Fragmentation versus Standardization in the Market for Digital Rights Management Solutions A CASE STUDY OF THE ONLINE MARKET FOR AUDIO AND VIDEO CONTENT LAURA GEE AND LUBOMIRA IVANOVA*

1

Introduction

Technology has influenced not only science, but also the arts. Advances in the digital world have transformed the means by which artistic works are created and presented to the public. Now users read and search through electronic books, download and listen to music, and watch trailers of upcoming movies via technological devices. They make copies of digital works, without any loss of quality or features, and share those files in a matter of seconds with thousands of users on the network. And all of this was unheard of before the digital era. The increased number of possibilities for consumers has led to increased abuses of copyright law. Legal restrictions are no longer strong enough to curb the widespread sharing of copyrighted files through peer-to-peer networks, or the illegal copying of CDs and DVDs. Thus, the need for enforceable user restrictions has led to the development of systems of technical protection referred to as Digital Rights Management (DRM) solutions. Today DRM solutions protect any digital content, including music, movies, mobile phone content, and enterprise documents.

* Gee is an Associate with LECG LLC. Ivanova is a Senior Economist with LECG LLC. We would like to thank David Evans, Anne Layne-Farrar, and Albert Nichols for their helpful comments and suggestions. Microsoft Corporation provided research funding for which the authors are grateful. The opinions expressed are those of the authors alone and we retain responsibility for all errors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of LECG LLC, or any other organization.

Technical protection of copyrighted works redefined the roles of owners, providers and users of digital works. It introduced new groups of players in the marketplace, namely developers of DRM software and hardware. The economics of DRM shares much in common with analyses of intellectual property rules, innovation incentives, competition standards and network economics. The standard models in the economic literature, however, do not adequately capture the unique and complex facets of digital rights protection. As DRM systems emerged, so did a nascent academic literature on the subject. The majority of the published studies focus on the legal aspects of technical protection and the subsequent implications for intellectual property rights.1 The emerging economics literature on the subject, however, is still at its early stages2. One such recent paper by Park and Scotchmer (2005)3 examine the content vendor’s choice between an independent versus a shared DRM system, i.e. a system that is shared by many different content providers. The authors argue, among other things, that a shared system can be socially and privately preferable to independent systems. First, the cost of developing and maintaining a single DRM system is lower, than that of multiple DRM systems. Second, because a shared system is more attractive to hackers (a single break in the system will give access to a large number of products), content providers would lower content prices to deter hacking and piracy. Thus, despite the increased risk of price collusion by content providers, consumers’ welfare may increase. Although Park and Scotchmer’s work suggests that one would see standardization on a single DRM system, this is not what one observes in one of the most developed markets for DRM: the market for DRM protected music/video, and DRM compliant hardware/software. Companies prefer to develop their own DRM system and use it to

expand their businesses. Moreover, at present there is little evidence of any tendency toward collusive pricing as the various DRM providers have very different pricing structures motivated by different business models. Competition has brought down the prices of online sales of music/video and has led to fewer restrictions for the user. The market for DRM systems is a dynamic and constantly evolving market with various players, interactions and incentives at play. Our goal in this paper is to provide an understanding of the specifics of DRM, and a discussion of the environment where these systems operate. A better understanding of DRM could form the basis for a well-thoughtout debate on digital rights protection. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the purpose and scope of DRM solutions. Section 3 discusses the economics of digital rights managements, section 4 focuses on the legal implications of DRM solutions, and Section 5 concludes. 2 2.1

Understanding DRM Purpose of DRM

DRM describes a group of technical solutions that allow for the persistent protection of digital content under a given set of conditions throughout its lifecycle. In short, DRM helps content owners define who can use their content, when, where, and for how long. The concept of DRM became widespread in the 1990s. At that time the growing popularity of the Internet allowed greater distribution of content in digital form. In contrast to earlier analog technology, digital files lend themselves to easy duplication without much, if any, loss in quality. The improvements, however, came with a greater risk of piracy. Software producers, content owners, and policy makers recognized the need for greater measures to ensure the enforcement of usage rights for digital content. The answer was

