TOM REGAN • THE R A D IC A L EG A L IT A R IA N CASE FOR A N IM A L RIGHTS

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4 The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights TOM REGAN

Professor o f philosophy at North Carolina State University and a leading animal rights advocate in the United States, Tom Regan is the author o f several articles and books on moral philosophy, including The Case for Animal Rights (1983). Regan disagrees with Singer’s utilitarian program for animal liberation, for he rejects utilitarianism as lacking a notion o f intrinsic worth. Regan’s position is that animals and humans all have equal intrinsic value on which their right to life and concern are based. Regan is revolutionary. He callsfor not reform but the total abolition o f the use o f animals in science, the total dissolution o f the commercial animal agriculture system, and the total elimination o f commercial and sport hunting and trapping. “The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources Lab animab are not our tasters; we are not their kings. ”

I regard myself as an advocate o f animal rights—as a part o f the animal rights movement. That move­ ment, as I conceive it, is committed to a number o f goals, including: 1.

the total abolition o f the use o f animals in science

2.

the total dissolution o f commercial animal agriculture

3.

and the total elimination o f commercial and sport hunting and trapping.

There are, I know, people who profess to be­ lieve in animal rights who do not avow these goals. Factory farming they say, is wrong—violates ani­ mals’ rights— but traditional animal agriculture is all right. Toxicity tests o f cosmetics on animals violate their rights; but not important medical research— cancer research, for example. The club­ bing o f baby seals is abhorrent; but not the harvest­ ing o f adult seals. I used to think I understood this

reasoning. Not any more. You don’t change unjust institutions by tidying them up. What’s wrong—what’s fundamentally wrong— with the way animals are treated isn’t the details that vary from case to case. It’s the whole system. The forlomness o f the veal calf is pathetic— heart wrenching; the pulsing pain o f the chimp with elec­ trodes planted deep in her brain is repulsive; the slow, torturous death o f the raccoon caught in the leg hold trap, agonizing. But what is funda­ mentally wrong isn’t the pain, isn’t the suffering, isn’t the deprivation. These compound what’s wrong. Sometimes— often— they make it much worse. But they are not the fundamental wrong. The fundamental wrong is the system that allows us to view animals as our resources, here for us— to be

eaten, or surgically manipulated, or put in our cross hairs for sport or money. Once we accept this view o f animals— as our resources— the rest is as predict­ able as it is regrettable. Why worry about their

From In Defense o f Animals, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985). Reprinted by permission o f Blackwell Publishers.

Copyright 2011 Cengage Lewmnig. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, (canned, or deplicrted. in a h o k or n p a t Dae to electronic rights, eoae third party content n q h e snpprea ed from the eBook end'or eChadsrte). Editorial review has deemed lh a aty ■ ipianm l content does not mrterially affect the overall leanaig experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additieauU cantm l a my time if mbasqnent rights restrictions Ngnin it

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C H A P T E R 2 • ANIMAL RIGHTS

loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals ex­ ist for us, here to benefit us in one way or another, what harms them really doesn’t matter— or matters only if it starts to bother us, m akes us feel a trifle uneasy w hen we eat our veal scam pi, for exam ple. So, yes, let us get veal calves out o f solitary confine­ ment, give them m ore space, a little straw, a few com panions. B ut let us keep our veal scampi. Bu t a little straw, m ore space, and a few com ­ panions d on ’t elim inate— d on ’t even touch— the fundam ental wrong, the w rong that attaches to our view ing and treating these animals as our resources. A veal calf killed to be eaten after living in close confinem ent is view ed and treated in this way: but so, too, is another w ho is raised (as they say) “ m ore hum anely.’’ T o right the fundam ental w rong o f our treatment o f farm animals requires m ore than m ak­ ing rearing m ethods “ m ore hum an’’— requires som ething quite different— requires the total dissolu­ tion of commercial animal agriculture. H ow w e do this— whether w e do this, or as in the case o f animals in science, w hether and how we abolish their use— these are to a large extent politi­ cal questions. People must change their beliefs be­ fore they change their habits. Enough people, especially those elected to public office, must be­ lieve in change— must want it— before we will have laws that protect the rights o f animals. This process o f change is very com plicated, very de­ m anding, very exhausting, calling for the efforts o f many hands— in education, publicity, political or­ ganization and activity, dow n to the licking o f en­ velopes and stamps. As a trained and practicing philosopher the sort o f contribution I can make is limited, but I like to think, important. T he cur­ rency o f philosophy is ideas— their m eaning and rational foundation— not the nuts and bolts o f the legislative process say, or the m echanics o f com m u­ nity organization. T h at’s what I have been explor­ ing over the past ten years or so in my essays and talks and, m ore recently, in my book, The Case for Animal Rights.] I believe the m ajor conclusions I reach in that book are true because they are sup­ ported by the w eight o f the best arguments. I believe the idea o f animal rights has reason, not ju st em o­ tion, on its side.

