace les aires protégées d’isolement biogéographique et questionne leur pérennité dans un système local de production matériel et de reproduction sociale en pleine mutation. Dans les deux contextes également, des tensions foncières se font jour entre les acteurs en présence. Au Ranch de Nazinga, l’enjeu semble plus d’ordre symbolique, entre des Kasséna détenteurs de la terre mais minoritaires confrontés aux migrants Mossi nombreux, dynamiques et opportunistes. Au Parc du W, les tensions foncières ont pour origine une saturation de l’espace par l’agriculture de rente des Gourmantchés, saturation repoussant les transhumants Peuhls à l’intérieur des aires protégées. Il faut souligner d’emblée que le choix de ces sites socialement conflictuels pour tester les premières ZOVIC du Burkina Faso n’est peut-être pas idéal. Si le choix de la périphérie d’une aire protégée semble se justifier aisément en termes cynégétiques (le potentiel de réhabilitation de la grande faune y est certainement plus important), il entraîne dès l’abord le pari implicite que les ZOVIC vont non seulement renverser des pratiques locales prédatrices de l’environnement, mais également contribuer à une meilleure gestion du foncier. En plus d’affronter les difficultés techniques liées à la gestion de la faune et au caractère communautaire de l’approche, il faut en outre gérer une situation initiale peu favorable. Si ce choix a en définitive été posé par la présence de projets intégrés dynamiques (projet "Valorisation scientifique du Ranch de Nazinga" sur financement de la Région Wallonne de Belgique, et projet "Parc W-ECOPAS" sur financement de l'Union Européenne) cherchant à résoudre la difficile équation du développement durable et de la conservation, rappelons qu’une ZOVIC pourrait également être construite loin d’une aire protégée, dans des contextes peut-être moins riches sur le plan faunique, mais plus favorables sur le plan social et foncier.

III. MISE EN PLACE DES ZOVIC III.1. ASPIRATIONS ET CONTRAINTES La donne légale et la réalité complexe du terrain se conjuguent pour former un ensemble de contraintes ; en définitive ce sont ces dernières qui détermineront le caractère novateur et pertinent de l’approche proposée. Néanmoins, la mise en place des ZOVIC au Ranch de Nazinga et au Parc du W reposait sur plusieurs aspirations théoriques qu’il importe de mentionner. Si ces dernières n’ont pu encore toutes être atteintes, elles sous-tendent cependant l’ensemble de la démarche. Elles peuvent également être considérées comme les objectifs poursuivis : contribuer à la gestion durable de la faune par les populations locales en périphérie des aires protégées, contribuer à la gestion globale des terroirs villageois, renforcer les capacités d’autogestion et d’autopromotion des communautés villageoises, restaurer la confiance des communautés villageoises, asseoir la gestion participative sur des accords écrits et équitables pour les parties, promouvoir une chasse sociale et équitable, et financer le développement local par la gestion de la faune. Dans une démarche expérimentale, ni les contraintes légales, ni les aspirations théoriques ne prévalent sur les contraintes locales. Il n’existe pas de Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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modèle de ZOVIC unique, et chaque situation constitue un cas particulier. Le canevas de base a donc été adapté à chaque réalité terrain. Au Ranch de Nazinga, des Zones Villageoises de Chasse existaient déjà. Dans un contexte de besoin en terre moins aigu, les ZOVIC ont été réaffirmées comme des espaces mono-fonctionnels principalement affectés à la gestion cynégétique, où des activités annexes (cueillette, ramassage de bois) liées aux services qu’offre une brousse villageoise sont autorisées. Au Parc du W, la situation plus complexe et la saturation foncière ont abouti à une proposition aux villageois plus nuancée : une Zone Villageoise de Chasse (ZOVIC) constituée du noyau des espaces de brousse, délimitée sur le terrain, accessible gratuitement aux éleveurs locaux, surveillée par le comité villageois élargi et plus représentatif et interdite aux agriculteurs ; et en bordure de la ZOVIC une Zone Rurale de la Chasse (ZRC) interdite aux pasteurs, locaux ou non, délimitée sur le terrain et où l’agriculture est autorisée et stabilisée. Le modèle de ZOVIC a donc été spécifiquement adapté dans le cas du Parc du W. Les ZOVIC sont vues comme des espaces multifonctionnels, porte d’entrée et facteur d’intégration des initiatives foncières dans les terroirs concernés. L’intervention va dans le sens de la sécurisation et la délimitation des derniers espaces de brousse villageois. Un objectif annexe devient la sécurisation des pasteurs par la délimitation d’espaces de pâture, au prix d’une amorce de stabilisation de l’agriculture. Par ailleurs, l’agriculture de rente s’insère dans le système via les Zones Rurales de Chasse.