DRM technology. The purpose of the early DRM solutions was to limit access to digital content to only those persons or machines with authorization. That is, the content would remain protected even if it were forwarded or copied. As DRM has evolved, it has grown from simple protection against unauthorized access to far more complex usage rights for authorized users. Currently, DRM serves three functions: (1) to encrypt content to keep it from unauthorized persons, (2) to provide a license system to control the conditions of use and access, and (3) to authenticate the identity of every person attempting to access the content. 2.2

Scope of Use The most familiar use of DRM is in online music distribution. DRM has enabled the

creation of a market for the legal online distribution of music with revenues of $1.1 billion globally in 2005, tripling in value compared to 2004.4 DRM protects artists’ works by preventing the songs from being illegally copied or distributed. In this market, various vendors have chosen different DRM technology to protect their media content. Apple developed Fairplay DRM to protect songs sold through its online music store iTunes, and these songs can only be played on Apple digital players or burned to a CD. In the same fashion, songs purchased from Sony’s online store Connect are only compatible with Sony’s digital players. Other music stores, such as Microsoft and MusicMatch, employ Windows DRM solutions, as part of the Windows software platform. Thus, the business practice in the industry has been for vendors to use proprietary DRM systems to restrict the number of hardware types that can play the songs sold through their music stores. On one hand, such restrictions tighten the copyright protection, but on the other, they serve as a

tool for software developers to promote the sales of their own hardware platforms, a business strategy we discuss further in section 3.2. The motion picture industry has also been quick to adopt DRM protected distribution to avoid the widespread piracy that overtook the music industry via peer-to-peer networks such as the original Napster. As in the DRM market for music protection, suppliers of DRM for video have developed their own proprietary solutions. Digital videos distributed through online video stores such as CinemaNow and World Cinema Online use Microsoft Windows Video format and WM DRM to encode, encrypt and digitally distribute films, whereas Movielink and RealNetworks’ own Starz use RealNetworks’ Helix DRM. Google and Apple furthered contributed to the variety of available video DRM solutions as they have recently entered the online video arena. Now Google offers downloads protected by its Google DRM, while Apple -- by its FairPlay DRM The concept of DRM, though, is not a novelty. Physical

media

carrying

digital

content, such as VHS cassettes, CDs and DVDs, employ some of the oldest DRM solutions. The film "The Cotton Club" was the first videocassette to be encoded by Macrovision copy prevention technology when it was released in 1985. Similar copy protection technologies are employed today on CDs and DVDs to make the discs incapable of being “ripped” (a.k.a. recorded) on a PC and reproduced. Most commercial DVDs are protected by the Content-Scrambling System (CSS), which allow a DVD to be played only on devices equipped with the CSS decryption module. In addition, another technical protection restricts the number of regions where a DVD can be played. A code embodied in the disk ensures that a disk can only be played on DVD players purchased in the same region.

The digital distribution of mobile content is a fairly new development for DRM. As mobile phones have become more prevalent, they have also developed more powerful capabilities. Handsets can now download and transmit media files. But to offer these new services to customers, mobile operators have to contract both with a provider of media content and with a DRM software developer to protect artists’ works from illegal copying, downloading and file-sharing. The scope of DRM solutions covers a wide variety of industries. Table 1 below outlines some of the most developed markets that use DRM protection along with the major industry players. Table 1: Scope of DRM Industry

Examples of DRM solutions

Online Music

Apple FairPlay Sony Open MG WM DRM Real Helix DRM

Online Video

Google DRM Apple FairPlay WM DRM Real Helix DRM

Physical Media (CDs & DVDs)

Macrovision SunnComm CSS

Mobile Content

OMA DRM Apple FairPlay WM DRM

3

The Economics of Digital Rights Management

The creation and the technical protection of copyrighted digital works have changed the economics of intellectual property. Software and hardware manufacturers, content owners, content providers, and consumers interact in a complex network of relationships. At present the most visible and most fully developed market for DRM is for the protection of digital audio/video content. In this section we examine these economic relationships and their market implications. 3.1