In the space I have at my disposal here I can only sketch, in the barest outlines, som e o f the main fea­ tures o f the book. Its main themes— and we should not be surprised by this— involve asking and answer­ ing deep foundational moral questions, questions about what morality is, how it should be understood, what is the best moral theory all considered. I hope I can convey som ething o f the shape I think this theory is. T he attempt to do this will be— to use a word a friendly critic once used to describe my work— cerebral. In fact I was told by this person that my work is “ too cerebral.’’ But this is misleading. M y feelings about how animals som etim es are treated are ju st as deep and ju st as strong as those o f my m ore volatile compatriots. Philosophers do— to use the jargon o f the day— have a right side to their brains. If it’s the left side we contribute or mainly should— that’s because what talents we have reside there. H o w to proceed? W e begin by asking how the moral status o f animals has been understood by thinkers w ho deny that animals have rights. Then we test the mettle o f their ideas by seeing how well they stand up under the heat o f fair criticism. If w e start our thinking in this way we soon find that som e people believe that w e have no duties directly to animals— that w e ow e nothing to them— that we can do nothing that wrongs them. R ather, we can do w rong acts that involve animals, and so w e have duties regarding them , though none to them. Such views may be called indirect duty views. By way o f illustration: Suppose your neighbor kicks your dog. Then your neighbor has done som ething w rong. But not to your dog. T he w rong that has been done is a w rong to you. After all, it is w rong to upset people, and your neighbor’s kicking your dog up­ sets you. So you are the one w ho is w ronged, not your dog. O r again: by kicking your dog your neighbor dam ages your property. And since it is w rong to dam age another person’s property, your neighbor has done som ething w rong— to you, o f course, not to your dog. Y o u r neighbor no m ore w rongs your dog than your car w ould be w ronged if the windshield were smashed. Y ou r neighbor’s duties involving your dog are indirect duties to you. M ore generally, all o f our duties regarding

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly alTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C cngoge L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.

TOM R E G A N • T H E R A D I C A L E G A L I T A R I A N C A S E FOR A N I M A L RI G H T S

animals are indirect duties to one another— to humanity. H ow could som eone try to justify such a view? O n e could say that your dog doesn’t feel anything and so isn’t hurt by your neighbor’s kick, doesn’t care about the pain since none is felt, is as unaware o f anything as your windshield. Som eone could say this but no rational person will since, am ong other considerations, such a view will com m it one w ho holds it to the position that no human being feels pain either— that hum an beings also d o n ’t care about what happens to them. A second possibility is that though both hum ans and your dog are hurt w hen kicked, it is only human pain that matters. But, again, no rational person can believe this. Pain is pain w heresoever it occurs. If your neigh­ b o r’s causing you pain is w rong because o f the pain that is caused, w e cannot rationally ignore or dis­ miss the moral relevance o f the pain your dog feels. Philosophers w ho hold indirect duty views— and many still do— have com e to understand that they must avoid the two defects ju st noted— avoid, that is, both the view that animals d o n ’t feel any­ thing as well as the idea that only hum an pain can be morally relevant. A m ong such thinkers the sort o f view now favored is one or another form o f what is called contractarianism. H ere, very crudely, is the root idea: morality consists o f a set o f rules that individuals voluntarily agree to abide by— as w e do when we sign a con­ tract (hence the name: contractarianism). Those w ho understand and accept the terms o f the con­ tract are covered directly— have rights created by, and recognized and protected in, the contract. And these contractors can also have protection spelled out for others w ho, though they lack the ability to understand morality and so cannot sign the con­ tract themselves, are loved or cherished by those w ho can. Thus young children, for exam ple, are unable to sign and lack rights. B ut they are pro­ tected by the contract nonetheless because o f the sentimental interests o f others, m ost notably their parents. So we have, then, duties involving these children, duties regarding them , but no duties to them. O u r duties in their case are indirect duties to other hum an beings, usually their parents.

