The Peacebuilding Fund in Guinea Independent evaluation 2009-12 Ian D. Quick September 2012
Executive summary The Peacebuilding Fund has been engaged in Guinea since 2007. This evaluation concerns activities implemented from the debut of the first Priority Plan for the Consolidation of Peace to the launch of the second Priority Plan near the end of 2011. This comprises eleven projects with a total budget of $12.8m.
Section 2 draws the broad lines of the situation in Guinea during this period. The political context has evolved rapidly, most notably with the Ouagadougou Accords in January 2010 and then the inauguration of an elected government in December of the same year. The peaceful character of this transition from the CNDD military regime must be the point of departure here. Simply stated, the fears of widespread popular unrest like in 2006-07, or a “reversal” of the transition, have not been realized. At the same time: the transition is still a work in progress. Most of the national institutions anticipated in the new constitution are not yet in place; and most notably the National Assembly has not yet come into being some two years after the constitutional deadline for this to happen. In the course of this evaluation, it was evident that these questions are increasingly becoming flash points for broader tensions over governance and the performance of public institutions that date back to the quasi-Stalinist regime of Sekou Touré. In this context, we review the engagements of the PBF from two main perspectives. Section 3 evaluates program management: the selection of priorities, planning, and monitoring and evaluation. We note first of all that project development at country level has been rather ad hoc. A Priority Plan for the Consolidation of Peace was launched in 2009, but a Steering Committee to control strategic direction was not installed until 2011. Projects were instead developed through bilateral agreements between UN agencies and their partner ministries, and their progress tracked and evaluated in the same way. This situation has led to negative consequences with respect to the involvement of bilateral partners. Most donors considered the PBF’s involvement in Guinea to be “opaque”, or in some cases a chasse gardée (“private hunt”); and the recent mapping exercise of the Peacebuilding Commission noted that they are yet to engage significant financial resources in-country. This was particularly striking in the case of security sector reform and for youth employment, where there is otherwise a high level of donor interest. The other main observation: the processes for monitoring and evaluation of the portfolio have been weak. We find that reporting has reflected only a small fraction of the indicators set out in the project agreements signed with the PBF, and there are no independent evaluations of projects. Moreover,
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there are effectively no consolidated reporting tools to track the impact of projects against the expected results of the Priority Plan, or against the Performance Management Plan of the PBF.
Section 4 reviews the three domains of the Priority Plan for the Consolidation of Peace. For each, we track the evolution of the situation during the reference period; analyze the pertinence of the PBF’s projects in this context; and evaluate their effectiveness against expected results. (Appendix 3 summarizes these findings in matrix format.) (i) Result 1: Inclusive and sustainable dialogue PBF support has played an important role in supporting the international mediation at the early stages of the transition. This process was indispensable in finalizing the plan for the transition, and for managing severe tensions during the presidential elections in 2010. Outside of this, projects have focused on the “stabilization” or apaisement of the situation during the transition. The results here have been mixed. It is undeniable that there is acute and widespread discontent with respect to the mechanisms for dialogue at national level, and specifically with respect to the finalization of the transition. It has been difficult for the UN to find a constructive role in this area following the disengagement of ECOWAS and the dissolution of the International Contact Group immediately after the inauguration of President Condé in 2010. Programmatic support since this point has been oriented towards the “sensitization” of the population and the reinforcement of local conflict management capacities – for example, tenancy and agricultural conflicts. This work has been more or less well received at the technical level, but we have serious concerns about its pertinence to the PBF’s mandate to address “critical gaps” for consolidation of peace. (ii) Result 2: Human rights, citizenship, security, justice. Support to the security sector is the cause célèbre of foreign assistance in Guinea. This sector was prioritized in the Ouagadougou Accords, and the subject of a major multilateral evaluation in 2010. It is now widely considered a major “dividend of the transition” due to: partial demilitarization of the capital, significant improvements in the level of discipline of the armed forces, and a reform process that is clearly being taken seriously (if still at the early stages). We find that the PBF has played an important role in energizing this process in a context where no other actors were able / willing to provide direct support. By contrast, activities with respect to criminal justice, human rights and citizenship education were conceived as emergency measures, and lacked an enabling political framework. We find that there are serious issues with the choice of activities, given the scale of challenges in these sectors and the limited resources of the PBF. (iii) Result 3: Roles of youth and women. This aspect of the situation in Guinea is widely considered a “time bomb”. The economic record of
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the last decade is weak, and 60% of the population is under 25 years of age. Very often, we heard that the instrumentalisation (manipulation) of youth was the most relevant factor in the violent uprisings of 2006-09, and for the scattered incidents of political violence that have been experienced in the transitional period. In this context, the PBF supported several activities to support vulnerable groups. These created about 550 permanent jobs; and supported the socio-economic reintegration of 2,000 “high risk” youth. Efforts to strengthen “youth leadership and voluntarism” benefited about 260 individuals directly and benefited about 6,000 others via “sensitization” activities. At the same time: The poverty rate is more than 50%, or more than 6,500,000 people; the national level of food insecurity is around 30% in some regions and more than 50% in Nzérékoré. Given these realities we find that there is surprisingly little analysis underlying project work. It is certain that poverty is a risk factor, but the links between this phenomenon and that of political violence are poorly understood. There is, moreover, a high level of interest from bilateral partners in this sector. We are accordingly far from sure that direct service delivery represents the most appropriate way forward under the PBF’s mandate.
Finally, section 5 summarizes the recommendations of this evaluation, in the hope of providing concrete orientations for the second Priority Plan of the PBF. We group these under three headings: ! More strategic targeting of projects, and specifically the definition of clearer and more measurable expected results; ! The multilateralization of efforts and the development of an “exit strategy” during this second phase of engagement; ! Attention to the political preconditions for work in the three priority sectors.
We thank all those inside and outside Guinea who have assisted with this evaluation. We also take the opportunity to thank the implementing partners for their work on the ground, and for the constructive spirit which has marked the exercise.
Ian D. Quick September 2012
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Table of contents Executive summary
2
Section 1. Introduction
6
1.1 About the evaluation 1.2 Methodology
Section 2. Guinea and the PBF 2.1 Country context 2.2 The PBF’s involvement 2.3 Current challenges
Section 3. Program management 3.1 Steering and project selection 3.2 Planning 3.3 Monitoring and evaluation
6 7
10 10 12 13
16 16 20 22
Section 4. Contribution to expected results
25
4.1 Inclusive and sustainable dialogue 4.2 Human rights, citizenship, security, justice 4.3 Contribution of women and youth
25 35 42
Section 5. Summary of recommendations
50
Appendices
52
A1 A2 A3 A4
Inventory of projects Summary of conclusions List of abbreviations List of works cited
52 53 54 55
Comments from UN Country Team
57
Annex
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1. Introduction This chapter explains the “why” and the “how” of the evaluation. We situate the exercise in the larger context of the Peacebuilding Fund’s engagement in Guinea, and explain the methodology employed.
1.1 About the evaluation The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) is a multi-donor trust fund supported by bilateral contributions. As at July 2012, it managed a global total of USD 452.64m with the following mandate:1 [S]upport interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process and contribute towards addressing critical gaps in that process, in particular in areas for which no other funding mechanism is available. Use of Fund resources is intended to have a catalytic effect in helping to create other, more sustained support mechanisms, such as longer-term engagements by development organizations and bilateral donors, and the mobilization of national stakeholders in support of peacebuilding. Support extended through the Peacebuilding Fund must have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process. The Fund supports countries included in the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as countries recovering from conflict or considered to be at risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict.
To be eligible for PBF financing, a country must be designated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Guinea was so designated on 25 June 2008 “on an exceptional basis” under the last clause above: in effect, because it was “at risk of lapsing into conflict”. (We examine the context of the initial intervention in Section 2 below.) A total of USD 27.14m of project funds have since been approved. The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is the Secretariat of the PBF at global level, which provides “overall direction and guidance on program management of the Peacebuilding Fund and monitor[s] its operations”. The present evaluation was conducted in response to the request the PBSO in May 2012. The PBF’s engagements in Guinea can be divided into two phases, corresponding to the two Priority Plans for the Consolidation of Peace (PPCPs). The first phase, launched in 2007, comprised USD 12.8m of funds for 12 projects; the second phase was launched in November 2011. The Terms of Reference of this evaluation speak of an “end-of-term external evaluation” 1
A/63/818 (2009), para 2.1. 6
for the first phase. The general objective is to “better define strategies of sustainability and consolidation for project results, by the Government and its partners, above all with respect to the development of projects in the second phase”. Underneath this, there are the following specific outcomes: ! Evaluate the performance of projects, and the supporting mechanisms put in place. ! Identify strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of PBF projects. ! Provide recommendations based on the analysis of information collected – good and bad practices, synergies, catalytic effects – to better position the PBF/PBSO to support the Guinean government in its efforts to reinforce the process of peace consolidation. ! The results of the evaluation are to be used by the Government and the UN agencies receiving PBF funds to consolidate the results of the PBF program and its individual projects during the second phase.
Organization of work The evaluation contract provided for a single international consultant for 30 working days. In practice the process looked as follows: 17 to 23 May 2012
Review of relevant documents Meetings with external experts and PBC / PBSO
24 May to 14 June 2012
Visits to Conakry and Middle Guinea (Labé, Mamou) Meetings with local stakeholders Retrieval of key documents
15 June to 31 July 2012 (10 working days)
Follow-up with partner agencies (clarifications for individual projects) Review and consolidation of conclusions
The coordination office of the PBF in Conakry was tasked to assist with logistical requirements. In general these worked well and we thank the personnel of the office.
1.2 Methodology The points of departure for developing the methodology were the following: ! The general mandate of the PBF: Projects must “have a direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process”. ! The strategic position: Interventions must “have a catalytic effect in helping to create
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!
other, more sustained support mechanisms such as longer-term engagements by development organizations and bilateral donors, and the mobilization of national stakeholders”, and address “critical gaps” that cannot be covered with other funds. The Performance Management Plan (PMP) of the PBSO. This plan defines indicators at country level with respect to strategic results, program management, and “a positive multi-year trend in the specific sectors of support”.
Having regard to these parameters, and the constraints noted in the following section, the evaluation methodology comprised two steps. Program theory
Articulation of how projects are expected to contribute to the positive evolution of the situation in target sectors and at the strategic level; and the critical underlying assumptions. Specifically: ! Review of planning and project documents. ! Validation (or amendment) of the articulated program theory with fund recipients and implementing partners, accounting for the evolution of approaches over time. ! Identification of expected outputs, and specific changes expected with regard to national and international actors.
Outcome mapping2
Based on the validated program theories, investigation of expected changes with three groups of stakeholders: the government, non-state actors (including civil society and traditional leaders), and bilateral partners. This investigation comprised two major lines of inquiry: ! Planned outputs, according to project contracts. ! Evidence of increased national and international engagement with the priority areas, e.g. via formal policies, financial allocations, new relationships with other stakeholders.
After having discussed with the PBSO we considered 9 of the 12 projects in detail. The projects excluded are: GIN/A-1 (“support to the feminine movement”); EMER/3 (“support to national dialogue in Guinea”); and GIN/E-1 (“strengthening coordination capacities to support peace consolidation”). This was in consequence of the limited resources of the evaluation and not a commentary on the quality or pertinence of these projects. At a practical level, research methods comprised semi-structured individual interviews; several focus group discussions; and review of relevant documents.3 All funding recipients had the opportunity to discuss their projects, including at least one meeting in Guinea; the report of preliminary findings in Conakry on 14 June 2012; and written requests for supplementary On this approach see generally Earl S, Carden F and Smutylo T (2001). We have benefited from many reviews and assessment missions over the last two years touching on the PBF’s engagement: see Appendix 4. 2 3
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information in late June 2012.
Constraints and limitations Timing: At the time of the evaluation, the projects of the first phase were mostly completed. This made it difficult in some cases to meet relevant interlocutors, or to visit activities in progress. But the more pressing concern is that the second Priority Plan had already been launched. A total of nine projects with a total budget of USD 14.29m had already been approved and implementation had started – already more than the total budget of the first phase. (Moreover, several other projects were on the cusp of disbursement.) For their part the PBSO explained a number of administrative difficulties relating to the evaluation. We are sympathetic with these problems but at the end of the day must agree with the many interlocutors at country level who described themselves as “ill at ease with the launch of the second phase in this way”. Data problems: We find below (in Section 3.3) that there are some severe limitations with respect to data. In particular: ! At project level: There are no consolidated monitoring tools for the PBF portfolio, and about 20% of indicators set out in the project contracts have actually been reported to the PBSO. The collection of basic project information thus consumed a large part of the evaluation. ! At the level of results: Funding recipients did not identify any formal evaluation of projects. Where we have not been able to establish whether an activity or result has occurred, we have classed it as “not demonstrated”. Access to some interlocutors: It is inevitable that there will be some scheduling problems in an exercise of this sort. Among these, we emphasize the following: ! For lack of time, the team could only visit two administrative regions (Mamou and Labé). This is concerning given the strong signs of political polarization that we examine below. ! Several meetings planned with government officials at the local and technical level were cancelled: for example, at mayoral offices in Conakry and the Ministry of Territorial Administration. There were several other gaps at the level of the central government but these are less concerning. In general, we find that these perspectives have been well captured in the many missions and studies conducted over the last four years (see Appendix 4).
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2. Guinea and the PBF This chapter summarizes the country context, and the history of the PBF’s engagements in Guinea. We cover relevant aspects of Guinea’s history, and the challenges that have been passed down to the present day. We then explain the broad lines of PBF support since 2007.
2.1 Country context For ease of explanation, we summarize in chronological fashion: 1958
Proclamation of independence; regime of PDG and President Sekou Touré
1984
Military coup of CMRN; installation of Lansana Conté as President
1993
First multi-party elections; marked by strong protests of opposition
Mar 2006
Major popular uprisings (until jan 2007)
Feb 2007
Government of national consensus
May 2008
Government of "large ouverture"
Dec 2008
Military coup of CNDD
Sep 2009 Jan 2010
Massacre of 28 September Ougadougou Accords
Nov 2010
Conclusion of presidential election; inauguration of President Condé
According to the first Priority Plan: “a totalitarian system managed by a single party, inspired by communist régimes”.
Launch of Second Republic in 1990 with a new basic law. But according to the ECOWAS mission of May 2010; “Guinea has not benefited to the present from either a rule of law respectful of fundamental rights, nor from free and transparent elections.”
According to the Second Priority Plan, “acute sociopolitical tensions, marked by ceaseless changes of government and the contentions generated by presidential, legislative and communal elections”.
The death of President Condé in December 2008 is followed immediately by the military coup of the CNDD. After the intensive involvement of ECOWAS and other partners, the Ouagadougou Accords institute a transitional government.
The new President is inaugurated in December 2010. Other constitutional organs are yet to be established, including most notably the National Assembly. July 2012
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The situation today After this political history, Guinea finds itself in a difficult situation. This underlies the comment in the document of engagement with the Peacebuilding Commission of 2011: “As Guineans say, ‘We have not had a violent conflict, but we have the same challenges as a post-conflict country.” In particular, we underline two aspects which it is essential to keep in mind when considering the current situation. Historically weak governance The figure at right summarizes some key indicators of governance over the last decade. 4 Briefly, we note: ! Guinea is in the bottom decile (1-10%) for most indicators of governance. ! The last decade has seen some large fluctuations in connection with the “acute socio-political crisis”. The mid-term review of the 2007-11 UNDAF, for example, underlined “the instability of institutions” and the “deterioration of the capacities of the Administration” (p29).5 ! Judgments by external analysts of “fragility”. These composite indices are based essentially on indicators of effectiveness and legitimacy. With regard to most of these indicators: Guinea finds itself – well before the current transition – in a comparable position to Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Burundi or Iraq (for example).This is so notwithstanding that the country does not appear on indices measuring actual / observed political violence (see e.g. Marshall 2010).