Market Players

The major producers in the digital audio/video DRM market are probably familiar to most households in the United States and the world over. Prominent players include Microsoft, RealNetworks, Apple, Google, and Sony. Microsoft sells Windows Media DRM (WM DRM) for protection of both audio and video content. WM DRM is used in the Windows Media Player software, online music stores (e.g. the MSN Music Store, and the MusicMatch Music Store), and on many different portable audio/video devices (e.g. the Creative Zen Micro, and iRiver U10).5 Similarly, RealNetworks’ Helix DRM, is used in settings like the RealPlayer software, the RealPlayer Music Store, and in portable media player devices. Likewise, Apple’s Fairplay DRM is used within the Apple iTunes software, the Apple iTunes Store, and on Apple’s iPod, while Sony’s Open MG DRM is used in its Sony SonicStage software, the Sony Connect Store, and Sony portable digital devices. Google, on the other hand, currently only uses its DRM to protect video content from the Google Video store. The rich variety of DRM systems shows that the market for protection of digital audio/video content is very fragmented. Firms are not minimizing costs by developing and supporting a shared DRM system, as Park and Scotchmer suggest. For now the major

players in the audio/video DRM market appear to find it profitable to develop their own proprietary DRM solutions in spite of the fact that any one of these solutions seems capable of protecting all the content in this industry. So, why do these different companies develop their own DRM solutions? Why do they not share the costs of supporting a single system? To find a possible answer to this question the next sub-section looks at the various business models of these players. 3.2

Business Models

The development of DRM systems allowed companies to expand their businesses and appropriates rents from new activities. Proprietary DRM solutions allowed firms to differentiate their products and lock-in customers using certain platforms. Thus, companies, developing DRM solutions not only earn profits from licensing software, they also earn profits from sales of hardware and operating systems compatible with these DRM systems. The business models of firms developing DRM solutions in the audio/video market can be classified into four groups based upon four main DRM related revenue streams. (We denote each source of revenue by [1]-[4] for convenience.) The first group comprises companies which earn revenue from sales of operating systems [1]. If a DRM solution is optimized to work seamlessly only with these respective operating systems, the increased demand for the DRM system will also raise the demand for their operating systems, and vice versa. The second business model derives revenue from sales of hardware compatible with only certain DRM systems, such as portable digital media players [2]. If a DRM system is prevalent in the industry, then demand for hardware that is built upon this DRM solution will also rise. The third group generates profit from online business activities, i.e.

through sales of content or advertising [3]. These companies capture customers that are already visiting the website by offering copyrighted content protected by proprietary DRM solutions. And the fourth revenue stream is from sales of DRM licensing [4]. Some companies license their DRM to other sellers (e.g. hardware makers or online music sellers). For all groups, except [4], developing DRM solutions is not the primary business activity. Rather, a proprietary DRM system allows them to enter an additional market, or to expand the revenue generated from their main business activities. The figure below summarizes the business models of the major players in the market for online distribution of audio/video content.

Almost all market players in the online audio/video market realize revenue from several business activities involving DRM. Microsoft, whose main source of revenue is sales of its operating systems, sells the WM DRM as part of a larger platform. By widely licensing the WM DRM to both content providers and device manufacturers [4], Microsoft adds value to its software platforms, and makes it more desirable to consumers. Moreover, Microsoft has recently begun to sell content through its MSN music store [3] which further

spurs demand for its operating system platform software [1] and increases web traffic to its MSN portal [3]. Thus, although Microsoft derives revenues from DRM by three different streams, stream [1] is its primary stream while streams [3] and [4] are indirect contributors. RealNetworks has a similar business model to Microsoft’s. It derives DRM related revenue from the same streams, but with a different mix of motivations. Early on RealNetworks derived the bulk of its revenue from server sales [1], but as the company has matured it has begun to earn more revenues from sales of content and subscription services [3].6 Real also earns revenue from licensing its DRM to be used on portable devices, and content sales [4]. Apple generates revenue from a number of different DRM related streams, the most successful of which is sales of the ubiquitous iPod hardware [2]. In addition, Apple earns revenues from its equally successful iTunes Music Store [3]. Like Microsoft, Apple also derives revenue from sales of its operating system, which is linked to a popular media player and DRM scheme [1]. Sony was one of the earliest and most influential players in the portable media device market with its WalkMan player. Currently Sony earns DRM related revenues from sales of its portable digital devices that use Open MG DRM [2], and sales of DRM protected content from its Sony Connect Store [3]. Google is a new entrant in the market for DRM solutions. As a search engine Google derives most of its profits from online advertising. Currently, it is the only major player in the digital audio/video DRM market with revenues from only one DRM related stream, namely from sales of content via Google Video [3]. One possible explanation for Google’s entrance to this new market is that it envisions to leverage its popularity as a search engine to attract users to the Google online store.