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As for animals, since they cannot understand the contract, they obviously cannot sign; and since they cannot sign; they have no rights. Like children, how ever, som e animals are the objects o f the sentimental interest o f others. Y ou , for exam ple, love your dog ... or cat. So these animals— those enough people care about: com panion animals, whales, baby seals, the American bald eagle— these animals, though they lack rights themselves, will be protected because o f the sentimental interests o f people. I have, then, according to contractarianism, 110 duty directly to your dog or any other animal, not even the duty not to cause them pain or suffer­ ing; my duty not to hurt them is a duty I have to those people w ho care about what happens to them. As for other animals, w here no or little sen­ timental interest is present— farm animals, for ex­ am ple, or laboratory rats— what duties we have grow w eaker and weaker, perhaps to the vanishing point. T h e pain and death they endure, though real, are not w rong if no one cares about them. Contractarianism could be a hard view to re­ fute when it com es to the moral status o f animals if it was an adequate theoretical approach to the moral status o f hum an beings. It is not adequate in this latter respect, however, which m akes the question o f its adequacy in the form er— regarding animals— utterly m oot. For consider: morality, according to the (crude) contractarian position before us, consists o f rules people agree to abide by. W hat people? W ell, enough to m ake a difference— enough, that is, so that collectively they have the pow er to en­ force the rules that are drawn up in the contract. That is very well and goo d for the signatories— but not so goo d for anyone w ho is not asked to sign. And there is nothing in contractarianism o f the sort we are discussing that guarantees or requires that everyone will have a chance to participate equita­ bly in framing the rules o f morality. T h e result is that this approach to ethics could sanction the m ost blatant forms o f social, econom ic, moral, and political injustice, ranging from a repressive caste system to systematic racial or sexual discrimination. M ight, on this theory, does m ake right. Let those w ho are the victims o f injustice suffer as they will. It matters not so long as no one else— no

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly alTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C cngoge L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.

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contractor, or too few o f them — cares about it. Such a theory takes on e’s m oral breath away ... as if, for exam ple, there is nothing w rong with apartheid in South Africa if too few white South Africans are upset by it. A theory with so little to recom m end it at the level o f the ethics o f our treatment o f our fellow humans cannot have any­ thing m ore to recom m end it when it com es to the ethics o f how w e treat our fellow animals. T he version o f contractarianism ju st exam ined is, as I have noted, a crude variety, and in fairness to those o f a contractarian persuasion it must be noted that much m ore refined, subtle, and ingenious va­ rieties are possible. For exam ple, Joh n Raw ls, in his A Theory of Justice, sets forth a version o f contractar­ ianism that forces the contractors to ignore the ac­ cidental features o f being a hum an being— for exam ple, whether one is white or black, male or female, a genius or o f m odest intellect. O nly by ignoring such features, R aw ls believes, can w e in­ sure that the principles o f justice contractors w ould agree upon are not based on bias or prejudice. Despite the im provem ent a view such as R aw ls’s shows over the cruder forms o f contractarianism, it remains deficient: it systematically denies that w e have direct duties to those hum an beings w ho do not have a sense o f ju stice— young children, for instance, and many mentally retarded humans. And yet it seems reasonably certain that, w ere w e to torture a young child or a retarded elder, we w ould be doing som ething that w rongs them , not som e­ thing that is w rong if (and only if) other hum ans with a sense o f justice are upset. And since this is true in the case o f these humans, w e cannot ratio­ nally deny the same in the case o f animals. Indirect duty views, then, including the best am ong them , fail to com m and our rational assent. W hatever ethical theory we rationally should ac­ cept, therefore, it must at least recognize that we have som e duties directly to animals, ju st as we have som e duties directly to each other. T he next two theories I’ll sketch attempt to m eet this requirem ent. T he first I call the cruelty-kindness view. Sim ply stated, this view says that w e have a direct duty to be kind to animals and a direct duty not to be cruel