III.2. COMITÉS VILLAGEOIS ET PARTENARIATS La première étape dans la mise en place d’une ZOVIC est la constitution du Comité Villageois de Gestion de Faune (CVGF) du village. Nous ne détaillerons pas ici l’ensemble des processus qui président à l’établissement d’un comité reconnu pour sa légitimité et sa représentativité. Soulignons simplement la difficulté de concilier les structures du politique local avec le souci de représentation de tous les acteurs en présence. Dans le cas du Parc du W par exemple, l’idéologie communautariste et démocratique qui veut que l’ensemble des strates sociales soient représentés (jeunes et vieux, migrants et autochtones, agriculteurs et pasteurs, femmes et hommes) s’est souvent heurtée au pouvoir traditionnel centralisé, masculin et conservateur des détenteurs de la terre, au détriment des femmes, des allochtones et des pasteurs. Au Ranch de Nazinga, la famille Kasséna détenant les pouvoirs religieux et foncier dans le village de Sia monopolisait le pouvoir au sein du CVGF. Une fois le comité établi, celui-ci doit être reconnu au niveau de l’administration territoriale en tant que groupement légal. Il peut ensuite ouvrir son compte en banque propre, garant de son indépendance financière par rapport aux autres opérateurs (guides de chasse privés et administration des Eaux et Forêts). Ainsi, le village désirant gérer ses propres ressources naturelles doit s’inscrire à l’intérieur d’un processus administratif complexe et répondre à une structure (comité avec président, trésorier) imposée par des règlements extérieurs à son mode de fonctionnement interne. Son entrée dans ce monde administratif se double en outre d’une entrée dans le monde bancaire. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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La seconde étape a consisté à établir des accords de partenariats entre les acteurs présents pour la gestion des ZOVIC. Cet accord est nécessaire parce que l’autonomie annoncée des ZOVIC reste toute relative. D’une part les populations locales dépendent toujours de l’administration pour l’établissement et le contrôle des quotas ; d’autre part le secteur privé est toujours requis pour trouver et acheminer la clientèle. Le potentiel de domination d’un acteur vis-à-vis d’un autre reste important. À Nazinga comme au Parc du W, il s’agissait d’abord de sécuriser des populations méfiantes dans leur relation avec l’administration. L’accord de partenariat consiste donc en un premier cadre formel de travail précisant les droits et devoirs des parties. Cet accord précise les objectifs poursuivis en commun et les actions à réaliser. Il décrit également la délicate question de la clé de répartition des recettes. Derrière cette première lecture, il faut donc comprendre également que le protocole d’accord est la première étape d’un processus visant à reconnaître les CVGF comme partenaire à base entière du processus de gestion de la faune.