The business models discussed above have similar sources of revenues but different emphasis on which revenue stream is most important. One reason for the proliferation of different DRM solutions is that each company wants to use its DRM with very different goals in mind. Microsoft may want to increase demand for its operating systems, while Apple and Sony may want to increase hardware sales. Google, on the other hand, may want to increase web traffic. In all of the cases discussed above, proprietary DRM solutions allow companies to increase customer base and revenue streams. Thus, a lack of analysis of business incentives may partly explain why predictions of standardization on one shared DRM solution have yet to be realized. 3.3

Network Effects

Indirect network effects are present for DRM solutions. Many of the segments that use DRM are multi-sided platforms. On one side of the platform, an online music store, for example, must attract music labels to license music, and on the other, it must attract users to buy that licensed music, and hardware makers to produce devices that are compatible with purchases from the music store. Thus, end users’ utility of a DRM-protected product increases as more hardware becomes compatible with a specific DRM solution, and as more content owners protect their works by the same solution. Software manufacturers of DRM solutions also benefit when more hardware providers produce machines compatible with their DRM software system. More hardware attracts more content owners, who obtain access to a bigger market, and also benefits end-consumers whose files become operable on a greater number of platforms.

3.4

Competition

The presence of indirect network effects leads to stiff competition at the software level. The more popular the DRM system is among customers, the more content owners will use it for protection of their copyrighted works. This in turn stimulates competition at the platform level because the more widely used the DRM software, the larger the sales from compatible hardware and operating systems, and the higher the revenues from licensing. The Motorola ROKR, for example, uses Apple’s FairPlay DRM solution, thus expanding the potential market for Apple’s online music store. The increased competition, as evidenced by the continuous stream of new entrants in the market for DRM solutions, can be explained by the lower costs of developing and distributing a DRM solution as opposed to the costs of licensing a system. For example, Apple and Google both opted to design their own DRM solutions instead of using preexisting solutions from another vendor. In addition, the freedom to set restrictions and have control over the products sold may further weigh in favour of a preparatory DRM. The competition in the market for DRM solutions has lead to a proliferation of incompatible DRM systems. Two DRM systems are incompatible if the users of one DRM solution cannot use the digital product on platforms supported by the other DRM provider. The problem of incompatibility of DRM systems involves many of the issues surrounding the incompatibility of software systems in general. For instance, DRM protected content designed for an Apple iPod does not work on a Creative Zen Micro which natively supports WM DRM. Although incompatibilities of different DRM solutions can be frustrating for users, as well as content sellers. the disutility from such incompatibility may be offset by the low costs of switching for both users and content owners. To play a copyright-protected song or

video one needs only to download a program to one’s computer. As a result, one can easily have both the RealPlayer and the Windows Media Player, or any other software for that matter, on a computer. This ease of switching among DRM systems is also evidenced by the use of many different DRM solutions at once on the other side of the platform by content owners. Many content owners allow their works to be protected by a variety of DRM solutions since the cost to content owners to protect their works with multiple DRM solutions is virtually nil. A movie studio is happy to have its content available to users who prefer to watch a film on their RealPlayer or on their Windows Media Player. Likewise, one can find the same song for online purchase protected by Apple’s FairPlay, WM DRM, Real’s Helix, and Sony’s Open MG. 3.5

Standardization

Although the market for DRM solutions and DRM protected works is still in its infancy and continues to evolve through new systems and technologies, there are two possible ways toward interoperability of DRM systems within and across industries. One route toward standardization is through licensing of a proprietary format: a standards company obtains legal rights to create a standard through licensing which then becomes available to all. The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), established in 1988, is one such initiative. This group is best known for producing the MPEG-1 standard, which is the basis for the MP3 file format. Beyond the ubiquitous MP3 format, the Moving Picture Experts Group has also created other media standards that are openly available for licensing through the International Organization for Standardization.