to them. Despite the familiar, reassuring ring o f these ideas, I do not believe this view offers an adequate theory. T o make this clearer, consider kindness. A kind person acts from a certain kind o f m otive— com passion or concern, for exam ple. And that is a virtue. But there is no guarantee that a kind act is a right act. I f I am a generous racist, for exam ple, I will be inclined to act kindly tow ard m em bers o f my ow n race, favoring their interests above others. M y kindness w ould be real and, so far as it goes, good. But I trust it is too obvious to require com m ent that my kind acts may not be above m oral reproach— may, in fact, be positively w rong because rooted in injustice. So kindness, not withstanding its status as a virtue to be encouraged, simply will not cancel the w eight o f a theory o f right action. Cruelty fares no better. People or their acts are cruel if they display either a lack o f sympathy for or, worse, the presence o f enjoym ent in, seeing another suffer. Cruelty in all its guises is a bad thing— is a tragic human failing. But ju st as a person’s being motivated by kindness does not guarantee that they do what is right, so the absence o f cruelty does not assure that they avoid doing what is wrong. M any people w ho perform abortions, for exam ple, are not cruel, sadistic people. But that fact about their char­ acter and m otivation does not settle the terribly dif­ ficult question about the morality o f abortion. T he case is no different when w e exam ine the ethics o f our treatment o f animals. So, yes, let us be for kind­ ness and against cruelty. B u t let us not suppose that being for the one and against the other answers ques­ tions about moral right and wrong. Som e people think the theory w e are looking for is utilitarianism. A utilitarian accepts two moral principles. T h e first is a principle o f equality: every­ one’s interests count, and similar interests must be counted as having similar weight or importance. W hite or black, male or female, American or Iranian, human or animal: everyone’s pain or frustration m atter and m atter equally with the like pain or frustration o f anyone else. T h e second principle a utilitarian ac­ cepts is the principle o f utility: do that act that tvill bring about the best balance of satisfaction over frustration for everyone affected by the outcome.

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly olTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C e n g ag e L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.

TOM R E G A N • T H E R A D I C A L E G A L I T A R I A N C A S E FOR A N I M A L RI G H T S

As a utilitarian, then, here is how I am to ap­ proach the task o f deciding what I morally ought to do: I must ask w ho will be affected if I choose to do one thing rather than another, how much each in­ dividual will be affected, and w here the best results are m ost likely to lie— which option, in other w ords, is m ost likely to bring about the best results, the best balance o f satisfaction over frustration. That option, w hatever it may be, is the one I ought to choose. That is where my m oral duty lies. T he great appeal o f utilitarianism rests with its uncom prom ising egalitarianism: everyone’s interests count and count equally with the like interests o f everyone else. T he kind o f odious discrimination som e form s o f contractarianism can justify— discrimination based on race or sex, for example— seems disallowed in principle by utilitarianism, as is speciesism— systematic discrimination based on spe­ cies membership. T he sort o f equality we find in utilitarianism, how ever, is not the sort an advocate o f animal or hum an rights should have in mind. Utilitarianism has no room for the equal moral rights of different in­ dividuals because it has no room for their equal inherent value or worth. W hat has value for the utilitarian is the satisfaction o f an individual’s interests, not the individual w hose interests they are. A universe in which you satisfy your desire for water, food, and w arm th, is, other things being equal, better than a universe in which these desires are frustrated. And the same is true in the case o f an animal with similar desires. B u t neither you nor the animal have any value in your ow n right. Only your feelings do. H ere is an analogy to help m ake the philosoph­ ical point clearer: a cup contains different liquids— som etim es sweet, som etim es bitter, som etim es a m ix o f the two. W hat has value are the liquids: the sweeter the better, the bitter the worse. T h e cup— the container— has no value. It’s what goes into it, not what they go into, that has value. For the utilitarian, you and I are like the cup; w e have no value as individuals and thus no equal value. W hat has value is what goes into us, what w e serve as receptacles for; our feelings o f satisfaction have positive value, our feelings o f frustration have neg­ ative value.