World Governance Indicators (2002-10) Percentile rank, world
Political violence 5th percentile Rule of law 2nd percentile Government effectiveness
11th percentile
Indexes of state fragility Failed States Index (percentile rank) Index of State Fragility (score, from 0-25)
7th percentile
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UNDP Human Development Reports Percentile rank, world
Index of Human Development
8th percentile
The consequences for economic development The extension of Guinea’s Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2011-12 does not mince its words. Here are the first two paragraphs: Today the government has completed the extension of the poverty reduction strategy paper. We may safely say that the progress achieved is well below the expectations legitimately harbored by the people in For general reference: we do not discuss the individual methodologies. See Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009; Messner et al 2012; Marshall and Cole 2011; UNDP 2012. 5 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2007-11. The core element of the UN Development Group’s “Common Country Programming Processes”. 4
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the early 2000s. The fact that we have witnessed an increase in poverty since 2002 should raise questions in all of our minds. The impact of this blight has increased from 49.2% in 2002 to 58% in 2010. It is easy to locate the causes, which to my mind relate primarily to the poor governance that has marked our country’s path toward a better future.
In practice, Guinea is classified as a “least developed country”. GDP per capita is about USD 1.110; average growth of this measure over the last decade has been 1% (World Development Indicators 2012).
2.2 The PBF’s engagements The PBF disbursed a total of $12.85m during the first phase of engagement. The figure below summarizes the development of this portfolio. Massacre of 28 September Gov. of national consensus Feb 07
Gov. of "large ouverture" May 08
Ouagadougou Accords Presidential election
Coup of CNDD Dec 08
Sep 09
Jan 10
Parliamentary elections?
June-Nov 10
Dec 12
$0,96m
$4,3m
$9,1m
There are four key points: During the “socio-political crisis” (2007-08) The project to support national dialogue (“ProConSoGui”) was approved in November 2007. It supported regional consultations and ultimately the “National Days of Dialogue” in August 2008. This was in the context of a crisis of confidence in national institutions ; the report of the Days of Dialog is preoccupied almost wholly with questions of governance and public services.
$24,0m
Under the CNDD regime (2008-09): The PBSO approved the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan
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(PPP1) in April 2009 under the military regime. This was an unusual step at the time: the African Union had suspended Guinea in December 2008, and the World Bank had suspended its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. In the aftermath of the coup, an International Contact Group had formed to coordinate the political engagement of bilateral and multilateral actors. During this period, the PBF portfolio grew to USD 4.3m with projects to support national dialogue and the security / justice sectors. We comment below (Section 3.2) on the appropriateness of these priorities in the context of a generally non-recognized government. Under the transitional government (2010): After the Ouagadougou Accords of January 2010 the PBSO rapidly committed the remaining funds of the first phase. These projects supported women’s political mobilization, marginalized youth, the reintegration of children “at high risk” and international mediation during the transitional period.6 A point of particular importance was the “stabilization” of the situation during the presidential elections of June to November 2010, which triggered violence in some areas. Projects were thus approved to support a special force for elections security; and “electoral accompaniment” to calm the situation in a more general sense. With the elected government (2011-12): Most projects of the first phase continued under the new government, with 55% still open administratively at the start of the evaluation in May 2012. In parallel, the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan was formally adopted in November 2011, about one year after the inauguration of the new president. The approval of “rapid impact” projects in November / December 2011 rapidly doubled the portfolio to USD 24m.
2.3 Current challenges After four and a half years of PBF engagement in Guinea, we highlight the following aspects of the situation. (i)
The transition remains in progress.
From the outside, one might conclude that the transition is finished. After the inauguration of President Condé in December 2010 the International Contact Group was dissolved; the mediation of ECOWAS under President Compoaré of Burkina Faso was also terminated. In the same line, some UN officials protested the word “transitional”, preferring to speak of the “electoral period”. It is thus essential to be clear: From the constitutional point of view, and that of the vast majority of interlocutors during this evaluation, the transition is ongoing. Most notably pending: ! The installation of the National Assembly. The earliest possible date for elections is 6
The reintegration projected was launched in February 2012, but prepared under the previous government. 13
! !
December 2012, implying a delay of 18 months after the constitutional deadline. Elections for local officials, following the parliamentary elections. Other national institutions; the Superior Council for the Judiciary; the High Council of collectivités locales, the independent national organization for human rights, etc.
In other words; There are critical unresolved questions of representation, the exercise of public functions, and the distribution of political power. And there is a high level of tension around these questions. We return to this point in detail in Section 4.1 (“Inclusive and sustainable dialog”). (ii)
There are strong tensions, albeit little violence.
There has not been major violence since the start of the transition in January 2010. The main point to note is a number of incidents of inter-communal violence between the two tours of the Presidential election in the second half of 2010. These incidents were not at a large scale, leading to perhaps twenty deaths and the displacement of several hundred people.7 However they excited very widespread concern, due in part to their essentially political character. In particular, some actors capitalized on existing ethnic tensions in the localities of Dabola and Siguiri which raised the specter of broader tensions along the “ethnic frontier” between the regions of Middle and Upper Guinea, and in mixed areas of Guinea Forestière. An evaluation by the political parties themselves remarked “one forgot the democratic character of the elections and focused on their ethnic and egocentric character”.8 Since then, the situation has generally remained calm. There have certainly been popular demonstrations in connection with the political questions mentioned immediately above. But up until the point of the evaluation, these did not use violent methods and were not met with a violent response. Many interlocutors underlined the importance of this fact given the history of violent confrontations in 2007 and 2009. We return to this point below in connection with the reform of the security sector (Section 4.2). (iii) In marked contrast with an unstable region.
We recall the first paragraph of the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan: Les six voisins de la Guinée ont tous connu des conflits intérieurs armés graves. La Guinée fait donc heureusement exception à cette règle, et s’avère en même temps un facteur de stabilité dans cette région de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.
This is the least that one might say. And it remained true during the reference period for this evaluation, where we saw three sharp reminders of the stakes of the Guinean transition; ! Cote d’Ivoire: Renewed conflict in 2010 triggered by the Presidential elections. Carter Center 2010; Human Rights Watch 2010; Open Society Initiative for West Africa 2011. It seems that the majority of displaced persons have returned at this point, but we did not have firm confirmation. 8 The review concerned the “Code of Good Conduct” for political parties, an initiative supported by the PBF and USAID. See Section 3.1 below. 7
14
! !
Guinea-Bissau: A military coup in April 2012 after more than a decade of intensive engagement of the UN, including the dedicated political mission UNOGBIS. Mali: A military coup in March 2012; the growth of an Islamist and separatist insurgency regarded as a potential destabilizing factor at regional level.
In defiance of the odds, perhaps, it does not seem that these incidents have had major direct effects for Guinea. There have not been large flows of refugees; still less the cross-border activities of militias that one saw during the Liberian civil war.
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3. Program management This chapter reviews core program management functions for the PBF in Guinea. We analyze project selection and steering at country level; the development and utilization of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan; and the system for monitoring and evaluation. Links to Performance Management Plan: Result 5.2 [Program quality]
3.1 Steering and project selection In general, the PBF uses two modalities for financing (A/63/818, paras 3.3-5): Immediate response facility (IRF): On request from the senior representative of the UN and national authorities. The PBSO approves these requests case-by-case; it must ensure “appropriate review procedures and risk assessments”. Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (PRF). These modalities require (a) a Priority Plan developed jointly between national authorities and the UN; and (b) the review and approval of projects at country level by a joint Committee. This Steering Committee must be co-directed by the government and the senior representative of the UN, and include “representatives of other key stakeholders”. These two modalities were used in equal measure for the projects covered in this evaluation: 47% IRF and 53% PRF. But Guinea is an unusual case in some regards: there was no Steering Committee at country level for the approval and monitoring of projects during the first phase. The PBSO described this as a “hybrid approach”. In practice it looked as follows: Project selection. All project documents were signed by the UN Resident Coordinator and the representative of PBSO at headquarters level. On the government side, some documents have no signature (e.g. GIN/B-1) and the others the partner ministry – that is, the ministry most closely involved with execution of the project(e.g. GIN/H-1). The first meeting of the Steering Committee was convened on 7 June 2010.9 At this date, 75% of the funds for the first phase had been committed, and all the funds using the PRF modality. In subsequent months, the remaining 25% of funds were allocated reconvening the Committee. Monitoring and evaluation. The meeting of 7 June 2010 comprised a “brief presentation of the Some UN officials insisted that there had been meetings of the Steering Committee before 7 June 2010. All the evidence considered, this has not been demonstrated. The procedural documents of 7 June speak of the “première réunion” and the “lancement” of the Priority Plan. Internal UN documents from the same point in time refer to the “démarrage” of the Steering Committee and explain its role. 9
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Fund”, along with validation of the Steering Committee’s Terms of Reference. The next meeting was 16 November 2011, dedicated to presentation of the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan, and more specifically the “quick impact” projects developed within that framework. There was certainly “ad hoc” follow-up with the office of the Prime Minister outside the Steering Committee proper. But there is little documentation on this up until May 2011, when a UN “technical mission on peace consolidation” included a review of results under the first phase with government officials.
Findings It is essential to recognize the rapid development of the political situation during the reference period of this evaluation. The launch of a program under the CNDD was controversial to begin with, and a steering role for the government would hardly have been consistent with the international posture towards the regime. After this there were: (i) the violent demonstrations at the end of 2009; (ii) the installation of a transitional government under the Ouagadougou Accords in early 2010, and (iii) a prolonged and tense electoral period for the second half of 2010. In this context, one cannot have unrealistic expectations. We accept that there were valid reasons for the lack of a formal mechanism at least until early 2011. At the same time, the utilization of the PRF modalities normally implies two other preconditions: (i) the close involvement of “representatives of other key stakeholders” (normally via the Steering Committee), and (ii) a “joint analysis of critical gaps” with national authorities. These preconditions were not met in this case, which has contributed to two adverse consequences. (i)
The involvement of other international partners has been very weak.
In principle the Steering Committee ensures that PBF projects support national priorities, but also the “established principles of the Fund” (A/63/818, para 3.6). In particular, PBF engagements must “have a catalytic effect in helping to create other, more sustained support mechanisms, such as longer-term engagements by development organizations and bilateral donors”. This is policy but also a self-evident necessity in Guinea’s specific context. Donor support is very concentrated, with the five largest representing 72% of ODA, and the first ten nearly 90%. And ODA per capita is significantly below the average for countries on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC Working Group 2012). In this context, it is disquieting that bilateral partners at country level found the PBF’s involvement to be “extremely opaque”. As one official commented, “I am unable to say who decides what, or how .. there is no official communication. Another: “I have no idea where the PBF ends and UNDP starts.” More than one described the process for allocation of funds as
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a chasse gardée (“private hunt”). The practical consequences were explained in the background paper prepared for the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned in July 2012: In terms of coordination for peacebuilding projects, the presence of a strong SSR taskforce and experts, as well as strong commitment on the side of the Guinean government, have helped to promote information sharing among relevant donors through periodic gathering with the SSR taskforce lead by the UNDP. However, similar active mechanisms are missing for the other two priorities of national reconciliation and youth and women employment, making it more difficult for the donors to exchange frequent information.
This is the situation after more than three years of PBF engagement. At the time of this evaluation in May 2012 a Technical Committee had just been established which included (in principle) bilateral partners, but the level of involvement was very weak. The meetings that we reviewed, for example, included two or three partners who participated on an informationsharing basis only.10
*
[PBSO] Support the transfer of experiences from other PBF countries regarding the management of the Steering Committee. Given the urgency, we recommend recruitment of at least one international staff with direct experience in this domain.
(ii)
National ownership of some objectives of the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan did not materialize.
There is no international compact or joint needs analysis for the transition, outside of the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan itself. Moreover, Guinea is the only country on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission without a mandated peacekeeping or political mission – it is the Resident Coordinator who is the senior representative of the UN in-country, with a supporting office in UNDP. As a consequence: It has been necessary to negotiate the political framework for projects on a case-by-case basis. On one side, work in the security sector has benefited from a clear political mandate in the Ouagadougou Accords, and the mechanisms established by the government following the 2010 elections. On the other side, some sensitive sectors – notably national reconciliation, and dialog around the finalization of the transition – do not have any such over-arching framework in place. The project documents themselves note the risks: “the authorities are not disposed to organize such spaces for dialogue”; “political will on the part of the government does not exist to push forward the reconciliation process”. We find below (Section 4.1) that these risks have effectively materialized, with serious consequences for the pertinence and impact of PBF projects. For the PBF as donor, it is critical to have realistic expectations. In particular, we underline the
10See
e.g. list of attendance for Technical Committee of 9 May 2012; minutes of meeting on 10 April 2012. 18
differences between the “black UN” (missions under a Security Council mandate) and the “blue UN” (the agencies, funds and programmes).11 UN officials in Guinea stated clearly that their starting point is “accompaniment of the government”; the central principle of the Resident Coordinator system is to “improve the effectiveness of response to the national development priorities of programme countries”.12 This has led to two important differences to other countries where the PBF is engaged: Role of the Steering Committee. According to several high-level UN officials, the Committee established in June 2010 “does not have a political role”; program activity of the PBF and the mutual engagements between Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission “exist in two different universes”. During the evaluation visit, for example, the first revision of the PBC’s mutual engagements was presented “for information purposes” to the Steering Committee. The points of this review concerning “the atmosphere of mistrust that reigns over the legislative election process and a certain tendency to manipulate ethnic identity for political purposes” (PBC/6/GUI/2, para 2) were not discussed, notwithstanding that they directly concern the first objective of both the first and second Peacebuilding Priority Plans. Neutrality during the transition. It is evident that the role of “accompaniment” is not compatible with that of neutral interlocutor amidst the high tensions around finalization of the transition. We cite, by way of example, the absence of the “round table” or facilitation role that the UN commonly adopts in the context of political / peacekeeping missions. This contrasts sharply with the period before the inauguration of President Condé in December 2010. At this time the International Contact Group coordinated most international efforts in support of the transition, and ECOWAS and the UN Office in West Africa (to a lesser extent) served as mediators between the key Guinean stakeholders. The same arrangements are not appropriate under an elected government, but prudent risk management dictates close attention to the process for establishing a policy consensus in sensitive program areas like national reconciliation and “inclusive dialog”.
*
[PBSO] Given the sensitive nature of the priorities in the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan, avoid identifying political conditions as “risks” or “hypotheses” without a framework at the level of the Steering Committee identifying “who will do what”.
