Al-Ghazālī on Causality Author(s): Ilai Alon Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 100, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1980), pp. 397405 Published by: American Oriental Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/602085 Accessed: 06/10/2009 22:17 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=aos. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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AL-GHAZALI ON CAUSALITY ILAI ALON TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY The widely-held view that Al-Ghazalf took a stand totally opposed to causality can be modified through a careful re-examination of the chapter on that question in his Tahafut al-Falasifah. The reason for the misunderstanding seems to lie in the efforts of Al-Ghazalf himself to conceal his true opinions. The paper will be divided into two parts. First, an introduction will summarize the aims of the paper and the background. Second, evidence for Al-Ghazalf's compromise will be brought out through an examination of the structure of the chapter, and through semantic and contextual evidence.

INTRODUCTION

When we speak of critique on the 'principle of causality' therefore, we are referring to questions about the necessity, demonstrability and knowability of particular causal relationships (especially within the natural order), that is, that events have definable causes, or that causal sequences are predictable.

MOST WRITERSAGREE THAT AL-GHAZALI rejected

causality,1 athough they differ in their emphases. Fakhri claims that while Al-Ghazali rejected ontological causal necessity, he accepted the logical one;2 in Wensinck's interpretation Al-Ghazalf's theory regarded Allah as the only agent in the world and thus Al-Ghazalf attacks causality, although he does not refrain from using the term itself;3 similarly, H. A. Wolfson maintains that Al-Ghazalf did not accept causality, despite some modes of expression he used.4 The only writer known to me who tries to reevaluate Al-Ghazalf's views is W. J. Courteney,5 who argued that Al-Ghazalf, like Occam, was misinterpreted on the topic of causality. Since there is wide divergence on how the term "causality" should be interpreted, it is advisable first to define the terms "cause," and then to determine whether this sort of causality was actually opposed

In this paper I shall argue that in his chapter on causality Al-Ghazali seeks to reconcile two extreme views on causality, namely the philosophical view and that of the kalam. Although upon first reading it seems that Al-Ghazalf follows the traditional religious rejection of causality, closer attention to the relevant passages reveals what I shall call his compromise between the two opposing views. This is not the first time that Al-Ghazalr sought to reconcile opposing views.7 First and foremost is the compromise he put forward between "Orthodoxy" and Sufism, but also between religon and philosophy as manifested in Islam. The present compromise concerning causality seems to be a part of the latter tendency, and perhaps should be regarded as one of its most important examples. The question may be posed as to why Al-Ghazalf felt it necessary to seek compromise on this, as well as on other issues. The answer may lie partly in the intellectual background of the time. Ashcarite Sunnism had reached its peak some years prior to AlGhazali, while the philosophical approach was fully developed at the time of Ibn Sfna (d. 1037), AlGhazalf's spiritual teacher in philosophy. Another

by any sect or author in Islam. One such definition

may be taken from Courteney's article:6 1 His views are quoted in Ibn Rushd's Tahafut al-

Tahafut, Ed. M. Bouyges, in Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Vol. III (Beyrouth, 1930), and only

accordingto this chapter.In this respect,Al-Ghazalf'sview did not change in his later writing. (Henceforth Tahafut with page and line number.) 2 Majid Fakhri, Islamic Occasionalism (London, 1950) p. 60. 3 A. J. Wensinck, La Pensee de Ghazdli (Paris, 1950) p. 60. 4 H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass., 1976) p. 549. 5 W. J. Courteney, "The Critique on Natural Causes in the Mutakallimin and Nominalism," Harvard Theological Review, 66 (1973) pp. 77-94. 6 Ibid., p. 79.

7 See, e.g., W. M. Watt,MuslimIntellectual(Endinburgh, 1963) pp. 173-180; W. M. Watt,"Al-Ghazalf,"inEI2 Vol. II, p. 1041; as well as many other instances. Also, H. Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies in Al-Ghazali, Jerusalem, 1975, p. 345, note 81, who quotes Al-Ghazalf as saying in Ihya IV, 5 that creation out of nothing is impossible.