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Serious problem s arise for utilitarianism w hen we rem ind ourselves that it enjoins us to bring about the best consequences. W hat does this m ean? It doesn’t mean the best consequences for m e alone, or for my family or friends, or any other person taken individually. N o , what w e m ust do is, roughly, as follows: we must add up— som ehow !— the separate satisfactions and frustrations o f everyone likely to be affected by our choice, the satisfactions in one colum n, the frustrations in the other. W e must total each colum n for each o f the opinions before us. That is what it m eans to say the theory is aggregative. And then w e must choose that option which is m ost likely to bring about the best balance o f totaled satisfactions over totaled frustrations. W hatever act w ould lead to this ou tcom e is the one we m orally ou gh t to per­ form — is w here ou r m oral duty lies. And that act quite clearly m ight not be the sam e one that w ould bring abou t the best results for m e person­ ally, or my family or friends, or a lab anim al. T he best aggregated consequences for everyone con ­ cerned are not necessarily the best for each individual. That utilitarianism is an aggregative theory— that different individuals’ satisfactions or frustrations are added, or sum m ed, or totaled— is the key ob­ jectio n to this theory. M y A unt Bea is old, inactive, a cranky, sour person, though not physically ill. She prefers to go on living. She is also rather rich. I could m ake a fortune if I could get my hands on her m oney, m oney she intends to give me in any event, after she dies, but which she refuses to give m e now . In order to avoid a huge tax bite, I plan to donate a handsom e sum o f my profits to a local children’s hospital. M any, many children will ben­ efit from my generosity, and much jo y will be brought to their parents, relatives, and friends. If I d o n ’t get the m oney rather soon, all these am bitions will com e to naught. T he once-in-a-lifetim eopportunity to make a real killing will be gone. W hy, then, not really kill my Aunt Bea? O h , o f course I might get caught. B ut I’m no fool and, besides, her doctor can be counted on to cooperate (he has an eye for the same investment and I hap­ pen to know a g oo d deal about his shady past). T he

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly olTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C e n g ag e L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts restric tio n s req u ire it.

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deed can be done ... professionally, shall we say. There is very little chance o f getting caught. And as for my conscience being guilt ridden, I am a resourceful sort o f fellow and will take m ore than sufficient com fort— as I lie on the beach at A capulco— in contem plating the jo y and health I have brought to so many others. Suppose Aunt Bea is killed and the rest o f the story com es out as told. W ould I have done any­ thing w rong? A nything immoral? O n e w ould have thought that I had. B ut not according to utilitari­ anism. Since what I did brought about the best balance o f totaled satisfaction over frustration for all those affected by the outcom e, what I did was not w rong. Indeed, in killing Aunt Bea the physi­ cian and I did what duty required. This same kind o f argum ent can be repeated in all sorts o f cases, illustrating time after time, how the utilitarian’s position leads to results that impartial people find morally callous. It is w rong to kill my Aunt Bea in the nam e o f bringing about the best results for others. A goo d end does not justify an evil means. Any adequate moral theory will have to explain why this is so. Utilitarianism fails in this respect and so cannot be the theory we seek. W hat to do? W here to begin anew? T he place to begin, 1 think, is with the utilitarian’s view o f the value o f the individual— or, rather, lack o f value. In its place suppose we consider that you and I, for exam ple, do have value as individuals— what w e ’ll call inherent value. T o say we have such value is to say that w e are som ething m ore than, som ething different from, mere receptacles. M oreover, to in­ sure that we do not pave the way for such injustices as slavery or sexual discrimination, we must believe that all w ho have inherent value have it equally, regardless o f their sex, race, religion, birthplace, and so on. Similarly to be discarded as irrelevant are on e’s talents or skills, intelligence and wealth, personality or pathology, whether one is loved and adm ired— or despised and loathed. T h e genius and the retarded child, the prince and the pauper, the brain surgeon and the fruit vendor, M other Theresa and the m ost unscrupulous used car salesman— all have inherent value, all possess it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status o f