We draw the language from the “Review of Integrated Missions”: see Eide et al 2005, p19. A/RES/62/208 (2008), para 90. For example: The second Peacebuilding Priority Plan is drawn up around “development objectives”. 11 12
19
3.2 Planning The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan was the reference document for the development of PBF projects during the period covered by this evaluation.13 According to the Terms of Reference of the PBF, a Priority Plan must comprise “an indicative number of critical interventions required to strengthen and sustain the peacebuilding process”. It is drafted on the basis of “a joint analysis of critical gaps and peacebuilding needs”, and refers to “a post-conflict needs assessment” or a “national peace consolidation or recovery framework” where these documents exist. In Guinea, the first Plan was launched in April 2009 under the CNDD regime. In effect, there were no very legitimate frameworks for international intervention at that time. The rapid succession of governments from 2006-08 had been linked with an equally rapid succession of initiatives: the “programme minimum d’urgence” of 2007, the National Days of Dialogue (with support from the PBF) in August 2008; the “programme national de bonne gouvernance” of November 2008. The Priority Plan itself explains its origins (p6): Le CNDD dans la première déclaration faite à la nation, et qui lui tient jusqu’à présent lieu de vision et d’orientations politiques et stratégiques, reprend a son compte la lutte contre tous les maux de la société guinéenne tels qu’identifies par le Dialogue Nationale entamé sous la régime précèdent. Le CNDD s’inscrit de ce fait implicitement dans la continuité de la mise-en-œuvre des résultats de ProConSoGui. Les recommandations des Journées Nationales de Dialogue, ainsi que la Déclaration finalisée par les participants, auxquelles s’ajoutèrent certains besoins issus de la transition en cours, constituent ensemble la base des projets qui seront présentés dans le cadre du Plan Prioritaire.
Substantively, the plan includes three main objectives: ! Support to inclusive and sustainable dialogue ! Support to promotion of human rights, citizenship education, and reinforcement of the security and justice sectors. ! Strengthening the contribution / role of women and youth in the prevention of conflicts and consolidation of peace Under these three broad headings there are eleven results. We find a major problem here. In effect, the scale of intervention that is described is enormous given a total financial envelope during this period of USD 12.8m. The easiest way to demonstrate this is to break down financial resources at the level of expected results:14 Projects using the PRF financing modality must be based on the Priority Plan. In practice, the four projects financed under the IRF modality also used the Priority Plan as the point of departure. 14 Estimates of the evaluator. The project documents do not indicate the division of resources between the results expected under the Peacebuilding Priority Plan. 13
20
Forums for dialogue
1,92 m$
Truth, justice, reconciliation
0,52 m$
Capacity of civil society
0,52 m$
National solidarity Structures for human rights Citizenship education
0,54 m$
Strengthen the security sector Justice and anti-corruption
2,95 m$ 0,57 m$
Support to youth Support to womenʼsʼ movement Coordination of PBF engagement
4,65 m$ 0,65 m$ 0,44 m$
Findings (i)
The Priority Plan was simply too general to add much value.
To illustrate, we take a simple example (Result 2.4, p12): Appui à la justice et la lutte contre la corruption Il est donc particulièrement urgent pour le gouvernement de mettre immédiatement en place un dispositif de renforcement institutionnel et des capacités et garantir l’indépendance, l’intégrité et le professionnalisme de la justice. Le gouvernement est soucieux de réhabiliter la justice et de créer les conditions d’une refonte complète du système judiciaire afin de lutter efficacement contre la corruption et les détournements de deniers publics.
This is an ambitious objective, but the only project undertaken in this area was to support the organization of two sessions of the cours d’assises (project GIN/B-1). In effect, then, a workplan that was very broad on paper became something quite different in practice. It was necessary to make a similar adjustment for the other expected results, with two consequences: ! The Priority Plan did not reflect a real prioritization with national and international partners. It was a starting point, but in the absence of a Steering Committee the process of agreeing specific priorities was extremely difficult (see above, Section 3.1). ! It was difficult to develop tools for monitoring above the level of individual projects, given the scope of the eleven results noted above. For the purposes of the present evaluation, we evaluate effectiveness against the specific expected results of individual projects and not the much broader language of the Priority Plan. (ii)
Some priorities were not well-adapted to the context.
At the early stages, the context was one of a military regime with limited international
21
legitimacy, which had suspended national institutions. There were, at the same time, many organizational difficulties. To cite a UN source, the mid-term evaluation of the UNDAF underlined “the instability of institutions” and the “deterioration of the Administration’s capacities” (at p29). The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan itself notes that it was based on the “implicit” priorities of the government. It is precisely these factors that led to the “hybrid approach” mentioned in the previous section. In this context, some results seem much too ambitious. In particular, those concerning national reconciliation, justice, human rights and national dialogue demanded a strong collaboration with the highest levels of government which was hardly likely to eventuate. (Moreover, any framework agreed in that context was hardly likely to pass to an elected government without major changes.)
3.3 Monitoring and evaluation Under PBF policy there is a division of labor for monitoring and evaluation of the portfolio (PBF Monitoring Matrix 2009). For individual projects, the fund recipient is responsible to (i) prepare quarterly and annual reports on progress, success and failures; and (ii) organize an independent evaluation at project close. At the level of the Priority Plan: the Steering Committee, with the support of the PBF Secretariat, is responsible to track achievement of overall results and the allocation of financial resources, and to identify “gaps”.
Findings (i)
Monitoring and evaluation at project level has been very weak.
We can say quite simply: the system for monitoring and evaluation has not worked well. No partner identified to us a formal evaluation at project level. The only (partial) example was an internal evaluation of one sub-contracted partner for the project GIN/A-2 (“Support to youth movements and disenfranchised groups of youth”). With respect to monitoring, the quarterly and annual reports were by and large submitted. But the transparency of activities has been poor. Quantatively, the project documents for the first phase identify a total of 245 indicators. The rate of utilization for these has been as follows: Indicators from project documents: Year # listed # reported 2009 60 12 (20%) 2010 224 60 (27%) 2011 245 50 (20%) 2012 108 10 (9%)
22
In other words, less than 25% of indicators in project contracts were actually reported during the reference period for this evaluation. By way of illustration, the project document for GIN/B-1 (priority support to justice and to security) (USD 1.7m) includes no less than 60 indicators. But the results framework in the reports does not correspond to that used in the project document. In the 2011 annual report, one does not find expected results concerning sessions of the cours d’assises, the establishment of an independent human rights institution, or support to the victims of the incident of 28 September 2009. Qualitatively, the problem is most serious at the level of expected results. To illustrate, consider the project GIN/A-2 (“Support to youth movements and disenfranchised groups of youth”): Indicators for project GIN/A-2 [evaluator’s translation] Objective
Consolidate peace in the context of improving the general socio-political environment for the good management of the transition process, including the organization of free elections in a calm / peaceful climate.
! Improve the participation of youth in the transition process (respect of the organs of the transition, increased participation in elections)
Outcome
Strengthen the contribution and the role of youth in actions to prevent conflict and to consolidate peace.
! Number of small enterprises created. ! Number of sensitive quartiers implicated in Conakry and the interior of the country ! Number of clans (gangs) in these areas organized, trained and reinserted in the community.
Output
Strengthened volunteerism and leadership of youth in difficult situations.
! Number of youth structures including the CECOJES strengthened and given technical, material and logistical support. ! Number of persons trained in peace culture and mobilization of youth.
We observe: ! At objective level: The “indicator” refers to ambitions which could be measured in principle, but there is no analysis of how to do it and the subjects that are mentioned are not covered in the project reports. ! At outcome level: The first and the second indicator concern project outputs only. The third is very vague and we have not found data on it in the reports. Section 4 reviews expected results for the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan case-by-case, but in brief this example is not unrepresentative. (ii)
There has been little monitoring or evaluation at the level of the Priority Plan.
There is no consolidated tool (“dashboard”) at the level of the Priority Areas, or for the portfolio as a whole. The annual report of the PBF Secretariat comprises a list of activities at the level of individual projects; the quarterly bulletin de la paix is a public communication tool and does not include an evaluation component.
23
The consequence: We heard many times from stakeholders at country level of a “lack of transparency”. Briefly: ! Bilateral partners feel strongly that they know little about PBF activities, apart from the high-profile case of the security sector. (See Section 3.1 above.) ! The Steering Committee and the Technical Committee evidently have not yet played the role envisaged by the Monitoring Matrix. Review of the procedural documents indicates that meetings until now have been dedicated to presentation of basic information regarding ongoing projects and the projects proposed for the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan. There have also been some pointed exchanges concerning the adequacy of information-sharing from the UN side.15 With respect to resources, there is a monitoring and evaluation specialist within the PBF Secretariat at country level. But it was clearly evident that they work primarily on the project development / approval projects with fund recipients, and in support of coordination mechanisms. This suggests in turn a lack of capacity for these other functions.
*
[Steering Committee / PBSO] For individual projects, insist on the definition of a list of realistic indicators and a budgeted process to monitor them, including an end-of-project evaluation. [Steering Committee / PBSO] Ensure that periodic project reports are written in reference to the results framework set out in the project document. [PBSO] Set clear expectations regarding evaluation at the strategic level, and reporting at the level of Priority Areas and the portfolio as a whole. Support the transfer of good practices from other PBF countries in this regard.
For example: The meeting of the thematic group on youth employment of 10 April 2012; or the Steering Committee meeting on May 2012 at which we were present. 15
24
4. Contribution to expected results This chapter reviews the three priority areas of the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan. For each, we pose three questions: Situation analysis
What has changed in the priority area during the period that the PBF has been engaged? What have been the “critical gaps” in the sense of the PBF’s mandate?
Relevance of projects
Have the PBF-supported projects demonstrated: ! the potential for a “direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process”? ! a financing gap that justifies the support of the PBF under its specific mandate?
Effectiveness of projects
Were expected results achieved as planned? Specifically, what were the: ! Direct outputs of the project? ! Changes in mobilization / engagement of government, nonstate actors, and international partners?
In posing these questions, we consider two additional transversal criteria (see Terms of Reference for the evaluation, and OECD-DAC 1991): ! Efficiency: Could the PBF have achieved the same results with fewer resources? ! Sustainability: Will the results obtained continue after the end of the project without international support?
4.1 Inclusive and sustainable dialogue Supporting projects: IRF/19 Support to international mediation GIN/H-1 Promotion of inclusive and sustainable dialogue in Guinea IRF/28 Post-electoral accompaniment EMER/3 Support to national dialogue in Guinea16 TOTAL
$0,63m $1,20m $0,45m $0,96m $3,25m
Links to Performance Management Plan: Result 1.4 Inclusive dialogue supports the implementation of peace accords. Result 2.1
16
Partnerships and procedures encourage and sustain inclusive political dialogue, with a view to resolving questions relating to conflict, instability and political participation.
We have excluded EMER/3 from our formal findings: see Section 1.2 above on scope. 25
4.1.1 Situation analysis The foreword of the report on the National Days of Dialogue in 2008 stated that the process “visait en priorité la restauration de confiance entre administrateurs et administrés”. The Declaration of Mutual Engagements with the Peacebuilding Commission speaks in the same vein of a “population which has lost all confidence in those who govern”, and the need to “reestablish on the one hand, the relation between the people and the state / the armed forces and, on the other hand, relations between the Guineans themselves”. In this connection, the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan clearly prioritizes national consultation during the transitional period. This flows from deficiencies in national institutions – “the exceptional institutional framework put in place by the CNDD”. The priority for the PBF is thus “institutional and juridical support to the transitional process”, and more generally “support to the development and implementation of a workplan to give tangible content to forums for consultation”. It is essential to recognize that this “exceptional institutional situation” continues today. We noted in Section 2 that the installation of many institutions envisaged in the new constitution of 2010 is still pending, with the National Assembly the most prominent. (The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan notes that elections would be the “dorsal spine” of the peace consolidation process.) In this connection, we recall the indicators of “fragility” in Section 2.1 above, and a finding of the UN “technical mission for peace consolidation” of May 2011: Civil society and international partners highlighted the breakdown, since the end of the recent electoral period, of dialogue and collaborative decision-making platforms which had previously helped the country overcome its most severe crisis points during the transition. In particular, lack of dialogue and consensus over the process for holding legislative elections was consistently raised as the most immediate source of risk for renewed violence.
We note that some UN interlocutors did not agree with this conclusion. But our observations in-country indicate that the situation has deteriorated since the words quoted above were written. In particular: ! The “Dialogue Committee” established to reconcile political parties around the organization of parliamentary elections was terminated with “eight points of disagreement”, comprising most of the fundamental aspects. In the words of the facilitator of this Committee: “nous sommes en plein crise politique”. ! Rhetoric that has become more and more heated. To take a typical example: “nous allons alterner les manifestations, les meetings et les (opérations) ‘ville morte’ tant que nous n'obtiendrons pas satisfaction à nos revendications” (Jeune Afrique, 8 May 2012); one could cite many others. We also underline the frequency of political protests in Conakry, for example on 17 March, 19 April, 13 May and 28 June of 2012.17 17
Regarding these protests see International Crisis Group 2012; Open Society Initiative 2012. 26
!
Feedback from traditional leaders and civil society during visits in the interior of the country. (The following section reviews some of these comments.)
Underlying these observations: Some parties in Guinea (political and otherwise) believe that the presidential elections have led to a “winner takes all” system. As one local official explained it, “the Guinean people interpret the political situation in the optic of history, in the optic of Touré, Conté, 2006-07 and 2009”. In the course of this evaluation, we found this sentiment widespread in Middle Guinea, a region which had heavily supported Cellou Dalein Diallo in the presidential election of 2010. Or, in the words of one senior diplomat, “To call a spade a spade, the Peuhl really feel they are being excluded”. It is not necessary, in the context of this evaluation, to express a definitive opinion on this point of view, and still less on broader questions of governance. The point at issue is the continued existence of strong tensions and the need, demonstrably not satisfied, for “inclusive and sustainable dialogue”. With respect to national reconciliation, there are similar indications. A “National Reflection Committee” was established in 2011, but up until now there is no clear work program and there are strong disagreements concerning, for example, the need for criminal prosecution.