III.3. PROGRAMME DE FORMATION La gestion cynégétique, a fortiori communautaire, ne fait pas partie du système de production des groupes ethniques en place. L’argument souvent avancé par les opérateurs privés selon lequel les villageois ne seraient pas «capables» de gérer la faune trouve d’abord son origine dans le manque de formation des villageois dans ce domaine, lacune en partie imputable au rôle de subalterne dans lequel ces derniers sont souvent maintenus dans le système de gestion traditionnel de la grande chasse. Certes, les capacités d’autoorganisation varient d’une communauté à l’autre et tous les essais ne seront pas probants. Mais il importe dans le cadre des projets de développement de construire la gestion cynégétique villageoise sur des bases solides. Si cet aspect avait été moins développé à Nazinga, la formation des CVGF dans les ZOVIC autour du W a constitué une des priorités du programme ECOPAS. Le programme de formation a notamment répondu à diverses exigences. Il devait être adapté, tant aux besoins, niveau et contraintes du monde rural qu’aux besoins du développement des ZOVIC. Il devait être intégré au programme ECOPAS, dans le sens que certaines formations pouvaient être utiles à d’autres publics (pisteurs, animateur, etc.). Le programme était également vu comme local, dans le sens qu’il a été fait appel le plus possible aux compétences présentes sur le terrain (ONG, projets en cours, forestiers en poste), lesquelles minimisent les coûts de déplacement et maximisent la connaissance préalable du terrain. Enfin, le programme était pluriel, dans le sens que les connaissances acquises puissent être valorisées par les villageois hors du cadre strict des CVGF. Le programme de formation qui a été dispensé aux CVGF comportait les rubriques suivantes : alphabétisation fonctionnelle, voyage inter-villageois d’étude et d’échange d’expériences, gestion des organisations paysannes, reconnaissance de petits gibiers, petite comptabilité, contenu du Code Forestier, suivi écologique villageois, techniques d’accueil des touristes de chasse. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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IV. RÉSULTATS IV.1. SUIVI ÉCOLOGIQUE La plupart des suivis écologiques se caractérisent par des techniques d’inventaires sophistiquées et onéreuses, un personnel de collecte qualifié, et des conditions de traitement informatiques des données. Toutes ces conditions en font de facto un monde inaccessible aux villageois. La participation de ces derniers se limite alors, quand elle existe, à leurs qualifications de « pisteurs ». Les villageois décryptent les traces sur le terrain mais ne comprennent pas l’ensemble du processus en cours. Cet état des choses conduit au désintérêt des acteurs locaux. Partant de ce constat, nous postulons qu’un suivi écologique villageois intégré dans une démarche de réappropriation et de gestion de la faune doit répondre à plusieurs critères. Le suivi écologique doit être simple et adapté localement. Il s’adresse à des personnes possédant un niveau scolaire minimal (lecture et écriture) et doit être traduit en langue locale. Il doit également être immédiatement utile, en ce sens que son traitement doit être simple, accessible aux villageois, et fournir des données intéressant un niveau de gestion compréhensible au village (par exemple : "les pintades sont en diminution, il faut limiter la chasse"). Enfin, le suivi écologique doit intégrer toutes les catégories sociales. Si les jeunes lettrés seront favorisés par leur capacité à remplir des fiches, les vieux pisteurs seront valorisés dans leur aptitude à déchiffrer les traces en brousse. Les équipes mixtes favoriseront un apprentissage mutuel et garantiront le respect de la hiérarchie locale. Un tel suivi écologique villageois hebdomadaire de la zone a été initié dans le village de Sia (périphérique au Ranch de Nazinga) dès février 2002. Basé sur un protocole simple, il consistait à faire parcourir la ZOVIC une fois par semaine par deux villageois formés à cet effet. Les informations recherchées portaient sur les observations directes d’animaux (espèce, classe d’âge, sexe), mais également sur les observations indirectes (crottes, traces, ainsi que les éventuelles traces de braconnage). Les résultats ont été présentés en nombres d’individus rencontrés par espèce, par kilomètre et par mois pour les oiseaux, et en nombres d’individus rencontrés par kilomètre et par mois, toutes espèces confondues, pour les mammifères. Ainsi, pour trois mois de suivi sur l’un des parcours proche du village et exclusivement fréquenté par l’avifaune, l’indice kilométrique (nombre d'individus par kilomètre parcouru) a décru pour toutes les espèces de mars à mai (tableau I), ce qui correspond à l’avancement de la saison sèche (la zone de Sia ne comprend pas de points d’eau). Cet indice est élevé pour les pintades, Numida meleagris (4 à 20), les francolins, Francolinus bicalcaratus (2 à 11) et surtout les tourterelles, toutes espèces confondues (7 à 30), et comparativement faible pour les pigeons verts, Treron waalia, les gangas, Pterocles quadricinctus, et les poules de roche, Ptilopachus petrosus (0 à 1,3). Suite à ces observations, il a été conseillé de fermer temporairement la chasse au ganga, au pigeon vert et à la poule de roche dans la zone de Sia, espèces pourtant réputées communes dans la zone. Cet exemple montre comment un suivi régulier peut apporter des données faciles à intégrer dans des réflexes de gestion simplifiés. En outre, l’indice produit, exprimé en termes d’individus observables par kilomètre parcouru, correspond également au langage de la clientèle. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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TABLEAU I Indices kilométriques (nombres d’oiseaux observés par kilomètre parcouru) recueillis sur le parcours n° 2 de la Zone Villageoise d'Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC) de Sia (1 276 ha) en périphérie du Ranch de Nazinga au Burkina Faso en mars, avril et mai 2002. TABLE I Kilometric index (numbers of observed birds per covered kilometre) collected on transect n° 2 in the Village Hunting Area (ZOVIC) of Sia (1,276 ha) in the periphery of the Nazinga Ranch, Burkina Faso, in March, April and May 2002. Espèce Tourterelles (diverses espèces) Pintade Numida meleagris Francolin Francolinus bicalcaratus Poule de roche Ptilopachus petronus Ganga Pterocles quadricinctus Pigeon vert Treron waalia

