Marie-Pierre Dargnies Date of birth : January 13, 1983 Current position : Assistant Professor, DRM Finance, University of Paris Dauphine
Professional address Universit´e Paris Dauphine Place du Mar´echal de Lattre de Tassigny 75016 Paris France
[email protected] Research Interests : Experimental Economics and Finance, Behavioral Economics and Finance, Labor Economics, Matching Markets
Education 2005-2009
2004-2005
2002-2004
Graduate studies Paris School of Economics and Universit´e Paris 1 Panth´eon-Sorbonne Advisor : Guillaume Hollard PhD dissertation title : Gender and Taste for Competition : An experimental approach DEA (Master) Industrial Economics, Microeconomics and Econometrics, with high honors. Universit´e Paris 1 Panth´eon-Sorbonne Magist` ere d’´ economie, with high honors. BA and MA in Econometrics Universit´e Paris 1 Panth´eon-Sorbonne
Research Publications ”Croyances et Goˆ ut pour la Comp´etition”, with No´emi Berlin (2013), Published in La Revue Economique (vol 64 (3)). ”Men Too Sometimes Shy Away from Competition : The Case of Team Competition”, Management Science (2012), 58(11), pp. 19822000. Recent results in experimental and personnel economics indicate that women do not like competitive environments as much as men. This article presents an experimental design which gives participants the opportunity to enter a tournament as part of a team rather than alone. While a large and significant gender gap in entry in the individual tournament is found in line with the literature, no gender gap is found in entry in the team tournament. Women do not enter the tournament significantly more often when it is team-based, but men enter significantly less when they are part of a team rather than alone. The main reason for men’s disaffection for the team competition appears to be linked to the uncertainty of their teammate’s ability. More precisely, high-performing men fear to be the victims of the free-riding behavior of their teammate.
”Comp´etition en ´equipe. Les hommes sont-ils moins coop´eratifs que les femmes ?” (2011), Published in La Revue Economique (vol 62). ”Incentives to Learn Calibration”, with Guillaume Hollard (2009), Published in Economics Bulletin (vol 29 (3)). Miscalibration can be defined as the fact that people think that their knowledge is more precise than it actually is. In a typical miscalibration experiment, subjects are asked to provide subjective confidence intervals. A very robust finding is that subjects provide too narrow intervals at the 90% level. As a result a lot less than 90% of correct answers fall inside the 90% intervals provided. As miscalibration is linked with bad results on an experimental financial market (Biais et al (2005)) and entrepreneurial success is positively correlated with good calibration (Regner et al (2006)), it appears interesting to look for a way to cure or at least reduce miscalibration. Previous attempts to remove the miscalibration bias relied on extremely long and tedious procedures. Here, we design an experimental setting that provides several different incentives, in particular strong monetary incentives ; i.e. that make miscalibration costly. Our thirty-minute training session has an effect on men’s calibration, even though a weak one, but no effect on women’s. Working Papers ”An experimental investigation of the determinants of cooperation.”, with J´er´emy Celse.
”Gender Differences in Reactions to Feedback and Willingness to Compete.”, with No´emi Berlin. In Western societies, it is generally known that men have a greater taste for competition than women. However, the determinants of the decision to enter competitions are still not fully understood. Providing feedback on relative performance reduces the gender gap in competitive entry. The aim of this paper is twofold. We first evaluate how participants update their beliefs after receiving feedback informing them of whether their performance is below or above the median performance. Second, we are interested in how men and women react to this information in terms of competitive entry. Our first result is that participants, and women in particular, react more strongly to the feedback they receive than would a Bayesian agent. As far as entry into competition is concerned, below-median participants adjust their entry decision according to the competition they expect to face, while above-median participants do not. However, the behavior behind these results is quite different for men and women : women mainly react to information on their own performance, while men seem to respond more to their beliefs over the competition they will face. Moreover, most of the effect of feedback and the information regarding the level of the competition on the decision to compete seems to operate via beliefs.
”Social Identity and Competitiveness”. Recent research papers are interested in the impact of social identity on individual behaviors while another literature deals with the gender gap in competitiveness. This paper studies the effect of social identity on individuals’ competitiveness. More particularly, it aims at studying whether social identity has a different impact on men and women’s competitiveness. The main result is that high-performing men are no more reluctant to be matched with a possibly less able participant when he or she is a fellow group member as opposed to a random participant. This is in line with the hypothesis that social identity shifts behaviors towards what is in the interest of the group. As for women, if anything, they are less willing to enter competitive environments when being a member of a group and behave more selfishly. Works in progress ”Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets”, with Rustam Hakimov and Dorothea Kuebler Refereeing activities
Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, Theory and Decision, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Experimental Economics, Canadian Journal of Economics, Managerial and Decision Economics, Bulletin of Economic Research Teaching
Current Statistics (L3) Corporate Finance (M1) Behavioral Finance Finance (M1) Past Statistics (L2, Universit´e Paris 1), General Introduction to Economics (L1, Universit´e Paris 1), Microeconomics (L1, Universit´e de Marne la Vall´ee), Microeconomics (L2 Mass, Universit´e Paris 1), Tutor in Microeconomics and Macroeconomics in English for students of QEM Erasmus Mundus (Master, Universit´e Paris 1).
Visits abroad
09/10-2007 10/11-2009 09/12-2011
Brown University, Providence, RI, USA, Economics Department. Stanford University, CA, USA, Economics Department. Stanford University, CA, USA, Economics Department.
References Guillaume Hollard, University Paris 1 :
[email protected] Dorothea Kuebler, WZB, Berlin :
[email protected] Muriel Niederle, Stanford University :
[email protected]