4.1.2 Relevance of projects (i) Support to international mediation: IRF/19 ECOWAS requested President Compoaré of Burkina Faso to act as mediator following the “stadium massacre” of 28 September 2009. He remained engaged until the inauguration of President Condé in December 2010, in collaboration with the International Contact Group. This function was indispensable in managing strong tensions during the presidential election, with respect to the annulation of 900,000 votes by the Supreme Court; dispute of the results by the candidate in third position (Sidya Touré); and the replacement of the head of the electoral commission between the two rounds. These issues were resolved in a peaceful fashion after considerable effort. With respect to possible other sources of funding, bilateral partners described these types of operating expenses as “very tricky” to support, notwithstanding their small magnitude. The project remains open “in the framework of accompanying legislative elections to finalize the transition” (according to the annual report for 2011). However it is evident that there is currently nobody ready to play this role; ECOWAS has not been engaged since the inauguration and the International Contact Group was dissolved at the same time. (ii) Stabilization / support to a peaceful environment: GIN/H1, IRF/28 The fund recipient UNDP described the objective of these projects as the “stabilization” or
27
the support to a “framework conducive to a peaceful transition in Guinea”. The approach has focused on support to civil society actors, traditional leaders, media and political parties. One important group of activities supported the peaceful conduct of the presidential elections in 2010. These included, for example, information campaigns around the electoral process; the establishment of a common reporting system to combat rumors; the dissemination of the “code of good conduct” for political parties; and intensification of these efforts for 11 “hot spots” that experienced particularly high tension and in some cases inter-communal violence (see Section 2.3 above). These activities were generally well adapted to the context; the election was a probable conflict trigger given the recent history of popular demonstrations leading to violence and the limited capacity of the transitional government to manage these risks. There were other actors who supported these types of activities at the time (USAID, most notably), and a certain confusion between programmes was observable. However all things considered the PBF played a useful complementary role. Implementing partners explained at length the financial limitations on program rollout (across all donors), and these suggest there was hardly an excess of funding available. Since the elections, it is clear that activities have become more and more general. Some illustrative activities: ! Support to the National Council of Civil Society Organizations of Guinea to conduct research into local conflict resolution practices, and to develop eleven “thematic handbooks” which “compile all local conflict resolution practices as reference tools”. ! Workshops with WANEP / ACCORD to train non-state actors in the management of three types of conflict: land, agricultural, and tenancy. ! A draft “conflict mapping” which identifies 130 individual conflicts across four regions of Guinea. These are divided in six types: land, grazing/cultivation, grazing, political, religious, and environmental. Internal documents of the PBF Secretariat speak in this connection of the preparation of a “national strategy for conflict resolution” with the Office of the Prime Minister. (iii) Comment: There is a major gap at the national level. The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan strongly emphasized national political dialogue. Support to traditional leaders was anticipated “in the framework of national pacification”; support to civil society “to facilitate dialogue between the different national communities of Guinea”. The second Peacebuilding Priority Plan likewise includes a short conflict mapping which puts “political” conflicts in first place, and nearly everywhere in the country (at p17). The same document refers to a series of evaluations for PBF and PBC engagement which state that lack of political dialogue constitutes the “most immediate threat to peace”; 18 in other words, dialogue around the finalization of the transition and the exercise of public power in the See UN Technical Mission on Peace Consolidation (May 2011); Initial Mission by the Chair of the Guinea Configuration of the PBC (April 2011); Report of mission of the PBC in Guinea (March 2012), paras 5-6. 18
28
interim. We noted in Section 2 that we agree with this view in the present transitional context. It is striking, then, that there has not been much support to mechanisms for dialogue at national level. In effect, the project GIN/H-1 supported (i) training for some members of the National Transition Council and the Economic and Social Council; and (ii) the development and implementation of the Code of Good Conduct for political parties. Support to national reconciliation has likewise focused on consultations at regional level; activities at national level have comprised two study visits of councilors from the National Transition Council to countries in the region. “We have worked well at the base, but a single word at the summit can put everything in question”. There was a certain uniformity to our meetings with imams and community leaders in Labé and Mamou. All took pains to underline their dissatisfaction with the current state of national dialogue. “There are no problems here – the problems concern the liars, the political class”. Or a variation: “You must look at the highest levels … the discours incendiaire can throw all this money in the trash”. Evidently, there is a motivation to present their opinions in this way with a foreigner. During the presidential election of 2010, these regions massively supported Cellou Dalein Diallo, who ultimately lost. One has to expect a certain degree of politicization or even opportunism. Nonetheless, we heard a similar message from a wide spectrum of society: members of civil society, women’s organizations, and even local government officials. All were familiar with the “sensitization” efforts; and the workshops to improve conflict management. The quality of these efforts was not in question, but even implementing partners for PBF projects emphasized that one “risked treating the systems and not the fundamental causes”.
All things considered: It is far from clear that reinforcement of local capacities to manage land conflicts, or between grazers and cultivators, will address the tensions identified in the previous section. (Or in the words of the PBF’s Performance Management Plan: That this will address the “questions relating to conflict, instability and political participation” or “the implementation of peace accords”.19) For example, it appears that there are no efforts to: ! Build networks capable of influencing positively the political class at national level with respect to the “discours incendiaire”. ! Reinforce public confidence concerning “winners and losers” in the transition process, outside of the efforts that were linked specifically to the 2010 elections. In reaction to this finding, UN partners highlighted the lack of an enabling political framework for activities at national level. We accept that this is true; we have commented in Section 3.1 on the difficulty of establishing these “preconditions” in the particular circumstances of Guinea. Some areas, notably in Guinea Forestière, have historically experienced widespread tensions and could be potential exceptions. 19
29
"
Findings on relevance (Priority Area 1): IRF/19
Support to international mediation
High
GIN/H-1
Promotion of inclusive and sustainable dialogue in Guinea
Weak
IRF/28
Post-electoral accompaniment
Moderate
[Steering Committee / PBSO] Investigate the possibility of support to the PBC to reinforce forums for dialogue around the finalization of the transition.20Ensure that financial resources are kept in reserve for this purpose given its importance. [Steering Committee] Support the development of a system of “early warning” to help target priority areas for support during the parliamentary elections, and with regard to other triggers for political violence.
4.1.3 Effectiveness of projects Findings regarding the expected results set out in project documents:
#
Good progress
$
Mixed / uneven
!
Not demonstrated
GIN/H-1
!
Establishment of permanent mechanisms for dialogue and consultation across the country At local level: ! Outputs: Workshops at regional level with government officials on “dialogue and conflict resolution”. ! Impact: No mapping is available for local conflict management capacities and we were not able to identify strong/weak areas in a systematic way. For the localities visited, our interlocutors had not observed seen any structural changes with respect to conflict resolution (e.g. new mechanisms or the frequency of dialogue with stakeholders). ! Appropriation: Officials at this level appreciated the training and could identify some changes in personal competencies / behaviors. However, they indicated a lack of technical and financial support to apply the principles explained in the workshops and confirmed that the planned mechanisms had not yet been established. At national level: ! Outputs: Limited. In effect, training for some members of the National Transitional Council and the Economic and Social Council “on mechanisms for prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, and for results-based monitoring-evaluation of
Or another interested actor. Most notably, during the evaluation the OIF had started to involve itself in the subject. 20
30
!
!
projects and programs”.21 The project document anticipates revision of fundamental laws but after several requests to the partner it remains unclear whether this occurred. Impact: Interlocutors from political parties and civil society were clearly unhappy with the frameworks for dialogue and consultation in place; the tendency here has generally been negative (see Section 4.1.1). Comment: The “Code of Good Conduct” for political parties is well regarded at the technical level; a review exercise by the parties themselves after the Presidential elections has provided some useful data. At the same time it seems that this mechanism has not touched the higher organizational levels according to lists of participation and the reality of the “discours incendiaire” mentioned in Section 4.1.1.
#
Support to media to promote dialog during the transition period ! Outputs: Establishment of a Code of Good Conduct and periodic short-course / thematic trainings of journalists in Conakry. (The program reports suggest about forty participants per session.) The production of radio programs on pacific co-existence which were fairly well known and well regarded in the localities visited for the evaluation. ! Impact: There is presently no process for systematic monitoring of media, nor the level of respect of the code of good conduct. Our general impression – based on meetings in-country – is that there are not serious problems in terms of the access of political parties to media, or undue amplification of the “discours incendiaire”.22 ! Appropriation: There is no clear framework for reinforcement of national capacities in the absence of the Haut Autorité de la communication (2010 constitution, title X). ! Coherence: Several good practices, including support to common reporting during the elections (“Radio FM Guinée 2010”); coordination with the parallel efforts of RFI and the “maison de la presse” supported by France, the EU and the US.
!
Elaboration of a program for national reconciliation ! Outputs: Key products have been a report of implementing partner International Alert based on regional-level consultations; and study visits of some members of National Transitional Council to Ghana and Togo. ! Impact: A “Reflection Committee” was established by the Government in 2011 but has not yet established a clear work plan. There are strong disagreements between political parties and elements of civil society concerning the scope and objectives of the process. ! Appropriation: Many interlocutors underlined the lack of coherent support to the Reflection Committee; few had confidence in the mechanism. There is no significant funding for the process from the government side until now; it is not clear if/how it has utilized the report of International Alert.
21
See report, “Atelier de préparation de la retraite du PBF”, February 2011. Excepting a notorious incident in October 2010, during the Presidential elections. See e.g. Carter Center 2010, pp32-4. 22
31
$
Strengthening of local capacities for negotiation and mediation ! Outputs: The development of eleven “thematic handbooks compiling current conflict resolution practices at local level. The establishment of “resource centers” at regional level was in progress during the evaluation visit. A workshop of three days in each administrative region of Guinea which emphasized civil society and traditional leaders, reaching a total of ~2,300 participants. ! Impact: A “conflict mapping” has been developed by the Secretariat of the PBF, UNDP and the office of the Prime Minister. This document gives a general idea of localization of different types of conflict but cannot yet indicate relative severity nor local capacities for managing them. ! Appropriation: Traditional leaders and interlocutors from civil society at local level were not aware of the program, but this can perhaps be attributed to the fact that activities were still in progress at the time of visit. It is thus clearly too early to envisage an increase in the utilization of mechanisms for peaceful management of conflict, or increased client satisfaction.
IRF-19
#
Support to the facilitation of ECOWAS for free elections and peace consolidation ! Outputs: Logistic support from UNDP to daily functioning and movements of the mediator’s team; reimbursement of expenses. These activities were said to be well executed; it was not possible to verify all the details with partners some two years after the fact. ! Impact: See findings above. In brief, indispensable. ! Engagement of international partners: The project supported joint efforts of ECOWAS and the International Contact Group of key partners. The contribution to the momentum of this process was important.
IRF-28
$
The population is informed and sensitized to accept the results of the presidential elections !
!
!
Outputs: There were many elements to this program. “Sensitization” activities of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems with respect to the electoral process and the “peace caravans” at local level were well known and regarded as well-adapted to the needs between the two stages of the Presidential election. Impact: There has clearly been an increased awareness of risks at local level linked with the transition process, with one notable example the weekly sermons of many religious leaders during the elections that stressed the importance of a peaceful environment. This is partly attributable to the fear of recent history (2006-07, 2008, 2010) but we find that project activities have played a significant role. Good practice: The prioritization of eleven “hot spots” (priority areas of intervention)
32
!
!
which emerged during the election was an appropriate response to limited resources. By contrast, the main criticism must be the very wide diffusion of the program as explained in the following section. Appropriation: All activities were implemented by international partners as “emergency measures” with approval of the government at technical level. We stress that the situation will be similar for the next round of elections and it is essential to progressively enlarge the role of CENI and the National Directorate of Civic Education (see Section 4.2.2 below).
Questions regarding the promotion of women are integrated into the programs of parliamentary campaigns ! Outputs: The current status of these activities was not clear. The outputs mentioned in the reports do not correspond to those set out in the project document. It seems that funds have been used to support the retroactive prise en charge of an expert and the “validation of a joint program on female leadership”. ! It seems that aspects regarding the political parties (e.g. round table exercises) have been dropped, along with the “finalization of a national policy on gender-based violence”.
Additional findings (i)
Evaluation of impact has been very weak.
To illustrate, consider the project document GIN/H-1(evaluator’s translation): Result 1.1: “Creation of a permanent framework for dialogue and consultation”. The indicator is “spaces for dialogue on priorities of the transition are established and reinforced in the country”. The means of verification: “reports of activities of permanent frameworks for dialogue and consultation”. Result 1.2: “Support to media for dialogue and the transition”. The indicator is that “media promote dialogue and apaisement”; the means of verification a “review of newspapers and radio programs”.
These engagements are not perfectly formulated, but the essentials are there. The problem is rather that there are no concrete arrangements for following up, nor a budget. If we take the second example above, the main implementing partner Search for Common Ground indicated that they could use methodologies for media monitoring developed in other countries. But, until now, this has not been requested or budgeted under GIN/H-1. The gap is still more evident at the strategic level. We have noted that there is a high level of tension at the present, and the upcoming parliamentary elections (or their further postponement) will be the critical test of effectiveness of mechanisms for dialogue. Given the generally decentralized approach of projects so far, it is surprising that there is no systematic cartography of risks linked to elections which could assist in targeting projects supported by PBF and by other actors.
33
There is, as a starting point, the list of “hot spots” that was utilized during the Presidential elections to orient emergency “sensitization” measures. On this point we defer to a civil society partner: “The ‘hot spots’ depend on who’s in government and the occasion … Upper Guinea may be peaceful today because they think they are ahead, but this has certainly not always been the case.” And another: “these programs have been opportunistic, and not in a good way … it is critical to develop more strategic approaches”. When we mentioned this feedback to program managers at UNDP, they mentioned a concept of “early warning” that would aim to capitalize on the networks developed in the course of projects implemented to day. We strongly encourage the further development of this approach. (ii)
Project resources have been dispersed too widely.
The projects GIN/H-1 and IRF/28 are implemented at a very large geographic scale. In effect both target “all the administrative regions and Conakry”, excepting only a part of the project IRF/28 which targeted the above-mentioned “hot spots”. To give an idea of the implications: Budgeting of projects H-1 and IRF-28 (USD) Project PBF/H-1 IRF/28
Budget national
by region (8)
by prefecture (34)
per person (10,6m)
1.128.100
141.012
4.147
0.11
281.763
35.220
1.036
0.03
These are rough estimations, but they illustrate the point.23 Moreover, one must also adjust for the timeframe. If we look at the electoral period: one considers at a minimum 36 months, from January 2010 to end 2012. If we look at the whole “transition period” – the usual formulation in the project documents – these resources must cover a considerably longer timeframe. We ask ourselves if the PBF’s engagements, in terms of money and staff time, are adequate to support objectives at this sort of scale. As one partner noted: “We are the firefighters, but we also know that there is an electoral cycle. After the parliamentary elections, there will be communal elections. After that, economic adjustments, and then the next Presidential elections”.
*
[Steering Committee and partners] Avoid developing projects at national scale that do not respond to risk criteria (or “early warning”). [Steering Committee] For zones judged to be at high risk: Establish clearer benchmarks regarding the desired capacities for local conflict management.
Numbers are approximate as project documents do not indicate budgets at the level of expected outcomes. The error over-estimates the amounts available as they include some activities that are only at the national level. 23
34
4.2 Human rights, citizenship, security, justice Supporting projects: GIN/B-1 Priority support to justice and security in Guinea IRF-20 Urgent support to the Special Force for Security of the Electoral Process GIN/B-2 Promotion of civic education and the culture of peace TOTAL
$1,71m $1,81m $0,35m $3,87m
Links to Performance Management Plan: Result 1.1 National armed forces and police exercise their functions in zones affected by conflict and respond to security concerns of the population. Result 1.2 Communities have recourse to systems of transitional justice to resolve conflicts and differences without recourse to violence, ensuring in particular respect for the human rights of women and girls.
4.2.1 Situation analysis Priority Area 1 concerned governance in a general sense. Priority Area 2 concerns the functions of the state that have been the most problematic. In first place here is the security sector. To sketch the broad lines, we cite the International Commission of Inquiry that was dispatched to establish the facts around the “stadium massacre” of September 2009 (Commission d’enquête internationale 2009, para 259): Le peuple guinéen n’a pas cessé de subir des coups d’état accompagnés par des atteintes graves et répétées aux droits de l’homme. L’outil qui permet cette situation est bien l’existence d’une armée aux facettes très particulières en Guinée, alors que la répétition des violations des droits de l’homme découle, elle, d’une impunité quasi institutionnalisée. Ce sont ces deux phénomènes, une armée atypique et une impunité organisée, qui constituent les véritables et profondes déficiences du système politique guinéen … On ne saisira pas assez le rôle de celles-ci dans la vie politique du pays tant que l’on ne se prendra pas en considération le fait que l’armée guinéenne est aujourd’hui composée de clans et de coteries qui taisent mal leurs rivalités.