Indice kilométrique (oiseaux par km) en mars avril mai 30,41 19,81 7,54 19,80 8,62 3,60 11,13 3,12 2,27 1,28 0,17 0,00 0,36 0,14 0,00 0,36 0,00 0,47

IV.2. DÉLIMITATION DES ZOVIC La délimitation des ZOVIC et des ZRC, confiée aux CVGF, représente l’une des actions pivot dans la démarche. Elle a contribué en effet fortement à asseoir la réalité des ZOVIC sur le terrain. Fruit d’un processus de négociation lent, interne à la communauté, il s’agit d’une étape encore en cours d’intériorisation pour certains ressortissants de villages toujours accrochés à l’idée d’un possible déguerpissement (particulièrement en périphérie du parc du W). Catalysant en outre les enjeux du politique local, elle réveille également d’anciens conflits fonciers latents. Par ailleurs, la délimitation oblige les acteurs agricoles à réviser leur stratégie d’expansion et peut provoquer des articulations foncières nouvelles. Mais, dans l’ensemble, elle s’est déroulée sans problèmes majeurs sur les deux sites. Au Ranch de Nazinga, la Zone Villageoise de Chasse de Sia présente maintenant une superficie de 1 276 ha. En périphérie du Parc du W, 4 zones ont été délimitées (figure 1) : une ZOVIC à Kaabougou de 227 ha composée exclusivement de brousse, une Zone Rurale de Chasse à Kaabougou de 1 142 ha, dont plus de la moitié en culture, une Zone Rurale de Chasse à Toptiagou de 331 ha dont 10 % en culture (LAMON, 2004), et une ZOVIC à Koumalou de 90 ha de brousse. Soit un total de 1 790 ha délimités par les trois villages pour tenter l’expérience d’une gestion multifonctionnelle de l’espace intégrant des activités cynégétiques. Comme nous pouvons le constater ces espaces sont relativement restreints, particulièrement dans le cas du Parc du W où l’accent a été mis sur une possible utilisation polyfonctionnelle de l’espace. Si la délimitation participative présente l’avantage du consensus villageois, elle est fortement guidée par les intérêts économiques locaux à court terme, à savoir la préoccupation de se ménager des terres pour l’exploitation cotonnière. Les superficies délimitées, réduites, sont constituées de zones arides et par conséquent relativement pauvres en faune. D’emblée, ces ZOVIC s’imposent Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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Figure 1 : Localisation des Zones Villageoises d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC) et Zones Rurales de Chasse (ZRC) en périphérie du parc du W au Burkina Faso. Figure 1 : Location of the Village Hunting Areas (ZOVIC) and Rural Hunting Areas (ZRC) in the periphery of the W Park, Burkina Faso.

donc comme des espaces où la conservation de la biodiversité (et donc la gestion cynégétique) est étroitement liée à la présence des aires protégées attenantes. En d’autres termes, leur gestion (y compris les quotas d’abattage) ne peut donc être envisagée isolément et doit être incluse dans le plan d’aménagement de l’aire protégée.

IV.3. VALORISATION ÉCONOMIQUE ET DÉMARCHE INTÉGRÉE La taille restreinte des espaces en ZOVIC renvoie en outre à une autre problématique, celle de leur valorisation économique. Dans le cas du Ranch de Nazinga, celle-ci est assurée par l’activité cynégétique du ranch lui-même. Les ZOVIC sont vendues comme complément des grands safaris « buffle » pratiqués dans l’enceinte du Ranch. Il n’en est absolument pas de même au Parc du W. Les ZOVIC de la périphérie du Parc ne constituent pas un produit en soi et doivent être « vendues » à l’intérieur d’un « paquet » plus large. L’insertion dans un réseau de petites zones de chasse est une formule intéressante, mais il faut garantir l’indépendance de chaque zone. Cette préoccupation a été résolue de deux manières. D’une part l’administration de tutelle a suscité la fédération des ZOVIC en une union provinciale, organe à même de constituer un produit commercial viable. D’autre part le caractère régional du Parc du W invite à la mise en place d’un produit « chasse équitable » à l’échelon des trois pays qui se partagent le Parc du W. Les ZOVIC du Burkina seraient alors valorisées à l’intérieur d’un circuit commercial tri-national où les zones de vision du Niger et les zones de grande chasse du Bénin, toutes caractérisées par des Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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modèles variés de partage des bénéfices avec les populations, constitueraient le complément commercial idéal. Il n’est pas possible dans le cadre de cet article de détailler l’ensemble des étapes relatives à la création d’une ZOVIC. Dans les paragraphes précédents, nous avons évoqué les plus significatives en accentuant les références liées à l’aspect social de la démarche. Celle-ci n’est évidemment pas exempte de techniques plus classiques, comme dans l’identification des zones giboyeuses, mais ce qu’il importe de retenir c'est l’effort d’une démarche de type intégrée (figure 2). Identification des zones giboyeuses et des habitats intacts Confrontation des contraintes sociales et biodiversité