Standardization can also be the natural outcome of market forces without the backing of a standards setting organization. If a company’s technology gains greater acceptance in the market, its solutions can gradually become the de facto industry standard. While routes toward standardization exist, the market for digital downloads of audio/video content at present has seen no such standardization. Although this lack of a single standard can cause incompatibility, at the same time it can stimulate innovation and competition. As none of the extant DRM solutions has been accepted as an industry standard, vendors compete for more content owners by developing more secure DRM solutions, and for customers by offering a wider selection of content and more flexibility with the purchased product. In 2004 in an effort to increase the flexibility of purchased songs, RealNetworks reverse engineered Apple’s FairPlay DRM and released its Harmony DRM conversion technology which allowed songs purchased from RealNetwork’s online store to be played on Apple’s iPods. Apple countered by modifying the software on iPods to prevent playback of the converted files, without affecting tracks purchased via Apple's iTunes Music Store. RealNetworks once again reversed engineered the Apple FairPlay DRM and as of the writing of this paper the fix was still functional. 3.6

Pricing

In the digital audio/video DRM market, DRM-protected content is mostly sold in two distinct ways. The first is the “a la carte” model which means a user purchases access to a particular song or video and owns that content for a specified amount of time (with songs and short videos, it is usually an unlimited time period, but with feature length films it is often a period of a few days). The second is the subscription model where a user pays a monthly fee to access as much audio/video content as they like.7 The “a la carte” model has

been in use for many years, while the subscription model has only recently begun to integrate DRM.8 The actual cost of content in the “a la carte” market may be driven down by the proliferation of many content sellers using differing DRM solutions. The success of the Apple iTunes Store has set the industry standard price for digital song downloads at $0.99. RealNetworks even cut the price of their downloads to as low as $0.49 as part of promotional campaign to lure users of iTunes to the RealNetworks Music Store.9 Although a single DRM solution may lower costs in the DRM market, as Park and Scotchmer argue, it may be that the costs of DRM are so low that such savings are unnecessary. And furthermore, the costs savings would not outweigh the benefits of the increased competition among multiple DRM systems. 4

Legal Implications and the Role of Fair Use

Historically, creative works have been protected by intellectual property rights (IPR). The goal of IPR, most commonly invoked through the use of copyright, patent and trade secret, is to provide adequate incentives for innovation and investment in new works. Thus IPR encourage investment in the content creation sector by ensuring that the authors of creative works are protected against unauthorized exploitation (e.g. piracy and counterfeiting), and receive a fair return on their works. In both the United States and Europe the increased use of technology in conjunction with, or in lieu of, traditional IPR to protect digital content has been coupled with new legislation. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was enacted in the United States in 1998. The DMCA forbids the circumvention of any “technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”10 Both copyrighted and

non-copyrighted works are covered under the DMCA, so un-copyrighted content that is protected via technology (e.g. DRM) is subject to the same restrictions as copyrighted content. In Europe similar legislation to the DMCA was enacted in 2001. The European Copyright Directive (EUCD) gives content owners the right to restrict reproduction, public exhibition, and distribution of their works.11 The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA and EUCD put more restrictions on individuals than standard copyright law, which raises the issue of finding the right balance between DRM solutions and fair use for consumers. Fair use defines a balance between the rights of the content owner and the rights of the individual.12 Online music stores use DRM solutions, for example, to limit the number of times a customer can download a song. Purchased songs also may have an expiration date, in contrast to the physical world where a music CD can be played an unlimited number of times. Such constraints create disutility for customers who highly value flexibility of use. DRM solutions, however, are highly customizable, and vendors can easily adapt restrictions to respond to market needs. Thus, despite the criticism that DRM systems restrict user’s right to fair use, market competition among online vendors of DRM protected content has reduced restrictions and increased customers’ flexibility with protected content. For example, when the iTunes store first opened in April 2003 songs purchased were only able to be played on 3 computers, but in May 2004 Apple increased that to 5 computers.13 Between those two dates, RealNetworks, MusicMatch and Wal-mart all entered the digital download market, and Wal-mart offered downloads for a mere $0.88 that were able to be played on up to 10 computers.14 It is very likely that Apple’s choice to lower restrictions on its DRM protected content was a direct result of increased competition in the digital download market. As the table below shows the restriction imposed by different content sellers using different