This is a severe diagnostic, made about four months after the approval of the first Peacebuilding Priority Plan and which remains useful to understand the situation. We underline three aspects: (i) “An atypical army”: The evaluation mission of ECOWAS in 2010 stated simply that “legal arrangements are not applied, or not managed democratically”. It is key to recognize also the importance of internal divisions, including ethnic divisions. As some interlocutors pointed out, “the CNDD crumbled in large part under the pressure of competition between different factions”. (ii) “Organized impunity”: Apart from the incidents well known internationally - September
35
2009, January 2007, February 1996 –the National Days of Dialogue in 2008 highlighted “the poor perception of the Defense and Security Forces by the population due to exactions committed by uncontrolled elements”. The evaluation visit was marked, for example, by widespread controversy over a homicide at Mamou. (iii) “Financial weight”: The Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2011-12 estimated that the defense sector consumed 37% of the national budget, and stated that “the government’s principal objective is to gradually and steadily reduce military spending in order to bring it within reasonable proportions.” Today, it is important to acknowledge that security is widely considered one of the principal “dividends of the transition”. By way of example, an evaluation mission for the PBF project to support retirement of 4,200 soldiers in March 2012 concluded that “national actors from all sectors of the society met by the mission, political, religious, and institutional or from the civil society, were unanimous in recognizing that SSR was an area where dynamics were constructive and progress notable”. In the course of this evaluation we heard frequently about: ! The demilitarization of Conakry, notably the removal of some heavy weapons and soldiers, and the reduction of controls on civilian movement. ! The peaceful management of unrest since the Presidential election. Many interlocutors mentioned by way of example a large protest in Conakry in may 2012, slightly before the evaluation visit. This led to injuries to twenty gendarmes due to (a) the confinement of the army to their garrisons, and (b) the refusal to employ firearms. This is not trivial in the context of recent Guinean history. ! Strong national appropriation of the reform process: notably the establishment of the National Steering Committee, the personal engagement of the President, the identification and successful launch of the first “quick start” projects (with the support of the PBF), and the significant financial and other contributions from the government side. Comment: the justice sector
One frequently finds in the project documents the phrase “74% of Guineans do not have confidence in judicial institutions” (taken from the Limited Poverty Assessment Survey of 2007). One can equally regard general indicators for rule of law, as cited in Section 2.1. However: this figure of 26% is not far from normal for a developing country. Depending on the formulation of the question, one finds very similar numbers close by in the region (AfroBarometer 2008a, 2008b), or for that matter in middle-income countries (World Values Survey Association 2009; Inglehart et al 2004).24 It is thus essential to approach this sector For example: 21% of the population in Mali are "very confident" in judicial institutions and 21% "somewhat confident": AfroBarometer 2008b. The corresponding figures in Nigeria are 10% and 30%. 24
36
from the perspective of the specific mandate of the PBF: interventions must anticipate a “direct and positive impact on the sustainability of the peacebuilding process” or, following the PMP of the PBF, “transitional justice to resolve conflicts / differences without recourse to violence”. We return to this point in the following section.
4.2.2 Relevance of projects (i)
Development of reform plan for the security sector: GIN/B-1
Here one can say simply: the objective is well defined and also very relevant. Interlocutors at national level were in agreement that the UN has capitalized on a favorable political environment, in which they key factors have been: ! A prise de conscience in the aftermath of the events of 28 September 2009, and the work of the International Commission of Enquiry. ! The prioritization of SSR in the Ouagadougou Accords of 2010. ! The joint ECOWAS-AU-UN evaluation in 2010. In this context, many diplomats and high-ranking Guinean officials remarked that “nobody else could have played this role of accompaniment”. This has not been a question of the amount of money but rather the appropriate role of a bilateral partner in Guinea, and the budget lines that are available to them in a transitional context. We heard many similar comments for the “quick start” projects launched at the end of 2011 with PBF support, to the effect that “some concrete steps were indispensable to guard the momentum of the process” with both the government and the population. (ii)
Support to the justice sector: GIN/B-1
Given the general state of this sector, the priorities that were chosen made sense on paper. These included: ! Establishment of an independent national institution for human rights, as foreseen in the new constitution of 2010. ! Support to organization of sessions of the cours d’assises to “return criminal justice to work”. These institutions had been practically suspended under the CNDD regime. ! “Structures to support the effective follow-up of the conclusions of the International Commission of Inquiry” [regarding the events of September 2009, with specific reference to gender-based violence. These activities addressed real priorities in the transitional period, perhaps urgent priorities. But at the same time: the project was developed under the CNDD regime, which did not have the necessary legitimacy for this work. The project document itself observes: (i) the importance of “establishing an agreed diagnostic of security in Guinea”; (ii) “the gaps between the priorities of the authorities and the activities retained”; and (iii) “the lack of support of the authorities to the creation of the CNIDH [the human rights institution]”. In these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that the workplan was realistic. Moreover, there is
37
considerable donor interest in the sector, but little progress towards the development of a sectoral framework to solicit and organize bilateral support. (ii)
Support to security forces during the elections: IRF/20
We have already noted that there were no serious incidents of violence during the presidential elections, but it is always difficult to project the counterfactual. At the time: (i) the course of the electoral process was unpredictable after the public turbulence of 2006-08, and (ii) the weakness of security forces to peacefully manage tensions was a known problem. In consequence: The escalation of electoral conflicts was obviously a potential conflict trigger, and likewise an appropriate area of support. The Force Spéciale de Sécurisation du Processus Electoral (FOSSEPEL) was created by decree on 18 May 2010; it was comprised of police and gendarmes in equal numbers and under the responsibility of the Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante. The support was organized in the larger framework of support from the International Contact Group to the elections, which regarded FOSSEPEL as the most viable choice available and contributed 50% of the financing for the project.25 (iv) Civic education and the culture of peace: GIN/B-2
Section 2 noted that the 2010 were elections were generally regarded as the “first open and democratic elections” in the country’s history. And outside of the democratic transition there is also a history of ethnic and regional divisions which were sometimes cultivated by the regime in power. Despite the existence of a formal curriculum for civic education then, many interlocutors commented that “Guineans do not understand their history in the same way”. Civic education is thus clearly pertinent to the needs of the country. The problematic aspect is the choice of activities. According to an implementing partner, GIN/B-2 is a “project of accompaniment” or an alternative delivery mechanism for messages similar to those encompassed under Priority Area 1. The revision of the formal curriculum is not an expected result; the products are rather “peace alliances” at the level of administrative regions and “peace clubs” installed in 15 schools (which do not always correspond to the “hot spots” identified under Priority Area 1). Government partners in target localities clarified, for example, that the initiative concerned “peace pure and simple” and did not encompass standardized instruction material. In these circumstances: useful links have been made with the Ministry of Pre-University Education but it is difficult to identify the value added of the approach. Specifically: ! Conflict triggers. Measures at field level have not addressed the factors identified as particular risks for youth: the electoral process and instrumentalization by political parties (see Section 4.3); the “discours incendiaire” which has marked the transition period (see Section 4.1). ! Structural causes: The project does not comprise preparatory work to facilitate the 25
The other partners were the European Union, the United States, and France. 38
necessary political dialogue for revision of the civic education curriculum.
"
Findings on relevance (Priority Area 2): GIN/B-1
*
Priority support to justice and security in Guinea
High
(with respect to the justice sector)
Weak
IRF-20
Urgent support to the Special Force for Security of the Electoral Process
High
GIN/B-2
Promotion of civic education and the culture of peace
Weak
[PBSO / Steering Committee] Insist on a clearer political framework as precondition for activities in the areas of justice and civic education.
4.2.3 Effectiveness of projects Findings regarding the expected results set out in project documents:
#
Good progress
$
Mixed / uneven
!
Not demonstrated
GIN/B-1
$
Reform of the security sector is launched in a consensual and defined framework ! Outputs: Technical support for development of a draft reform plan (in course of budgeting at the time of the evaluation). Facilitation of dialogue within government; and between government and bilateral partners. ! Impact: Security sector reform is the cause célèbre of international efforts in Guinea. National appropriation of the process is strong at the level of national Steering Committee and the President. These efforts have permitted identification and launch of “quick-start” projects for the second phase of support, which have effectively kept up the momentum of the process. ! Catalytic effects: The current framework is generally regarded as a “shopping list” in need of prioritization to reflect the limited period of intervention (2011-15). There is a great deal of interest on the part of bilateral partners but up until now few concrete financial engagements (see the following section).
!
The judicial system is reinforced and instruments for the protect and promotion of human rights are in place. ! Outputs: In general the availability of data for this result was extremely poor. The project encompassed support to recommence the cours d’assises at Conakry and Kankan for the large backlog of criminal cases. Some equipment has been provided to the Government but the partner UNDP was unable to verify if the planned sessions of the courts had actually occurred. ! The independent national institution for human rights that is foreseen in the 2010 constitution is not in place; it is not clear if there is a timetable or program of work in place. The reports of the partner observe instead “the sensitization of the public with
39
regard to respect of human rights during periods of crisis”.
IRF/20
#
Logistical support is provided to the Force Spéciale de Sécurisation du Processus Electoral to assure citizens appropriate security and a peaceful climate during the elections. ! Outputs: Support included transport equipment, payment of per diems to 7,500 elements and operational expenses. This made sense in mid-2010 as an emergency measure but it will be necessary to revisit the question for the parliamentary elections more than two years on. We also note some reports that FOSSEPEL did not receive the non-lethal equipment foreseen in the project contract. ! Impact: There were no major incidents of violence during the presidential elections outside the incidents already mentioned in Section 2. These incidents were not of very large scale albeit with some allegations that FOSSEPEL did not react adequately.26
$
A system for the security of elections which conforms to universal standards for human rights is put in place ! Outputs: Training of 360 officers of FOSSEPEL; training of about 900 civil society observers to complement the international observation missions. ! Impact: There was little analysis or reporting available from the partner with regard to conduct of FOSSEPEL. In general, reports of the European Union, the Carter center and Guinean observers suggest that there were few cases of improper influence, and our interlocutors characterized the force as “more or less OK” in this regard. (And in particular FOSSEPEL was not regarded as a factor in the severe procedural problems that marred the first stage of the presidential elections.)
GIN/B-2
$
26
Formulation and implementation of a program of information, education and communication viz. the culture of peace and human rights ! Outputs: A programme d’urgence comprising “peace clubs” in 15 schools and the development of a radio series. ! Impact: Implementing partners explained that there was no formal program or common materials for the “peace clubs”; these concerned “the peace, pure and simple”. There do not appear to be structural changes with regard to the program of instruction or school organization; it seems that the program was an exceptional initiative linked to the exceptional availability of resources. ! Appropriation: The Ministry of Pre-University Education agreed that the enlargement of the program could only be met by revision of the existing curriculum. In the absence of common approaches at the level of the “peace clubs” it is not clear that one has advanced towards that objective. ! Good practice: With respect to the radio series. The level of diffusion of this series
See Carter Center 2010; Union Européen 2011, p47. 40
was not clear, but its development was driven by the national partner and well executed at a technical level. It will be a useful resource in the future.
!
Training of youth, women and adults viz. citizenship before, during and after the elections. ! Outputs: Workshops based on a “training of trainers” module developed by the National Directorate of Civic Education, targeting a total of 480 participants for the seven administrative regions and Conakry. The expected output was the establishment of “peace alliances” at regional level, and follow-up workshops at prefectural level. ! Impact: There were perhaps changes to individual perspectives and competencies of the participants, but the concrete activities of the “peace alliances” remain opaque. In the region of Labé we did not find the expected “action plan”; government officials and civil society interlocutors could not identify initiatives linked with the project. For the prefecture of Pita it appears that the follow-up workshop did not take place.
!
Sensitization of the population viz. the electoral process, the importance of civil / legal status, the national identity card. ! Outputs: We were unable to obtain much information regarding this result. Specifically, no data was available regarding the uptake rate for the national identity card or other civil documents.
Additional findings We add two further observations with regard to reform of the security sector. (i)
There have been substantial results in respect of national appropriation.
Outside of program outcomes – the development of the draft action plan and the “quick start projects” – we find that governance has improved at sectoral level. These changes cannot be straightforwardly attributed to UN support, but many interlocutors highlighted the importance of the GIN/B-2 project in facilitating dialogue concerning the key questions (in particular, between the different parts of the government). Specifically we mention here: ! The strong role of General Lamine Cissé, the ECOWAS representative for the joint evaluation in 2010. ! The biweekly meetings with technical and financial partners, which have become an effective form for the sharing of information. ! Work at technical level for which “the critical importance was to encourage further efforts”, according to military interlocutors. The evaluation mission for the project “retirement of 4,200 soldiers” also stressed the increased dynamism in the sector. (ii)
“Catalytic effects” with respect to bilateral partners have been limited.
There is a high level of interest from bilateral partners in assistance in the security sector. The mapping exercise of the PBC Working Group on Lessons Learned in June 2012 indicated projects under consideration at USD 70.67m. At the same time, we note that USD 54.3m of
41
this amount is projected. And if one removes the PBF contribution, the total that is actually programmed is USD 6.1m. In other words: At the time of the evaluation, bilateral partners had not yet committed much. The central preoccupation was well-stated by the evaluation mission for the project “retirement of 4,200 soldiers” in March 2012: [para 39] A strategic vision is essential to guide the technical programmes to ensure a logical flow towards true reform. The secondment of a UN Senior SSR Adviser and his small team to Guinean authorities will help alleviate the strategic issues highlighted above. Strategic advice is more than ever indispensable to push forward the SSR process in Guinea in a balanced way.
The criticisms noted above of a “shopping list” are of the same type: the need to reduce the rather general evaluation of ECOWAS to practical dimensions. Underneath this, we heard about several specific factors: ! The strong perception of a chasse gardee (“private hunt”). According to this point of view, coordination mechanisms are used primarily for information-sharing, and UN support relied too heavily on bilateral conversation with the government to have gained the buy-in of other partners. ! According to many interlocutors, “communication and process management have been a major problem”. They mentioned documents circulated late, the absence of an agenda for meetings at ambassadorial level, and other organizational problems of the same type. ! From the government side: There are some frustrations over the utilization of shortterm consultants, who have employed different methodologies. Foreign experts were in agreement, and several remarked that engagements for one or two months “were not serious” at this critical point in the reform process.
*
[Steering Committee] Prioritize the reinforcement of the multilateral process in the security sector; specifically with experts in the political and coordination aspects who can accompany the process in the medium term.
4.3 Roles of youth and women Supporting projects: GIN/A-2 Support to youth movements and to certain disenfranchised groups IRF/26 Socio-economic reintegration of children recruited irregularly into the armed forces, and other vulnerable children GIN/A-1 Support to female movements and reinforcement of womens’ capacities for conflict prevention27 TOTAL
$1,65m $0,65m $3,00m $5,30m
Links to Performance Management Plan: Result 1.1 Women assume – in a formal sense – leadership functions and responsibilities in 27
We have excluded GIN/A-1 from our formal findings: see Section 1.2 on scope. 42
Result 3.1
relevant areas to permit the reinforcement of the peace. Youth, women and other groups affected by the conflict can access employment opportunities in the labor market, as peace dividends.
4.3.1 Situation analysis “Instrumentalization” was a leitmotif of this evaluation. Many interlocutors spoke of the disproportionate role played by youth during recent episodes of instability, and most notably (see Section 2.3): ! The protests and violence of 2004 and 2006-07, and more recent demonstrations such as those in Conakry through the first half of 2012. ! The inter-communal violence between the two stages of the presidential election in 2010. This was attributed to political parties, local notables, or both at once. These preoccupations are common in countries in unstable situations. One has to look no further than the 2011 World Development Report, which observed (at p79): In surveys for this Report in areas affected by violence, unemployment and idleness was cited as the most important factor motivating young people to join rebel movements. The issue was also raised as important in every WDR consultation.