Etude de l'appropriation coutumière, de la conflictualité, identification des villages volontaires

Choix des villages Mise en place des cadres de concertation/ CVGF

Formations des Comités de gestion

Délimitation participative et matérialisation des ZOVIC

Signature d'un protocole d'accord CVGF/guide de chasse/administration Réalisation des safaris

Union commerciale des CVGF

Mise en place des aménagements Mise en place des codes locaux de gestion

Gestion communautaire des recettes

Figure 2 : Démarche intégrée pour la mise en place d’une Zone Villageoise d’Intérêt Cynégétique (ZOVIC). CVGF = Comité Villageois de Gestion de Terroir. Figure 2: Integrated approach for implementing a Village Hunting Area (ZOVIC). From top to bottom: first line: the "Identification of the game-rich areas and undisturbed habitats" and the "Study of the traditional land property, conflicts and voluntary villages" are at the roots of the "Comparison of the social constraints with the biodiversity"; second line: after the "Choice of the villages" an "Institution for dialogue called Village Committee of Land Management (CVGF) is implemented" merging into a "CVGF commercial union"; third line: this allows to provide a "Participative delimitation and materialization of the ZOVIC", the "Formation of management committees" and the "Implementation of management measures"; fourth line: after the "Signing of a CVGF agreement protocol concerning hunting and administration" "Safaris can be undertaken" and "Incomes can be shared by the community".

Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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V. CRITIQUES DE L’EXPÉRIENCE EN COURS Sur le plan légal Le premier constat qui vient à toute personne désireuse de mettre en place des ZOVIC au Burkina Faso est l’absence de statut fiscal, commercial, foncier et administratif global. Tandis que le Code Forestier définit les aspects liés à la gestion de la faune, il laisse en suspend le statut foncier, que la loi sur la décentralisation, très partiellement entrée en vigueur sur le terrain, tente tant bien que mal de récupérer. La transformation du CVGF en personne morale renvoie à d’autres catégories de lois, et sa forme (association, groupement, etc.) est laissée à l’appréciation de la population. Cette forme conditionne cependant la capacité du groupement à gérer des échanges de types commerciaux. Enfin, si le partage des recettes entre l’État et la population renvoie à une certaine forme de fiscalité, la loi ne précise pas la place des structures décentralisées (Direction Provinciale de l’environnement, Communes, etc.) dans cette répartition. Ce dernier point constitue la porte ouverte aux ponctions administratives plus ou moins officielles.

Sur le plan des recettes villageoises L’intérêt ultime des populations villageoises dans la gestion de la faune reste la génération de bénéfices. L’expérience de la ZOVIC de Sia en périphérie du Ranch de Nazinga semble indiquer (VERMEULEN et OUEDRAOGO, 2003) que les ZOVIC peuvent constituer une source de revenus communautaires intéressante (la première saison de chasse avait généré près de 650 000 Fcfa avec seulement trois groupes de chasseurs répartis en sept matinées, soit un équivalent salaire (30 000 Fcfa/mois) de 21 hommes/mois. Mais cette réussite est en partie imputable au caractère fiscal particulier du Ranch de Nazinga, qui ne rétrocède pas ses recettes à l’État central. Dans le cadre de cette exception, les ZOVIC en périphérie du RGN perçoivent les taxes d’abattage (normalement dues à l’État) ainsi que des taxes d’amodiations élevées (100 000 Fcfa/jour/chasseur). Le cas des ZOVIC du Parc W, en principe plus représentatif d’une situation normale, est préoccupant. Ces dernières ne bénéficient en effet ni des taxes d’abattage, ni d’une taxe d’amodiation élevée (arbitrairement fixée dans la zone, au mépris de la loi, par l’administration). Ces maigres recettes sont en outre grevées de ponctions effectuées par les structures décentralisées. Dans de pareilles conditions, il y a fort à craindre que ce bilan décevant n’incitera guère des agriculteurs spéculateurs à la préservation des habitats naturels. Quoiqu’il en soit, il s’avère que les recettes des ZOVIC du Burkina Faso seront bien moindres que celles générées par l’expérience centrafricaine (BOULET et al., 2003).