things, as if they exist as resources for others. M y value as an individual is independent o f my useful­ ness to you. Y ours is not dependent on your usefulness to me. For either o f us to treat the other in ways that fail to show respect for the other’s independent value is to act im m orally— is to violate the individual’s rights. S om e o f the rational virtues o f this view — what I call the rights view — should be evident. U nlike (crude) contractarianism, for exam ple, the rights view in principle denies the moral tolerability o f any and all forms o f racial, sexual, or social discrim­ ination; and unlike utilitarianism, this view in prin­ ciple denies that we can justify g oo d results by using evil means that violate an individual’s rights— denies, for example, that it could be moral to kill my Aunt Bea to harvest beneficial consequences for others. That w ould be to sanction the disrespectful treatment o f the individual in the name o f the social good, something the rights view will not— categorically will not— ever allow. T h e rights view — or so I believe— is rationally the m ost satisfactory moral theory. It surpasses all other theories in the degree to which it illuminates and explains the foundation o f our duties to one another— the dom ain o f hum an morality. O n this score, it has the best reasons, the best argum ents, on its side. O f course, if it w ere possible to show that only hum an beings are included within its scope, then a person like myself, w ho believes in animal rights, w ould be obliged to look elsewhere than to the rights view. B u t attempts to limit its scope to humans only can be show n to be rationally defective. Animals, it is true, lack many o f the abilities hum ans possess. They can’t read, do higher mathematics, build a bookcase, or m ake baba ghanoush. N either can many human beings, how ever, and yet w e d on ’t say— and shouldn’t say— that they (these humans) therefore have less inherent value, less o f a right to be treated with respect, than do others. It is the similarities betw een those hum an beings w ho m ost clearly, m ost noncontroversially have such value— the people reading this, for exam ple— it is our similarities, not our differences, that matter most. And the really crucial, the basic similarity is simply this; we are each of us the experiencing subject of a

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly alTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C cngoge L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts restric tio n s req u ire it.

TOM R E G A N • T H E R A D I C A L E G A L I T A R I A N C A S E FOR A N I M A L RI G H T S

life, each of us a conscious creature having an individual welfare that has importance to us whatever our usefulness to others. W e want and prefer things; believe and feel things; recall and expect things. And all these dim ensions o f our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoym ent and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our un­ timely death— all m ake a difference to the quality o f our life as lived, as experienced by us as indivi­ duals. As the same is true o f those animals w ho concern us (those w ho are eaten and trapped, for exam ple), they, too, must be view ed as the experiencing subjects o f a life with inherent value o f their own. There are som e w ho resist the idea that animals have inherent value. “ O nly humans have such value,” they profess. H ow m ight this narrow view be defended? Shall w e say that only humans have the requisite intelligence, or autonom y, or reason? B ut there are many, many humans w ho will fail to m eet these standards and yet w ho are reasonably view ed as having value above and beyond their usefulness to others. Shall w e claim that only hu­ mans belong to the right species— the species Homo sapiens? B ut this is blatant speciesism. W ill it be said, then, that all— and only— humans have im m ortal souls? Then our opponents m ore than have their w ork cut out for them. I am m yself not illdisposed to there being im m ortal souls. Personally, 1 profoundly hope I have one. B ut I w ould not w ant to rest my position on a controversial, ethical issue on the even m ore controversial question about w ho or what has an im m ortal soul. That is to dig on e’s hole deeper, not climb out. Rationally, it is better to resolve moral issues without m aking m ore controversial assum ptions than are needed. T he question o f w ho has inherent value is such a ques­ tion, one that is m ore rationally resolved without the introduction o f the idea o f im m ortal souls than by its use. W ell, perhaps som e will say that animals have som e inherent value, only less than w e do. O n ce again, how ever, attempts to defend this view can be shown to lack rational justification. W hat could be the basis o f our having m ore inherent value than animals? Will it be their lack o f reason, or auton­ om y, or intellect? O nly if w e are willing to m ake