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explanation can be found in our author's personal background, namely his philosophical studies which could hardly have left no impression on him,8 especially as the Tahafut was written during a time when he still doubted the means to find his path to truth.9 The topic of causality and its implications were so basic, both to Islam and to philosophy, that a schism might easily have occurred, more severe, perhaps, than that which took place in the ninth century between the Mu'tazilah and the Ahl alSunnah. Hence the time was ripe for an effort to conciliate on this very delicate matter, and AlGhazalf was well equipped to do this. Our thesis must not, and does not, contradict AlGhazalr's two objectives stated at the beginning of this chapter, to allow for the possibility of miracles, and to adhere to Allah's omnipotence. Both these objectives were threatened by the extreme philosophical view on causality. Outright rejection of causality, however, raises certain difficulties of its own. Al-Ghazalf's compromise succeeds in evading some of these difficulties, which he considered to be greater than those produced by his own solution. STRUCTURE

The first argument for this thesis is a structural one. Al-Ghazalf constructs this chapter in a rather complicated and enigmatic manner, as if purposely to conceal his own views. The chapter itself and some introductory remarks to it are divided into three main paragraphs: I, Preface: The place of the topic among others. (507,5; II, Introduction: 512,1-514,7). (A) general outline of the philosophical approach; (B) objectives of the chapter; (c) the general approach of Al-Ghazalf (517,2-518,2). III, Four approaches: (A) the philosophical: (1) extreme (518,3-519,11), (2) middle (525,7-526,2); (B) religious: (1) extreme (528,6-9; 529,6-530,3; 530,4-17), (2) middle (533, 12-537,8). Let us now consider these subparagraphs in detail. I. Preface. In the preface, Al-Ghazalf puts the question of causality in perspective by assimilating it 8 See also S. Van den Bergh, in his introduction to the

translation of Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (London, 1954) Vol. I, p. xii: ".... and he himself[i.e., Al-Ghazalf] has been strongly influenced by the philosophers, especially by Avicenna, and in many works he comes very near to the Neo-Platonic theories which he criticizes." 9 Ibid.

to three other questions (the spirituality of the soul, the immortality of the soul, and bodily resurrection) to form one chapter which deals with physics (al-tabiCiyyat). II. The Introduction. Al-Ghazalf's general description of the philosophical approach to causality is very brief and general; the connection between cause and effect is a necessary one and the two are inseparable.10 Having outlined the opponent's view, Al-Ghazalf states the two objectives of this chapter. The first is to establish the possibility of miracles, the existence of which is essential to Islam," but which is threatened by arguments such as those of the philosophers. According to Al-Ghazalf they interpret the miracles which are an essential part of the Islamic faith in a metaphorical way, attribute them to explicable human sorcery, or flatly deny their ever having occurred.12 The importance which AlGhazalf attached to this topic is also shown by the length to which he goes in describing the philosopher's arguments concerning miracles. He maintains that they explain phenomena that are called by religion "miracles" connected with prophecy in one of the following ways: 1) The phenomenon of foreseeing the future by observing the Indelible Tablet (al-luah al-Mahfuz) can be experienced both by common people, in the form of dreams, and by prophets in a waking state, because of their strong imaginative faculty. 2) Intellectual acuteness makes it possible to pass rapidly from one idea to another, such as from a problem to its solution and vice versa, or from a middle term to the conclusion of a syllogism. The prophet differs from other people in that his intellecutal faculty (al-quwwah al-nazariyyah) is so developed that he may need no learning at all. 3) Psychosomatic phenomena, such as the production of saliva by the mere thought of tasty food, are explained by the philosophers by the fact that the 10 I do not accept Van den Bergh's translation of iqtiran talazama bildararah as "is of logical necessity" (p. 312 of the translation), as I fail to find the "logical" in the Arabic text. The question of logical vs. ontological necessity is of vital importance in this context. Cf. also Tahafut, 512,1. I1 See, e.g., G. E. von Grunebaum, Medieval Isalm (Chicago, 1954) pp. 91-97. 12 Tahafut, 512, lOff. Note that the term muCgizah means basically "something impossible," but only to mankind, if a lesson can be learned from the concept of

iCgazal-Qur'an.