We can equally cite the mid-term evaluation of the UNDAF for 2007-11 which commented, in reference to the political situation, “that the slightest spark would be sufficient to ignite the powder” (p26), and that the situation of youth “constitutes a veritable time bomb for the country” (p33). The logic can be easily summarized. First: Guinea has a young population which is growing rapidly. The estimated population growth rate is 3.1%: the percentage below 25 years is about 60%. Second: The economy has not been sufficiently strong in the last decade to absorb this type of growth. In Section 2, we noted that average GDP growth during this period was 1%. And the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) for 2011-12 estimates the rate of poverty and food insecurity for the eight regions of Guinea as follows:
Food insecurity Poverty
Conakry 6.4
Mamou 31.3
Labé 30
Boké 11.5
Faranah 24.7
Kankan 23.6
26.3
50.1
51
52
53
58.7
Kindia Nzérékore 27.3 52.7 64.1
64.3
The threats to peace? As at now, there is no clear framework for action in this sector despite several drafts and propositions formulated over the last three years. To illustrate, the PRS for 2011-12 proposes weakly “the organization of training seminars for 200 youths on job-seeking techniques” and “sessions for dialogue on youth employment”. And after three years of engagement of the PBF, the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan highlighted in June 2011 the “lack of policy or
43
adequate strategies, having regard to the superficial knowledge of the subject” (p29). We wish to emphasize the second point in particular. The numbers noted above imply an enormous quantity of under-occupied youth: according to Ministry of Planning estimates mentioned in program documents, there are 200,000 new entrants into the labor market each year. But the links between this demographic reality and the phenomena of political and inter-communal violence are far from clear. The first Peacebuilding Priority Plan states, for example, that “this unoccupied youth, often without training or qualifications, finds itself sought after by opinion leaders of all tendencies, who are ready to instrumentalize them” (at p12). The problem is that this proposition is far from generally accepted in post-conflict / unstable contexts. We cite by way of example a recent literature review (Cramer 2010, p24): There is no remotely convincing evidence at the cross-country, large-N level, at the quantitative case study level, or at the ethnographic, ‘qualitative’ level, for any bold claims that unemployment is a mechanistic causal factor in violent conflicts in developing countries. The evidence on youth unemployment is even weaker.
This is perhaps too strong but the point remains: links are possible but it is indispensable to understand how they work in the specific circumstances of Guinea. The National Days of Dialogue in 2008 evoked the “need for inter-generational dialogue”, but we have found very little analysis in the available documents of the access of youth to the socio and political spheres. One could suggest, based on experiences in other countries:28 ! The modalities of “recruitment” by political parties and traditional leaders, including the motivations for youth participation (financial, ideological, potential access to public office). ! The possibilities of attaining “adult” status as traditionally defined in the prevailing context. ! Urban migration and its effects for traditional mechanisms of social support. ! The specific difficulties of youth in the labor market.
4.3.2 Relevance of projects (i)
Improvement of the socio-economic circumstances of “the most disenfranchised groups”: GIN/A-2, IRF/26
In practice, PBF-supported projects have used two approaches: The quartiers défavorises. UNIDO’s component of the project GIN/A-2 states: “During the various events that Guinea has recently experienced, several quartiers at high risk have been identified”, including the so-called axe du mal of Conakry. This led to the ambition to “direct these youth towards productive revenue-generating activities”.
See e.g. Bennett, Karki and Nepal (2012) with respect to Nepal; Sommers and Schwartz (2011) for South Sudan; Sommers and Uvin (2011) for Rwanda and Burundi. 28
44
Former combatants. The project IRF/26 of UNICEF/WFP targeted a total of 1,200 youth irregularly recruited under the CNDD regime, and another 800 “marginalized” youth. The logic: These youth were recruited by CNDD factions in anticipation of clashes during the electoral period. This was done with the aid of community leaders and, in some cases, the remnants of Liberian armed groups, for “the defense of their community or ethnic group”. It is not difficult to imagine that the same characters could repeat the process in view of upcoming parliamentary elections or other political controversies, notwithstanding that the army would not now support the effort. It is evident that these groups are at higher risk. Our principal concern is the feasible scale of action for the PBF. In particular, the project of UNIDO supported the creation of 550 permanent jobs according to the partner’s estimates. This must be contrasted with the demographic realities. According to the Ministry of Planning’s estimates that we noted above, there were 600,000 new entrants into the labor market during the life of the project. Or another perspective: A WFP study in 2009 estimated that 103,000 persons live in food insecurity in the peripheral areas of Conakry, and that 35% of families live with one meal per day. The UNICEF/PAM project concerns an obvious example of a more limited / better defined group, and probably one at more elevated risk. At the same time, it illustrates the limits of the approach. There is no reason to think that community leaders could not find other candidates for recruitment, even if the project was executed 100% successfully. (To start with, the CNDD also irregularly recruited a large number of adults under the same initiative.) The resources are simply not available to directly lift all potential candidates off the recruitment market. Everything considered, it is far from sure that direct service delivery is the best utilization of the PBF’s scarce resources given the policy gap identified in the previous section. To indicate the differences in comparative advantage it is enough to review the just-approved filets sociaux project of the World Bank to reduce tensions during the next five years, which targets more than 20,000 families at a budget of USD 25m. (ii)
The socio-political role of youth: GIN/A-2
The locus of intervention for this project has been the “youth associations”: a general term covering the small and medium-size youth groups one finds nearly everywhere in Guinea. These groups serve diverse functions but have often aided political/ethnic actors (depending on the case) to mobilize youth supporters at local level. Project activities envisaged “the reinforcement of volunteerism and leadership of youth in difficult situations” and “the responsibilization and effective involvement of youth to reduce the level of violence and consolidate peace in target localities” (according to the implementing partner Search for Common Ground). One understands the hope. But there has been little analysis of the links between these
45
associations, political parties and/or community leaders during the incidents of violence mentioned in the project document. For example: the project report for 2011 notes that associations that had been affiliated with political parties or specific ethnic groups were excluded from consideration: the selection of participants by the Ministry of Youth prioritized the groups which already had formal links with the government. It is not clear how work with this target group is expected to diffuse to other associations that are known to have been involved with political violence. In this connection it is important to look at the question of scale. There were 260 direct beneficiaries in 11 localities. To give a concrete example, in the region of Mamou, about 20 youth were selected. The Ministry of Youth indicated that “we have chosen the most dynamic associations, and the most dynamic youth within those associations”. This process included 10 of about 70 associations in the locality and excluded, for example, those based outside the town. Findings:
We re-emphasize the need for a more strategic approach. The first meetings of the thematic group established to support the Technical Committee / Steering Committee occurred just prior to the evaluation visit in May 2012. It is disturbing that they concerned almost exclusively the familiarization of government partners with the projects already underway (since 2010). There has, in other words, been little progress until now to develop a common diagnostic to facilitate the engagement of other actors. We also hazard to make the same observation in respect of the PMP of the PBF. The current formulation of Result 3.1 – “employment opportunities” as “peace dividends” – seems at once too restrictive (with respect to socio-political factors) and too ambitious (with respect to PBF/UN comparative advantages). Relevance of projects (Priority Area 3):
*
GIN/A-2
Support to youth movements and to certain disenfranchised groups
Weak
IRF/26
Socio-economic reintegration of children recruited irregularly into the armed forces, and other vulnerable children
Moderate
[Steering Committee] Prioritize the development of a medium-term framework for the economic situation of youth. Avoid service delivery except on a pilot / proof-of-concept basis. [Steering Committee] For localities which have experienced political violence, research the perceptions of youth on participation in political and economic life, including how interactions with “spoilers” in the past have functioned. [PBSO] Consider revising the PMP to reflect the socio-political dimension of the roles of youth and women.
46
4.3.3 Effectiveness of projects Findings regarding the expected results set out in project documents:
#
Good progress
$
Mixed / uneven
!
Not demonstrated
GIN/A-1
$
Support to “occupation” of youth and the creation of youth enterprises !
!
!
$
Strengthening of volunteerism and leadership of youth in difficult situations !
!
!
!
$
Outputs: Creation of 13 small enterprises and about 160 permanent jobs, with perhaps 500 indirect beneficiaries. Micro-grants to 16 groups supporting creation of 400 permanent jobs according to estimates of recipient agency (this is a one-off and not a revolving facility). Six “communication hubs” were planned but not delivered. Impact: Little analysis on the links between participation in the project and involvement with political agitation / violence, or conflict with the law. (For example: the frequent demonstrations during the first half of 2012.) Our interlocutors at the political level and from civil society had not observed changes viz. mobilization of youth in Conakry and were not familiar with the project. Appropriation: The Ministry of Youth has been strongly critical of their level of involvement at design and launch. We regard this as a serious problem given the pressing need to develop sectoral policy and viable pilot approaches.
Outputs: Training in “peace and conflict resolution” for 260 youth and 35 adult “mentors”; 11 localities judged at high risk based on “high levels of violence involving youth” from 2006 to 2011. The Ministry of Youth was happy with the project at a technical level and identified some concrete cases of improved behavior for the “youth associations” involved with the project. Little information was available regarding the specific results set out in the project document: the development of socio-economic cases; vaccination campaigns; registration of births; sporting competitions; and involvement in emergencies. Impact: For the localities visited during the evaluation, the participating associations comprised 10-20% of the total. Local government officials (outside of the Ministry of Youth) were not able to identify changes in relations with youth associations in a general sense. Civil society emphasized that political “instrumentalization” is a continuing practice. Appropriation: It seems that the “forms for exchange” with authorities immediately following the training programs have not been repeated. In the localities visited we did not find structural changes in terms of the mechanisms for consultation with youth, or how youth associations were organized.
Youth associations are mobilized for active participation in peace consolidation. !
Outputs: Project reports highlight “930 sensitization activities” led by youth; and several “peace festivals” that involved some 6,180 participants.
47
!
!
The partner also produced 90 radio programs. There is no systematic data on diffusion / listenership but most interlocutors in Conakry and in Middle Guinea knew of the programs and felt they were well adapted to context. Impact: Visits in the interior suggested that effectiveness has diminished with the passage of time. According to many participants, sensitization activities ended along with the micro-grants provided for this purpose in 2011.
IRF/26
$
Socio-economic reintegration of youth in high risk situations in Guinea Forestière and Conakry. ! Outputs: Ongoing activities targeting 1,200 children who were irregularly recruited into the armed forces; plus 800 others judged at high risk. The retention rates for the individual activities (professional training; secondary schooling; basic psychological rehabilitation) are strong. ! Impact: Planned indicators regarding the implication of youth in community conflicts, and conflicts with the law, have not been reported up until now. In general, we observe that there has been little political violence in targeted localities (see Section 2).
Additional findings (i)
There is little clarity on what results are expected.
To illustrate: We already mentioned the project GIN/A-2 in Section 3.3 on monitoring and evaluation. The project document does not identify indicators for the results “reinforcement of volunteerism and leadership of youth in difficult situations”, or “youth associations are mobilized to participate actively in peace consolidation”. In other words, there is a gap between the level of activities (“number of youth trained”) and the objective (“improvement of the participation of youth in the transition process”). Consequently: It is difficult to draw many conclusions at this level. It is not clear if “volunteerism” and “the promotion of non-violence” have satisfied the aspirations of youth in terms of their political / economic / social participation. An internal evaluation of the implementing partner Search for Common Ground asserted three important results:29 ! “They feel important and valued within their communities.” ! “The authorities begin to regard the youth differently.” ! “A community leader explained that youth who had participated were less vulnerable to political manipulation.” But ultimately, there are no clear expectations nor an evaluation framework for these results: interactions between youth and traditional authorities, the government, and with other groups. 29
Annexed to project report of UNICEF for 2011.
48
In the localities visited for this evaluation, for this example, the Ministry of Youth knew the program. But higher-level officials – prefects, governors – said that they were unaware of efforts and could not identify significant changes with regard to youth engagement. Traditional leaders, likewise, said that they were happy with existing mechanisms. And in practice, the government partner could not identify “structural” changes – regarding, for example, the proportion of youth associations which had lodged charters / plans, the content of these documents, or the modalities of interactions with political parties. This suggests a problem similar to that raised for the project GIN/H-2 above (Section 4.1.3): the lack of coherent policy and processes at local level to capitalize on an increased level of interest from youth in political participation. In this context, one interesting initiative has been the use of “mentors” – adults who assisted to establish links between youth associations, the government and other local actors. This experience could provide some useful perspectives for the development of approaches in the future. (ii)
It is necessary to limit direct support to the genuinely urgent cases.
We recap: ! The project of UNICEF/WFP for socio-economic reintegration cost about USD 3m, or 25% of the funds of the first phase, for a total 2,000 youth ($1,500 per head). ! UNIDO indicated a range of USD 1000 to 1,973 for creation of one permanent job, depending on the micro-project. In more rudimentary fashion, it is a project budgeted at USD 1m which created about 550 permanent jobs, near the top end of this range. The interventions so far are not pilot projects: the partner ministry indicated that it has no plans to scale up the approaches. We thus repeat a commentary from Section 4.1: given the limited availability of resources, and the mandate of the PBF, it is critical to justify on a case by case basis whether a given group/ area can warrant this level of support.
*
[UNICEF and partners] Review the project GIN/A-2 to identify good practices and more specific benchmarks with regard to links between youth associations, the government and the traditional authorities at local level. [Steering Committee] Based on the analysis of risk suggested in Section 4.1.2, orient support to mechanisms for dialogue with youth in those localities which are particularly sensitive, and avoid programs of national scale.
49
5. Summary of recommendations This chapter summarizes the recommendations made in this evaluation, in the hope of providing concrete orientations for the second phase of PBF engagement. We group these under three headings that emerged as the most pertinent themes throughout this evaluation.
More strategic targeting of work 3.3
[Steering Committee / PBSO] For individual projects, insist on the definition of a list of realistic indicators and a budgeted process to monitor them, including an end-of-project evaluation. [Steering Committee / PBSO] Ensure that periodic project reports are written in reference to the results framework set out in the project document. [PBSO] Set clear expectations regarding evaluation at the strategic level, and reporting at the level of Priority Areas and the portfolio as a whole. Support the transfer of good practices from other PBF countries in this regard.
4.1.2
[Steering Committee] Support the development of a system of “early warning” to help target priority areas for support during the parliamentary elections, and with regard to other triggers for political violence.
4.1.3
[Steering Committee and partners] Avoid developing projects at national scale that do not respond to risk criteria (or “early warning”). [Steering Committee] For zones judged to be at high risk: Establish clearer benchmarks regarding the desired capacities for local conflict management.
4.3.2
[Steering Committee] For localities which have experienced political violence, research the perceptions of youth on participation in political and economic life, including how interactions with “spoilers” in the past have functioned. [PBSO] Consider revising the PMP to reflect the socio-political dimension of the roles of youth and women.
4.3.3
[UNICEF and partners] Review the project GIN/A-2 to identify good practices and more specific benchmarks with regard to links between youth associations, the government and the traditional authorities at local level. [Steering Committee] Based on the analysis of risk suggested in Section 4.1.2, orient support to mechanisms for dialogue with youth in those localities which are particularly sensitive, and avoid programs of national scale.
50
Multilateralization of efforts 3.1
[PBSO] Support the transfer of experiences from other PBF countries regarding the management of the Steering Committee. Given the urgency, we recommend recruitment of at least one international staff with direct experience in this domain.
4.2.3
[Steering Committee] Prioritize the reinforcement of the multilateral process in the security sector; specifically with experts in the political and coordination aspects who can accompany the process in the medium term.
4.3.2
[Steering Committee] Prioritize the development of a medium-term framework for the economic situation of youth. Avoid service delivery except on a pilot / proof-of-concept basis.
Political frameworks for the priority areas 3.1
[PBSO] Given the sensitive nature of the priorities in the second Peacebuilding Priority Plan, avoid identifying political conditions as “risks” or “hypotheses” without a framework at the level of the Steering Committee identifying “who will do what”.
4.1.2
[Steering Committee / PBSO] Investigate the possibility of support to the PBC regarding the reinforcement of forums for dialogue regarding the finalization of the transition.30 Ensure that financial resources are kept in reserve for this purpose given its importance.
4.2.2
[PBSO / Steering Committee] Insist on a clearer political framework as precondition for activities in the areas of justice and civic education.