Sur le plan institutionnel Nous venons de le souligner, un des freins à la mise en place de ZOVIC performantes réside dans le comportement de l’administration. Le problème réside bien dans "les résistances institutionnelles au partage du flux financier". D’une façon générale, l’administration se considère impuissante à estimer ce flux financier, aux mains des concessionnaires privés et inconnu des autres acteurs. Toute tentative pour augmenter la taxe d’amodiation au profit des Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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populations se solde par des réticences (compréhensibles dans une stratégie commerciale) de la part de ces concessionnaires, réticences aussitôt relayées par l’administration. Celle-ci considère en fait que les villageois gagnent déjà « bien assez », et ne se gène d’ailleurs pas pour prélever 30% sur ces mêmes taxes d’amodiation (en principe appartenant dans leur entièreté aux populations locales).

Sur le plan commercial Tel qu’il est proposé, le modèle de gestion communautaire dépend entièrement du marché international de la chasse et donc par ricochet de la stabilité politique planétaire. Si cette assertion est sans doute valable pour un grand nombre d’activités économiques, elle l’est d’autant plus pour une activité considérée comme un tourisme de luxe à l’usage d’une élite fortunée. Cet aspect est indéniablement une des grandes faiblesses de ce type de valorisation des ressources. Une des solutions palliatives consisterait à se tourner d’avantage vers le marché national. Cependant, ce marché se caractérise par des revendications agressives pour diminuer l’ensemble des tarifs pratiqués par la filière, et donc indirectement pour diminuer encore et d’autant les recettes villageoises.

Sur le plan de la formation Nous l’avons souligné, la mise en place d’une ZOVIC requiert une base de formation importante si on désire un jour atteindre une réelle indépendance de la part des populations locales. Les expériences présentées ici ont toutes été réalisées dans le cadre de projets de coopération financés par la communauté internationale. Qu’en sera-t-il des ZOVIC crées sans soutien extérieur ?

Sur le plan du politique local Différentes contraintes à la mise en place des ZOVIC émanent également du fonctionnement interne aux communautés. L’idéologie du secret, comme moyen de pouvoir et de domination des aînés sur les cadets, du chef de terre sur les autres familles, des hommes sur les femmes a été décrite comme un des fondements de la société Gourounsi Nuna (DUVAL, 1985). Au Ranch de Nazinga, cette idéologie représente un frein structurel à l’idéologie concurrente d’appropriation communautaire des ressources, en ce sens que l’harmonie et le collectivisme requis par le caractère communautaire de la gestion sont constamment entravées par la rétention d’informations, rétention employée comme outil d’affirmation de sa fonction et de sa place sociale. À titre d’exemple, les membres du Comité Villageois de Gestion de Faune formés à la collecte des données du suivi écologique se gardaient bien de faire part de leur savoir aux autres, malgré les demandes répétées dans ce sens faites par l’assistance technique. Ou encore, les membres du Comité occupant une fonction sociale définie au sein du village se comportaient comme tels vis-à-vis des cadets membres du même Comité et disposant en principe de droits équivalents. Une autre entrave à la diffusion de la philosophie d’équité qui préside à la mise en place des ZOVIC réside dans la rivalité, pour ne pas dire la xénophobie entre groupes ethniques. En périphérie du Parc du W, la philosophie participative identifiée (BORRINI, 2002) recommandait d’élargir les CVGF à l’ensemble des acteurs traditionnellement exclus de la donne (femmes, Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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migrants, etc.). Les premières résistances furent perceptibles durant cet élargissement. Par la suite, les faits confirmèrent un principe d’exclusion quotidienne. Il est en effet significatif qu’en pays Gourmantché, Djermas et Peuhls n’eurent rarement, sinon jamais, accès aux formations. La philosophie d’autogestion prône que les CVGF choisissent librement les membres à envoyer à chaque séance de formation. Le constat amer qui en résulte est simple : les Djermas et Peuhls membres des CVGF ne sont jamais sélectionnés. La philosophie d’autogestion trouve ici une de ses principales limites, car elle revient à cautionner des pratiques qui, même ancrées dans des habitudes culturelles, sont inacceptables.