ALON: Al-Ghazall on Causality

body is merely the soul's servant and tool. The soul's power is not necessarily restricted to one's own body, but can even affect extra-bodily things. Such phenomena, argue the philosophers, occur with no obvious physical cause, but their extent is limited to the domain of things which are disposed to accept the prophetic influence. The second objective of this chapter is to establish Allah's omnipotence. Two questions arise here. First, acceptance of the principle of Allah's omnipotence logically entails acceptance of miracles. What, then, is the reason to state both, particularly in this order? The second question (which is beyond the scope of this paper) refers to the importance of miracles to Al-Ghazalf and to Islam, bearing in mind that Muhammad had never claimed the power to perform miracles-apart from the Qurmanitself. The answer to these questions may lie in the fact that the Tahafut was aimed at readers on two different levels, the ordinary believer and the more sophisticated one. Emphasis on miracles was for the benefit of the former, while the more elaborate argument for Allah's omnipotence was aimed at the latter. Having stated his objectives, Al-Ghazali proceeds to describe his general view of causality at the beginning of the particular chapter dedicated to attacking the philosophers' use of this concept. Speaking on behalf of all Muslims, by using the first person plural, he discredits the alleged necessary connection between what are called "cause" and "effect." In so doing, he has in mind the philosphers' view which he himself had put forth above, again using the same wording.'3 The skeleton of the religious view is constructed of three main ideas: first, that every two things are separate;14 next, on the ontological level, that the affirmation or negation of one of these things implies neither the affirmation or negation of the other; and finally, on the ontological level, that the existence or non-existence of one does not imply the existence or non-existence of the other. There seems to be a particular significance in the wording Al-Ghazalf uses in this paragraph. The definition of the universality of causality, namely the assertion that

13 Taiafut, 517,1. 14 Taanafut, 517,3: "Each of two things is different from the other." I do not use Van den Bergh's translation here, because the term "individuality" in this context may connote an atomistic viewpoint, which is hardly the case in this context.

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nothing has ever occurred without some cause,15 usually maintains that the existence of a phenomenon implies that of a cause. Such a definition of causality would seem to be acceptable to Al-Ghazalf, as well as to even the most extreme opponents of causality among the Ashcarites, who accept the doctrine that Allah is the sole cause of everything. Al-Ghazali's intention in this general exposition seems to be to underline the differences between the philosophical and religious attitudes rather than to try and erase them as he does towards the end of the present chapter.16

After having stated what he opposes in the concept of causality, Al-Ghazali then provides the explanation given by Islam of the phenomenon of the connection between things: Allah alone is responsible for their creation in a specific order, but it is in His power to disconnect them at will. III. Four Approaches: Before he goes into detail, AlGhazali states that three philosophical approaches, or standpoints on causality, are discernible.'7 Next, he presents the religious approach, which he does not call maqam, but subdivides into two, each of which he entitles maslak, that is, "road," "path." Thus the two philosophical approaches are called maqam while the religious ones are called maslak. In addition to stating his views in the preface to the chapter, Al-Ghazalf here replies at once to each of the two philosophical approaches. An important 15 See, e.g., R. Taylor, "Causation" in P. Edwards, Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York and London, 1967), Vol. II, pp. 57-58. 16 It is of interestthat in the list of examples he gives of the sort of causality he objects to, the result is mentioned firstandthe allegedcause second(e.g., burningandcontact with fire). It is also noteworthythat the greaterpartof this list deals with humanlife and welfare-drink, food, death, medical care, diarrhea and medicine in general (see Tahafut, 5 17,5). As for the originof the present,as well as other examples in the Tahafut, see the extensive notes by Van den Berghin his translationof the book.This attitudeis to be connected with the views Al-Ghazali held about medicalcare as contrastedwithtawakkul, completetrustin Allah, which excludes any activity on man's part as concernshis own life. See Al-Ghazali,Ihydi) Ulum al-Din, IV, 243ff. 17 I do not accept Van den Bergh's translation of maqamat as "points."Thereis some confusionthere,for in what follows only two such approaches (maqam) are specified.