Or another interested actor. Most notably, during the evaluation the OIF had started to involve itself in the subject. 30
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A1 Project inventory PROJECT TITLE INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINBLE DIALOG PBF/EMER/3 Support national dialogue in Guinée PBF/GIN/H-1 Support to the promotion of inclusive and sustainable dialogue PBF/IRF-19 Support to international mediation PBF/IRF-28 Post-electoral accompaniment HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, SECURITY, JUSTICE PBF/GIN/B-1 Priority support to justice and security in Guinea PBF/IRF-20 Security Forces (FOSSEPEL) PBF/GIN/B-2 Promotion of civic education and the culture of peace CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN / YOUTH TO CONFLICT PREVENTION PBF/GIN/A-1 Support to womenʼsʼ movement and strengthening of capacities PBF/GIN/A-2 Support to youth movements and to specific groups of disenfranchised youth PBF/IRF-26 Socio-economic reintegration of children COORDINATION PBF/GIN/E-1 Support project for coordination and reinforcement of capacities
PART.
BUDGET 3.25 0.96 1.20 0.63 0.45
SPEND 2.74 0.96 1.20 0.58 0.00
START
END
Nov-07 Oct-09 Jun-10 Sep-10
Dec-10 May-12 Dec-12 Dec-11
UNDP UNDP UNESCO
3.87 1.71 1.81 0.35
2.57 1.08 1.26 0.23
Oct-09 Jun-10 Jul-10
Dec-11 Dec-12 Jul-11
UNFPA UNIDO UNICEF UNICEF
5.30 0.65 1.05 0.60 3.00
4.20 0.63
Apr-10
Dec-11
1.58
May-10
Dec-11
1.99
Feb-11
Aug-12
UNDP
0.44 0.44
0.41 0.41
Oct-09
Dec-12
TOTAL
12.85
9.92
UNDP UNDP UNDP UNDP
52
A2 Summary of findings Interpretation:
!
Good progress
"
!
Mixed / uneven
PROJECT TITLE
Relevance
Not demonstrated
Effectiveness viz. planned results Result 1 Result 2 Result 3 Result 4
I. INCLUSIVE AND SUSTAINBLE DIALOG
!
GIN/H-1 Promotion of inclusive and sustainable dialogue
Weak
!
IRF-19 Support to international mediation
High
!
Moderate
"
!
GIN/B-1 Priority support to justice and security in Guinea
High
"
!
IRF-20 Security Forces (FOSSEPEL)
High
!
"
GIN/B-2 Promotion of civic education and the culture of peace
Weak
"
!
!
Weak
"
"
"
Moderate
"
"
IRF-28 Post-electoral accompaniment
!
"
II. HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, SECURITY, JUSTICE
III. CONTRIBUTION OF WOMEN / YOUTH GIN/A-2 Support to youth movements and to specific groups of disenfranchised youth IRF-26 Socio-economic reintegration of children
53
A3 List of abbreviations CNDD
Conseil national pour la démocratie et le développement
ECOWAS
Economic Community of West African States
IRF
Immediate Response Facility (of the PBF)
PBC
Peacebuilding Commission
PBF
Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO
Peacebuilding Support Office
PMP
Performance Management Plan (of the PBF)
PPP1
First Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PPP2
Second Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PRF
Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility (of the PBF)
PRS
Poverty Reduction Strategy
RC
Resident Coordinator
UNDAF
United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNFPA
UN Population Fund
UNIDO
UN Industrial Development Organization
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A4 Works cited UN documents Peacebuilding Commission, Initial Mission by the Chair of the Guinea Configuration (April 2011) Peacebuilding Commission, Rapport de mission du PBC en Guinée (mars 2012). Peacebuilding Commission, Conclusions and recommendations of the first review of the Statement of Mutual Commitments between the Government of Guinea and the Peacebuilding Commission (June 2012), UN Doc PBC/6/GUI/2 Peacebuilding Commission, Working Group on Lessons Learned, session of July 2012 Peacebuilding Support Office, Atelier conjoint sur le développement du second Plan Prioritaire (UN Staff College / PBSO, March 2012) Peacebuilding Fund, PRF Monitoring Matrix (October 2009). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Terms of Reference for the Peacebuilding Fund, UN Doc A/63/818 (April 2009) United Nations / World Bank, Military Retirement Project Assessment Mission to Guinea (mars 12-16 2012) United Nations, UN Technical Mission to Guinea on Peacebuilding (2-10 May 2011)
Other documents AfroBarometer, 2008a. Summary of results: Round 4 AfroBarometer survey in Nigeria, Practical Sampling International / Michigan State University. AfroBarometer, 2008b. Sommaire des résultats: Round 4 AfroBarometer enquête au Mali, Practical Sampling International / Michigan State University. Bennett R, Karki S and Nepal N, 2012. Youth and peacebuilding in Nepal: The current context and recommendations. Carter Center, 2010. Observing the 2010 presidential elections in Guinea: Final report, Atlanta USA. Cramer C, 2010. Unemployment and Participation in Violence, Background paper for the WDR 2011, World Bank, Washington DC. Cunningham W et al, 2008. Supporting youth at risk: A policy toolkit for middle-income countries, World Bank, Washington DC. Earl S, Carden F et Smutylo T, 2001. Outcome mapping: Building learning and reflection into development programs, International Development Research Center, Canada. Eide EB et al, 2005. Report on integrated missions: Practical perspectives and recommendations (Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, Geneva) Human Rights Watch, 2010. Guinea: Witnesses Describe Security Force Excesses, 29 November. Inglehart R et al, 2004. Human Beliefs and Values – A Cross-cultural Sourcebook Based on the 1999–2002 Values Survey. International Commission of Inquiry, 2009. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry mandated to establish the facts and circumstances of the events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea, UN Doc S/2009/693 International Crisis Group, 2010. Conflict Risk Alert: Guinea, 18 November. International Crisis Group, 2011. Remettre la transition sur les rails, 23 September. International Crisis Group, 2012. Crisiswatch: Guinea, à 20 juillet, www.icg.com. International Labor Organisation, 2010. Local economic recovery in post-conflict: Guidelines, International Labor Office, ILO Programme for Crisis Response and Reconstruction, Geneva.
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Jeune Afrique, 2012. Guinée: L’opposition annonce une nouvelle vague de manifestations, 8 May. Justino P, 2010. War and Poverty, Working Paper 32, Sussex: Microcon. Kaufmann D, Kraay A and Mastruzzi M, 2009. Governance Matter VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. Lederach JP, 2003. The little book of conflict transformation, Good Books. Open Society Initiative for West Africa, 2011. Rapport d’enquête sur les violences et violations des droits humains durant le processus électoral guinéen de 2010, July. Open Society Initiative for West Africa, 2012. Guinée: L’intérêt du pays avant tout, April 13, Conakry. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development / Development Assistance Committee, 1991. Principles for development assistance, Paris. Marshall MG, 2010. Major episodes of political violence (MEPV) and conflict regions, 1946-2008, Center for Systemic Peace, July. Marshall MG and Cole BR, 2011. Conflict, governance and state fragility: Global report 2011, Center for Systemic Peace. Messner JJ et al, 2012. The Failed States Index 2012, Fund for Peace, Washington DC. Sommers M and Schwartz S, 2011. Dowry and Division: Youth and state building in South Sudan, United States Institute of Peace: Special Report, Washington DC. Sommers M and Uvin P, 2011. Youth in Rwanda and Burundi: Contrasting Visions, United States Institute of Peace: Special Report, Washington DC. Swisspeace, 2009. Rapport d’atelier: Réflexions sur une stratégie de consolidation de la paix en Guinée, Conakry, Mai. UN Development Group, 2009. Guidelines for UN Country Teams on preparing a CCA and UNDAF, February. UN Development Program, 2012. Human Development Report 2011: Sustainability and equity: A better future for all, New York. Union Européenne, 2010. Mission d’observation électorale en République de Guinée: Rapport finale, Conakry, February. World Bank, 2011. World Development Report: Conflict, security and development, Washington DC. World Values Survey Association, 2009. World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, Madrid
56
Annex. Comments from UN Country Team Cette étude de référence bien que réalisée en retard est indispensable pour permettre une meilleure intégration les avancées et bonnes pratiques à la fois en terme à la fois d’actions et de méthodologie et une bonne prise en compte des échecs et difficultés dans le cadre de la préparation de la seconde phase du PPCP2 et également servir de leçons apprises dans les perspectives de développement d’actions pour la Paix. Si la qualité de l’étude en terme d’approche est très appréciable, cependant certains facteurs combinés tels que la complexité de ce type d’évaluation, le retard accusé dans la réalisation de l’étude, le niveau d’expérience du Consultant n’ont pas permis de saisir toute la richesse d’une telle expérience de sortie de crise tout en précisant la contribution du plan prioritaire dans la gestion et l’aboutissement d’un processus de transition militaire du moins dans sa première phase. Projets Appui à la médiation internationale : IRF/19
Création d’un environnement apaisé : GIN/H1, IRF/28
Recommandations de l’évaluation Actuellement le projet reste ouvert « dans le cadre de l’accompagnement de la tenue des élections législatives en vue de parachever la transition » (selon rapport annuel de 2011). Il semble cependant évident que personne ne soit prêt à endosser ce rôle. La CEDEAO ne s’est plus engagée depuis 18 mois et le groupe international de contact a été dissout à la même époque
Les partenaires des Nations Unies ont souligné le manque d’un cadre politique qui pourrait permettre des activités plus intensif au niveau national. Nous avons commenté dans la Section 3.1 sur la difficulté d’établir ces « préalables » dans les circonstances particulières de la Guinée. Le code de bonne conduite des partis politiques est bien
Observation du PBF-Guinée Ce genre d’accompagnement dans un contexte de démocratie naissante où il existe un président élu nécessite une demande des acteurs nationaux et sur la base d’un consensus. Le contexte est déterminant quant à la reproduction d’un tel modèle. C’est pourquoi, le Pays a fait recours à d’autres mécanismes comme la facilitation nationale et la mise à disposition de consultants internationaux, appuyée par des actions de plaidoyers et de lobbying à travers les partenaires sous régionaux et internationaux auprès du chef de l’Etat. L’impact recherché était de contribuer à l’apaisement du climat politique en vue d’une élection présidentielle calme et qui limite les violences électorales et postélectorales. Selon le rapport synthèse de l’évaluation de la participation des Partis politiques au processus électoral de 2010 « l’élection du Président de la république a été une étape majeure ……… Tout n’a certainement pas été parfait, mais tout ne fut pas non plus négatif » page4.
57
regardé au niveau technique; un exercice de révision des partis eux-mêmes dans la suite des élections présidentielles a créé des données utiles. En même temps il semble que le processus ne touche pas les niveaux le plus élevé des partis : d’après les listes de participation aux exercices, et la réalité du « discours incendiaire » mentionné dans la Section
Appui aux médias pour la promotion du dialogue en période de transition
Mise en place d’un programme de réconciliation nationale
Impact : Il n’y a pas un monitoring systématique des médias, ni le niveau de respect du code de bonne conduite. Notre appréciation générale – sur la base des entretiens au niveau de terrain – est qu’il n’y ait pas de problèmes sérieux en termes de l’accès des partis politiques, ou l’amplification de « discours incendiaire » dû aux média Appropriation : Il n’y a pas un cadre clair de renforcement des capacités nationales dans l’absence de la Haute Autorité de la communication (constitution de 2010, titre X). Cohérence : Des bonnes pratiques, y compris l’appui à rapportage commun (« Radio FM Guinée 2010 ») pendant les élections ; coordination avec les efforts parallèles de RFI et la maison de la presse (France / E-U / U-E). Impact : Le gouvernement a établi un « Comité de Réflexion » en 2011 mais ce comité n’avait pas défini un programme de travail clair jusqu’à maintenant. Il y a des désaccords forts parmi les partis politiques et les groupes de la société civile en ce qui concerne les objectifs du processus Appropriation : Plusieurs interlocuteurs ont souligné le manque d’appui cohérent au Comité de Réflexion ; peu d’interlocuteurs ont fait confiance au mécanisme. Il n’y a pas de financement significatif du processus du côté du
Aussi, le même rapport stipule « Pour permettre à ces élections de se dérouler dans un climat apaisé…..un certain nombre d’acteurs se sont impliqués sur le terrain pour former, informer et sensibiliser l’électorat ainsi que les partis politiques. Le code de bonne conduite des Partis Politiques représente un instrument important, cependant il y a une nécessité impérieuse d’une synergie d’action entre les différents partenaires techniques d’appui aux partis politiques et une nécessité de création d’un cadre de dialogue entre les Partis politiques intégrant leaders. Le Conseil National de la Communication est l’organe régulateur et le cadre de renforcement de capacité nationale en matière de médias ( avant la mise en place de haute autorité de la communication)
La commission nationale provisoire de réflexion sur la réconciliation a été mise en place en 2011, à la suite de la mise en œuvre du projet dialogue inclusif et durable dans son volet « mise en place d’un programme de réconciliation nationale ». Les seuls outils de base disponibles pour orienter les travaux de la dite commission à sa création étaient : le rapport provisoire sur la réconciliation (produit dans le cadre du PRODID), et le rapport des Journées Nationales de Dialogue. Les deux co-présidents du comité ont souligné cet état de fait dans une de leur première intervention publique, et cela a permis notamment de positionner
58
gouvernement jusqu'à maintenant. Ce n’est pas clair si/comment le Comité a utilisé le rapport d’International Alert.
Renforcement de capacités de négociation et de médiation au niveau local
L’appui au secteur de la justice : GIN/B-1
Education civique et de la culture de paix :
Impact : Il y a une « cartographie de conflits » qui a été développé par le Secrétariat du PBF, le PNUD et la Primature. Ce document donne un idée de la localisation des types différentes de conflit mais il n’indique pas encore la sévérité relative ; ni les capacités locaux de gestion .Appropriation : Les leaders traditionnels et les interlocuteurs de la société civile au niveau local ne connaissaient pas le programme, mais probablement parce que les ressources n’avaient pas démarré à cette époque-là. C’était donc trop tôt à chercher une augmentation d’utilisation des mécanismes pacifiques de gestion de conflit. La cadre d’action actuel est souvent décrit comme une « liste de courses » qui a besoin de priorisation pour mieux refléter la période limité d’intervention (2011-1. Il y a beaucoup d’intérêt de la part des partenaires bilatéraux mais jusqu’à maintenant les engagements concrets restent limité. Impact : Les partenaires nous ont expliqué qu’il n’y ait pas un programme scolaire ou matériels communs pour les
les Nations Unies dans le leadership de l’appui à ce comité. Ce rapport a été remis à toutes les autorités : Présidence, Primature et ministères clés impliqués dans la réconciliation. Les travaux de ce rapport ont été menés sous le leadership du CES et du CNT qui ont tous deux des mandats sur la prévention des conflits et la réconciliation nationale. Bien qu’un appui marqué ne soit pas manifeste du coté gouvernemental (ex : manque de siège pour la commission), les co-présidents bénéficient actuellement s’un appui du PPCP2 à travers une expertise international mise à disposition pour appuyer à impulser la philosophie des processus de réconciliation, surtout dans les aspects: Vérité-Justice-Réconciliation (mis en avant par le rapport notamment) La cartographie qui doit être finalisée dans le cadre du PPCP2 (TDR disponible) a permis de mettre en place un programme d’alerte précoce avec l’appui du consortium d’ONG International Wanep-ACORD. Cet projet est focalisé sur les zones à haut risque de conflit identifiées dans le document de cartographie et confirmées dans le PPCP2
RAS Il y a un engagement fort de l’UE et de la France sur le secteur de la justice
L’objet du Programme était de contribuer à l’acquisition de la culture de la paix chez les jeunes dans les zones ciblées pour des
59
GIN/B-2
Formation des jeunes, des femmes et des adultes à la pratique citoyenne avant, pendant et après les élections
Sensibilisation de la population sur le processus électoral, l'importance de l'état civil, de la carte nationale d'identité, et suivi des campagnes de délivrance Appui à l'occupation des jeunes, à la création d'entreprises de jeunesse
clubs de la paix ; le contenu concerne plutôt « la paix pur et simple ».Nous n’avons pas trouvé des changements « structurels » par rapport au programme d’instruction ou l’organisation des écoles ; il paraît que le programme est une initiative exceptionnel qui est lié à la disponibilité de ressources exceptionnels. Il y a peut-être des changements de perspectives individuels, mais les activités concrètes des « alliances de la paix »restent opaques. Au niveau de la région de Labé nous n’avons pas pu trouver le « plan d’action » escompté(ou son taux de réalisation actuel) ; les officiels du gouvernement et de la société civile à ce niveau-là n’ont pas pu identifier des initiatives concrètes attribuable au projet. Au niveau de la préfecture de Pita, il paraît que les ateliers de suivi n’a pas été fait.