Sur le plan des économies locales face à l’économie de marché Nous avons vu que le concept des ZOVIC est invoqué par les projets de développement pour pallier de nombreux problèmes liés aux ressources naturelles. La plupart de ces problèmes ont eux-mêmes pour origine la perturbation des systèmes de productions locaux par l’économie de marché (flagrante dans le cas de la culture du coton, plus insidieuse dans le cas de la transformation des mentalités et la déstructuration des valeurs traditionnelles). L’un des paradoxes de la démarche ZOVIC réside dans le fait que, dans ce combat, elle contribue également à l’insertion dans le monde moderne. Monde bancaire, administratif, logique marchande y sont étroitement liés. Les formations dispensées apprennent aux populations les droits et devoirs liés à cet univers nouveau et complexe. Avec ce constat, nous sommes cependant loin de l’idée de BASSET (2002) qui y voit une sorte de complot tramé à l’échelon des États nations africains pour affirmer leur existence administrative dans les campagnes reculées. Il semble malheureusement et tout simplement que, pour lutter contre un système écrasant, il faille en parler le langage.

Sur le plan théorique L’ensemble de ces critiques assez dures ne doit cependant pas cacher les avancées que représentent le concept des ZOVIC. À une entrée dans le monde administratif et marchand s'ajoutent également une tentative de démocratie directe et une capacité renforcée d’autodétermination locale. Les ZOVIC annoncent la décentralisation effective de la gestion des ressources naturelles et parient sur une réelle responsabilisation des populations. D’un développement rural de la zone périphérique de l’aire protégée, obtenu par des compensations financières aux problèmes liés à la cohabitation homme/faune (dégâts), on est passé, grâce à la gestion cynégétique de la faune par les communautés, à un développement rural financé par la conservation de la faune. Le renversement est clair et souhaitable.

VI. CONCLUSION Dans la pratique des choses, il reste donc encore beaucoup d’étapes à franchir avant que des Zones Villageoises d’Intérêt Cynégétiques réellement autonomes et indépendantes financièrement ne prennent corps. Les résistances au niveau institutionnel et privé ne manquent pas, et seule la démonstration Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004

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de la capacité des populations locales à relever ce défi pourra faire évoluer les mentalités. Dans des contextes de tensions foncières particuliers, liés soit à une importante immigration humaine dans le cas du Ranch de Nazinga, soit à une course au coton dans le cas du Parc du W, l’expérience de la mise en place des premières ZOVIC a été riche d’enseignements. Elle a montré que la gestion cynégétique villageoise recouvrait un ensemble d’enjeux variés. Outre les besoins de formations importants et les classiques enjeux techniques (préservation de l’habitat, gestion de la faune, quotas d’abattages dont l’application reste parfois aléatoire en raison de la petite taille des zones délimitées, etc.), les ZOVIC ont ouvert la porte à d’autres questionnements. Questionnements internes à la communauté d’abord, dans son rapport à l’espace et au foncier. Questionnements quant au fonctionnement des structures locales de gestion et leur fusion avec le système politique coutumier local ensuite. Mais également questionnement de l’univers administratif et privé de la chasse, dans sa réelle volonté à partager la rente avec les populations locales. La gestion cynégétique villageoise doit donc être comprise comme un exercice de démocratie directe et comme la voie vers la gestion globale des terroirs villageois. Au-delà de l’aspect technique lié à la faune et à sa gestion durable, la réussite de ces expériences de ZOCIC devrait également annoncer la pratique d’une chasse plus sociale et plus équitable, où les populations locales participeraient d'avantage au partage du flux financier.