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point in his answer is that Allah is never mentioned in the philosophical arguments. A. The Philosophical Approaches Al-Ghazalr first considers the extreme approach, identifying four points which constitute its focus. These are: the agent is solely the direct natural "cause"; it acts by way of nature rather than by way of choice; it cannot cease once the recipient of its action is ready to accept it; and this entire interpretation of phenomena is based solely upon the evidence of sense perception, which cumulatively amounts to experience. Having stated this approach, Al-Ghazalf tentatively criticizes it on the following grounds: (a) The only true agent, who acts either directly or indirectly, is Allah. Even though he accepts the existence of intermediate factors, Al-Ghazalr argues that these are not "natural," but divine, such as angels. The direct physical "cause" is nothing but an actionless body. (b) Allah, as the agent, does not act "naturally" or under any compulsion as "causes" do. (c) He can always refrain from pursuing His action at will. (d) According to Al-Ghazalf, the evidence corroborating the extreme philosophical argument reveals only a chronological relation between phenomena, rather than a causal one. The true "causal" relation between the Agent and the effect is unobservable to the senses. In this argument a further subdivision is made by Al-Ghazalf. Among the extreme philosophers there is a group called by our author "those who are right." According to this group, the agent is the bestower of forms and is an angel, or a number of angels, who utilize the preparations and dispositions of the substrata to bring about results which seem to us to be consequences of physical causes. Al-Ghazalf uses this philosophical argument to refute the extreme opinion that the agent of an event is only its "natural cause," and he is thus spared the need to produce any further "religious" arguments to accomplish this refutation.18 It is noteworthy that Al-Ghazalf in his critique uses a Neo-Platonic terminology, such as "The First,"19 in contrast with the Aristotelian terminology which he uses to describe the philosophical approach. This may give some indication as to the identity of those "philosophers who are right." Al-Ghazalf now turns to the middle approach of the philosophers, which he also calls maqam. He discerns here three main points: (a) The agent (faCil)

18 Tahafut, 519, 6-11. 19 Tahafut, 518, 12.

of phenomena and things is the "principles of events" (mabadi) al-hawadith). (b) These act through the disposition of the recipient to accept the forms, which is produced by means of apparent causes. There is no free choice for either of these two components of the event, namely the principle and the apparent cause, and they both act necessarily according to nature. (c) On these grounds, the partisans of this approach deny miracles (in this instance, Abraham's survival of the fire into which he was thrown), unless they can provide a natural explanation for them.20 Al-Ghazalf does not respond immediately to this argument and it would seem that the reasons for his silence are two-fold. First, soon after describing this approach he will give the religious arguments and answer the points raised here more systematically. In addition, this silence may also indicate a tacit acceptance of some of the points made here despite his basic objection to the argument against miracles. The concept of the miracle was not an easy one, for even among the mutakallimun there were some thinkers such as Al-Khayyat Al-Baghdadf,21 who denied what Al-Ghazali would regard as a miracle, such as a stone that does not fall when in mid-air, or wood that does not burn when put to fire, etc. This makes one suspect that some mutakallimun held attitudes even more extreme than those of the philosophers on the subject of miracles. B. The Religious Approaches First, Al-Ghazali presents the main points of the extreme religious approach: (a) The agent is Allah. (b) He acts through His will, and the principles act in a voluntary way by choice.22 This second point is of crucial importance, as it goes through all the approaches mentioned by Al-Ghazalf. This argument, as described by Al-Ghazalf, differentiates between Allah and the principles, both by mentioning them by different names, and by ascribing to each a different manner of action-will (iradah) and choice (ikhtiyar). The difference between these two terms may be that of range, i.e., quantitative, but in that case the difference between Allah and the principles must also be quantitative; while will suggests no limit or range from which to choose, choice connotes a closed number of alternatives. This distinction suits the difference between an omnipotent God and secondary principles, which only serve as tools for Him. 20 Tahafut, 525, 7-526,2. 21 AMIR, 314,3. (See below, bibliography.) 22 Tahafut, 528,6.