élections présidentielles apaisées. Par ailleurs, le département de l’éducation s’intéresse au produit du programme en vue de contribuer à la réforme du programme d’éducation civique dans les écoles, ce qui pourrait confirmer la pérennisation des acquis du projet et l’effet catalytique. Une niche reste à développer dans le cadre des synergies entre les acteurs de la Paix. Il est envisager de créer un cadre de concertation et de coordination pour assurer des cohérences entre les différents intervenants et praticiens de la paix.
RAS Nous n’avons pas pu obtenir d’informations en ce qui concerne ce résultat. Spécifiquement, il n’y avait pas de données par rapport aux taux de délivrance de la carte nationale d’identité ni l’autre document de l’état civil.
Il n’y a pas d’analyse concernent les liens entre la participation au projet et le niveau d’implication à l’agitation politique / violence / conflit avec la loi. (Par exemple : les manifestations fréquents de la première moitié de 2012.) Nos interlocuteurs au niveau politique et de la société civile n’ont pas vu des changements au niveau de mobilisation des jeunes et ne connaissaient pas le projet Le ministère de la jeunesse était fortement critique du niveau faible d’implication au début. C’est un problème sérieux face à l’exigence de développer la politique sectoriel et des approches pilotes faisables
Les bénéficiaires du projet ont été identifiés en fonction des zones à haut risque de tensions. Le projet a servi de cadre de partage entre jeunes venant d’horizons différents et d’appartenance politique différente en vue de contribuer au renforcement du tissu social et à l’apaisement du climat social. L’identification et la sélection des bénéficiaires dont les listes ont été officiellement remontées par les cadres du MJEJ ont été conjointement réalisées. Aussi, la désignation d’un point focal du Ministère pour la mise en œuvre conjointe du projet et l’existence d’un comité technique, présidé par le Secrétaire Général dudit
60
ministère constituent des éléments probants. Par ailleurs, tous les lancements d’activités du projet ainsi que les inaugurations se sont effectués sous la présidence conjointe du MJEJ et de L’ONUDI. Mieux, les organisations de jeunesse de la société civile ont été les principaux bénéficiaires du projet.
Renforcement du volontarisme et du leadership des jeunes en situation difficile
Résultats immédiats : Formation en « paix et la résolution de conflits » pour 260 jeunes et 35 adultes en tant que « mentors »; 11 localités qui ont été jugé à haut risque sur le base du « niveau élevé de violence impliquent les jeunes » de 2006 à 2011. La ministère de la jeunesse était heureuse avec le projet au niveau technique et a identifié des cas concrètes de comportement amélioré des associations bénéficiaires. Il y avait peu d’information par rapport aux résultats particuliers qui ont été escompté selon le document de projet : le développement des activités socioéconomique; les campagnes de vaccination; la registration de naissances; les compétitions sportives; la disponibilité à prendre part dans les urgences. Impact : Pour les localités nous avons visité, les associations ciblées ont compris 10-20% du total. Pendant les visites sur le terrain, les officiels du gouvernement local (en dehors la ministère de la jeunesse) n’ont pas pu identifier de changement des relations avec les associations de jeunes en termes générales. La société civile a souligné
En terme d’appropriation, ce projet a contribué à l’élaboration d’une politique nationale d’emploi jeune en Guinée. Le MJEJ a manifesté son intérêt à reproduire cette expérience à l’intérieur du pays dans le cadre de sa politique nationale de la jeunesse. L’objet du projet était de contribuer à réduire l’instrumentalisation des jeunes pendant la période des élections présidentielles et favoriser l’organisation d’un scrutin apaisé. Le partenaire d'exécution, Search for Common Ground, a procédé au choix des bénéficiaires conformément aux critères définis en ciblant les jeunes de toutes les associations politiques et ethnies. Le calcul qu'il y avait 260 bénéficiaires ciblés par la formation / ateliers n'est pas correcte. Les chiffres corrigés sont les suivants : ! 260 jeunes dans 23 préfectures formés comme formateurs ! 330 groupes de jeunes engagés dans des ateliers, un total estimé d'au moins 3.300 jeunes touchés ! 953 séances de sensibilisation organisées par les partenaires d'exécution et les 260 jeunes formés, s'engageant au moins 5.000 jeune Une estimation prudente (pour éviter le double comptage des jeunes engagés dans différentes activités) donne un nombre total d'au moins 8.000 jeunes engagés directement
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la persistance politique.
du
phénomène
d’instrumentalisation
Appropriation : Il paraît que les « séances d’échange » avec les autorités dans le suite des programmes de formation n’avaient pas répété. Dans les localités visités, nous n’avons pas trouvé des changements structurels en termes des mécanismes de consultation ou l’organisation des associations de jeunes Les associations de jeunesse sont mobilisées pour une participation active à la consolidation de la paix et à la nonviolence Réintégration des jeunes en situation à risque en Guinée Forestière et Conakry
Le projet a été copiloté par le ministère de la jeunesse et les organisations de la société civile (cf. les rapports de mise en œuvre)
RAS Les visites sur le terrain ont suggéré que les effets ont diminué au fil de temps. Selon certains participants, les activités de sensibilisation et les petites subventions qui avaient été donné en 2011 ont terminé ensemble. Les indicateurs planifiés par rapport à l’implication de jeunes dans les conflits communautaires, et les conflits avec la loi, n’ont pas été rapportés jusqu'à maintenant. En générale, il n’avait pas été des violences politiques dans les localités ciblées (voir la Section 2). Réviser le projet GIN/A-2 pour chercher des bonnes pratiques et des « benchmarks » plus spécifiques par rapport aux liens entre les associations des jeunes et le gouvernement / les autorités traditionnels au niveau local. Orienter l’appui aux mécanismes de dialogue impliquant les jeunes aux localités à haut risqué et éviter les programmes d’échelle nationale. Le projet de réintégration socioéconomique d’UNICEF a utilisé 3 m$, ou environ de 25% des fonds de la première phase, pour un total de 2.000 jeunes (1.500 $ par jeune). L’ONUDI a indiqué une gamme de 100 à 1.973 pour la création d’un emploi permanent, selon le microprojet. De façon plus rudimentaire, c’est un projet de 1 m$ qui a crée
Le projet IRF/26 de l'UNICEF / PAM ciblé un total de 1,200 jeunes recrutés irrégulière sous le régime du CNDD, et 800 autres« marginalisés », dont la majorité ont été précédemment associé à des actes de banditisme ou criminelles de jeunes «clans». Ces jeunes, la grande majorité provenait du même groupe ethnique que Dadis Camara, ont été recrutés et formés par des factions du CNDD, dans l'une des vagues successives de recrutement irrégulier qui a eu lieu au cours du régime du CNDD. Il a été rapporté que l'un des objectifs de ce recrutement a été de créer un pool qui pourrait être mobilisés au cours de la période électorale. Le Projet a ciblé les personnes qui présentent le risque le plus élevé d’exposition à la violence. L'un des objectifs des interventions pour la consolidation de la paix est d'identifier les «points d'entrée» pour réduire les risques de la violence et de la stabilité.
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environ de 550 emplois permanents, proche au plafond de cette gamme.
L'analyse du coût du projet par bénéficiaire est un peu mécanique et du coup trompeuse. Il est vrai que le coût du projet divisé par Ils ne sont pas des projets pilotes ; la ministère de tutelle a le 2,000 jeunes est de 1.500 USD par bénéficiaire, par rapport 180 indiqué qu’elle ne s’intéresse pas à répliquer l’approche. USD par bénéficiaire pour le projet de la Banque mondiale, qui Nous répétons alors une commentaire de la Section 4.1 : prend en charge 20.000 familles, soit l'équivalent de 140.000 étant donné le montant limité des ressources, et le mandat personnes (la moyenne des ménages en Guinée dispose de 7 du PBF, il faudrait justifier les localités ou groupes qui membres ). Cependant, le projet en objet a adopté une approche exigent de soutien intensif au cas par cas à base communautaire, en soutenant : les familles d’accueil de l'adolescent avec des rations alimentaires, y compris plus de 900 familles qui sont «hôtes» des jeunes séparés de leur famille d'origine. Aussi, d'autres jeunes dans les centres de formation, qui sont au nombre d'environ 3,900 sont des bénéficiaires indirects, grâce à un appui matériel aux centres. Ce qui fait un total d'environ 18.000 personnes soutenues par le projet (2.000 jeunes de projet, ainsi que 3.900 autres jeunes dans les centres, plus 2,000 familles, ce qui équivaut 14.000 personnes). Cela prend du coût par bénéficiaire de 167 USD, moins que le projet de la BM, avec des niveaux comparables de soutien. Le ministère de la formation professionnelle en lien avec le Service Civique et d’Action pour le développement envisage de s’inspirer du modèle pour la prochaine vague de « formationréinsertion » à la fois au niveau pédagogique et au niveau organisationnel. Suivi et évaluation
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Le S&E au niveau de projet avaient été très faible.
le système de suivi et évaluation n’a pas bien été mis-enœuvre. Tout d’abord, aucun partenaire n’a pu identifier une évaluation formelle au niveau de projet. La seule évaluation qui a été donné à l’équipe était une évaluation interne d’un partenaire de mise-en-œuvre d’une partie du projet Il y a eu peu de S&E au niveau du Plan Prioritaire.
RAS, L’observation est prise en compte dans le PPCP2 ( ex : mission conjointe à Nzérékoré pour le suivi de la mise en œuvre du projet par le PNUD, ONUDI UNFPA, PAM et secrétariat du PBF).
OBSERVATIONS GENERALES : Le premier plan prioritaire date de 2009, la précision est nécessaire pour éviter l’amalgame avec les interventions faites en 2007-2008 qui étaient dans le cadre du programme “EMERGENCY WINDOW” et non d’un plan prioritaire. Ce programme a bénéficié d’un financement de 963.000 USD à titre exceptionnel. Au point de vue méthodologique il est impératif de faire ressortir que le ProConSoGui (2007) n’est pas inclus dans le 1er PPCP. Il est fait dans le cadre de l’EMERGENCY WINDOW et à permis certes d’aboutir aux axes d’interventions du 1er PPCP. le contexte politique et social n'a pas été bien exploité, amenant à des affirmations qui méritent d'être nuancées. Il faut remarquer que les interventions « quicks starts » du PPCP2 ont été identifiées sur la base de l’analyse de contexte postélectoral qui restait préoccupant sur le plan sécuritaire et des droits de l’homme. Il y a souvent un amalgame/incompréhension entre les projets PBF1 et PBF2, situation méritant clarification plus ample. Cet amalgame peut avoir conduit à une mauvaise compréhension de l'objet des entretiens par les interlocuteurs du consultant durant sa mission. NON, cet état des lieux porte exclusivement sur les 3 priorités du 2ème plan prioritaire. Ceci est illustré par exemple par les affirmations dans pages 17 et 18 du Rapport : « Cet état de lieu est intervenu après plus de trois ans d’engagement intensif. Au moment de la présente évaluation est conduite, en mai 2012, un Comité Technique vient d’être établi, incluant (en théorie) les partenaires bilatéraux, mais le niveau d’implication se révèle faible. Les cas qui nous avons révises, par exemple, ont inclus deux ou trois partenaires qui ont participé a titre d’information seulement ». Ceci concerne le 2ème plan prioritaire, on a du mal à faire le distinguo entre le champ d’évaluation (le 1er plan prioritaire) et ce qui sort de son cadre. Les amalgames relevés sont souvent dus au retard enregistré dans la conduite de cette évaluation qui aurait du se faire avant l’élaboration du second plan. La méthodologie du Consultant devrait prendre en compte cet état de fait. Le projet de dialogue inclusif et durable est jugé de "pertinence faible" mais c'est sur ce projet que capitalise des activités estimées prioritaires dans le cadre du PPCP2 : réconciliation nationale.
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Concernant la perception de la question de l’instrumentalisation par les communautés, il convient de noter que le projet visait à réduire la vulnérabilité des jeunes, et non l'arrêt de la pratique de l'instrumentalisation au niveau des dirigeants politiques. Il s'agit d'un aspect de la consolidation de la paix soutenue par des autres projets du PBF. Il convient de préciser que le comité de pilotage avait déjà réalisé deux sessions dans le cadre du PPCP1 (une en 2010 et une en 2011). La session du 14 Novembre 2011 était la première du PPCP2 et la troisième session du Comité de Pilotage ( à revoir dans le rapport). L’atelier Conjoint du Gouvernement de la République Guinée et ONU portant sur le Pan Prioritaire de Consolidation de la Paix s’est tenu du 6 – 9 mars 2012 à Conakry a pris en compte la question relative à la dynamisation des instances d’analyse et de pilotage du PBF à la fois dans ses aspects programmatiques et stratégiques (Groupes de travail thématique, Comité Techniques et Comités de Pilotage). Dans le même cadre la question de la multiplicité du nombre d’indicateurs a été pris en compte avec la révision du cadre logique et son actualisation progressive (en application à ce jour). Il existe une équipe d’expert de haut niveau pour l’accompagnement stratégique de la mise en œuvre de la RSS. Une étude est en cours de lancement concernant le secteur de la jeunesse qui sera la base d’actualisation de la Politique nationale de l’emploi en général et des jeunes et des femmes en particuliers dans l’agenda de la consolidation de la Paix. Intitulé du Projet « Projet d’appui à l’Emploi des Jeunes et des Femmes dans l’agenda de consolidation de la paix en Guinée : « Étude des opportunités dans les secteurs Minier et Agricole » À propos de la recommandation « Insister sur la présence d’un cadre politique plus clair comme préalable des activités en l’avenir dans le secteurs de la justice / de l’éducation civique », les documents de référence concernant la réforme du secteur de la sécurité y compris la justice et le document du programme sectoriel de l’éducation (PPSE) sont à prendre en compte. Il faut noter autre quelques évaluations ont été réalisées : celle relative au secteur de la sécurité en république de Guinée (mai 2010), celle relative à l’appui au Parti Politique par NDI ( 1er trimestre 2011) et celle relative à l’appui aux médias par Search for Common Ground ( 1er trimestre 2011). L’évaluation concernant l ‘éducation citoyenne et celle liée à la jeunesse sont en cours. Les recommandations qui n’ont pas fait l’objet d’observation de la part des équipes SNU sont pris en compte par le présent document comme élément à améliorer et à intégrer dans la prochaine étape du PBF.
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