DRMs are comparable. Thus, although a wide breadth of restrictions limiting customer’s right of fair use exists, the competition among online stores has increased users’ flexibility with protected content. Table 2. Comparison of Restrictions among Online Stores iTunes Music Store

MSN Music Store

MusicMatch Music Store

RealPlayer Music Store

DRM

Apple FairPlay

WM DRM

WM DRM

Real Helix

Average price of a single track

0.99

0.99

0.99

0.99

Number of PCs a track may be saved on

5

5

5

5

Burn One Individual Playlist to CD

7

7

7

5

Sync to a portable Device

Unlimited

Unlimited

Unlimited

Unlimited

Sources: http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2004/apr/28itunes.html; http://music.msn.com/help/rights; http://music.msn.com/help/price; http://www.musicmatch.com/info/terms/index.htm; http://real.custhelp.com/cgi-bin/real.cfg/php/enduser/std_adp.php?p_faqid=373.

5

Conclusion The development of digital technologies and the Internet have changed the way media

content is created and distributed to the public. The advances in the digital world have redefined the roles of owners, vendors and consumers of digital content, and created more complex relationships among players. These advances prompted changes in intellectual property legislation and stimulated the creation of new business models for distribution of copyrighted works through proprietary DRM systems. On one hand, proprietary DRM systems allow companies to differentiate their products and generate revenue from incompatible devices that use DRM solutions. On the other, the low cost of developing and supporting a DRM system allows businesses to expand on their activities and enter new markets. Even though incompatibility between DRM solutions creates some disutility for users, it is usually offset by low switching costs for end-user and content providers. The

competition among online vendors has led to lower prices of online audio/video files and to increased user flexibility. In this paper we argue that the lack of tendency toward standardisation of DRM solutions, may be a result of the differing business models of DRM suppliers.

1 For discussion of the legal implications of DRM see D. Phan, “Will Fair Use function on the Internet, Columbia Law Review,” Vol. 98 (1998):169-216 and L. Takeyama, “The Intertemporal consequences of unauthorized reproduction of intellectual property,” Journal of Law and Economics, 40 (1997): 511-522.

2

The majority of published work is in law journals and focuses on the legal aspect of digital rights management, while the economic literature is still at the working paper stage. 3

See Y. Park. and S. Scotchmer, “Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products,” Working Paper 11532, NBER, www.nber.org/papers/W11532. 4

“IFPI 06: Digital Music Report,” http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/library/digital-music-report-2006.pdf

5

WM DRM is also used on mobile phones like the Samsung YP-T8x.

6

RealNetworks 10-K 1998 to 2005; Warren Wilson, “Now Hear This Seattle Company Leads The Way With `Streaming Audio' For Internet Sound,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, February 19, 1996. 7

Much of this content is offered via streaming. When the content is streamed it is typically unprotected by DRM because the file is only available to a user when they are connected to the provider by the internet, and a permanent copy of the file does not reside on the user’s computer or other digital device. 8

Microsoft Press Release, “Microsoft Announces New Version of Windows Media Digital Rights Management Software,” May 2, 2004, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2004/may04/0503digitalrightsmanagementtechnologypr.mspx. 9

Real Networks Press Release, “RealNetworks Announces Record 3 Million Songs Sold in Three-Week Music Sale,” September 9, 2004, http://www.realnetworks.com/company/press/releases/2004/real_3million.html 10

17 U.S.C. §1201 (a)(1)(A).

11

See supra Error! Bookmark not defined. at p. 9.

12

Fair use covers everyday activities such as humming a song while walking down the street, photocopying a newspaper article for your files or quoting a line from a movie in an email to a friend. It also allows less common acts such as reverse engineering of computer code or playing an excerpt of a song in a classroom for learning purposes, 17 U.S.C. 1201 (a)(1)(A) as cited in supra 10 at p.11 13

Apple Press Release, “Apple Launches the iTunes Music Store,” April 28,2003, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2003/apr/28musicstore.html. 14

David Bank, “RealNetworks Offers Its Own Web Service For Music Downloads,” The Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2003; Sue Zeidler, “MusicMatch launches digital download service,” Reuters News, 29 September 2003; Chuck Bartles, “Online Music Sales Begin For Wal-mart,” Augusta Chronicle, 19 December 2003.