ALON: Al-Ghazali on Causality

(c) Here, for the first time in this discussion, a distinction is drawn between fact, or event, and knowledge of the fact. It is only from the outline of the religious approach to knowledge which he gives here that we can also learn about the philosophical. The two, says Al-Ghazalf, must be interrelated in a manner which will make it certain that no knowledge is possible of possible events which do not occur. If such knowledge exists in us, it has been created by Allah in a prophet or in some other people.23 Consequently, the source of our knowledge, in contrast with the argument put forward by the philosophers, is not based upon experience or senseperception. Events occur according to a certain habitual course, and our knowledge follows suit. (d) What is called a "miracle" is nothing but the unusual created by Allah, who simultaneously ceases to create in us the knowledge of the habitual. His power to act in contradiction to His habitual way of acting stems from His choice and free will. AlGhazalf accepts this view along with, among other Mu'tazilites, Al-Iskaft,24 Abu Al-Hudhail, AlOubbar) as well as many of the mutakallimun,25 who maintained that Allah can refrain from creating burning despite contact between fire and wood, or from creating falling in heavy stones. The ancient controversy concerning human free will seems to have taken a strange turn here; the issue is Allah's free will. As the partisan of the former is the opponent of the latter, Allah's free will seems to be at the expense of human free will. Al-Ghazali now presents the middle religious approach giving an exposition of Islam's view on causality. The Islamic views have been briefly stated twice before, in the preface, where the philosophical vs. the religious arguments are given in a general way, and when he immediately answered the philosophical arguments, but without trying to construct a whole system of the religious view.26 Here, however, he describes the Islamic arguments in a more or less systematic way,27 selecting three 23 See the elaboration of this question of divine knowledgein AMIR. Al-Oubba)fthe Muctazilitemaintains (ibid., 206,6-11) that the occurrenceof somethingknownto Allah as not going to take place is possible. He makes the distinction between two connotations of the expression "possible" (gadiz), (a) in the sense of doubt, and (b) in the sense of "allowed." In this context he means the former. 24 25

26

AMIR, 313,7. AMIR, 312,10.

E.g., Tahafut, 518,5ff.

27 Tahafut, 533,12.

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main ideas: (a) The agent of events and things is Allah acting either directly or through "the angels." (b) Cause acts through Allah's creation which is the reason for its regularity also. There are, however, two expressions which might seem incompatible. At the beginning of his exposition, Al-Ghazalf says that a certain quality is inherent in fire, which despite its nature to burn may cause it not to do so. This quality is created either by Allah or the angels.28 Later, AlGhazalf says that it is Allah who is the sole agent, but He may act either directly or through the angels. While Allah is the agent, there is a nature in things which he has created and which makes them act in a fixed manner, so that, for example, when two identical pieces of cotton come into contact with fire, both burn. (e) This explanation further establishes the possibility of miracles by accounting for them on two levels. On the first level Allah's intervention in the "natural" course of events occurs in the stage prior to the action of the participants in the physical event, namely, He changes the quality of either these participants, so as to inhibit the fire from burning or to change the individual so that he is not harmed by the fire. That is achieved, Al-Ghazalf explains, by creating new physical (!) qualities either in the fire, which without changing its nature will prevent it from burning the prophet, or which will render him resistant to fire. This process is not inconceivable, as there exist even natural things which can hinder a natural process from taking place, such as talc being used against fire.29 On the second level the miracle is explained by the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, on the one hand, and by time on the other. As matter can receive any form, anything can change into anything, provided the usual lapse of time has taken place. Allah's intervention here may take the form of shortening this lapse of time to such an extent as to render the change a miracle. However, unless one takes from the idea that events in the world go in circles and return, this argument is invalid, while the ordinary change is in one direction, the miracle change can also be reversed, for instance, changing a stick into a serpent and vice versa.30 What is the prophet's place in this process of the miracle? It is certainly not his direct action which produces the miracle, as he belongs neither to the realm of "natural" habitude, nor to Divine direct 28

Tahafut, 533,13.

29 Tahafut, 533,12. 30 Tahafut, 534,4ff.

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action in contradicting the habitude. He may evoke the Divine intervention only under three conditions: (a) when its appearance is necessitated by the order of good to ensure the duration of the order of religion, that is, when the prophet must prove his prophecy for the sake of the good. It is noteworthy, though, that the only example Al-Ghazalf gives of a miracle performed by a prophet is that of Abraham and the fire. Not once does he refer to Muhammad and the Qur)an as a miracle; (b) the miraculous phenomenon should in itself be possible; and (c) the liberality and openhandedness of its principle be present.31 In elaborating on the second of these conditions, AlGhazali defines what is "impossible." This is the simultaneous affirmation and negation of a thing, or the affirmation of the more particular with the negation of the more general, or the affirmation of two things with the negation of one of them.32 This definition is valid only for the logical domain, but not for the ontological one. A little later, however, he draws conclusions from this definition concerning the ontological realm, such as regarding the coexistence of black and white in the same place