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the same ju d gm en t in the case o f hum ans w ho are similarly deficient. B u t it is not true that such hum ans— the retarded child, for exam ple, or the mentally deranged— have less inherent value than you or I. N either, then, can w e rationally sustain the view that animals like them in being the experiencing subjects o f a life have less inherent value. All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be human animals or not. Inherent value, then, belongs equally to those w ho are the experiencing subjects o f a life. W hether it belongs to others— to rocks and rivers, trees and glaciers, for exam ple— we do not know. A nd may never know . B u t neither do w e need to know , if we are to m ake the case for animal rights. W e do not need to know how many people, for exam ple, are eligible to vote in the next presidential election before we can know w hether I am. Sim i­ larly, we do not need to know hotv many individuals have inherent value before w e can know that som e do. W hen it com es to the case for animal rights, then what w e need to know is w hether the animals w ho, in our culture are routinely eaten, hunted, and used in our laboratories, for exam ple, are like us in being subjects o f a life. And we do know this. W e do know that many— literally, billions and billions— o f these animals are subjects o f a life in the sense explained and so have inherent value if w e do. And since, in order to have the best theory o f our duties to one another, w e must recognize our equal inherent value, as individuals, reason— not sen­ timent, not em otion— reason compels us to recognize the equal inherent value of these animals. And, with this, their equal right to be treated with respect. That, very roughly, is the shape and feel o f the case for animal rights. M ost o f the details o f the supporting argum ent are missing. They are to be found in the book I alluded to earlier. H ere, the details go begging and I must in closing, limit m y­ self to four final points. T he first is how the theory that underlies the case for animal rights shows that the animal rights m ove­ m ent is a part of, not antagonistic to, the human rights m ovem ent. T h e theory that rationally grounds the rights o f animals also grounds the rights o f humans. Thus are those involved in the animal rights m ove­ m ent partners in the struggle to secure respect for

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly olTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C e n g ag e L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.

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C H A P T E R 2 • ANIMAL RIGHTS

human rights— the rights o f w om en, for exam ple, or minorities and workers. The animal rights m ovem ent is cut from the same moral cloth as these. Second, having set out the broad outlines o f the rights view, I can now say why its implications for farming and science, for example, are both clear and uncom prom ising. In the case o f using animals in sci­ ence, the rights view is categorically abolitionist. Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings. Because these animals are treated— routinely, systematically— as if their value is reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely systematically treated with a lack o f respect, and thus their rights routinely, systematically violated. This is just as true when they are used in trivial, duplicative, unnecessary or unwise research as it is when they are used in studies that hold out real promise o f human benefits. W e can’t justify harming or killing a human being (my Aunt Bea, for example) ju st for these sorts o f reasons. N either can w e do so even in the case o f so lowly a creature as a laboratory rat. It is not just refinement or reduction that are called for, not just larger, cleaner cages, not ju st m ore generous use o f anes­ thetic or the elimination o f multiple surgery, not just tidying up the system. It is replacement— completely. T he best w e can do when it com es to using animals in science is— not to use them. That is where our duty lies, according to the rights view. As for com m ercial animal agriculture, the rights view takes a similar abolitionist position. T he fun­ dam ental moral w rong here is not that animals are kept in stressful close confinem ent, or in isolation, or that they have their pain and suffering, their needs and preferences ignored or discounted. All these are w rong, o f course, but they are not the fundam ental w rong. They are sym ptom s and effects o f the deeper, systematic w rong that allows these animals to be view ed and treated as lacking inde­ pendent value, as resources for us— as, indeed, a renewable resource. Giving farm animals m ore space, m ore natural environments, m ore com panions does not right the fundamental wrong, any m ore than giving lab animals m ore anesthesia or bigger, cleaner cages w ould right the fundamental w rong in their case. N othing less than the total dissolution o f com ­ mercial animal agriculture will do this, just as, for