REMERCIEMENTS L’auteur remercie l’ensemble des acteurs du programme ECOPAS (Union Européenne) et du programme « Valorisation du Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga » (Région Wallonne de Belgique). BIBLIOGRAPHIE BASSET T.J. (2002). - Patrimoine et territoires de conservation dans le nord de la côte d’ivoire. In: Patrimonialiser la nature tropicale, dynamiques locales, enjeux internationaux, M.C. CORMIERSALEM, D. JUHE-BEAULATON, J. BOUTRAIS & B. ROUSSEL, eds. IRD, Collection Colloques et Séminaires, Paris : 323-342. BORRINI G. (2002). - Mission d’appui à la formulation d’une stratégie de gestion participative de la périphérie du parc du W. Programme régional Parc du W-ECOPAS, FED, 7 ACP RPR 752, Rapport définitif, 57 p. + annexes. BOULET H., MBITIKON R. & OUAMOUDJOU F. (2003). - Les zones cynégétiques villageoises ou l’utilisation durable de la faune sauvage par le tourisme cynégétique. Exemple de la RCAprojet ECOFAS-ZCV. Parc et Réserves, 58(1). DUVAL E. (1985). - Un totalitarisme sans État. Essai d’anthropologie politique à partir d’un village Burkinabé. L’Harmattan, Collection Anthropologie, 182 p. KLEITZ G. (2001). - Les zones périphériques du Parc du W (Bénin, Burkina Faso, Niger). Programme régional Parc du W-ECOPAS, FED, 7 ACP RPR 752, Rapport CIRAD-mvet, Rapport définitif, 38 p. + annexes. LAMON A. (2004). - Gestion communautaire de la grande faune et aménagement des terroirs villageois en périphérie du Parc du W au Burkina Faso. Mémoire de fin d’étude, Faculté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux, 82 p+ annexes. MICHAUX J.F. (2002). - Aménagement du territoire villageois et gestion des relations population humaines /éléphants au Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga, Burkina Faso. Mémoire de fin d’étude, Faculté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux, 87 p+ annexes. VERMEULEN C. & MOREAU C. (2001). - Démographie, immigration et emploi dans le village gourounsi de Sia, périphérie Ouest du Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga. Rapports Internes de Nazinga. Projet de Valorisation Scientifique du Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga, Faculté Universitaire des Sciences Agronomiques de Gembloux, 14 p.

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VERMEULEN C. & OUEDRAOGO F. (2003). - La zone villageoise de chasse de Sia (Ranch de Gibier de Nazinga, Burkina Faso). Une expérience de gestion communautaire du petit gibier. Parcs et Réserves, 58(2) : 32-44.

COMMUNITY-BASED WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN BURKINA FASO: THE EXPERIMENTS OF THE NAZINGA RANCH AND W PARK C. VERMEULEN KEY WORDS: Wildlife, wildlife conservation, community-based wildlife management, hunting, rural community, rural development, Village Hunting Area (ZOVIC), Nazinga Ranch, W Park, Burkina Faso.

ABSTRACT Burkina Faso is the only country in West Africa which has a legislation in which the hunting management by local communities has become a reality. According to the law, local communities are allowed to allocate part of their land for commercial hunting, to bring in hunters and to return to the State its share of the profits. The legislation also calls for the creation of Village Committees for Wildlife Management (Comités Villageois de Gestion de la Faune, CVGF), institutions attached to the Village Committees of Land Management (Comités Villageois de Gestion de Terroir, CVGT) which are recognized in the ongoing decentralization process. There is therefore a real opportunity to build up wildlife conservation with direct contribution to local development. In fact, there are still many stages to be passed through before the Village Hunting Areas (Zones Villageoises d’Intérêt Cynégétique, ZOVIC) are autonomous, financially independent and fully functional. At the institutional and private levels there is some opposition to this project, and only a demonstration of the ability of the local communities to overcome this challenge could help change minds. Since 2000, the first ZOVIC have been set up in the peripheries of the Nazinga ranch (1,276 ha of ZOVIC) and the W Park (1,790 ha of ZOVIC). These experiments have been very instructive as to how to deal with particularly strong land use conflicts, linked either to a high level of human immigration as was the case in the ZOVIC of the Nazinga ranch, or because of cotton encroachment which was the case in the ZOVIC of the W Park. They showed that there were important training needs and classical technical stakes (habitat preservation, wildlife management, hunting quotas whose enforcement remains unpredictable partly because of the small size of the hunting areas). The ZOVIC also open the doors to the question of the relation between the community on one hand and space and landownership on the other hand, the question regarding the running of local management structures and their link with the customary local political system, and the question of the will of the administrative and private hunting sectors, whether or not they have a serious desire to share the profits with the local communities. The hunting management by villages should therefore be considered as a process of direct democracy, and as a step towards the global management of the village territories. The eventual success of these experiments should, even beyond its technical aspect related to wildlife and its sustainable management, open up a more sociable and equitable model of hunting, in which the local populations would no longer be left out of sharing its financial advantages. Game Wildl. Sci., 21 (3), 2004