31 It is interestingto considerAl-Ghazalr'sview against its historicalbackground.All the MuCtazilite groupsseem to be united in their acceptance of miracles, although they differwith regardto the people for whomthese miraclesare performed.The Rawafidmaintainthat only prophetsare to see a miracle. Abu Husain Al-Naggar held the view that those who claim divinity for themselves, ratherthan those who claim prophethood,are to be shown miracles, and others, namely Sufis, allow miracles to be shown to the righteousin this world.AMIR, 438, 1-439,2. 32 Al-Iskafi makes a similarreservationaboutthe power of Allah, denying any possibility of the co-occurrenceof two logically contradictoryphenomena,such as knowledge and death in the same person (AMIR, 313,11). A similar argumentwas put forwardby other Mu'tazilites such as Abu Al-Hudhail, Mucammar, and Hisham, who are reportedby Al-AshCarfto have denied Allah's power to combinedeath and knowledge,just as it was impossiblefor him to combinedeath with life (ibid., 568,6). Al-Ghazalf's argumentis strikinglyreminiscentof that of Al-Oubba)i who, while allowingAllah to refrainfrom creatingburning between fire and cotton, also allows Him to create two contradictoriesin the same place and at the same time (ibid., 570,1). A slight variation is apparentin the Salihf school of the Mu'tazilahwho held that althoughAllah can combine accidents which oppose one another, such as hearingor sight with death, he cannot combine contradictory ones, such as death with life. (AMIR, 310,9).

and time as impossible,33 because asserting "white" implies negating "black"; the same holds for other examples.34 The only possible change is that of a form over a given matter. Hence, as there is no common matter between essence and accident, these are not interchangeable. Nonetheless, there are phenomena which, although possible, are far-fetched (mustankar) as they are unusual, such as Allah's moving the hand of a dead man. These views did not always accord with those of other Muslim thinkers. Thus, for instance, according to Al-Husain b. Muhammad Al-Naggar, Allah can change the functions of human organs so as to make the hand see, etc., which again falls under the heading of miracles. It is strange that it is a Mu(tazilite who maintains this view. The opposite view was held by most of the mutakalliman, such as Aba Al-Hudhail, Mucammar, Hisham, and Bishr b. Al-MuCtamar, namely, that it is possible that Allah should combine death with accidents such as knowledge, power, and so on.35 However, Abu AlHudhail also accepted the possibility of Allah's not creating the act of falling when a stone is combined with air, or combustion when a fire meets a piece of cotton. Again, Al-Ghazalf has changed his stand. If, according to him, there is no difference in principle between any development and a miracle, and the difference is only that of the length of time needed to accomplish a change, there are no grounds to speak of "miracles." Thus, this term can only be used by the philosophers who deny it. To sum up this section, Al-Ghazalf follows the religious approach, but not without making great concessions to the philosophers' doctrine, notably, in accepting a connection betwen logical and ontological impossibility. SEMANTIC EVIDENCE

On a number of occasions Al-Ghazalr uses words which might, on careful reading, reveal his own 33 The questionof the possible and impossiblefor Allah is mentionedby Al-Gubba)fthe Muctazilite,who concentrated on the combination of two events as a cause for a third one. He maintained, basing himself on the Qur)an, that a combination of two possible things is possible (i.e.. results in a possible thing), of two impossible things is impossible, and of one possible with one impossible is impossible (AMIR. 204,5). 34 Tahafut, 536.2. 35 AMIR, 568,4.

ALON:Al-Ghazall on Causality attitude toward the relevant issue. This can hardly be interpreted as carelessness. One example is his reluctance to use the term maqam for all the approaches, despite his declaration in the preface. Another example occurs when the author describes the more acceptable philosophical approach to causality, that is, that of the philosophers who do not adhere to the extreme view on causality, but come closer to the middle religious approach. These he describes as muhaqqiqfn,36 which S. Van den Bergh has translated as "the true philosophers." Rather, the term seems to connote "those among them who hold right views." This point is important, as the first interpretation would imply the philosophers who most strongly advocate causality, while here the opposite is meant. Van den Bergh himself states in a footnote that the author might have meant the NeoPlatonists and the Islamic philosophers. He surely did not intend to imply that the latter are more truly "philosophers" than Aristotle, Plato, and the others? A third example is found at the beginning of his description of the middle religious approach when he says, "The second answer is to agree that in fire there is createdt a nature. .,"'37 using the Arabic verb naslam. This verb connotes a certain compromise more than it does agreement, especially when later38 he makes it clear that he has some reservations about miracles: "But still we regard .. ." The same verb is also used in another place, when opposition to the view following is expressed: "We do not accept (naslam) the assertion that the principles do not act in a voluntary way ...."39 CONTEXTUAL EVIDENCE