similar reasons I w o n ’t develop at length here, m o­ rality requires nothing less than the total elimination o f commercial and sport hunting and trapping. T he rights view ’s implications, then, as I have said, are clear— and are uncom prom ising. M y last two points are about philosophy— my profession. It is m ost obviously, no substitute for political action. T he w ords I have written here and in other places by themselves d on ’t change a thing. It is what w e do with the thoughts the w ords express— our acts, our deeds— that change things. All that philosophy can do, and all I have at­ tem pted, is to offer a vision o f what our deeds could aim at. And the why. B u t not the how. Finally, I am reminded o f my thoughtful critic, the one I mentioned earlier, who chastised me for being “ too cerebral.” Well, cerebral I have been: indirect duty views, utilitarianism, contractarianism— hardly the stuff deep passions are made o f I am also re­ m inded, however, o f the image another friend once set before me— the image o f the ballerina as expres­ sive o f disciplined passion. Long hours o f sweat and toil, o f loneliness and practice, o f doubt and fatigue; that is the discipline o f her craft. B ut the passion is there, too: the fierce drive to excel, to speak through her body, to do it right, to pierce our minds. That is the image o f philosophy I w ould leave with you; not “ too cerebral,” but disciplined passion. O f the disci­ pline, enough has been seen. As for the passion: There are times, and these are not infrequent, w hen tears com e to my eyes when I see, or read, or hear o f the w retched plight o f animals in the hands o f humans. Their pain, their suffering, their loneli­ ness, their innocence, their death. Anger. R age. Pity. Sorrow . Disgust. T h e w hole creation groans under the w eight o f the evil w e humans visit upon these m ute, powerless creatures. It is our heart, not ju st our head, that calls for an end, that dem ands o f us that w e overcom e, for them, the habits and forces behind their systematic oppression. All great m ovem ents, it is written, go through three stages: ridicule, discussion, adoption. It is the realization o f this third stage— adoption— that dem ands both our passion and our discipline, our heart and our head. The fate of animals is in our hands. God grant we are equal to the task.

C o p y rig h t 2011 C e n g ag e L e a rn in g A ll R ig h ts R e se rv e d M ay n o t b e c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to e lec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m a y be su p p ress ed from th e e B ook a n d 'o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly olTect th e o v e ra ll le arn in g ex p erien c e. C e n g ag e L ea rn in g re se rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l con ten t at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.

M A R Y A N N E W A R R E N • A C R I T I Q U E OF R E G A N ' S A N I M A L R I G H T S T H E O R Y

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NOTE 1. T om R egan , The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1983).

STUDY QUESTIONS 1.

H ow is R e g a n ’s position on animal rights dif­ ferent from Singer’s? Explain.

2.

W hat are R e g a n ’s reasons for granting animals equal moral rights?

3.

D oes R eg an allow for experim entation on animals? If w e have to test a dangerous A ID S vaccine, on w hom should w e test it?

5 A Critique of Regan's Animal Rights Theory MARY ANNE WARREN

The author of many articles in moral philosophy, Mary Anne Warren teaches philosophy at San Francisco State University. Warren reconstructs Regan's argument for animal rights and criticizes it for depending on the obscure notion of inherent value. She then argues that all rational human beings are equally part of the moral community since we can reason with each other about our behavior, whereas we cannot so reason with an animal. She puts forth a “weak animal rights theory, ” which asserts that we ought not to be cruel to animals or kill them without good reason. T o m R eg an has produced what is perhaps the de­ finitive defense o f the view that the basic moral rights o f at least som e non-hum an animals are in no way inferior to our own. In The Case for Animal Rights, he argues that all normal m am m als over a year o f age have the same basic moral rights.1 N o n ­ hum an m am m als have essentially the same right not

to be harmed or killed as we do. I shall call this “ the strong animal rights position ,” although it is w eaker than the claims made by som e animal liberationists in that it ascribes rights to only som e sentient anim als." I will argue that R e g a n ’s case for the strong animal rights position is unpersuasive and that this

R ep rin ted from Hetuven the Species, Vol. 2, N o . 4 (Fall 19H7) by perm ission o f M ary Anne W arren.

C o p y rig h t 2011 C en g ag e L ea rn in g A ll R ig h ts Reserv ed M ay n o t be c o p ied , sc an n e d , o r d u p lic ated , in w h o le o r in p a rt D ue to elec tro n ic rig h ts, som e th ird pa rty c o n ten t m ay be su p p ress ed h o rn th e e B ook and /o r e C h ap ter(s) E d ito ria l re v ie w h a s d e em e d th at any su p p ressed c o n ten t d o c s n o t m a teria lly a ffect th e o v e ra ll le arnin g ex p erien c e. C e n g ag e L ea rn in g rese rv e s th e rig h t to rem o v e a d d itio n a l c ontent at any tim e if su b se q u en t rig h ts re stric tio n s req u ire it.