At the beginning of his exposition of the middle religious approach, Al-Ghazalf says, "the second answer, and in it is to be found deliverance from these reprehensible consequences .... ."40 Even if we did not know that the author was aware of the difficulities raised by the extreme religious approach,

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these words can only mean that Al-Ghazalf acknowledges the difficulties and is prepared to put forward new arguments which will avoid them. As these difficulties are logical, the answer must meet them on the same level, namely the logicophilosophical one, that is, it must concede to the philosophical approach to a certain extent. The second concession to the philosophical approach Al-Ghazali makes is more substantial. He accepts the concept of the "nature" of a thing, without accepting this term itself. The word he uses instead is sifah, i.e., quality (literally "description," "attribute"). He goes on to explain this term: "The second answer is to agree that fire has been thus created as to burn two identical pieces of cotton when these come in contact with it, without differentiating between them."41 While yielding to the philosophers' argument on this topic, Al-Ghazalf immediately makes it clear that he does not do so entirely: " . . . but still we regard it as possible that a prophet should be thrown into the fire and not burn."42 Paradoxically, the explanation our author provides for the occurrence of the miracle in this context not only does not discard causality, but rather affirms it as Allah acts through physical means to block physical actions, " . . . either through a change in the quality (sifah) of the fire or through a change in the quality of the prophet."43 In this paragraph Al-Ghazalf concedes almost entirely to affirming the idea of causality, but he still maintains, or so he thinks, Allah's omnipotence-the first of the two objectives he stated in the introduction to the chapter. His argument here is very similar to the one he calls "the second maqam," where he even uses almost the same wording.44 His second objective was to maintain the possibility of the miracle. This Al-Ghazali manages to do despite his partial acceptance of causality; he agrees to reduce the miracle to a phenomenon which follows the course of nature without the usual lapse 41

36 Tahafut, 519,10. See H. Lazarus-Yafeh, ibid., pp. 54-

60, and also D. Z. Baneth, "Philosophical Notes to the Metaphysical Book of Joseph ibn Yahuda ibn Shim)on" (in Hebrew) in the Anniversary Book to G. Shalom, Jerusalem. 1958, p. 115, note 30.

37 Tahafut,533,14. Vanden Bergh'stranslation,326,29. 38 walakinna maca hadha nagaz 'an yulqa nab[.... English translation, Van den Bergh, op. cit., 326,32. 39 Ibid., 323,9; Tahafut 528,6. 40 Tahafut, 533,12; Van den Bergh, op.cit., 326,28.

Tahafut, 533,12: ... an naslam an al nar khuliqat khalqatan idha laqaha qitaatan mutamathilatan ahraqathuma walam tufarriq bainahuma. Van den Bergh, 326,29. I disagree with his translation here, mainly because he uses the word "nature," which Al-Ghazali could not have done (". .. is to agree that in fire there is a nature which burns... "). 42 Tahafut, 5 33,12.

43 Tahafut, 533,14. Van den Bergh(whose translationI have used here), 326,33. 44 Tahafut, 525,7.

404

Journal of the American Oriental Society 100. 4 (1980)

of time. The concession demanded from the philosophers, on the other hand, is hardly a fundamental one. Having made this point, Al-Ghazalf immediately states that "such a fact (that is, the miracle) only emanates from Him when necessity gives a preponderance to its existence and the good determines it, and the good only determines it when a prophet needs it to establish his prophetic office for the promulgation of the good."45 The reservation expressed here is the introduction of the supernatural into the world by making the reason for the miracle and its end something beyond or external to the realm of physics. Here too, a compromise has been offered, according to which Al-Ghazalf accepts the "autonomy" of physical laws, but demands that their "breaking" should be initiated by Allah through the prophet, using nature's laws. A compromise par excellence is evident in the question of the prophet. According to Al-Ghazalf, the philosophers have accepted the particular character of the prophet and his differences from the ordinary man: "And all this is in accordance with the rest of their views, and is necessitated by them, as they have accepted that the prophet is endowed with a special characteristic which is on a par with what is usual in people. The intellect cannot accurately weigh the extent of this character, but in spite of this, there is no need to declare false that for which tradition rests upon a long chain (of authorities), and which the religious law declares to be true."46 Earlier, Al-Ghazalf stated for the philosophers that the idea of the prophet was acceptable only on one or all of three grounds, which he regards as only some of the true ones. One of these is the ability of the prophet to see the Indelible Tablet, thanks to his very strong imaginative faculty. Another compromise is offered by Al-Ghazalf concerning the "natural" way in which animals come into being, an issue which only serves as a symbol of a much deeper controversy. On the one hand he is willing to accept that because of its nature, the sperm of any animal or the seed of any plant can only become such an animal or plant. To quote him, "And generally speaking, from the human sperm nothing but a human being is created, and from that of a horse, only a To balance this view, Al-Ghazalf horse...."47 45 Tahfut, 534,14; Van den Bergh, 327,34.

46

Tahafut, 534,18; Van den Bergh,327,37.

47 Tahafut,534,20; Vanden Bergh,327,42. A few words

later, the translatortranslates the word qattu by "barely

continues the same paragraph by noting that there are animals which are produced in a manner we cannot explain, such as worms, mice, serpents, and scorpions. The causes for their creation are beyond us, as they all share the earth as their original matter, and their variety is the result of various astral (angelic?) influences from a higher source. If, says Al-Ghazalf, their creation is accepted by the philosophers as something of a marvel, there is room for other marvelous things too.48 The culmination of Al-Ghazalf's readiness for compromise comes toward the end of this chapter. Whereas at the beginning Allah's omnipotence was stated as a truth to be defended against all attacks, here it is regarded with a critical eye. The paragraph opens with a remark which seems to go a long way toward a compromise with the philosophical approach. In response to a claim he attributes to the philosophers, Al-Ghazalf offers to define the "impossible" and to admit that it is out of Allah's reach of action, "...

the impossible

cannot be done

(by God)."49 This, however, is only the basis for an even greater concession. On the basis of this definition, almost any two things can exclude each other, and thus, their simultaneity is regarded as impossible. All one has to do is to interpret both in terms of contradictions, for instance conciliation between white and black is impossible as "white" excludes "black" if interpreted as "not white." By accepting the concept of the impossible, Al-Ghazalf has made the farthest-reaching concession possible for him, and in the process has managed to attack the extremist mutakallimun for their rejecting any notion of impossibility in Allah.50 It seems that it is this idea that served Fakhri as a basis for his argument that Al-Ghazalf accepted logical, while rejecting ontological, causality. Judging by the range never," where it seems that "barely" is superfluous. 48 Tahafut, 535,2; Van den Bergh, 328,5.

49 Tahafut, 536,2; Van den Bergh, 329,18, translates,

"... cannot be done by God," which is only implied in the text. 50 Tahafut, 536,11; Van den Bergh, 329,39. See Van den Bergh's note 329.5 in Vol. II, p. 184, where he gives Ibn Hazm as a possible example for such mutakalliman. Van den Bergh continues, "... but as a matter of fact, it is the theory which the Ashcarites and Ghazalf himself hold, since according to them God at every moment recreates afresh the whole world in which there is no stable element nor any connexion."

ALON: Al-Ghazall on Causality

of examples given above, there is no difference between the two realms, the logical and the ontological, and hence, impossibility (and, for that matter, causality) is accepted in both. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Majid Fakhri,Islamic Occasionalism (London, 1950) pp. 33-48, 56-78.

405

L. Gardet, "(Illa," in El2, vol. III, pp. 1127-1132, in particularsection 3, on the Kalam. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass., 1976) Ch. VII, Causality. Al-AshCarf, Maqalat AI-?Islamiyin, Ed. H. Ritter (Wiesbaden, 1963) AMIR.

Averroes, Tahafut Al-Tahafut, Tr. S. Van den Bergh (London, 1954).